

The (unintended?) effects of US military training during the Cold War in Latin America

EEA-ESEM 2024 | Rotterdam

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Aug 26th -30th, 2024

Motivation

This paper: We explore how changes in democracy is explained by foreign interventions and policies.

- ▶ External forces interact with internal conditions and impact democracy patterns.
- ▶ We show how US policy affected behaviour in target countries during and after Cold War.
- ▶ The main mechanism was repression and civilian victimization.

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1. Economic and military aid, economic sanctions, influence in foreign elections and politics Important to understand domestic policies
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▶ What do we do?

- Assess the influence of “indirect” military interventions using the School of the Americas (SOA) in Latin America.
- Study the influence of external forces on the shaping of democracy patterns.

▶ How do we do it?

- Records of US trainings specifying the training period and trainees' home countries.
- Identify commanders in Argentina (Dictatorship) and compare the behaviour (disappearances, deaths) in their jurisdictions.
- Assess the enduring impacts by analysing the historical placement of military bases pre-dating 1942 and different exposed cohorts.

▶ What do we find?

- US military training during the Cold War was linked to democracy deterioration.
→ This effect comes from the influence of officers rather than enlisted troops.
- SOA trained commanders are associated with greater levels of victimization (enforced disappearance).
- But, in the long term, increased support for democracy.

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
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Motivation

General trends

School of Americas


- ▶ Training program for Latin American armed forces under the US guide during the cold war.
- ▶ Complains of Human Right violations by graduates.



SOA Graduates: US register of all graduates attended to SOA 1946-1991.

- ▶ Position rank of attendees → civilian, soldier, enlisted, in academy or officer.
- ▶ Date of graduation → Semester of graduation and year.

Geographical distribution SOA graduates




a. Total Graduates




b. Share

Time evolution graduates



a. Total Graduates



b. By zone

Effect of SOA on Democracy - Strategy

Polity IV index (-10 to 10)

18 independent countries by 1946 excluding Haiti and Cuba

$$DI_{ct} = \alpha_c + \alpha_t + \beta_1 \times \text{Stock SOA}_{ct-5} + \sum_{j=1}^J \beta_j^* \times DI_{ct-j} + \varepsilon_{ct}$$

Where:

- ▶ DI_{ct} : Polity IV index
- ▶ Stock SAO_{ct} : SOA graduates stock for one to five years in the past

Main identification assumption: $\forall c$ and $t > t_0$

$$E[\varepsilon_{ct} | DI_{ct-1}, \dots, DI_{ct_0}, \text{Stock SAO}_{ct-2}, \dots, \text{Stock SAO}_{ct_0}, \alpha_c, \delta_t] = 0$$

Effect of SOA on Democracy - Results

	Total		Troop		Academy Officers		Lower Rank Officers	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Dependent Variable: Democracy Index ($\mu = 0.2, \sigma = 6.5$)</i>								
Stock SOA Trainees _{t-5}	-0.035 (0.024) [0.029]	-0.030 (0.023) [0.027]	-0.005 (0.035) [0.047]	-0.008 (0.035) [0.045]	-0.056* (0.029) [0.062]	-0.045 (0.027) [0.055]	-0.178** (0.063) [0.084] ^{††}	-0.151** (0.068) [0.088] [†]
<i>Democracy</i>								
Democracy Index _{t-1}	0.845*** (0.024) [0.023] [‡]	0.908*** (0.040) [0.039] [‡]	0.844*** (0.024) [0.023] [‡]	0.910*** (0.040) [0.040] [‡]	0.846*** (0.024) [0.023] [‡]	0.909*** (0.040) [0.039] [‡]	0.844*** (0.023) [0.022] [‡]	0.906*** (0.039) [0.039] [‡]
Democracy Index _{t-2} to _{t-5}	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Constant Stock Effect 5 Years After	-0.130 (0.090) [0.105]	-0.116 (0.090) [0.102]	-0.018 (0.128) [0.172]	-0.031 (0.134) [0.175]	-0.205* (0.110) [0.228]	-0.173 (0.105) [0.212]	-0.654*** (0.230) [0.309] ^{††}	-0.580** (0.257) [0.336] [†]
N Country	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18
N	756	738	756	738	756	738	756	738
Period FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Country FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Effect of SOA on Democracy - Robustness

- ▶ **Index correction of violence:**
Civil conflict is capture in the index. Vreeland (2008)
- ▶ **Dichotomous measure:**
Acemoglu et al. (2019) dichotomous democracy indicator.
- ▶ **Additional Controls:**
GDP, Population, Military size.
- ▶ **Effects of other type of aid:**
Economic and military aid.
- ▶ **Long time structure:**
Ten years.
- ▶ **Influence:**
Looking at the votes alignment with US and Soviet Union.

