

# Start-up Acquisitions and the Entrant’s and Incumbent’s Innovation Portfolios\*

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## Abstract

An entrant and an incumbent engage in an investment portfolio problem where each chooses how to allocate its research funds across a rival market, where they compete with one another, and a non-rival market, where they do not interact. Allowing for acquisitions distorts both players’ incentives to allocate funding across their rival and non-rival projects. We show conditions under which the incumbent, anticipating the rents that accrue from the monopolization of the rival market, moves R&D resources from other markets to the rival market. This “incumbency for buyout effect” lowers the expected rents the entrant obtains from the contestable market, which gives it incentives to move its investment portfolio away from the rival market. We show that this strategic effect dominates the usual “innovation for buyout effect” when the entrant’s bargaining power is below a threshold. Allowing for acquisitions may improve the direction of innovation of each of the players as well as consumer surplus. Because precisely the shift of resources towards and away from non-rival projects causes the welfare gains and losses, using the traditional definition-of-the-market approach to assess the impact of acquisitions should be reconsidered.

**JEL Classification:** O31, L13, L41

**Keywords:** start-up acquisitions, innovation portfolios, direction of innovation, incumbency for buyout, innovation for buyout

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# 1 Introduction

“I remember your internal post about how Instagram was our threat and not Google+. You were basically right. One thing about startups though is you can often acquire them.”

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*Mr. Zuckerberg on April 9, 2012, the day Facebook announced it was acquiring Instagram, cited in FTC vs. Facebook, Case No.: 1:20-cv-03590.*

“Examples of things we could scale back or cancel: . . . Mobile photos app (since we’re acquiring Instagram).”

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*Mr. Zuckerberg on April 22, 2012, cited in FTC vs. Facebook, Case No.: 1:20-cv-03590.*

The popular photo-sharing app *Instagram* was launched on Oct 6, 2010. Its founders also worked on *Burbn*, a check-in app for sharing locations with friends. A couple of years later, in 2011-2012, *Facebook* attempted to develop a competing app for images transmission. In 2012 *Facebook* acquired *Instagram* for 1 billion dollars. A similar course of events occurred in the *Google/DoubleClick* case. In 2008 *Google* bought *DoubleClick* for 3.1 billion dollars. Before its acquisition, *DoubleClick* had been active in the markets for search marketing services (*Performics*) and consumer-purchasing data (*Abacus Direct*). Likewise, *Google* started developing its own online advertising technology *AdWords* in 2000 and added new functionalities year after year. Another tech giant, *Microsoft*, developed *Messenger* in 1999, which allowed for voice calls and instant messaging. The once most-famous voice-over-IP service *Skype* entered the market later, in August 2003. Its founders also invested in a streaming video service known as *Joost*, which later turned unsuccessful. In 2011 *Microsoft* bought *Skype* for 8.5 billion dollars and later in 2013 *Microsoft* discontinued *Messenger*.

These famous start-up acquisitions, which drastically reshaped the online advertising and consumer communication markets, have two important features in common. First, before the acquisition took place, both the target and the acquirer were actively investing in various technological developments and *held a portfolio of projects*. Second, some of the target’s investment projects but not all overlapped with the acquirer’s projects, which created *firm rivalry in the markets of common interest*. In this paper we develop a theory to understand the impact of start-up acquisitions that have the above two features. By comparing the investment portfolios of the target and the acquirer when they anticipate an acquisition to take place with those that they would hold in a hypothetical counterfactual where acquisitions are not allowed, we assess the impact of start-up acquisitions on a new margin, namely, the innovation direction taken by target and acquirer, as well as on prices and overall consumer surplus.<sup>1</sup>

The study of the (anti-)competitive effects of start-up acquisitions has recently received a great

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<sup>1</sup>Earlier work has focused on whether start-up acquisitions increase or decrease investment incentives (see e.g. Cabral (2021); Cunningham et al. (2021); Katz (2021)). However, the direction of technology is certainly no less important (see e.g. Hopenhayn and Squintani (2021); Acemoglu (2023)).

deal of attention. While some authors have emphasized the “killer acquisitions” phenomenon by which incumbent firms that buy start-ups discontinue some of their innovation projects (e.g. Cunningham et al. (2021) and Motta and Peitz (2021)), others have put forward the “innovation for buyout” effect, which refers to the idea that allowing start-ups to exit via acquisitions boosts their incentives to innovate in order to appropriate a significant share of the acquisition rents (e.g. Rasmusen (1988); Hollenbeck (2020); Cabral (2021) and Katz (2021)).

