

Searching Where Ideas are Harder to Find – The Productivity Slowdown as a Result of Firms Hindering Disruptive Innovation

Richard Bräuer

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Introduction

Research Question

- ▶ Productivity growth is declining across the developed world
- ▶ Patents/Scientific Publications have become less
 - ▶ disruptive (Park et al. 2023 and Funk & Owen-Smith 2017)
 - ▶ scientific (Arore et al. 20019, Poege et al. 2019)
 - ▶ creative (Kalyani 2024)
- ▶ Researcher productivity declines, yet firms still hire more (Cowen 2019, Bloom et al. 2020)
- ▶ **But why?**
 - ▶ Decline in patent quality (Olmstead-Rumsey 2024)?
 - ▶ ICT (De Ridder 2024)?
 - ▶ Technology diffusion (Akcigit & Ates 2023)?

Agenda

- ▶ Empirics: Gather stylized facts about Disruptive Innovations and its costs
- ▶ Model: Build an endogenous growth model with disruptive and incremental innovation
- ▶ Discussion: Explore under which conditions innovation becomes more incremental
- ▶ Counterfactuals: Simulate to understand effect size

Literature

- ▶ Endogenous growth (Romer 1987, 1990, Aghion & Howitt 1992, Grossman & Helpman 1991...)
 - ▶ Firms invest in R&D to reap monopoly profits
 - ▶ Closest Model: Akcigit & Kerr 2018
- ▶ Search and matching labor markets (Rogerson 2005)
 - ▶ Increased assortative matching (Abowd, Kramarz & Margolis 1999, Hagedorn, Law & Manovskii 2016, Card, Heining & Kline 2013)
- ▶ Dynamic Inefficiencies in Innovation
 - ▶ General purpose technologies (Helpman and Trajtenberg 1998, Bresnahan and Trajtenberg 1995, Comin & Mestieri 2010)
 - ▶ Firms direct research so they can appropriate benefits (Hopenhayn & Mitchell 2001, Denicoló, 2000, Scotchmer 1991, Bryan & Lemus 2017)

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Empirics

Data Source

PATSTAT


- ▶ 70+M. international patent applications
- ▶ Inventor & firm name, country, address
- ▶ Patent citations

Used Measures

- ▶ Disambiguated inventor names (PatentsView)
- ▶ Technology fields: IPC-8 classes
- ▶ 5 year Citations (Output)

Data Source


Figure: Overview over PATSTAT



Notes: Number of patents in PATSTAT per region. The gray region marks the time period of data used in the event study.

Sources: PATSTAT (European Patent Office).


Measure of "Disruptiveness"



Notes: -

Decline of "Disruptiveness"

Figure: *Aggregate Evolution of Disruptive Innovation*



Notes: Average CYG per technology class over time. The CYG of individual IPC classes containing 50% (90%) of patents are contained in the dark (light) gray area.

Sources: PATSTAT (European Patent Office).

Matching Disrupted and Undisrupted IPC classes

- ▶ To understand the impact of a disruptive innovation
- ▶ IPC Disruption: $\geq 50\%$ of citations for disruptive patents
- ▶ Nearest Neighbor matching on

- ▶ Citation year gap:

$$CYG_{T-4}, CYG_{T-3}, CYG_{T-2}, CYG_{T-1}$$

- ▶ Citations:

$$nr_{citations}(T), nr_{citations}(T-1), nr_{citations}(T-2)$$

- ▶ Citations of established Inventors:

$$cum.nr_{citations}^{cohort T-5}(T-1)$$

$$y_{tr;i} = \sum_{r=-5}^{r=15} \beta^{tr} t_i^r + \Theta_i + u_{tr;i} \quad (1)$$


