

Institut für Versicherungswirtschaft

## Insurance as Anxiety Antidote?

Preference for Uncertainty Resolution and Insurance Demand

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From insight to impact.

## Why do people buy (too much / too little) insurance?

- "Standard" risk aversion, probability distortions, loss aversion (e.g., Barseghyan et al. 2013)
- Delay dependency of risk preferences (Epper & Fehr-Duda 2024)
- Contract non-performance risk (e.g., Biener et al. 2019)
- Still, a large fraction of the variation in consumer choice in insurance is often attributed to "confusion" (Ericson & Sydnor 2017)
- → hard to learn anything about individual preferences / welfare from choices if it's simply "confusion"
- → Contribution: add theoretical and empirical support on a novel dimension of preferences ("peace of mind")





## «Peace of mind» in insurance is a common theme in real markets

By concluding an insurance contract, insureds receive:

• a contingent claim, addressing "standard" (i.e., risk, time) and non-standard (i.e., loss aversion) preferences and beliefs

#### AND

 "peace of mind" during a period of uncertainty that pertains to individuals with an aversion to anxiety (Caplin & Leahy 2001).











## In a nutshell: we show that «peace of mind» might be an additional determinant of insurance demand

Theoretically we show that (ergo Hypotheses):

- A DM that maximizes psychological expected utility (Caplin & Leahy 2001) with an aversion to anxiety exhibits higher demand for "perfect" insurance compared to EUT preferences
- If insurance is not "perfect" (i.e., has contract nonperformance risk), a DM maximizing psychological expected utility does not exhibit higher insurance demand or even has lower insurance demand

 $\rightarrow$  See WP for details

Empirically (incentivized + admin data, N=1,595) we find:

- A positive association between an incentivecompatible measure of aversion to anxiety and real insurance demand among a population with high confidence in their insurance company
- A negative association between an incentivecompatible measure of aversion to anxiety and real insurance demand among a population with low confidence in their insurance company


 $\rightarrow$  Focus of this talk





## How can we model «peace of mind»?


- If Early > Late a DM has a preference for early resolution of uncertainty (PERU)
- Generally early resolution can also be preferred under standard models (e.g., EUT), since DMs can "act" upon information received earlier (i.e., instrumental value)
- In the absence of such instrumental value, standard models imply indifference to the timing of uncertainty resolution → Early ~ Late
- "Perfect" insurance implies early resolution of uncertainty, so a DM with PERU gains utility from insurance as it removes a period of anxiety





## Why the assumption of insurance being perfect is crucial

- Even under EUT, contract non-performance risk reduces insurance demand (e.g., Doherty & Schlesinger 1990, Biener et al. 2019)
- Under PERU, perceptions of high contract nonperformance risk reduces "peace of mind" resulting from insurance and the model predicts even higher reductions in insurance demand
- Our data shows large heterogeneity in contract nonperformance perceptions of <u>own</u> insurer





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# Data & methodology: incentive-compatible preference and belief data combined with real-world administrative data

#### Administrative data

- Random conditional (i.e., household, motor, liability) subsample of customers of large Swiss primary insurer
- Detailed policy-level and claims data on each individual

#### **Experimental data**

- Incentive-compatible measures for PERU, risk preferences, beliefs about loss probabilities and contract non-performance risk
- A large range of non-incentivized control variables

Variable	Early resolution			Late resolution			
	Ν	Mean	SD	Ν	Mean	SD	Test
Age	537	46.2	13.3	1,093	46.9	13.1	F = 0.938
Marital status	537			1,093			$\chi^2 = 5.062$
divorced	80	15%		122	11%		
partner	232	43%		480	44%		
separated	15	3%		36	3%		
single	200	37%		436	40%		
widowed	10	2%		19	2%		
Gender	537			1,093			$\chi^2 = 0.53$
female	206	38%		401	37%		
male	330	61%		689	63%		
other	1	0%		3	0%		
Employment	537			1,093			$\chi^2 = 3.688$
employed (less 90%)	95	18%		208	19%		
employed (more 90%)	328	61%		682	62%		
in education	6	1%		17	2%		
other	21	4%		40	4%		
pensioner	66	12%		116	11%		
stay at home	9	2%		11	1%		
unemployed	12	2%		19	2%		
Educational level	537			1,093			$\chi^2 = 9.892$
academic school	55	10%		130	12%		
high school	190	35%		402	37%		
limited	23	4%		28	3%		
no degree	1	0%		0	0%		
other	6	1%		4	0%		
skilled	90	17%		177	16%		
university	172	32%		352	32%		
Income bracket	537			1,093			$\chi^2 = 12.29$
5,001 - 9,000	240	45%		550	50%		
9,001 - 12,000	95	18%		137	13%		
above 12,001	45	8%		87	8%		
below 5,001	138	26%		296	27%		
don't share	19	4%		23	2%		
Wealth	537	639.9	3,101.2	1,093	527.6	1,273.7	F= 1.068
Young child	537	0.7	0.5	1,093	0.7	0.5	F = 0.112
Size housing	537	130.1	73.2	1,093	270.4	4,539.1	F = 0.513
Car value	537	38.9	25.3	1,093	35.8	20.2	F= 7.219**
Risk aversion	537	5.1	2.1	1,093	5.3	2.1	F= 6.084*

Statistical significance markers: \* p<0.05; \*\* p<0.01; \*\*\* p<0.001



## **Empirical model**

 $Coverage = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \cdot beliefsLP + \beta_2 \cdot riskAversion + \beta_3 \cdot PERU$ 


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+ \beta_4 \cdot \text{beliefsCNP} + \beta_5 \cdot (\text{PERU} \times \text{beliefsCNP}) + \beta_j \cdot X_j + \epsilon
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- Coverage = real insurance coverage from administrative data
- beliefs LP = incentivized measure of beliefs about loss probabilities
- riskAversion = incentivized measure of "standard" risk aversion (from lottery choices)
- PERU = incentivized measure of preference for early resolution of uncertainty
- beliefs CNP = incentivized measure of beliefs about contract non-performance risk
- X = a range of individual-level control variables



### Insurance coverage index (admin data)


- The main dependent variable is an insurance coverage index inspired by Armantier et al. (2023)
- We combine all policy-level coverage dimensions in a *Coverage* variable, weighting each dimension equally
- The insurance demand index contains coverage dimensions such as supplementary coverage, sums insured, and deductibles







## PERU measure (experimental data)





- At the end of the experiment, participants have the option to resolve uncertainty about their payout *early* or *late* (avg. payout CHF 38)
- Late resolution incentivized by CHF 2
- Time preferences irrelevant, since payment date is identical




## Main results

- Consistent positive association of "standard" risk aversion on insurance coverage when CNP is believed to be low
- PERU is positively (negatively) associated with insurance coverage when CNP is believed to be low (high) → support for our main hypotheses









## Conclusion

- We show theoretically and provide first empirical evidence from real administrative data that "peace of mind" (i.e., PERU) during periods of uncertainty might provide an additional and separate motive for insurance demand
- PERU might provide an answer to the contract nonperformance puzzle in insurance (i.e., why premium discounts demanded for low levels of CNP are so much higher than expected under EUT)
- Cave: PERU individuals may seek to avoid exposure to risk so we would underestimate the effect, causal approaches needed





Thank you.

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