Mechanism: Increase in Repression

Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive (Banks and Wilson, 2013).

$$M_{ct} = \alpha_c + \alpha_t + \beta_1 \times \text{Stock SOA}_{ct} + \sum_{j=1}^J \beta_j^* \times DI_{ct-j} + \sum_{j=1}^J \beta_j^+ \times M_{ct-j} + \varepsilon_{ct}$$

Where:

- ▶ DI_{ct} : Polity IV index
- ▶ Stock SAO_{ct}: SOA graduates stock for one to five years in the past
- ▶ M_{ct} : Mechanism measure
 1. Social movements: General Strikes, violent strikes, anti-government demonstrations.
 2. Media: Newspaper circulation per capital.
 3. Political Institution: Parties system.
 4. Communist contention: Guerrilla Warfare.


Mechanism: Results

	Strikes (1)	Violent Riots (2)	Anti-governemnt Demonstrations (3)	Parties Banned (4)	Newspaper Circulation (5)	Guerilla Warfare (6)
Stock SOA Trainees _{t-5}	-0.021** (0.008)	-0.017 (0.010)	-0.014 (0.011)	0.010*** (0.003)	-5.586*** (1.496)	-0.007 (0.010)
Constant Stock Effect 5 Years After	-0.025** (0.010)	-0.024* (0.014)	-0.017 (0.013)	0.030*** (0.010)	-35.164*** (10.277)	-0.013 (0.017)
Mean Dep. Var.	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.1	803.3	0.3
Std. dev. Dep. Var.	0.4	0.5	0.4	0.2	596.4	0.4
N Country	18	18	18	18	18	18
N	738	738	738	738	738	738
Period FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Country FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Within country evidence Argentina

National Reorganization Process (1976 - 1983)


- ▶ Military dictatorship characterized with high levels of repression
- ▶ Documented kidnaps, enforced disappearance, torture and opposition exile




SOA Graduates: NGO collected information about commander with all military areas

- ▶ Military hierarchical structure in 1974: Zone, Area and Sub-area
- ▶ National register of victims, date and location of kidnapping or killing

SOA commanders and force disappearance in Argentina



a. SOA influence



b. Force disappearance

Civilian victimization in Argentina

Instrumental variables strategy

$$Y_{mzpt} = \gamma_m + \gamma_{pt} + \beta_1^* \times SOA_{zt} + \Phi' W_{mt} + \sum_{k \in X_m} \phi'(k \times \gamma_m) + \epsilon_{mzpt}$$

$$SOA_{zt} = \gamma_m^0 + \gamma_{pt}^0 + \beta_1^{0*} \times \text{Pred. Stock}_{tm} + \Phi^{0'} W_{mt} + \sum_{k \in X_m} \phi^{0'}(k \times \gamma_m) + \eta_{mzpt}$$

Where:


- ▶ Y_{mzpt} : Force Disappearance
- ▶ SOA_{zt} : SOA commander in the region
- ▶ Pred. Stock_{tm} : Predicted stock based on perfect military careers and distance to other countries capitals

Effect of SOA commander in Argentina


	Dependent variable:							
	Forced disappearance				Civilian deaths			
	F.D. > 0		log (F.D.+1)		C.D. > 0		log (C.D.+1)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
SOA commander	0.007 (0.008) [0.010]	0.189*** (0.063) [0.092]	-0.002 (0.012) [0.021]	0.433*** (0.127) [0.187]	0.005 (0.008) [0.010]	0.189*** (0.064) [0.094]	-0.003 (0.013) [0.022]	0.448*** (0.133) [0.195]
Estimation	OLS	IV	OLS	IV	OLS	IV	OLS	IV
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Mun. controls x time effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year-zone FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	15330	15330	15330	15330	15330	15330	15330	15330
Department/partido	511	511	511	511	511	511	511	511
Exc. Instruments F-stat.	-	22.87	-	22.87	-	22.87	-	22.87

Robustness

1. Quantification of the results



a. Forced disappearance



b. Civilian deaths

2. Similar results in Colombia

- ▶ Increase of forced disappearance
- ▶ No change in operation activities against guerilla groups

