


Rooting for the same team:
Shared social identities in a polarized context

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
EEA-ESEM 2024

Football



Motivation

- **Political party preference has become a core element of individuals' social identity** [Huddy et al., 2015; Van Bavel and Packer, 2021]. Thus, in contexts of intense political polarization, **political party identity becomes a crucial divisive cleavage**.
- Affective polarization: we **like** supporters of the party we support (**in-group favoritism**), while we **dislike** supporters of the opposing party (**out-group derogation**).



* Boxell et al. [2022]: Using "feeling thermometer" questions ("from 0 to 100, how much do you like supporters of party P?"), measures the average difference between respondents' affect towards their most preferred party(ies) and the average respondents' affect towards the remaining parties.

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- Why should we care about **this divisive cleavage**? Can negatively affect **social cohesion and the formation of social ties** \Rightarrow Contribute to the formation of **Echo chambers**, affect the **news content consumed by citizens** (Levy, 2021) and reduce **exposure to dissenting views** (Bursztyn et al., 2022) (potentially) dampen democratic institutions (Iyengar et al., 2019)

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- However, other social non-political dimensions of identity matter! [Tajfel and Turner, 1986; Akerlof and Kranton, 2000]
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- However, other social non-political dimensions of identity matter! [Tajfel and Turner, 1986; Akerlof and Kranton, 2000]
 - Rooting for the same teams, national identity.
- Sharing other social (non-political) identities can potentially soften the detrimental consequences of political polarization on social cohesion and on the formation of social ties

Questions:

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- Does **congruence** in non-political dimensions of identity soften the detrimental consequences of political polarization in social cohesion?
- Or political identities are so strong as to **overshadow** the positive effects of sharing non-political identities, potentially preventing the strengthening of social cohesion that might otherwise flourish?

This paper

- Experimental evidence from Twitter in a polarized country: Brazil
- Fictional bot accounts that signal two identity dimensions:
 - Political identity: Lula or Bolsonaro supporter.
 - Non-political identity: support a Brazilian football club.

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- Randomly follow Brazilian Twitter accounts with congruent/incongruent identities across these two dimensions.
- Measure formation of ties with two outcomes: **Follow-backs** (in-group favoritism) and **Blocks** (out-group animosity).

Background

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


Toalhas de Bolsonaro e de Lula em loja no centro do Rio


Imagem: Felipe Lucena/UOL

Political Polarization in Brazil

- Brazil's democracy is going through the **most polarizing moment in its history** [Ortellado et al., 2022; Kingstone and Power, 2017].
- Affective polarization in Brazil similar to that of the US.
 - Data from the Comparative Electoral Studies and methodology from Boxell et al. [2022].



(a) Brazil



(b) US [Boxell et al., 2022]

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- ③ Twitter.

Football

- By far, the most popular sport in Brazil.
 - 65% of the country's population claim to be interested in this sport [Nielsen Sports, 2022];
 - 73.1% claim to support a football club [IPEC and O Globo, 2022].
- Football has a **distinctive role in Brazilian society**, being considered a constitutive element of Brazil's national identity [Murad, 1995; DaMatta, 1994].
- **Important features:** Brazilian clubs have traditional **rivals**. Overall, supporters' characteristics across different clubs are “reasonably uncorrelated” with other societal divides.



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- ③ **Twitter.**

Twitter

- Twitter seems to play an **increasingly important role in shaping political discourse worldwide** [Jungherr, 2016].
 - Evidence that Twitter had causal effects on voters' decisions in US elections [Fujiwara et al., 2021]
- Used by over 24 million people in Brazil (top 8 in per capita) [Statista, 2022].

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 - Evidence that Twitter had causal effects on voters' decisions in US elections [Fujiwara et al., 2021]
- Used by over 24 million people in Brazil (top 8 in per capita) [Statista, 2022].
 - Among Brazilians who use Twitter, 75% claim to use the platform to see political information at least sometimes a year [LAPOP, 2019].
 - 45% of Brazilians claim that social media has influenced their vote in the 2018 elections [DataSenado, 2019].
- **Probably not representative of all Brazilians (we selected people who publicly expressed they football-team and political identities), but massive and relevant.**

Experiment Design

Experiment Design: Bot Accounts I (Both dimensions of identity)

- **Profile Pictures:** Club's flag.
- **Bio:** Signals both dimensions of identity:
 - Non-Political Identity: club's official account handle, using the text "Fan of @Club";
 - Political Identity: hashtag "#Lula2022" or "#Bolsonaro2022".
- **Retweets:** the bot retweets a post from the club's official account and a post from its preferred candidate.



Experiment Design: Bot Accounts II (Single dimension of identity)

- Similar to the accounts on the main experiment, but:
 - For the football-club neutral accounts, the account still signals interest about football using a profile picture of a foreign football stadium and the text “Football Fan.” in its bio;
 - The politically-neutral accounts only signal their preferred football club.



Experiment Design: Subject Pool

Initial Subject Pool: Sample of twitter accounts that either tweeted or rt-ed a status containing either a pro-Lula or pro-Bolsonaro hashtag between May 31th and July 11th, 2022.

Account informs its preferred Brazilian football club on its bio. We restrict the analysis to the 6 largest clubs in terms of fans plus their regional rivals.

