

# Pricing in Transition and Physical Risks: Carbon Premiums and Stranded Assets

Christoph Hambel<sup>1</sup>      Frederick van der Ploeg<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Tilburg University

<sup>2</sup>University of Oxford

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# Research Question

- Sudden shocks to the political landscape or technological breakthroughs are disruptive changes and examples for transition risk.
- Other examples for disruptive changes are climate tipping points that suddenly affect the Earth's climate system.

## Research Questions

- ① How do sudden disruptive changes affect the social cost of carbon and the transition to a low-carbon economy?
  - ② How does the risk of asset stranding interact with this transition?
  - ③ How do financial markets price in those risks?
- To answer those questions, we develop, calibrate, and solve a two-sector DSGE model with a three-dimensional Markov chain that nests the model of Hambel et al. (2024) as a special case.

# The Model in a Nutshell

- DSGE model with two sectors (green and brown) and two energy sources (renewable energy and fossil fuel).

- Cobb-Douglas production with capital, energy composite

$$E_n = (\kappa_{1,n} G_n^{\rho_n} + \kappa_{2,n} F_n^{\rho_n})^{\frac{1}{\rho_n}}, \text{ and TFP damages } \Lambda_n(T, \mathbf{X})$$

$$Y_n = A_n K_n^{1-\eta_n} E_n^{\eta_n} \Lambda_n(T, \mathbf{X}), \quad n = 1, 2.$$

- endogenous investment, capital reallocation from brown to green.
- capital is affected by climate-related and exogenous disasters.
- Standard climate model with tipping points.
  - industrial emissions  $\sim$  fossil fuel use  $E^{ind} = \nu(F_1 + F_2)$ .
  - negative emission technology may eventually be available at low marginal costs,  $E^{net} = \nu(F_1 + F_2) - D$ .
  - temperatures  $\sim$  cumulative emissions, but noisy.


$$dT = \vartheta(\mathbf{X})[\nu(F_1 + F_2) - D] dt + \sigma_T dW_3$$

- climate tipping points affect the TCRE and damages.

# Markov Chain for Disruptive Changes

- Three-dimensional Markov chain  $\mathbf{X} = (X^c, X^t, X^p)$ .
- Climate-related Markov chain  $X^c$  with three states:
  - pre-tipping state, intermediate state, post-tipping state.
  - climate tipping points affect the TCRE and damages.
  - transition intensity depends on temperature.
- Technological Markov chain  $X^t$  with two states:
  - post-tipping state: Negative emission technology for carbon removal at moderate to low marginal costs (depending on how far the transition is).
- Political Markov chain  $X^p$  with three states modeling political regime shifts:
  - BAU "Trump": Social planner ignores damages from climate change.
  - PIGOU: Social planner implements a tax that internalizes the negative externalities.
  - CAP: Social planner forbids CO<sub>2</sub> emissions if temperatures exceed two degrees.

# Markov Chain for Disruptive Changes



# Consumption and EZ-Preferences

- Consumption goods produced by sector  $n$  are the sector's residual cash flow net of investments, energy costs, and costs of negative emissions

$$C_n = Y_n - I_n - c_n(\mathbf{S}, \mathbf{X}, E_n) - \zeta_n b_d(\mathbf{S}, \mathbf{X}, D).$$

$c_n(\mathbf{S}, \mathbf{X}, E_n)$ : aggregate costs of the energy composite  $E_n$ .

$\zeta_n b_d(\mathbf{S}, \mathbf{X}, D)$ : costs of negative emissions.

- Aggregate consumption:  $C = C_1 + C_2$ , Dividends:  $\mathcal{D}_n = C_n^\varphi$
- We assume that our economy is populated by a representative agent with recursive preferences,

$$J(t, \mathbf{S}, \mathbf{X}) = \sup_{D, F_n, G_n, I_n, R} \mathbb{E}_t \left[ \int_t^\infty f(C_s, J(s, \mathbf{S}_s, \mathbf{X}_s)) ds \right],$$

where  $f$  is the EZ-aggregator. We denote the continuous state variables in the economy by  $\mathbf{S} = (K_1, K_2, T)$ .

# Solution Approach

- The model contains the two-sector model of Hambel et al. (2024) as a special case.
- Rewrite the indirect utility function

$$J(t, K_1, K_2, T, \mathbf{X}) = \frac{1}{1-\gamma} (K_1 + K_2)^{1-\gamma} V(t, S, T, \mathbf{X})$$

where  $S = \frac{K_2}{K_1 + K_2}$ .

- Solve the corresponding Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation and determine carbon prices.
- Derive the dynamics of the pricing kernel and determine
  - risk-free rate,
  - risk premia,
  - dividend yields.
- Simulate the model forward.

# Semi-analytical Results I: SCC and NET

- SCC = Present value of the damages from releasing one ton of carbon into the atmosphere:

$$\tau = \frac{\vartheta(\mathbf{X})c^{1/\psi}}{\delta(\gamma - 1)} \frac{V_T}{V^{1-1/\theta}} K > 0.$$

It is the optimal Pigouvian tax that internalizes the negative externalities from global warming, and is implemented in PIGOU and CAP.