Data Results

Lost of population in Argentina

Difference and Difference strategy: Using data on three census waves: 1947, 1970, 1980

$$Y_{mt} = \gamma_m + \gamma_t + \beta_1^\dagger \times SOA_m^{1975-79} \times \text{Year } 1980_t + \beta_2^\dagger \times SOA_m^{1980-82} \times \text{Year } 1980_t \\ + \sum_{k \in X_m} \phi'(k \times \gamma_m) + \epsilon_{mt}$$

Where:


- ▶ Y_{mt} : Population growth rate
- ▶ $SOA_m^{1975-79}$: Any SOA commander in the region between 1974 - 1979
- ▶ $SOA_m^{1980-82}$: Any SOA commander in the region between 1980 - 1983
- ▶ Using differential effect between men and women

Effect of SOA commander on population growth

	Dependent variable:								
	Growth male 1970-1980			Growth female 1970-1980			Male share 1947, 1970, 1980		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
SOA commander...									
... in 1975-1979 x 1947							-0.005 (0.026) [0.022]		-0.003 (0.029) [0.023]
... in 1980-1982 x 1947								-0.026 (0.026) [0.023]	-0.025 (0.030) [0.026]
... in 1975-1979 x 1980	-0.015* (0.009) [0.007]		-0.016* (0.009) [0.007]	-0.012 (0.008) [0.006]		-0.013 (0.009) [0.006]	-0.013** (0.006) [0.008]		-0.013** (0.006) [0.009]
... in 1980-1982 x 1980		-0.001 (0.006) [0.007]	0.002 (0.006) [0.007]		0.006 (0.008) [0.007]	0.008 (0.008) [0.007]		-0.007 (0.009) [0.012]	-0.005 (0.008) [0.012]
Mun. controls x time effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Mun. FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	1022	1022	1022	1022	1022	1022	1533	1533	1533
Department/partido	511	511	511	511	511	511	511	511	511

Effects on democracy perception

Military bases before 1945



Effect of SOA on democracy perception

Using data of Latinobarómetro between 2000-2020, and presences of **military bases**

$$Y_{icpmtb} = \delta_m + \delta_{tc} + \delta_b + \beta_1 \times \text{SOA Trainees}_{tcb} \times \omega_m + \Psi' X_i + \sum_{k \in \text{age, age}^2} \psi'(k \times \delta_c) + \varepsilon_{icpmtb}$$

Where:

- ▶ $\text{SOA Trainees}_{tcb}$ Average number of SOA trainees after 16 years.
- ▶ ω_m Share of military in the two nearest military bases before 1945 (100 km).

Long term effect of SOA graduates on democracy perception

	Satisfaction (1)	Democracy Preference (2)	Best gover. (3)	Trust Armed Forces (4)	Trust Public Forces (5)	Favorable opinion United States (6)
<i>Panel A: Effect of SOA graduates exposure</i>						
<i>Current SOA Trainees_{itcb}/100 x ω_m</i>	0.018 (0.013)	0.024** (0.012)	0.029** (0.012)	-0.050*** (0.019)	-0.051*** (0.015)	0.014 (0.010)
<i>Panel B: Placebo SOA graduates exposure</i>						
<i>Previous SOA Trainees_{itcb}/100 x ω_m</i>	-0.005 (0.010)	0.018 (0.015)	0.005 (0.011)	-0.018 (0.013)	-0.012 (0.012)	0.009 (0.008)
Obs.	374623	374623	339628	336613	374623	374623
Cohorts	99	99	98	99	99	99
Country-years	346	346	346	326	346	346
Localities	3837	3837	3740	3682	3837	3837
Indiv. characteristicstis	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Locality FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year-State FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Cohort FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
μ	0.346	0.555	0.722	0.451	0.537	0.675
σ	0.476	0.497	0.448	0.498	0.499	0.468

Effect of SOA on democracy perception - Robustness

Remove individual groups:

- ▶ Countries
- ▶ Survey waves
- ▶ Cohorts

Additional **Controls** effects per country.

Conclusion


How does external interventions shape internal policies?

- ▶ School of the Americas military training in Latin America.
 - ▶ It is systematically related to reduction of democracy health.
 - ▶ Specially true for military officers and for repression tactics.
 - ▶ Created an a framework for civilian victimization.
 - ▶ In the long run is related with more favourable views of democracy.


- ▶ What do we learn from this?
 - Building democracy regimens is difficult.
External forces shape internal institutions.
 - Without proper context military training can have perverse effects.
 - However in the long run it have positive long-term effects.
Challenging picture. What will happen with new generations.

Thank you!