Matching Disrupted and Undisrupted IPC classes

Table: Summary Statistics on IPC classes before and after Matching

	Panel 1: Before Matching			Panel 2: After Matching		
	Controls	Disrupted	Difference	Controls	Disrupted	Difference
CYG_{T-1}	-5.585 (4.231)	-3.441 (3.821)	2.144*** (0.044)	-4.031 (2.996)	-3.917 (3.205)	0.114 (0.109)
CYG_{T-2}	-5.485 (4.148)	-3.742 (3.919)	1.743*** (0.048)	-3.907 (3.006)	-3.843 (3.230)	0.064 (0.109)
CYG_{T-3}	-5.386 (4.067)	-4.008 (3.903)	1.378*** (0.052)	-3.813 (3.048)	-3.783 (3.266)	0.029 (0.111)
CYG_{T-4}	-5.278 (3.976)	-4.105 (3.866)	1.174*** (0.057)	-3.752 (3.213)	-3.662 (3.368)	0.090 (0.115)
$nr_{citations}(T)$	4.820 (65.112)	5.322 (8.486)	0.502 (0.317)	24.855 (25.414)	22.311 (27.623)	-2.544*** (0.929)
$nr_{citations}(T-1)$	4.820 (65.112)	3.186 (7.374)	-1.634*** (0.317)	23.901 (22.709)	22.973 (23.086)	-0.928 (0.802)
$nr_{citations}(T-2)$	4.391 (59.560)	2.544 (6.494)	-1.847*** (0.290)	21.021 (20.732)	20.265 (20.128)	-0.755 (0.716)
$cum.nr_{citations}^{cohort T-5}(T-1)$	1.187 (16.565)	0.999 (2.975)	-0.188** (0.081)	7.306 (8.650)	7.484 (9.222)	0.178 (0.313)
Observations	1,477,476	42,283	1,519,759	1,631	1,631	3,262


Notes: Unit of observation: harmonized IPC class first disrupted in year T . Standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$. CYG measures how disrupted a technology is. It is worth noting that matching mainly works for larger, well-cited IPC classes and the matched sample reduces substantially.

Subsequent Disruptions




Sources: PATSTAT (European Patent Office).

Citations



Sources: PATSTAT (European Patent Office).

Citations of Established Inventors



Sources: PATSTAT (European Patent Office).

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
Model Overview

- ▶ Model Technological Progress as a function of the resistance to disruption
 - ▶ Progress is "normally" the result of investment
 - ▶ But: Progress produces losers
 - ▶ Historically, these losers often inhibited growth
- ▶ Exogenously fixed decisions not in focus
 - ▶ Price setting/Employment
 - ▶ Supply of Inventors

Technology Structure

- ▶ Each Product is equivalent to a technology field
- ▶ Each technology field is split into technology clusters
 - ▶ An exogenous amount of inventors enter the field
 - ▶ These enter the most recent technology cluster
- ▶ Exogenous amount of disruptive inventors also enter
- ▶ All inventors draw a random (incremental) firm to match
 - ▶ Match is permanent, even if not working together
 - ▶ Nash Bargaining over match output

Technology Structure



Product Markets

- ▶ Final goods sector that converts intermediate goods into final goods

$$Y(t) = \frac{1}{1-\beta} L_c^\beta(t) \int_0^1 q_j^\beta z_j^{1-\beta} dj \quad (2)$$

- ▶ Profits of a monopolist producer:

$$\pi_{mon}^* = L_c(t) * (1-\beta) * \beta^\beta (1-\beta)^{1-2\beta} * q_j = \pi * q_j \quad (3)$$

