

# The Trilemma for Low Interest Rate Macroeconomics

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# Secular stagnation

Japan since 1995:

- ▶ Nominal interest rate at the zero lower bound;
- ▶ Inflation near 0%;
- ▶ Weak GDP growth.

Despite:

- ▶ Money supply (M0): 100% of GDP;
- ▶ Public debt: 260% of GDP.

# Secular Stagnation

Secular stagnation hypothesis:

- ▶ The economy fails to produce at full capacity due to a lack of demand;
- ▶ This is a permanent state of affairs.

Multiple equilibria problem:

- ▶ Keynesian **secular stagnation equilibrium** with:
  - ▶ Binding zero lower bound;
  - ▶ Low inflation;
  - ▶ Under-employment.
- ▶ **Neoclassical equilibrium** with:
  - ▶ Full employment;
  - ▶ Low (natural) real interest rate;
  - ▶ High inflation.
- ▶ **Ponzi equilibrium** with:
  - ▶ Full employment;
  - ▶ Low inflation;
  - ▶ Ponzi scheme.


# Secular Stagnation

Three desirable policy objectives:

- ▶ Full employment;
- ▶ Low inflation (on target);
- ▶ Low debt with no Ponzi scheme.

Trilemma:

- ▶ When the natural real interest rate is low, these three objectives are inconsistent.



# Outline

1. **Model of secular stagnation**
2. Trilemma
3. Conclusion

# Government

Evolution of nominal debt:

$$\dot{B}_t = i_t B_t - \tau_t P_t N_t.$$

Present value of real primary surpluses (per capita):

$$\Phi_t = \mathbb{E}_t \left[ \int_t^\infty \frac{\Lambda_s}{\Lambda_t} \tau_s ds \right].$$

Real debt per capita:

$$b_t = \frac{B_t}{P_t N_t}.$$

Ponzi scheme:

$$\Delta_t = b_t - \Phi_t.$$

# Government

The Ponzi scheme collapses at Poisson rate  $\varepsilon$ :

$$dP_t = \pi_t P_t dt + \frac{\Delta_t}{\Phi_t} P_t dJ_t,$$

where

$$dJ_t = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{with probability } \varepsilon dt \\ 0 & \text{with probability } (1 - \varepsilon dt) \end{cases} .$$

$\varepsilon$  could be:

- ▶ A sunspot shock;
- ▶ A fundamental shock raising the natural real interest rate.

# Model

Ramsey model:

- ▶ Preference for wealth:

$$\mathbb{E}_0 \left[ \int_0^{\infty} e^{-(\rho-n)t} \left[ u(c_t) + \gamma(a_t - b_t + \Delta_t) - \psi c \left( \frac{dP_t}{P_t} \right) \right] dt \right];$$

- ▶ Zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate;
- ▶ Downward nominal wage rigidity:
  - ▶ Nominal wage growth cannot fall below  $\pi^R$ ,
  - ▶ Hence,  $\pi_t \geq \pi^R$  and  $L_t \leq 1$  with complementary slackness.



# Equilibrium

Until the sunspot shock, the equilibrium  $(c_t, \Delta_t, i_t, \pi_t, r_t)_{t=0}^{\infty}$  is given by:

$$\frac{\dot{c}_t}{c_t} = \left( \frac{u'(c_t)}{-c_t u''(c_t)} \right) \left[ r_t - \rho + \frac{\gamma'(\Delta_t)}{u'(c_t)} + \varepsilon \left( \frac{u'(\bar{c}_t)}{u'(c_t)} - 1 \right) \right];$$

$\pi_t \geq \pi^R$  and  $c_t \leq 1$  with complementary slackness;

$$(i_t - \pi_t) - r_t = \varepsilon \frac{\Delta_t u'(\bar{c}_t)}{b_t u'(c_t)};$$

$$i_t = \max\{r^n + \pi^* + \phi[\pi_t - \pi^*], 0\};$$

$$\dot{\Delta}_t = \left[ r_t - n + \varepsilon \frac{u'(\bar{c}_t)}{u'(c_t)} \right] \Delta_t;$$

$$\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} e^{-(\rho - n + \varepsilon)t} u'(c_t) \Delta_t = 0.$$

# Steady state equilibria

**Neoclassical** steady state:

- ▶ Full employment  $c^n = 1$ ;
- ▶ No Ponzi scheme  $\Delta^n = 0$ ;
- ▶ Real interest rate  $r^n = \rho - \frac{\gamma'(0)}{u'(1)}$ .

**Secular stagnation** steady state:

- ▶ Low inflation  $\pi^{ss} = \pi^R$ ;
- ▶ Binding zero lower bound  $i^{ss} = 0$ ;
- ▶ No Ponzi scheme  $\Delta^{ss} = 0$ ;
- ▶ Underemployment  $\frac{1}{u'(c^{ss})} = \frac{\rho + \pi^R}{\gamma'(0)}$ .

