

Misguided Effort

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Motivation

A basic inference problem

- You submitted to a top journal
- You think highly about the quality of your work
- You receive a rejection

A basic inference problem

- You submitted to a top journal
- You think highly about the quality of your work
- You receive a rejection
 - What do you learn about the quality of your work and the fairness of the review process?
 - How do these inferences affect your future effort?

A basic inference problem

- Psychology literature: people attribute their achievements to their own merits but their failures to external fundamentals (see Mezulis et al., 2004, for a review).
 - Rejection: “the review process is unfair”
 - Acceptance: “my work is great”

Misguided inference

- Heidhues et al. (2018) and Hestermann and Le Yaouanq (2021) model attribution bias as an inference problem.
 - Individuals observe an outcome, but cannot identify the effect of one's ability (e.g., scholarship quality) and the external fundamental (e.g., fairness of review process).
 - Individuals with miscalibrated priors about their ability draw misguided inferences about the external fundamental.
 - Misguided inference leads to suboptimal decision making.

Misguided inference

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 - Individuals observe an outcome, but cannot identify the effect of one's ability (e.g., scholarship quality) and the external fundamental (e.g., fairness of review process).
 - Individuals with miscalibrated priors about their ability draw misguided inferences about the external fundamental.
 - Misguided inference leads to suboptimal decision making.
- Experiments confirm misguided inference (Goette and Kozakiewicz, 2022; Marray et al., 2020) but they do **not study the causal impact on decision making.**

Biased beliefs about one's ability

→ Misguided inferences about environment

→ Future decisions

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Labor Market Setup:

- Work on an ability-based task
- Hold biased beliefs about how skilled they are
- Receive feedback
- Can make inferences about the returns to effort from feedback
- Work on a subsequent effort-task

Experimental Design

Work on an ability-based task

- Logic quiz with 12 questions (Civelli et al., 2018)
- EASY and DIFFICULT quiz versions (Moore and Healy, 2008).
 - Questions 1-7 are common.
 - Questions 8-12 vary across EASY and DIFFICULT quiz versions.

Question (3/12)

A 3x3 grid of shapes. The first two columns have solid borders, and the third has a dashed border. The first row contains shapes: a square with a top-left corner cut out, a square with a top-right corner cut out, and a square with a bottom-left corner cut out. The second row contains: a square with a bottom-left corner cut out, a square with a top-left corner cut out, and a square with a top-right corner cut out. The third row contains: a square with a top-right corner cut out, a square with a bottom-left corner cut out, and a question mark. To the right of the grid are four options: A (square with top-left corner cut out), B (square with top-right corner cut out), C (square with a vertical line and a horizontal line at the bottom), and D (square with a bottom-left corner cut out). Each option has a small letter above it and a radio button below it.

A B C D

Form beliefs about their relative performance

- Beliefs about likelihood of scoring in the top half among a group of 4.
- Performance prior: $\gamma \in (0, 1)$
- Incentivized with the Binarized Scoring Rule (Prize of 1\$).

Receive payoff feedback

- Participants receive payments from two different evaluators (evaluator 1 and evaluator 2):
 - Performance Evaluator: \$2 if they score in the top half, and \$0 otherwise
 - Random Evaluator: \$2 if a coin toss lands on heads, and \$0 otherwise
- We randomly assign these roles to evaluator 1 and evaluator 2.

Receive payoff feedback

- Payoff feedback is based on logic quiz performance, the outcome of the coin toss and the randomly assigned evaluator roles:
 - BOTH HIGH (Evaluator 1: \$2, Evaluator 2: \$2) → high ability type.
 - BOTH LOW (Evaluator 1: \$0, Evaluator 2: \$0) → low ability type.
 - MIXED 1 (Evaluator 1: \$2, Evaluator 2: \$0)
 - MIXED 2 (Evaluator 1: \$0, Evaluator 2: \$2)
- MIXED 1 and MIXED 2 groups do not learn their ability type and proceed to period 2.

Work on a real effort-task

- Choose how much to work (1–25 decoding tasks).
- Payment is based on evaluator 1 type from period 1:
 - If evaluator 1 is chance based, no payment (zero returns to effort).
 - If evaluator 1 is performance based, 10 cents per task (positive returns to effort).

Please enter text decoded from the number. This is achieved by looking up the corresponding letter for each number.

L	S	X	R	T	E	Z	I	W	H
0	8	1	5	6	3	9	7	4	2
03976									

Form beliefs about the evaluator 1 type (returns to effort)

- Beliefs about likelihood that evaluator 1 is the performance based evaluator (returns to effort beliefs).
- Returns to effort beliefs: $\theta \in (0, 1)$

Theoretical Predictions

No learning about ability (γ)

- MIXED 1 and MIXED 2 payoff feedback provides no information about participants' relative performance in the logic quiz.

$$Pr(H|s_i = H, s_{-i} = L) = \frac{Pr(H)Pr(s_i = H, s_{-i} = L|H)}{Pr(s_i = H, s_{-i} = L)} = \gamma \quad (1)$$

Learning about the returns to effort (θ)

- MIXED 1 and MIXED 2 payoff feedback flips the direction of learning about the returns to effort.
- MIXED 1:

$$Pr(P|s_1 = H, s_2 = L) = \frac{Pr(P)Pr(s_1 = H, s_2 = L|P)}{Pr(s_1 = H, s_2 = L)} = \gamma \quad (2)$$