- After a technological breakthrough, the social planner keeps extracting carbon from the atmosphere until the marginal costs exceed the marginal benefits (i.e., the SCC):

$$\frac{\partial b_d(\mathbf{S}, \mathbf{X}, D)}{\partial D} = \tau$$



## Semi-analytical Results II: Risk-free Rate


$$\begin{aligned}
 r_t^f = & \underbrace{\delta}_{\text{Discounting}} + \underbrace{\frac{1}{\psi}\mu_C}_{\text{Consumption Smoothing}} - \underbrace{\frac{1}{2}\gamma\left(1 + \frac{1}{\psi}\right)\|\sigma_C\|^2}_{\text{Standard Diffusion Risk}} \\
 & - \underbrace{\sum_{i=c,e} \lambda_i(T)\mathbb{E}\left[Z_i^{-\gamma} - 1 + \frac{\theta-1}{\theta}(1 - Z_i^{1-\gamma})\right]}_{\text{Disaster Risk}} \\
 & + \underbrace{\frac{\gamma\psi-1}{2\psi^2}\left(\|\sigma_C - \sigma_k\|^2 + \psi(\|\sigma_C\|^2 - \|\sigma_k\|^2)\right) + \frac{\theta-1}{\theta}\frac{1}{\psi}\sigma_g^\top(\sigma_C - \sigma_k)}_{\text{Temperature Interaction Risk}} \\
 & - \underbrace{\sum_{x \neq \mathbf{X}} \lambda_x(\mathbf{S}, \mathbf{X}, x)\left[(1 - j_v^x)^{1-1/\theta}(1 - j_c^x)^{-1/\psi} - 1 + \frac{\theta-1}{\theta}j_v^x\right]}_{\text{NEW: Climate Tipping and Transition Risk}}
 \end{aligned}$$

# Benchmark Calibration I

- ① Green sector only takes renewable energy. Brown sector takes both energy forms as substitutes. Costs of renewable energy fall in accordance with Swanson's law. → No asset stranding
- ② We calibrate the economic part of the model such that it matches the historical average (e.g., Hambel et al., 2023, 2024)
  - consumption growth rate of  $\approx 2\%$ ,
  - investment-output ratio of  $\approx 25\%$ ,
  - real interest rate of  $\approx 0.8\%$ ,
  - equity premium of  $\approx 6.6\%$ ,
  - Tobin's Q of  $\approx 1.5$ ,
  - consumption volatility of  $\approx 2\%$ .
- ③ We calibrate the climate part to match a relaxed RCP8.5 scenario and Allen et al. (2009), tipping points and TFP damages in line with Cai and Lontzek (2019), and climate disasters in line with Karydas and Xepapadeas (2022).



# Benchmark Calibration II

- 4 We calibrate the cost functions for the net emission technology and the breakthrough probability to be in line with Rebonato et al. (2023) and Fuss et al. (2018).







- 5 The political Markov chain is calibrated to roughly match the likelihood and resulting temperature increase of the various transition scenarios in Moore et al. (2022).

# Simulation Results for the Benchmark Calibration I







- Carbon taxes are initially zero as the world starts in BAU.
- When society starts pricing, taxes are sizable but depend to a large extent on the current state of the Markov chain.
- Average taxes in 2021 are 308 USD/tC or 84 USD/tCO<sub>2</sub>.





# Simulation Results for the Benchmark Calibration II



# Simulation Results for the Benchmark Calibration III



# Simulation Results for the Benchmark Calibration IV







# Simulation Results for the Stranded Asset Case I





- As a variant, we calibrate the model such that it can generate asset stranding.
  - The brown sector takes fossil fuel only.
  - The green sector accepts both energy forms as substitutes with a much higher weight on renewable energies.
  - We provide several alternative specifications that lead to qualitatively similar results.
- The brown sector can now be interpreted as the fossil fuel industry.
- If temperature exceeds  $2^{\circ}\text{C}$  and there is a policy transition to CAP, the brown sector must not be operated anymore. → Asset stranding
- The costs of stranding are sizable and society aims to counter this risk by implementing more stringent carbon taxes (366 USD/tC) and an accelerated transition towards net zero.
- Financial markets price in the risk of stranding.
  - More precautionary savings → lower interest rates.
  - Higher risk premia for both risky assets.
  - Price of the brown asset is sizable lower than in the benchmark case.





# Simulation Results for the Stranded Asset Case II



# Simulation Results for the Stranded Asset Case III



# Simulation Results for the Stranded Asset Case IV



- Number of paths with stranded assets peaks in 2080 at 15% of the paths.
- Stranding can be reverted if either the policy state transitions back from the CAP state or if temperatures fall below two degrees.
- Negative emission technology reduces the likelihood of stranding and increases the likelihood that the brown technology may eventually be operated again.

# Conclusion

- Our results indicate that the existence of the carbon premium (Bolton and Kaspercyk 2021, 2023; Hsu et al. 2023) is driven by political transition risk.
  - It is initially small (Aswani et al. 2024; Hambel and van der Sanden 2024; Zhang 2024).
  - When transition risks become more pronounced, it becomes sizable.
- Negative emission technologies are essential to keep temperatures below two degrees.
- We provide a detailed numerical analysis on how political shocks affect asset prices and find (among other things):
  - If climate policy has already tightened, the risk of a transition to CAP has sizable effects on risk premia and the risk-free rate.
  - If temperatures are already close to two degrees, the magnitude of the risk premia and precautionary savings can be about as high as for Barro-type disaster risk.
  - These effects vanish when the transition is complete.