With some exceptions, notably Letina et al. (2020), Katz (2021), Motta and Shelegia (2021) and Cabral (2023), the literature on start-up acquisitions has focused on the effects of acquisitions on the entrants’ investment incentives and has, to a large extent, ignored their impact on the acquiring firms. This omission is important because of at least two reasons. First, as mentioned in the examples above, incumbent firms do pursue their own innovative projects and there is often overlap with the start-up’s projects. Neglecting this rivalry presumes the acquirer’s and the target’s investment portfolios are independent, while they may not. Second, and more importantly, when acquisitions are allowed, both the target and the acquirer may distort their investment plans to strengthen their competitive position vis-à-vis the entrant in order to merge on more favorable terms. This is what Katz (2021) calls the “incumbency for buyout” effect, which, in a multi-project setting, may push the incumbent to forgo its own research effort in the area of business overlap with the entrant and instead focus on other business areas. As suggested by the above quote on *Facebook* scaling back its work on Mobile photos app after the acquisition of *Instagram*, such portfolio adjustment may cause “reverse killer acquisitions” (see Caffarra et al. (2020) and Cabral (2023)). In this paper, by examining how start-up acquisitions affect not only the portfolio of investments of the target firm but also that of the acquirer, we give the aspect of *strategic interaction* in the investment market a central role. We show that incorporating the strategic aspect that the acquirer can invest to defend its market or alternatively to give it up leads to new insights not yet shown in the literature. In particular, we show that the strategic defense of the contestable market by the acquirer may completely offset the well-known “innovation for buyout” effect of start-up acquisitions.

We present a model of an industry where an incumbent and a start-up entrant interact in the innovation and product markets. Both firms have a fixed R&D budget, or alternatively a fixed number of scientist-hours. Initially, the incumbent is active as a monopolist in two markets. In each of these markets, the incumbent originally sells low-quality products but can make investments to improve their quality. One of these markets is alluded to as the *rival* market and the other as the *non-rival* market. This nomenclature is meant to refer to the idea that the entrant can challenge the position of the incumbent in the former market but not in the latter. In fact, the entrant can make investments to enter the rival market and another, third, non-rival market. The outcomes of the research projects are

stochastic. A project may turn successful or unsuccessful, with the probability of project success being increasing in the amount of investment allocated to it. A successful outcome in a project allows the entrant to enter the market corresponding to that project. When the entrant successfully enters the rival market, it enters with a high-quality product. Likewise, a successful project allows the incumbent to improve the quality of its offering in the corresponding market. When the incumbent succeeds in the rival market, it also offers a high-quality product. We are interested in how permitting acquisitions distorts the players' incentives to allocate funding across rival and non-rival projects and how this bears on the direction of innovation and consumer surplus.

The interaction between incumbent and entrant is modeled as a three-stage game, with an additional bargaining stage if an acquisition is allowed. In the first stage, the start-up allocates its research budget over the rival and non-rival projects. In the second stage, upon observing the outcome of the entrant's projects, the incumbent apportions its R&D resources over the rival and non-rival projects. In the last stage, if acquisitions are not allowed, the start-up and the incumbent engage in strategic competition to serve the rival market, while each player serves its non-rival market. If acquisitions are allowed, the merged entity serves all markets and the incumbent and entrant bargain to appropriate a share of the monopolization rents generated by the acquisition.

We first examine the impact of acquisitions on the investment portfolios chosen by the target and the acquirer. The key to understand how acquisitions distort the incentives to allocate funding across projects is to realize that firms distribute their funding across their investment opportunities to equalize the marginal returns from their investments. Hence, if permitting acquisitions makes a project relatively more attractive for a player, then acquisitions will imply a shift of resources towards the project whose relative profitability rises, to the detriment of the alternative project.

This insight helps us easily explain how the incumbent adapts its investment portfolio in anticipation of the acquisition of the entrant. First, notice that an acquisition alters the returns from the rival project (because of the acquisition rents created by monopolization of the rival market) but does not affect those from the non-rival project. Hence, if the acquisition rents accruing to the incumbent when it successfully innovates are greater than when it fails to improve its product, permitting acquisitions results in the incumbent shifting resources from the independent market project to the rival market project. Otherwise, allowing acquisitions results in the incumbent "giving up" the rival market and allocating a larger share of funds to its independent market. Therefore, the so-called "incumbency for buyout" effect of Katz (2021) manifests itself here as a change in the investment portfolio –and consequently in the incumbent's direction of innovation– that depends on how the expected acquisition rents in case of project success and failure rank.