- MIXED 2:

$$Pr(P|s_1 = L, s_2 = H) = \frac{Pr(P)Pr(s_1 = L, s_2 = H|P)}{Pr(s_1 = L, s_2 = H)} = 1 - \gamma \quad (3)$$

Misguided inference

- Definitions:
 - Prior Bias: $\Delta\gamma \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \gamma - \gamma^*$; Overconfidence: $\Delta\gamma > 0$; Underconfidence $\Delta\gamma < 0$
 - Misguided inference: $\Delta\theta \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \theta - \theta^*$
- Bayesian misguided inference:
 - MIXED 1: $\Delta\theta = \theta - \theta^* = \gamma - \gamma^* = \Delta\gamma$
 - MIXED 2: $\Delta\theta = \theta - \theta^* = 1 - \gamma - (1 - \gamma^*) = \gamma^* - \gamma = -\Delta\gamma$

Misguided inference


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- **Hypothesis 1:** *Overconfident individuals will be positively misguided in MIXED 1 and negatively misguided in MIXED 2. Underconfident individuals will be negatively misguided in MIXED 1 and positively misguided in MIXED 2. More generally, the difference in misguided inference between MIXED 1 and MIXED 2 increases monotonically in prior bias.*

- Assume that the expected utility from exerting effort e depends on expected returns to effort provision, $\theta\omega e$, and convex costs of effort, $c(e)$:

$$u(e, \theta) = \theta\omega e - c(e)$$

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- **Hypothesis 2:** *The expected utility-maximizing effort is monotonically increasing in returns to effort beliefs θ and consequently monotonically increasing in the degree of misguided inference $\Delta\theta$.*

Causal inference




- Our design orthogonally manipulates
 - Extent of prior bias, by quiz difficulty assignment
 - Direction of misguided inference, by evaluator type assignment
- Without confounding effort provision
 - No learning about ability
 - No motivational effects through payoff differences

Results

- N=2,011, US sample on *Prolific*, half of them women.
- N=1,004 received mixed payoff feedback in period 1 and proceed to period 2
- Completion fee: \$2; average bonus payments: \$1.7.
- Treatments are balanced by observable characteristics.


Performance priors (γ)

- Higher confidence in EASY compared to DIFFICULT ($p < 0.001$).
- Average performance priors in EASY: 66.7%.
- Average performance priors in DIFFICULT: 51.4%.



Prior bias ($\Delta\gamma = \gamma - \gamma^*$)

- Higher overconfidence in EASY compared to DIFFICULT ($p < 0.001$).
- Average prior bias in EASY: 15.4%.
- Average prior bias in DIFFICULT: 1.7%.




How do individuals make inferences about the returns to effort in period 2?

- With aggregate overconfidence, hypothesis 1 predicts higher returns to effort beliefs in MIXED 1 compared to MIXED 2.
- Why? Overconfident individuals infer that evaluator 1 is more likely performance based when they receive a high payoff from evaluator 1 (MIXED 1).


Returns to effort beliefs (θ)

- Higher returns to effort beliefs in MIXED 1 compared to MIXED 2 ($p < 0.001$).
- Average returns to effort belief in MIXED 1: 64.0%.
- Average returns to effort belief in MIXED 2: 43.9%.




Misguided inference ($\Delta\theta = \theta - \theta^*$)


- Higher misguided inference in MIXED 1 compared to MIXED 2 ($p < 0.001$).
- Average misguided inference in MIXED 1: 13.2%.
- Average misguided inference in MIXED 2: -5.9%.



Are subjects perfect Bayesians?




Decomposition of misguided inference




Misguided inference as a function of prior bias

Panel A: Overconfident Individuals



Panel B: Underconfident Individuals




Misguided inference $\Delta\theta$ as a function of prior bias $\Delta\gamma$

Dependent Variable:	Misguided Inference	
	(1)	(2)
MIXED 1	19.088*** (1.704)	19.091*** (1.896)
PRIOR BIAS	-0.759*** (0.043)	-0.228 (0.226)
MIXED 1*PRIOR BIAS	1.655*** (0.053)	0.771*** (0.279)
Constant	-5.876*** (1.352)	-5.885 (1.521)
Observations	1,004	1,004
Instrumental Variables	No	Yes

Do misguided inferences about the returns to effort causally affect effort provision in period 2?

- Distribution is bi-modal: most people either quit after working on one task or work on all 25 tasks.
- MIXED 1 group is more likely to solve maximum ($p = 0.011$), and MIXED 2 group is more likely to solve minimum ($p = 0.003$).
- Average decoding tasks solved are different ($p < 0.001$):
 - MIXED 1: 13.8
 - MIXED 2: 11.8




Causal impact of misguided inference on effort provision (tasks solved)

Dependent Variable:	Tasks Solved	
	(1)	(2)
Misguided Inference	0.023*** (0.008)	0.108*** (0.033)
Constant	12.716*** (0.318)	12.405*** (0.345)
Observations	1004	1004
Instrumental Variables	No	Yes

Misguided effort: What if priors were accurate?

- We predict the level of effort provision with and without misguided returns to effort beliefs.
- We denote the difference between these predictions *misguided effort*.

Misguided effort



Conclusion

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- We show that overconfident individuals attribute poor initial labor market outcomes to low returns to effort in the economic environment, and therefore, put less effort into a subsequent real-effort task.
- Underconfident individuals also learn in a misguided manner and adjust their efforts accordingly, but in the opposite direction.
- With misguided learning, it is hard for meritocracy to work. Initial prior biases and initial feedback may have long-lasting consequences on who succeeds.

Thank you!

- Questions?
- Contact: `christoph.drobner@tum.de`