

# Learning in a Network of Cournot Markets

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
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# Quick Setup

- ▶ Single good, multiple markets Cournot economy with linear inverse demand
- ▶ Firms and Consumers connected by bipartite graph
- ▶ Assumed Information: known slope of demand and price-quantity history
- ▶ Market size (intercepts) unknown  $\rightarrow$  least-squares learning

## Quick Setup



# Motivation

- ▶ Rational expectations require:
  - ▶ a lot of information
  - ▶ high computational ability
- ▶ How do agents learn equilibrium?
  - ▶ educative
  - ▶ **evolutive**
- ▶ If there are shocks or structural changes, agents need to learn fast!
- ▶ Not all firms and consumers interact with each other

# Research Question

- ▶ Is there convergence to an equilibrium? Which?
- ▶ How fast?
- ▶ How does network affect convergence speeds?

## Summary of findings

- ▶ Convergence to full information Cournot-Nash equilibrium
- ▶ Network has no effect on stability but affects convergence speed
- ▶ Individual quantities converge polynomially at a constant rate
  - ▶ independent of network structure
- ▶ Aggregate (market and firm) quantities converge faster than individual quantities
  - ▶ speed dependent on network structure

# Model - Notation

- ▶ markets:  $\mathcal{M} = \{1, \dots, M\}$ , indexed by  $m$
- ▶ firms:  $\mathcal{J} = \{1, \dots, J\}$ , indexed by  $j$
- ▶ price in market  $m$  in period  $t$ :  $p_t^m$
- ▶ quantity produced by firm  $j$  for market  $m$  in period  $t$ :  $q_t^{m,j}$
- ▶ True parameters:  $\alpha$  and  $\beta$
- ▶ Estimates by firm  $j$  for market  $m$  at time  $t$ :  $a_t^{m,j}$
- ▶  $\mathcal{J}_m$ : firms connected to market  $m$
- ▶  $\mathcal{M}_j$ : markets that firm  $j$  is connected to
- ▶ demand shock:  $\varepsilon_t^m$

## Model – Network

- ▶ Network: bipartite graph  $\mathcal{G} = (\mathcal{M}, \mathcal{J}, E)$
- ▶ biadjacency matrix  $G$  with elements  $g_{ij}$
- ▶ Example graph:

$$G = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 1 \end{pmatrix}$$



## Model – Firm

Inverse demand function:

$$p_t^m = \alpha - \beta \left( \sum_{j \in \mathcal{J}_m} q_t^{m,j} \right) + \varepsilon_t^m$$

Perceived inverse demand:

$$p^{m,j} = a^{m,j} - \beta q^{m,j} + v^{m,j}$$

Parameters are unknown  $\rightarrow$  firm estimates:

$$\hat{p}_t^{m,j}(q_t^{m,j}) = a_{t-1}^{m,j} - \beta q^{m,j}$$

# Model – Firm

Objective:

$$\mathbf{q}_t^j = \arg \max_{\{q^{m,j}\}_{m \in \mathcal{M}_j}} \left[ \left( \sum_{m \in \mathcal{M}_j} \hat{p}_t^{m,j}(q^{m,j})q^{m,j} \right) - \frac{c}{2} (Q^j)^2 \right]$$

Yields:

$$q_t^{m,j} = \frac{2}{\beta} \left( \frac{1}{2} a_{t-1}^{m,j} - \frac{1}{2(M_j + \beta)} \sum_{i \in \mathcal{M}} g_{ij} a_{t-1}^{i,j} \right)$$

## Model – Firm

Vectorize:

$$q_t^{m,j} = \frac{2}{\beta} g_{mj} \left( \text{diag } G_j \left( \frac{1}{2} \mathbf{e}_m + t_j \mathbf{1} \right) \right)^\top a_{t-1}^j,$$

where  $t_j = \frac{1}{2(M_j + \beta)}$ ,  $\mathbf{e}_m$  is the  $m$ -th unit vector,  $\mathbf{1}$  a vector of ones, and  $\text{diag } G_j$  is the diagonal matrix with the  $j$ -th column of  $G$  as its diagonal.

## Model – Firm

Vectorize more:

$$q_t^j = \frac{2}{\beta} L_j a_{t-1}^j,$$

where

$$L_j = \text{diag } G_j \left( t_j \mathbb{1} + \frac{1}{2} I \right) \text{diag } G_j,$$

and  $\mathbb{1}$  is a matrix of ones.