We now discuss how the entrant adjusts its investment portfolio in anticipation of its acquisition.

We observe that the change in the entrant’s investment incentives is driven by two economic forces. The first force is the “innovation for buyout effect”. In our model, because the rents from the entrant’s independent project are not affected by the prospect of an acquisition, this effect incentivizes the entrant to move resources from the non-rival project to the rival project. The second effect is a strategic effect that arises because the entrant’s and the incumbent’s investments in the rival project are strategic substitutes. By this effect, the entrant, anticipating the incumbent will decrease investment in the rival project, will tend to strategically increase it, and *viceversa*. Hence, the innovation for buyout effect and the strategic effect operate in the same direction when the incumbent’s expected acquisition rents in case of project failure are higher than in case of project success, in which case the entrant moves its investment portfolio towards the rival project. In the opposite situation where the incumbent’s expected acquisition rents in case of project success are higher than in case of project failure, the innovation for buyout effect and the strategic effects operate in opposite directions. We then show that the relative strength of these two effects depends on the bargaining power of the target and the acquirer. Specifically, the innovation for buyout effect dominates the strategic effect when the entrant’s bargaining power is sufficiently large. In such a case, the incumbent changes its investment portfolio little in anticipation of the acquisition of the target and, hence, the magnitude of the strategic effect is small. Consequently, acquisitions result in both the entrant and incumbent tilting their research portfolios towards the contestable market. By contrast, when the entrant’s bargaining power is sufficiently low, the strategic effect dominates the innovation for buyout effect and acquisitions result in the incumbent investing more in the rival market and the entrant shying away from it and focusing on other markets.

Having described how acquisitions alter the investment portfolios of the players, we now relate how acquisitions impact the efficiency of their investment portfolios. We show that circumstances exist under which allowing for acquisitions improves the direction of innovation for both the entrant and incumbent, though there also exist other contexts where the opposite occurs. For example, when an acquisition causes the entrant to tilt its investment portfolio towards the contestable market and the incumbent to “give it up” and move research resources away from it, then the direction of innovation improves provided that the surplus of consumers in the entrant’s alternative market is low and that in the incumbent’s alternative market is high. The conditions simply require that resources are moved towards markets with high returns for consumers. Last but not least, we show that the efficiency enhancing effect of acquisitions on the direction of innovation may be sufficiently large so as to dominate the negative price effects of acquisitions. Thus, permitting acquisitions may improve the direction of innovation and increase consumer surplus. These insights are robust to alternative modeling assumptions where we reverse the order of moves in the investment market, we allow the acquirer to take over the investment decision of the entrant and not only its production decision, and finally we assume that

the incumbent does not observe the outcome of the entrant’s projects but just its investment portfolio. These extensions are placed in an online appendix.

The paper highlights that strategic choices driven by the anticipation of acquisitions may affect not only market profitability but can also re-shape the portfolio of projects undertaken by both the acquirer and target. Such strategic responses can be profitable for the firms but can also hurt the direction of innovation in various markets relative to what is socially desirable. This raises additional concerns for antitrust enforcement. Given our results that tighter regulations on acquisitions may either positively or negatively impact the direction of innovation and consumer welfare, we suggest a case-by-case assessment to determine the potential benefits and drawbacks. We also argue that examining the acquisitions of start-ups by innovative incumbents in multi-project settings using the traditional *definition-of-the-market* approach overlooks a crucial factor: the shift of R&D resources towards or away from non-overlapping areas of business of the target and the acquirer, which causes significant welfare effects.

The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. After reviewing the relevant literature, Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 offers a general characterization of the solution to the investment portfolio problem. This general solution applies irrespective of whether the decision maker is the start-up, incumbent, joint entity or social planner. Sections 4 and 5 give the equilibria of the no-acquisition and acquisition games. In Section 6, we investigate how the prospect of an acquisition distorts the start-up’s and incumbent’s investment portfolios. Section 7 evaluates how acquisitions impact the players’ direction of innovation activity from a social welfare point of view, while Section 8 assesses the impact of permitting acquisitions on consumer welfare. Finally, Section 9 concludes the paper and offers some policy recommendations. All the proofs are relegated to the Appendix. An online appendix contains various extensions, where we relax some of the modeling assumptions of the basic setup and show robustness of our results.