- ▶ Patents represent a stream of future profits


$$r * V^{Patent} = \pi \omega^c \quad (4)$$

Value Function


- ▶ Inventors represent a stream of future patents

$$\begin{aligned}
 rV_f^{inv}(1, \lambda_f^{dis}, X^{inc}) = & \underbrace{\frac{\pi}{r} \omega^c * \alpha}_{\text{new patents net of inv. wages}} - \underbrace{\delta V_f^{inv}(1, \lambda_f^{dis}, X^{inc})}_{\text{inv. exit}} \\
 & - \underbrace{\Lambda_{max}^{dis} \frac{\gamma \omega \pi * V_f^{inv}(1, \lambda_f^{dis}, X^{inc})}{V_f^{inv}(1, \lambda_f^{dis}, X) * X^{inc}}}_{\text{disruption risk}} \\
 & - \underbrace{\lambda_f^{dis} V_f^{inv}(1, \lambda_f^{dis}, X^{inc})}_{\text{wages to poached inv.}} + \underbrace{\frac{\partial V_f^{inv}(1, \lambda_f^{dis}, X^{inc})}{\partial X^{inc}} (H^{inc} - \delta X^{inc})}_{\text{increase in poaching by others}} \quad (5)
 \end{aligned}$$

Behavior of a Sector



Behavior of a Sector




Social Planner's Perspective

- ▶ Social Planner wants to prevent/delay decline in disruptiveness
- ▶ increase γ : increase the expected first mover advantage
- ▶ increase ω : but it is a technology parameter?
- ▶ decrease y^{max} : if there are no high value incremental firms, they cannot hinder disruption
- ▶ increase $\frac{H^{dis}}{H^{inc}}$: increase ration of disruptive to incremental inventors
- ▶ make labor market for disruptive inventors less efficient

Counterfactual Simulation

Policy Implications

Figure: *Effect of Parameter Changes*




Notes: Effects of 10% changes to selected parameters.

Sources: PATSTAT (European Patent Office).

Behavior the Economy – Simulation vs. Reality

Figure: *Decline in Disruption predicted by the Model*



Notes: Graph shows the evolution of the rate of disruptions in IPC classes with more than 50 patents per year – actual vs. predicted rate of disruptions.

Sources: PATSTAT (European Patent Office).

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- ▶ Include an inventor labor market into endog. growth. model
 - ▶ allows firms to slow down each others' innovation
 - ▶ creates an additional asset that firms protect
- ▶ Firms deliberately poach inventors to slow down competition
- ▶ Technological progress happens because
 - ▶ refrain from hindering other firms
 - ▶ "aggregate aging" explains half of the decline in disruptions

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Endogenous growth

- ▶ Romer 1987, 1990, Aghion & Howitt 1992, Grossman & Helpman 1991...
 - ▶ Firms invest in R&D to reap monopoly profits
 - ▶ Steady state growth rate
- ▶ Helpman and Trajtenberg 1998, Bresnahan and Trajtenberg 1995, Comin & Mestieri 2010
 - ▶ General purpose technologies can lead to waning and waxing growth
 - ▶ Cycles of technology invention and adoption
 - ▶ Adoption of technologies is as important as invention
- ▶ Akcigit & Kerr 2018
 - ▶ Technology clusters in an endogenous growth framework
 - ▶ Fitting model against firm behavior (Patent data)
- ▶ Contribution: Insert a labor market to endogenize key parameters and test vs. data

Inefficiencies in dynamic innovation

- ▶ Hopenhayn & Mitchell 2001, Denicoló, 2000, Scotchmer (1991)
 - ▶ Firms underinvest in research that spawns new research
- ▶ Hopenhayn & Squintani 2016
 - ▶ Firms over-invest in high value projects
- ▶ Bryan & Lemus 2017
 - ▶ Firms direct research so they can appropriate benefits
- ▶ Contribution: I insert these insights into an endogenous growth model

Search and matching labor markets

- ▶ Abowd, Kramarz & Margolis 1999, ..., Hagedorn, Law & Manovskii 2016
 - ▶ Separate worker and firm productivity out from wages paid in a match
 - ▶ Assume match production is additive
- ▶ Mendes et al. 2010; Card, Heining & Kline 2013
 - ▶ Document rising assortative matching between workers and firms
- ▶ Contribution: Transfer to endogenous growth and loosen the additivity restriction (a bit)