# The Gender Gap in Tax Evasion

Eduard Krkoska

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#### Motivation & Contribution

- Despite progress towards convergence, large gender gaps remains until this day
- Large literature explaining:
  - Narrowing of gender gaps over time (Blau and Kahn, 2017; Ngai and Petrongolo, 2017)
  - Sources of remaining gaps (Adams-Prassl et al., 2023; Goldin, 2014; Petrongolo & Ronchi, 2020; Kleven et al., 2019)
- Complementary literature on gender differences in preferences (Borghans at al., 2009; Niederle, 2017; Croson & Gneezy, 2009; Erat and Gneezy, 2009, Exley et al, 2022; Roussille, 2022)
- I contribute to both literatures by studying the unexplored gender-gap in tax evasion and its sources

#### Motivation: Romania

- Second lowest raw wage gap in the EU (European Commission)
- My data: raw gender wage gap of 4.5%, shrinks to zero just controlling for hours
- Thought to be persistence of explicit gender equality policies during communism (Andren & Andren, 2015; Vanc & White, 2011)
- Can also be rationalised by gap between true and reported wages

#### Tax Evasion in Romania

- Anecdotally, tax-evasion is common
  - ullet Employer reporting  $\Longrightarrow$  collusion to under-report income
- The story:
  - Employer reports (and tax is paid on) minimum wage
  - Remainder of the salary is paid cash-in-hand/under the table
- One Romanian newspaper asks "Why do one third of Romanian employees earn only the minimum wage? Is it tax evasion [...]?"
- Another claims this is "as difficult to stop as it is widespread"
- Conviction that "nearly all MW workers earn untaxed side payments" in East and S. East Europe (Elek, 2012)

#### Data

- Monthly matched employee-employer tax returns from Jan 2018 to Jan 2020
  - Approx 5.5 Million employee observations per month
  - Approx 460 Thousand firm observations per month
- Provided by Romanian Ministry of Public Finance
- Employee data contains info on reported wages, hours (contracted and actually worked), gender, age, dependents and location
- Employer data contains detailed sector codes and firm income

# Collusion: Descriptive Evidence

Collusion ⇒ difficult to sustain in large firms




Figure: Minimum Wage Work by Firm Size

#### Identification: Tax Reform

- Major reforms in construction sector for employees of eligible firms
  - Unannounced "Govt. Emergency Ordinance" in Dec 2018
  - Eligible if construction ≥ 80% firm revenue
- Major decreases in personal tax rates
  - But new minimum wage approx. 50% above regular minimum wage
- Policy offer attractive if true wages above new min. wage

# Changing Tax Schedule




Figure: Tax and Other Contributions vs Reported Gross Salary

# Take-up




Figure: Percent Construction Revenue Reported

#### Collusion: Construction Sector




Figure: Minimum Wage Work by Firm Size

#### No Excess Separations




Figure: Job Separation Rates

#### **Employment Effects**





Figure: Construction Employment

#### Is the Market Monopsonistic?

• Empirically, it is relatively competitive



ullet To address wage markdowns/bargaining  $\Longrightarrow$  one (wo-)man bands



#### Reported Wage Distributions




Figure: Gross Wages Histogram

# Source of the gender gap?

- Occupational Segregation
  - E.g. men on the construction site and women doing accounting
- Bargaining power of male and female employees with their employers may be different
- Sorting into different firms

# Empirical Strategy

- Balance panel (exclude switchers)
- Look at jumps from NMW

#### Event-Study Diff-in-Diff

$$y_{i,t} = \sum_{\forall s/-1} \beta_s \mathbb{1}\{treated_{s=t}\} + \alpha_i + \alpha_t + \epsilon_{i.t}$$

#### Diff-in-Diff Results




Figure: DiD Results

# Diff-in-Diff Results: One (wo-)man Bands




Figure: DiD Results: One-person firms

#### Differential Occupation Selection: Manual-Workers

ullet High variation/seasonality in hours worked  $\Longrightarrow$  likely manual work




Figure: DiD Results: Manual Workers

#### Differential Occupation Selection: Office-Workers

ullet Low variation/seasonality in hours worked  $\Longrightarrow$  likely office-based work




Figure: DiD Results: Office Workers

# Differential Occupation Selection: Case Study of Building Project Management




Figure: DiD Results: Project Management

#### Firm Selection & Composition

- Gender heterogeneity is explained by differential firm sorting
  - Gap disappears in female-dominated firms




Figure: DiD Results: Female-Dominated Firms

#### Big Picture & Conclusions

- It seems that there is a gender gap in tax evasion
- As reported wages approach marginal product, wage gap shrinks
  - From 8% in favour of women to being out-earned by 7%
- Occupational segregation and differences in bargaining power seem to have little impact
- Selection into different kinds of firms seems to matter the most

# Appendix 1

	(1) Construction Sector			(2)		
				Non-Construction Sector		
	Median	Mean	S.D.	Median	Mean	S.D.
Age	42.00	42.45	11.21	42.00	42.15	11.98
Hours Worked	160.00	145.36	49.12	160.00	147.80	46.39
Number of Dependents	0.00	0.27	0.66	0.00	0.34	1.01
Firm Size	27.00	118.25	248.33	97.00	1252.53	3316.14
Female Share of Firm	0.23	0.31	0.24	0.70	0.66	0.23
Full-Time Contract	1.00	0.92	0.28	1.00	0.90	0.30
Bucharest	0.00	0.17	0.38	0.00	0.15	0.36
Observations	1576734			64263673		

Panel (a): Women

	(1) Construction Sector			(2)		
				Non-Construction Sector		
	Median	Mean	S.D.	Median	Mean	S.D.
Age	43.00	42.88	11.74	43.00	42.84	12.79
Hours Worked	160.00	145.62	47.52	160.00	151.74	40.91
Number of Dependents	0.00	0.29	0.72	0.00	0.33	0.79
Firm Size	30.00	114.80	241.06	103.00	1416.81	3691.08
Female Share of Firm	0.09	0.11	0.11	0.30	0.34	0.24
Full-Time Contract	1.00	0.97	0.18	1.00	0.92	0.27
Bucharest	0.00	0.09	0.29	0.00	0.13	0.34
Observations	9809794			63315734		

Panel (b): Men