Eliminating countries




a. Preference for democracy




b. Democracy is the best form of gover.

Back

Eliminating survey waves




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
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Back

Eliminating countries



a. Preference for democracy



b. Democracy is the best form of gover.


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Long term effect of SOA graduates on democracy perceptions - Controls


	Satisfaction (1)	Democracy Preference (2)	Best gover. (3)	Trust Armed Forces (4)	Public Forces (5)	Favorable opinion United States (7)
<i>Panel A: Effect of SOA graduates exposure</i>						
<i>Current SOA Trainees_{tcB}/100 x ω_m</i>	0.019 (0.013)	0.021* (0.012)	0.029** (0.012)	-0.050** (0.019)	-0.053*** (0.016)	0.016* (0.010)
<i>Panel B: Placebo SOA graduates exposure</i>						
<i>Previous SOA Trainees_{tcB}/100 x ω_m</i>	-0.004 (0.010)	0.010 (0.013)	0.002 (0.010)	-0.018 (0.014)	-0.012 (0.013)	0.010 (0.008)
Obs.	374623	374623	339628	336613	374623	374623
Cohorts	99	99	98	99	99	99
Country-years	346	346	346	326	346	346
Localities	3837	3837	3740	3682	3837	3837
Indiv. characteristic x Country FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Locality FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year-State FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Cohort FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
μ	0.346	0.555	0.722	0.451	0.537	0.675
σ	0.476	0.497	0.448	0.498	0.499	0.468

[Back](#)

Forced disappearance victims



a. Argentina



b. Colombia

Back

Effect of SOA Graduates on Democracy (Vreeland 2008)

	Total		Troop		Academy Officers		Lower Rank Officers	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Dependent Variable: Democracy Index ($\mu = 0.1, \sigma = 6.4$)</i>								
Stock SOA Trainees _{t-5}	-0.036 (0.023) [0.027]	-0.030 (0.022) [0.025]	-0.006 (0.034) [0.046]	-0.007 (0.033) [0.043]	-0.056* (0.029) [0.058]	-0.045* (0.023) [0.050]	-0.187*** (0.057) [0.075] ^{††}	-0.154** (0.063) [0.080] [†]
<i>Democracy</i>								
Democracy Index _{t-1}	0.859*** (0.021) [0.020] [‡]	0.955*** (0.030) [0.030] [‡]	0.858*** (0.021) [0.020] [‡]	0.957*** (0.030) [0.029] [‡]	0.859*** (0.021) [0.020] [‡]	0.955*** (0.030) [0.029] [‡]	0.858*** (0.021) [0.020] [‡]	0.953*** (0.030) [0.029] [‡]
Democracy Index _{t-2} to _{t-10}	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Constant Stock Effect 5 Years After	-0.137 (0.088) [0.102]	-0.121 (0.087) [0.100]	-0.021 (0.127) [0.174]	-0.028 (0.131) [0.172]	-0.211* (0.109) [0.221]	-0.181** (0.092) [0.204]	-0.704*** (0.211) [0.279] ^{††}	-0.620** (0.244) [0.313] ^{††}
N Country	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18
N	756	756	756	756	756	756	756	756
Period FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Country FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Back

Effect of SOA Graduates on Democracy (Dichotomous)

	Total		Troop		Academy Officers		Lower Rank Officers	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Dependent Variable: Democracy ($\mu = 0.4, \sigma = 0.5$)</i>								
Stock SOA Trainees _{t-5}	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	0.003 (0.003)	0.002 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.009 (0.006)	-0.007 (0.006)
<i>Democracy (Dichotomous)</i>								
Democracy _{t-1}	0.833*** (0.023)	0.826*** (0.042)	0.831*** (0.023)	0.825*** (0.042)	0.833*** (0.023)	0.826*** (0.042)	0.834*** (0.023)	0.825*** (0.042)
Democracy Index _{t-2 to t-10}	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Constant Stock Effect 5 Years After	-0.003 (0.008)	-0.002 (0.008)	0.009 (0.011)	0.006 (0.013)	-0.008 (0.011)	-0.004 (0.011)	-0.032 (0.022)	-0.026 (0.022)
N Country	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18
N	730	716	730	716	730	716	730	716
Period FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Country FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

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Effect of SOA Graduates on Democracy with Additional Controls