# Model – Learning

Recursive updating:

$$\begin{aligned} a_t^{m,j} &= a_{t-1}^{m,j} + \frac{1}{t} \left( \underbrace{p_t^m + \frac{\beta}{2} q_t^{m,j}}_{\text{Inferred } \alpha} - \underbrace{a_{t-1}^{m,j}}_{\text{Current belief about } \alpha} \right) \\ &= a_{t-1}^{m,j} + \frac{1}{t} \left( \alpha - \frac{\beta}{2} \left( \sum_{i \in \mathcal{J}_m \setminus j} q_t^{m,i} \right) - a_{t-1}^{m,j} + \varepsilon_t^m \right). \end{aligned}$$

# Model – Learning

By stacking the difference equations for all firms we can write the learning process in matrix form as

$$a_t = a_{t-1} + \frac{1}{t} (\alpha \text{vec } G - Aa_{t-1} + \mathcal{E}_t) .$$

## Proposition 1

Steady-state beliefs  $\bar{a}$  induce the Cournot-Nash equilibrium quantities.

▶ Matrix form

# Stochastic approximation

In deviations from the steady state,  $\hat{a}_t = a_t - \bar{a}$ :

$$\hat{a}_t = \hat{a}_{t-1} - \frac{1}{t} (A\hat{a}_{t-1} - \mathcal{E}_t) .$$

Approximation:

$$\frac{\hat{a}_t - \hat{a}_{t-1}}{\frac{1}{t}} \approx \dot{a} = -A\hat{a} + \mathcal{E}_t .$$

# Stochastic approximation

## Proposition 2

Discrete learning dynamics are approximated by ODE

$$\dot{a} = -Aa .$$

In particular, if  $a(\tau)$  is a solution to the ODE, then

$$a_t \approx a(\tau) ,$$

with  $\tau \approx \log t$ .

**Dynamics of discrete system can be analyzed using the eigenvalues and eigenvectors of  $A$ .**



# Stochastic approximation

ODE solution:

$$a(\tau) = \sum_{i=1}^{JM} c_i e^{-\lambda_i \tau} v_i,$$

where  $\lambda_i$  are the eigenvalues of  $A$  and  $v_i$  the corresponding eigenvectors.

# Results

## Theorem 1 (Individual Learning)

For any strongly connected network, quantities converge polynomially at a rate of  $-\frac{1}{2}$  to the steady state values.

## Theorem 2 (Informational Efficiency )


Aggregate production converges at a faster rate than individual production both within markets and within firms. Prices are determined by aggregate production and are thus also learned at the faster rate.

► Connectivity


## Proof sketch

1. Show that smallest eigenvalue of  $A$  is  $\lambda_{\min} = \frac{1}{2}$
2. Characterize the eigenspace of  $\lambda_{\min}$ ,  $E_{\lambda_{\min}}(A)$
3. Construct a mapping  $u^m$  that aggregates individual beliefs to aggregate (market) quantities
4. Show that  $u^m \in \ker E_{\lambda_{\min}}(A)$


# Network comparison




# Erdős-Rényi random graph



# Learning time series – Complete network



# Learning time series – Tree network



# Conclusion

- ▶ Firms are able to learn the Cournot-Nash equilibrium
- ▶ Individual quantities converge polynomially at a constant rate independent of network structure
- ▶ Aggregate (market and firm) quantities converge faster than individual quantities
- ▶ The convergence speed depends on the network structure

**Thank you!**



## Model – Learning in matrix form

Where

$$A = \text{diag } G (L + I) \in \mathbb{R}^{JM \times JM}, \quad (1)$$

$$L = \begin{pmatrix} 0 & L_2 & \dots & L_J \\ L_1 & 0 & \dots & L_J \\ \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ L_1 & L_2 & \dots & 0 \end{pmatrix} \in \mathbb{R}^{J \times J}, \quad (2)$$

and,

$$\mathcal{E}_t = (\mathbf{1} \otimes \varepsilon_t) \circ \text{vec } G. \quad (3)$$

▶ Back

# Definitions

## Definition 1 (Weak connectivity)

A network is weakly connected if the number of connections  $D = |E|$  satisfies

$$D > M + J - 1.$$

## Definition 2 (Strong connectivity)

A network is strongly connected if

$$M_j \geq 2 \quad \forall j \in \mathcal{J} \quad \text{and} \quad J_m \geq 2 \quad \forall m \in \mathcal{M}.$$

▶ Back