## 1.1 Related literature

Our paper is a contribution to the understanding of the effects of start-up acquisitions on innovation. Specifically, by modeling investment portfolios, our paper focuses on the effect of permitting acquisitions on the direction of innovation; moreover, by allowing both the target and the acquirer to invest in R&D projects, our paper captures strategic interaction in the innovation market in the context of start-up acquisitions.

The study of start-up acquisitions has attracted much effort in recent years, and our study builds upon existing work in this area. In a seminal contribution, Cunningham et al. (2021) demonstrated the possible occurrence of the “killer acquisitions” phenomenon whereby, owing to the force of the well-

known “Arrow replacement effect”, incumbents discontinue the research projects of acquired firms. Although Greenstein and Ramey (1998), Chen and Schwartz (2013) and Motta and Peitz (2021) point out that it is possible that the replacement effect is weaker for incumbents than for entrants and hence killer acquisitions need not materialize, Cunningham et al. (2021) and Gautier and Lamesch (2021) provide empirical evidence for this phenomenon in the pharmaceutical and digital markets, respectively.<sup>2</sup>

Several authors have highlighted a potentially positive aspect of start-up acquisitions: the “innovation for buyout” effect. This refers to the heightened motivation for start-ups to engage in innovation when they anticipate the possibility of being acquired (see Rasmusen (1988); Cabral (2018); Hollenbeck (2020); Katz (2021)). However, other authors have pointed out that this effect need not be definitely beneficial for consumers. For instance, Bryan and Hovenkamp (2020) present a dynamic multiple-incumbents model in which start-ups choose to innovate in a way that benefits the market leader rather than the laggards, thereby perpetuating the dominance of the leader firm. Further, Kamepalli et al. (2020) suggest that start-up acquisitions may discourage entry into markets with network externalities because consumers may be less inclined to adopt a new technology from a new entrant if they anticipate the entrant will be acquired by an incumbent. Finally, Denicolò and Polo (2021) argue that while the innovation for buyout effect may boost innovation in the short-term, repeated acquisitions can reinforce the incumbent’s dominance over time, leading to an “entrenchment of monopoly” effect that can stifle innovation in the long run. In an empirical study of firm entry into the North American and European software industry, Eisfeld (2023) estimates the “innovation for buyout” effect to have a net positive effect on entry, which suggests that a prohibition of acquisitions would have a detrimental effect on entry in that industry. Our contribution to this line of work is showing that the “innovation for buyout” effect may be offset by a strategic effect by which the entrant, anticipating the incumbent to “defend” its dominance in the contestable market, gives it up and focuses on other non-rival activities.

The innovation for buyout effect affects not only the intensity of innovation but also its nature. For example, Callander and Matouschek (2021) and Gilbert and Katz (2022) show that start-ups, anticipating being acquired by an incumbent, tend to choose products that are more similar to those of the incumbent, rather than products that are more horizontally differentiated. Moreover, Warg (2022) finds that start-ups are more likely to develop substitute products rather than complementary ones when they anticipate being acquired by an incumbent. Our paper is complementary to this line of inquiry because, rather than asking how acquisitions affect the nature of the product developed by the entrant, it asks which products get developed.

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<sup>2</sup>A related study is Fumagalli et al. (2020), which shows that, despite incumbents having less incentive to innovate than entrants due to the Arrow replacement effect, an acquisition may be beneficial for consumers if the entrant is severely financially-constrained.

Our contribution is closer to a group of papers in the literature that explore the effects of start-up acquisitions not only on entrants but also on incumbents. As far as we know, Katz (2021) is the first paper mentioning the “incumbency for buyout” effect, whereby an incumbent may make investments to extract rents from an entrant through a merger. In our setting, the “incumbency for buyout” effect manifests itself as a change in the incumbent’s direction of innovation and the nature of this effect depends on market fundamentals. Further, Motta and Shelegia (2021) allow incumbents to use imitation strategies to protect their market power, which create so-called “kill zones” and push entrants to develop complement products, rather than substitutes. Permitting acquisitions weakens the “kill-zone” effect and enhances start-ups’ incentives to enter the incumbent’s market by introducing rival products.<sup>3</sup> In our model, the strategic effect by which the entrant moves its investment portfolio in a direction opposite to the incumbent’s is akin to the “kill-zone” effect but, depending on parameters, it may reinforce the “innovation for buyout” effect of acquisitions.