4,652
subjects

Remove:

- Bots;
- Less than 10 followers;
- Created in 2022;
- Followers/Friends ratio greater than 20.

Experiment Design: Treatment Assignment and Timing

- Day 0** • Creation of Accounts. Bots re-tweet, follow “elite accounts” and are followed by colleagues.
- Day 1** • Each bot follows 100 subjects randomly assigned to it.
- Day 5** • Collect **follow-back** and **block** data. De-activate bot.

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- **Follow-Backs**: measure of whether subjects reciprocate the bot’s follow.
 - Collected using Twitter’s API.
 - Measure of positive affection (in-group favoritism), i.e., of willingness to establish ties with the bot.


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
- **Follow-Backs**: measure of whether subjects reciprocate the bot’s follow.
 - Collected using Twitter’s API.
 - Measure of positive affection (in-group favoritism), i.e., of willingness to establish ties with the bot.
- **Blocks**: through blocking, users restricts the blocked account from contacting them and seeing their posts.
 - Collected manually.
 - Measure of “negative affection” (out-group animosity). Through blocking, user signals the will to be as far apart from the blocked account as possible.

Results

Football as a non-political identity (politically-neutral accounts)




(a) Follow Backs




(b) Blocks

- Congruence in **football-club preference is relevant to the formation of social ties.**
- Individuals who share football club with the bot are 13.4 pp more likely to follow it back, and 1.4 pp less likely to block it.
- At least in our sample: **football-club is a dimension of identity. It matters..**

Political Identity and the Formation of Social Ties (football-neutral accounts)



(a) Follow Backs




(b) Blocks

- **At least in our sample, sharing political identity is also important for the formation of social ties:**
 - Subjects that politically agree with the bot are more than twice as likely to follow it back.
 - Significantly less likely to block it
- **Blocking is much higher when there is political incongruence.**


The Interplay between political and non-political identity

- So far, we only considered results for accounts that were neutral in one of the two identity dimensions we study.
- What about accounts that signal both identities?


The Interplay between political and non-political identity: Follow-Backs




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


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
- Agreeing politically boosts the formation of social ties very similarly, regardless of non-political congruence/incongruence.

The Interplay between political and non-political identity: Follow-Backs




- But, conditional on political identity, the effect of sharing football club is smaller, particularly for politically-opposite individuals.
 - Non-political congruence becomes less relevant when there is political info.

The Interplay between political and non-political identity: Follow-Backs




- The positive effect of sharing political identity (but not non-political) is almost four times larger than the effect of sharing non-political identity (but not political).

The Interplay between political and non-political identity: Follow-Backs




- Congruence in non-political identity still matters, even among politically-opposite individuals. **Interpretation: football may reduce in-group favoritism, although mildly.**

The Interplay between political and non-political identity: Blocks



- Results for blocks are qualitatively similar. However, blocks happen almost exclusively against politically-opposite accounts.

The Interplay between political and non-political identity: Blocks




- For politically-opposite individuals, sharing football club reduces the likelihood of blocking by 41.8%, and by 34.6% relative to when this identity is not signaled.
Interpretation: football may reduce out-group animosity.

Summary so Far

Robustness and Further Analyses

- Both non-political and political identities are relevant to the formation of ties in our setting.
- However, the effect of political identity is larger.
- Effect of non-political identity becomes smaller once we condition on political identity (**evidence that political identity overshadows other dimensions of identity**).
- Yet, non-political identity has an effect on counterbalancing political polarization (especially reducing **out-group animosity**).
 - Consistent (**but to a much lesser extent**) with evidence that football can potentially reduce political divides (Depetris-Chauvin et al. [2020]; Ronconi [2022]).

Effects of polarization over time



- After elections: effects of political congruence become smaller (though effects remain large).
- However, small (and non-significant) differences during the World Cup.

Polarization in the National Team

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- **Overall: another evidence that political polarization may overshadow the cohesion power of shared identities (in this case, the national team)**

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Conclusion

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- The glass is half full...
 - Sharing a non-political identity can foster ties even among politically divergent individuals.
 - Large effect in terms of preventing blocks.
- The glass is half empty...
 - Political polarization reduces the cohesive effects of shared non-political identities.
 - Effects of rooting for the same football club becomes smaller.
 - Disputes between political groups when supporting national team.

Conclusion

A not exhaustive list of reasons we should care

- **Determinants of Social Cohesion:**

- Sports can foster cohesion between conflicting groups Lowe [2021]; Mousa [2020]. And reduce divides: Depetris-Chauvin et al. [2020]; Ronconi [2022]
- **Our paper:** With intense political polarization, the positive effects of sharing a non-political identity are **severely weakened**.
- **Our paper:** Even the identification with the national football team (a la Depetris-Chauvin) has limited power if polarization also permeates the players.

- **Social Media and Polarization:**

- Social media causes (Gentzkow [2016]) and amplifies polarization through echo chambers (Sunstein [2018]). Should we blame algorithms (Epstein and Robertson [2015]; Nyhan et al. [2023])?
- **Our paper:** Social media users choose to sort with those politically similar **even when losing valuable connections**.

Thanks!

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