**Ponzi** steady state:

- ▶ Full employment  $c^P = 1$ ;
- ▶ Real interest rate  $r^P = n - \varepsilon \frac{u'(\bar{c})}{u'(1)}$ ;
- ▶ Ponzi scheme  $\gamma'(\Delta^P) = (\rho - n + \varepsilon)u'(1)$ .

# Steady state equilibria

Existence conditions:

- ▶ Secular stagnation steady state

$$r^n < -\pi^R;$$

- ▶ Neoclassical steady state


$$\pi^* \geq -r^n;$$

- ▶ Ponzi steady state

$$r^n < n - \varepsilon;$$

$$\pi^P \geq \max \left\{ \varepsilon \frac{\Phi}{\Phi + \Delta^P} \frac{u'(\bar{c})}{u'(1)} - n, \pi^R \right\}.$$

## Secular stagnation



Steady states with  $i = 0$  and  $\Delta = 0$

# Secular stagnation

Paradox of flexibility:

- ▶ A rise in wage flexibility (lower  $\pi^R$ ) reduces output!

Fundamental cause of secular stagnation:

- ▶ Existence of money!

The real interest rate is jointly determined by:

- ▶ Zero lower bound;
- ▶ Binding downward nominal wage rigidity.

Under-employment is a general equilibrium phenomenon:

- ▶ Excessive interest rate in financial markets  $\Rightarrow$  Depressed demand for goods  $\Rightarrow$  Insufficient demand for labor.

# Outline

1. Model of secular stagnation
2. **Trilemma**
3. Conclusion

## Trilemma

To reach the welfare maximizing steady state, the government chooses:

- ▶ the inflation target  $\pi^*$ ;
- ▶ the magnitude of the Ponzi scheme  $\Delta$ .

Welfare:

- ▶ Neoclassical steady state

$$u(1) + \gamma(0) + \psi r^n;$$

- ▶ Secular stagnation steady state

$$u(c^{ss}) + \gamma(0) - \psi \pi^R;$$

- ▶ Ponzi steady state

$$u(1) + \gamma(\Delta^P) - \psi \max \left\{ \varepsilon \frac{\Phi}{\Phi + \Delta^P} \frac{u'(\bar{c})}{u'(1)} - n, \pi^R \right\} - \psi \varepsilon C \left( \frac{\Delta^P}{\Phi} \right).$$

# Calibration

$$u(c) = \frac{c^{1-\theta} - 1}{1-\theta}$$

$$\gamma(a) = k \frac{(a - \underline{a})^{1-\sigma} - 1}{1-\sigma}$$

Parameter	Calibrated value	Moment
Discount rate	$\rho = 5\%$	$\cdot$
Population growth	$n = 0\%$	$\cdot$
Reference rate of inflation for wage bargaining	$\pi^R = 0\%$	$\cdot$
CRRA for consumption	$\theta = 4.46$	$r^n = -3\%$
CRRA for wealth (relative to reference level)	$\sigma = 1.16$	$\Delta^P = c^n$ when $\varepsilon = 0$
Scale parameter of preference for wealth	$k = 0.18$	$c^{SS} = (1 - 0.1)c^n$
Reference wealth level	$\underline{a} = -2$	$\underline{a} = -2c^n$
Present value of primary surpluses	$\Phi = 1$	$\Phi = c^n$



## Calibration

Welfare cost of inflation under a Ponzi scheme:

$$\psi \left[ \pi^P + \varepsilon C \left( \frac{\Delta^P}{\Phi} \right) \right].$$


The convex welfare cost of a price level jump:

$$C(x) = \alpha \frac{(x+1)^\beta - 1}{\beta}$$

Cases:


- ▶  $\alpha = 5$  and  $\beta = 1$ ;
- ▶  $\alpha = 1$  and  $\beta = 6$ ;
- ▶  $\alpha = 1$  and  $\beta = 1$ .

# Trilemma




Trilemma for  $\alpha = 5$  and  $\beta = 1$

# Trilemma



Trilemma for  $\alpha = 1$  and  $\beta = 6$

# Trilemma



Trilemma for  $\alpha = 1$  and  $\beta = 1$

# Breaking through the trilemma

How can we break through the trilemma (such as to have full employment, low inflation, and no Ponzi scheme)?

- ▶ Electronic money (abolish cash);
- ▶ Tax wealth or set an increasing consumption tax;
- ▶ Government spending;
- ▶ Redistribute across heterogeneous households.

# Conclusion

If the 2% inflation target is too low, we must either have:

- ▶ Secular stagnation
  - ▶ Inflation is below target;
- ▶ Ponzi scheme
  - ▶ Inflation is much above target when the Ponzi scheme collapses.

In both cases, the central bank is powerless!

The trilemma is a fundamental challenge to the inflation targeting framework (with a low inflation target).