	No Control		GDP 1946		Pop 1950		Military Size 1950	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Dependent Variable: Democracy Index ($\mu = 0.2, \sigma = 6.5$)</i>								
Stock SOA Trainees _{t-5}	-0.179** (0.063)	-0.151** (0.068)	-0.135** (0.058)	-0.114* (0.065)	-0.192*** (0.065)	-0.171** (0.070)	-0.187** (0.068)	-0.168** (0.073)
<i>Democracy</i>								
Democracy Index _{t-1}	0.843*** (0.023)	0.906*** (0.039)	0.835*** (0.022)	0.895*** (0.042)	0.835*** (0.025)	0.892*** (0.038)	0.831*** (0.025)	0.887*** (0.040)
Democracy Index _{t-2} to _{t-5}	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Constant Stock Effect 5 Years After	-0.656*** (0.230)	-0.580** (0.257)	-0.485** (0.214)	-0.430* (0.247)	-0.692*** (0.234)	-0.639** (0.258)	-0.669*** (0.242)	-0.620** (0.266)
N Country	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18
N	738	738	738	738	738	738	738	738
Period FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Country FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

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Placebo effect of US aid on democracy

	Economic Aid		Military Aid	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<i>Dependent Variable: Democracy Index ($\mu = 0.2, \sigma = 6.5$)</i>				
Value Aid _{t-5} (Millions USD)	-0.020 (0.012)	-0.017 (0.013)	-0.097 (0.083)	-0.066 (0.082)
<i>Democracy</i>				
Democracy Index _{t-1}	0.841*** (0.023)	0.906*** (0.038)	0.846*** (0.024)	0.909*** (0.039)
Democracy Index _{t-2} to _{t-5}	No	Yes	No	Yes
Constant Stock Effect 5 Years After	-0.072 (0.044)	-0.064 (0.050)	-0.358 (0.307)	-0.254 (0.316)
N Country	18	18	18	18
N	738	738	738	738
Period FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Country FE	✓	✓	✓	✓

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Effect of SOA Graduates on Democracy 10 years lags

	Total		Troop		Academy Officers		Lower Rank Officers	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Dependent Variable: Democracy ($\mu = 0.4, \sigma = 6.5$)</i>								
Stock SOA Trainees _{t-5}	-0.036 (0.025)	-0.041 (0.029)	-0.006 (0.035)	-0.018 (0.041)	-0.056* (0.031)	-0.070* (0.034)	-0.179** (0.063)	-0.151** (0.063)
<i>Democracy (Dichotomous)</i>								
Democracy _{t-1}	0.844*** (0.024)	0.895*** (0.041)	0.843*** (0.024)	0.897*** (0.042)	0.844*** (0.024)	0.896*** (0.042)	0.843*** (0.023)	0.894*** (0.040)
Democracy Index _{t-2 to t-10}	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Constant Stock Effect 10 Years After	-0.187 (0.133)	-0.189 (0.129)	-0.033 (0.183)	-0.085 (0.189)	-0.291* (0.173)	-0.324** (0.149)	-0.934*** (0.333)	-0.695** (0.314)
N Country	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18
N	738	648	738	648	738	648	738	648
Period FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Country FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

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Effect of SOA Graduates on Influence: Agreement with USA

	Total		Troop		Academy Officers		Lower Rank Officers	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Dependent Variable: Alignment with US ($\mu = 0.5, \sigma = 0.3$)</i>								
Stock SOA Trainees _{t-5}	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	0.001* (0.001)	0.001* (0.001)	-0.002* (0.001)	-0.002* (0.001)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)
<i>Alignment with US</i>								
Alignment _{t-1}	0.271*** (0.073)	0.271*** (0.073)	0.270*** (0.074)	0.270*** (0.074)	0.269*** (0.073)	0.269*** (0.073)	0.271*** (0.073)	0.271*** (0.073)
Alignment _{t-2 to t-10}	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Constant Stock Effect 5 Years After	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	0.002* (0.001)	0.002* (0.001)	-0.002* (0.001)	-0.003** (0.001)	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.003)
N Country	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18
N	630	630	630	630	630	630	630	630
Period FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Country FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

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Effect of SOA Graduates on Influence: Agreement with Soviet Union


	Total		Troop		Academy Officers		Lower Rank Officers	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Dependent Variable: Alingment with Soviet Union ($\mu = 0.5, \sigma = 0.2$)</i>								
Stock SOA Trainees $_{t-5}$	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.003* (0.002)	-0.003* (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.003)
<i>Alingment with Soviet Union</i>								
Alingment $_{t-1}$	0.401*** (0.052)	0.401*** (0.052)	0.398*** (0.051)	0.398*** (0.051)	0.400*** (0.051)	0.400*** (0.051)	0.401*** (0.052)	0.401*** (0.052)
Alingment $_{t-2}$ to $t-10$	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Constant Stock Effect 5 Years After	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.005* (0.003)	-0.007* (0.004)	0.002 (0.003)	0.003 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.006)
N Country	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18
N	630	630	630	630	630	630	630	630
Period FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Country FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