Finally, our paper relates to a cluster of papers studying firm decision-making in multi-project settings. The study of multi-project settings is a central focus in the works of Gilbert (2019); Letina et al. (2020); Letina (2016), as well as other studies on the direction of innovation (Bryan and Lemus, 2017; Bryan et al., 2022; Chen et al., 2018; Hopenhayn and Squintani, 2021; Manenti and Sandrini, 2023). The main difference between these papers and ours is that these studies typically assume firms work on developing one project only, but must explore multiple research avenues to potentially discover a successful one. In contrast, our study specifically examines the impact of start-up acquisitions on multi-project R&D firms. In this sense, the closest paper to the current one is our own previous work Dijk et al. (2022). While our earlier contribution focuses solely on the impact of start-up acquisitions on the entrant’s investment incentives and is completely silent about the incumbent’s R&D incentives, our current paper takes the strategic interaction between the entrant and the incumbent in the innovation market to its heart. Combining the well-known “innovation for buyout” and “incumbency for buyout” phenomena into a single framework gives rise to a strategic effect akin to the “kill-zone” effect that bears importantly on how target and acquirer adjust their investment portfolios when acquisitions are allowed. In fact, in our model if the acquirer could not invest to defend its market, then the entrant would always invest more in anticipation of its acquisition relative to when acquisitions are not allowed. Modeling the acquirer’s R&D incentives leads to the new result that the “innovation for buyout” effect may not be observed at all because it may completely be dominated by the strategic effect. To the best of our knowledge, this has not yet been shown in the literature and may have implications for the interpretation of empirical results on the effects of acquisitions on investment.

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<sup>3</sup>In a model with multiple start-ups, Teh et al. (2022) show that allowing acquisitions may create “kill zones” for non-targeted start-ups. This occurs because non-acquired start-ups, anticipating tougher competition from the incumbent upon acquiring the latest technology, choose to develop a weak substitute or even a non-rival product.



## 2 The model

We study an industry with an incumbent ( $I$ ) and a start-up entrant ( $E$ ). Initially, the incumbent is active as a monopolist in markets  $A$  and  $C$ . In both markets, the incumbent originally sells products of low quality but can make investments to improve the quality of its products. Likewise, the entrant can invest to enter in one of these markets, say market  $A$ , and in another market  $B$ . The focus of our paper is on how the incumbent and the entrant allocate funding to their research projects and how this allocation is affected by acquisitions. We assume that both the incumbent and the entrant have fixed R&D budgets, which we normalize to one without loss of generality.<sup>4</sup> The R&D budget of a firm has to be spent on research and hence may also be interpreted as the fixed number of scientist-hours it has at its disposal.

We model the interaction between the incumbent and the start-up as a three-stage game. In the first stage of the game, *the entrant's innovation stage*, the start-up chooses its investment portfolio, i.e. how much funding to allocate to projects  $A$  and  $B$ . Let  $x^E$  be the start-up's investment in project  $A$  and, correspondingly, let  $1 - x^E$  be its investment in project  $B$ . The entrant can only enter the markets corresponding to the projects  $A$  and  $B$  upon successful completion of the projects. Following Moraga-González et al. (2022) and Dijk et al. (2022), the probabilities the entrant successfully completes the projects are given by the Tullock specifications:

$$p(x^E, \epsilon_A) = \frac{x^E}{x^E + \epsilon_A} \quad \text{and} \quad q(1 - x^E, \epsilon_B) = \frac{1 - x^E}{1 - x^E + \epsilon_B}. \quad (1)$$

The parameters  $\epsilon_A$  and  $\epsilon_B$  proxy for the innovation difficulty. The success probabilities increase in investment and decrease in innovation difficulty. Adopting the Tullock functional form is useful because, as we will see in Section 3, the investment portfolio problem is strictly concave in own investment. Moreover, when  $\epsilon_A \rightarrow 0$  and  $\epsilon_B \rightarrow 0$  the maximization problem of the entrant always has an interior solution and can be computed in closed form by solving the first order condition (FOC) for expected profit maximization. If project  $A$  is successful, the entrant enters market  $A$  with a product of higher quality than the basic quality of the incumbent. If project  $A$  is unsuccessful, the entrant stays out of market  $A$  and gets zero profits. Likewise, if project  $B$  is successfully concluded, the entrant enters market  $B$ ; otherwise, it stays out.