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RESERVA PROVENIENTE DEL CUADRO DEL PERSONAL SUPERIOR
PERSONAL EN SITUACION DE RETIRO DESDE EL AÑO 1926
LISTADO VOMINAL POR ORDEN GRADO Y ANTIGUEDAD

				DOMICILIO ACTUALIZADO			
A	*MAT	*IND*	*APELLIDO Y NOMBRES	*E*	*S*	*DEPARTAMENTO	*CALLE NRO LOCALIDAD
MS	*GRADO	*NRO		*S*	*PROV		
R				*P*			
I	CNL	02778652	ALBRISI ALFREDO FRANCISCO			CORDOB CAPITAL	BUENOS AIRES 951*5003 CORDOBA
I	CNL	02486264	AMARANTE JOSE PABLO			C FIED	CARLOS E PELLEGRINI 6025*1431 CAP FEDERAL
I	CNL	02242922	BOTTO JOSE ARMANDO		09	BORCHAGUA	2974*1425 C FIED
V	CNL	01238456	CALVO CARLOS ALBERTO			BS AS	GRL SARMIENTO FERNANDO FADER 2441*1663 SAN MIGUEL
S	CNL	02033997	CALVO ERNESTO		09	C FIED	M T DE ALVEAR 768 P 3 DTO A*1058 CAP FED
A	CNL	04772742	CARULLO DAVID			C FIED	DORREGO 3289 P 7 D B*1425 CAPITAL FEDERAL
I	CNL	04040260	DALE JOSE ARMANDO			C FIED	VICENTE LOPEZ VIGADO 339*1638 VICENTE LOPEZ
C	CNL	05766285	DAZ LOZA FLORENTINO			C FIED	ZAPATA 346 P 6 D B*1426 CAPITAL FEDERAL
S	CNL	00147661	ESTEVEZ JULIO RICARDO		09	BS AS	MOINE 1956*1551 BELLA VISTA
A	CNL	06616250	FARCON ARTOS MARIANO			C FIED	CARRON BELGRANO KM 11*200*1896 CITY BELL
A	CNL	05626159	GORDOLLO ERNESTO MANUEL			C RIOS	LA PAZ DE JULIO 1377*3190 PAZ
J	CNL	02587591	HADAD MIGUEL ALBERTO			C FIED	MALVINAS 57 P 5 D B*1406 CAPITAL FEDERAL
A	CNL	04756881	ISLA RODRIGUEZ FELIX RODOLFO			C FIED	PERU 1398 P 1 D A*1068 C FIED
I	CNL	04768933	LOPEZ LEOPOLDO ALFREDO			C FIED	URRUTIA 2569 P 8 D C*1124 CAPITAL FEDERAL
G	CNL	04037999	LUERA JOSE RICARDO			BS AS	URQUIZA 1725*1563 SAN MIGUEL
S	CNL	01921246	MARTIN CARLOS MARIA		09	BS AS	TRES DE FEBRERO MATIENZO 748*1684 CDAD JARDIN LOMAS DEL PALOMA
J	CNL	04321545	OLEGO JOSE			C FIED	CANNING 2673 P 2 D B*1425 CAPITAL FEDERAL
Y	CNL	05534372	ORAZI LUIS EDUARDO			C FIED	ECHEVERRIA 2399 P 1*1428 C FIED
J	CNL	02588268	ORMELLA ANIBAL ARGENTINO			C FIED	AV DORREGO 2599 P 24 D 6*1425 CAPITAL FEDERAL
A	CNL	04011831	PEDREIRA ROBERTO ANTONIO MANUEL			C FIED	MOLDES 1896 P 2 D B*1428 CAPITAL FEDERAL
G	CNL	02783295	POSSE ALBERTO FRANCISCO			C FIED	AV DEL LIBERTADOR 5040 P 10 D A*1426 CAP FED
G	CNL	02797891	RUIZ PALACIOS JOSE DAVID ALBERTO			C FIED	MONTEVIDEO 1920 P 5 C*22*1021 CAPITAL FEDERAL
A	CNL	04765457	SEMBROEIZ PASCUAL ALFREDO			C FIED	PARAGUAY 2499 P 7 D A*1121 CAPITAL FEDERAL
C	CNL	00415877	THOLKE EDUARDO CARLOS			C FIED	AV CALLAD 1370 P 2 D B*1023 CAPITAL FEDERAL
I	CNL	04767834	TREGLIA ENRIQUE ALFREDO			BS AS	ACASSUSO 670*1635 OLLIVOS
G	CNL	04775109	VALLEJOS ALBERTO CESAR			C FIED	MONTEVIDEO 1745 P 7*1021 CAP FEDERAL
D	CNL	00447613	ABBURRA OSCAR EDMUNDO			C FIED	GRL RIVAS 2320*1417 CAPITAL FEDERAL
I	CNL	03233311	ACUNA CLAUDIO			C FIED	BARTOLOME MITRE 2692*1030 CAPITAL FEDERAL
D	CNL	01936866	AGOGIA HOMERO CROMWELL			C FIED	URRUTIA 227 P 0 D A*1425 CAPITAL FEDERAL
I	CNL	02396638	AGUIRRE OSCAR CESAR			C FIED	CALLAD 1225 P 2 D A*1023 CAP FED
C	CNL	04772763	AGUIRRE PAZ MAXIMO PEDRO			C FIED	AVDA DEL LIBERTADOR 4800 P 2*1426 CAP FEDERAL
I	CNL	04768637	AMBROSI ENRIQUE ALVARO			C FIED	SARMIENTO 1674 P 3 D K*1042 CAPITAL FEDERAL
A	CNL	04762609	ARCE MARCELO ANIBAL AURELIO			C FIED	JORGE NEWBERY 2695 P 1*1426 CAPITAL FEDERAL
A	CNL	00431352	ARDANZA LUCAS AUGUSTO			C FIED	ECHEVERRIA 2164 P 6 D 27*1428 CAPITAL FEDERAL
I	CNL	04759602	ARENA SANTIAGO			C FIED	CULPINIA 14 P 12 D A*1406 CAPITAL FEDERAL
C	CNL	04656491	ARIZAGA JORGE AUGUSTO			C FIED	AV DEL LIBERTADOR 4894 P 7 D C*1426 CAP FEDERA
I	CNL	02000253	ARROYO AMILCAR FLACIDO			BS AS	OLAVARRIA LAMADRID 2557*7430 OLAVARRIA
A	CNL	04784904	BACIGALUPPI ALFREDO ALBERTO			BS AS	CALLE 1 N 845 P 1*1900 LA PLATA
I	CNL	04040534	BALLESTERO WALTER HUGO CRIACO			C FIED	MURILLO 598*405 CAPITAL FEDERAL
O	CNL	02002522	BANCHIERI GUILLERMO VALDOLFO			C FIED	AV SANTA FE 4452 P 10 D 52*1425 CAPITAL FEDERAL
A	CNL	04451140	BARLETA OSCAR EDUARDO			C FIED	PALPA 2390 P 8 D C*1426 CAP FEDERAL
A	CNL	07308646	BARRIL ORLANDO MANUEL			C FIED	CNL DIAZ 1461 P 1 D 3*1425 CAPITAL FEDERAL
I	CNL	04759602	BASTOS ARSENIO			C FIED	MURILLO 55*1551 BELLA VISTA
O	CNL	03230557	BATTAINI ALBERTO ENRIQUE			GRL SARMIENTO	AV CABILDO 376 P 5 D A*1426 CAP FED
I	CNL	06700684	BAZAN JULIO CESAR FLAVIO			C FIED	JUNCAL 3408 P 4*1425 CAP FED
I	CNL	04778796	BELLANI OMAR ENRIQUE			C FIED	AV RIVADAVIA 7190 P 5 DB*1406 CAP FED
Y	CNL	03231156	BELLO JUAN RAFAEL			C FIED	RICARDO GUTIERREZ 1031*1425 ACASSUSO
I	CNL	04656568	BELPOLITI HERIBERTO GLASCO ORLANDO			BS AS	LIBERTAD 455*2930 SAN PEDRO
I	CNL	04759199	BERRA ANGEL CARLOS			BS AS	RAUCH 862 P 5*1708 MORON
O	CNL	04025657	BRANCHI JULIAN EDUARDO			C FIED	ARAZO 1315*1416 CAP FED
Y	CNL	05552294	BIDAR JORGE ADOLFO			C FIED	MANUEL UGARTE 2341 P DTO B*1428 C FIED
A	CNL	05595718	BIDONE GUILLERMO JAIME			C FIED	MENDOZA 2321*1428 CAPITAL FEDERAL
A	CNL	04499456	BLAY ANTONIO ENRIQUE			C FIED	AV MELIAN 2321 P 5 D 2*1430 CAP FEDERAL
I	CNL	01921960	BONARDI MESTOR JULIO JUAN			C FIED	AV MELIAN 2321 P 5 D 2*1430 CAP FEDERAL
I	CNL	04465543	BORDA ALFREDO MARIANO			BS AS	B MARTIN 2761 P 1 DPTO 12*7603 MAR DEL PLATA
Y	CNL	00421904	BORDES GABRIEL VIRGILIO			BS AS	GRL SAN MARTIN SAN LORENZO 227*1650 SAN MARTIN
I	CNL	01737092	BRACCO EDUARDO ALBERTO			C FIED	VIA MONTI 1889 P 2*1056 CAP FED
I	CNL	04778952	BRADLAO CARLOS ERNESTO			C FIED	ARZOBISPADO 335 P 3 DPTO 13 C FIED
I	CNL	04784927	CAFFARINI CARLOS ALBERTO			C FIED	AV SANTA FE 1834 P 6 D B*1123 CAP FED
D	CNL	03233225	CAFFARO ALBINO JOSE			C FIED	B ENCALADA 2502 P 1*1428 CAPITAL FEDERAL
C	CNL	04815541	CALVO HECTOR ANIBAL			SG EST CAPITAL	OBISPO TREJO 50*4200 SANTIAGO DEL ESTERO

Maps examples



a. Mexico

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Maps examples

<u>4th Military Zone</u>		
1	Salinas	Artillery Group No. 3 Bolivar
2	Esmeraldas	Engineer Battalion No. 2 Ohaborazo
		Independent Co. Zapadores-Minadores
4	Guayaquil	Infantry Battalion No. 3 Piohinocha
		Infantry Battalion No. 11 Cayambe
		Cavalry Group No. 3 Alhajucla
	(Guayaquil-Ancon)	Anti-aircraft Artillery Group
2	Portoviejo	Infantry Battalion No. 8 Inbabura
		Infantry Company Manabi (Independent)
1	Ancon	Artillery Group No. 5 Villamil
1	Playas	Infantry Battalion No. 1 Vencedores
<u>5th Military Zone</u>		
7	Loja	Infantry Battalion No. 9 Tulcan
		Infantry Battalion No. 13 Napana
		Infantry Battalion No. 19 Azuay
		Cavalry Group No. 4 Pedroa Cordero
		1 Anti-aircraft Battery
	Loja-Vinas	Artillery Group No. 2 Tarqui
	Loja-Vinas	Engineer Battalion No. 1 Montufar
1	Macara	Infantry Battalion No. 14 Macara
<u>Oriente</u>		
1	El Don	Infantry Battalion No. 16 Oriente
1	Montalvo	Infantry Battalion No. 17 Patria
1	Hendex	Infantry Battalion No. 15 Ecuador
1	Zamora	Infantry Battalion No. 18 Maranon

b. Ecuador



c. Colombia

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Effect of SOA commander in Colombia civil conflict

	Dependent variable:					
	Clashes			Attacks		
	Gov.-Gue. (1)	Gov.-Par. (2)	Gue.-Par. (3)	Gue. (4)	Par. (5)	Gov. (6)
SOA commander	-0.050 (0.060) [0.070]	0.005 (0.005) [0.008]	-0.008 (0.016) [0.021]	-0.110 (0.078) [0.063]	-0.017 (0.036) [0.034]	-0.054** (0.025) [0.031]
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Mun. controls x time effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year-Region FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	42854	42854	42854	42854	42854	42854
Municipalities	1094	1094	1094	1094	1094	1094
Exc. Instruments F-stat.	183.85	183.85	183.85	183.85	183.85	183.85

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Robustness: Effect of SOA commander in Colombia

	Dependent variable: Forced disappearance			
	F.D. > 0 (1)	F.D. > 0 (2)	log (F.D.+1) (3)	log (F.D.+1) (4)
SOA commander	0.007 (0.007) [0.006]	0.029 (0.054) [0.066]	0.004 (0.012) [0.008]	0.271** (0.133) [0.134]
Estimation	OLS	IV	OLS	IV
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓
Mun. controls x time effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year-region FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	42854	42854	42854	42854
Municipality	1094	1094	1094	1094
Exc. Instruments F-stat.	–	183.85	–	183.85

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