In the second stage of the game, *the incumbent's innovation stage*, the incumbent chooses its investment portfolio after observing the outcomes of the entrant's research projects.<sup>5</sup> Specifically, the

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<sup>4</sup>Later in Section 3 we show that assuming different research budgets for the incumbent and the entrant does not impact our results qualitatively.

<sup>5</sup>In different words, we assume that the incumbent observes entry into its market. An alternative modeling is such that the incumbent observes the investment portfolio of the entrant but does not observe whether the projects turn out

incumbent chooses how much money to allocate to projects  $A$  and  $C$ . Hence, let  $x_j^I$  be the incumbent's (conditional) investment in project  $A$  and, correspondingly, let  $1 - x_j^I$  be its investment in project  $C$ , where  $j = f, s$  indicates whether the entrant has failed ( $f$ ) or succeeded ( $s$ ) to enter market  $A$  in stage 1. Similarly as for the entrant, the probabilities the incumbent successfully completes its two projects are given by:

$$p(x_j^I, \epsilon_A) = \frac{x_j^I}{x_j^I + \epsilon_A} \quad \text{and} \quad q(1 - x_j^I, \epsilon_C) = \frac{1 - x_j^I}{1 - x_j^I + \epsilon_C}, \quad j = f, s. \quad (2)$$

Successful completion of project  $A$  allows the incumbent to increase its product quality. Specifically, we assume that this quality improvement allows the incumbent to match the quality of the entrant in case the latter has entered the market. Likewise, if project  $C$  is successfully completed, the incumbent increases the quality of its offering in market  $C$ .<sup>6</sup>

If acquisitions are allowed there is a third stage of the game, *the bargaining stage*, in which the incumbent and the start-up (Nash-)bargain over the rents created by the acquisition. We denote the bargaining power of the entrant by  $1 - \delta$  and that of the incumbent by  $\delta$ . If acquisitions are prohibited, this stage is skipped.<sup>7</sup>

Finally, in the last stage of the game, *the market stage*, the incumbent and the entrant serve their markets. This stage depends on whether acquisitions are allowed or not. When acquisitions are not allowed, if the start-up enters the rival market  $A$ , the start-up and the incumbent engage in strategic interaction to serve market  $A$ 's consumers. The quality of the product the incumbent sells depends on whether its project is successful or not. Meanwhile, the start-up and the incumbent serve their customers in markets  $B$  and  $C$ , respectively. Otherwise, when acquisitions are allowed, the merged entity takes over all production decisions concerning markets  $A$ ,  $B$ , and  $C$ .

We solve the game by backward induction. In principle, we do not explicitly model the last stage of the game and specify the payoffs from the strategic interaction in market  $A$  as follows. There are four sub-games. First, suppose that both the start-up and the incumbent successfully complete project  $A$ . In that case, both firms sell a high-quality product in market  $A$  and we denote the payoff each of the firms gets by  $\pi_{hh}$ , where the sub-index  $hh$  indicates that both players sell a high-quality product. Second, suppose that the start-up successfully completes project  $A$  but the incumbent fails. In that case, the entrant sells a high-quality product while the incumbent the basic low-quality one. Let  $\pi_{hl}$

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successful or unsuccessful. We examine such a case in the online appendix where we show that, despite making some of the analysis analytically intractable, our main results stay unchanged.

<sup>6</sup>Our assumption that the incumbent invests after the entrant is consistent with the “quiet-life” hypothesis of monopoly: the presence of the start-up “awakes” the incumbent who then invests to defend its market. Nevertheless, in the online appendix we examine an alternative modeling where we reverse the players’ order of play in the R&D market. The main insights of our analysis are robust to this modification.

<sup>7</sup>In the online appendix we also study an alternative modeling of acquisitions where they occur at the very beginning of the game and hence the incumbent not only takes over the production of the start-up but also over its investment decision.

and  $\pi_{\ell h}$  denote the payoffs of the start-up and the incumbent in such a case, respectively. Naturally, we assume  $\pi_{h\ell} > \pi_{hh} > \pi_{\ell h}$ . Third, suppose the start-up fails to complete project  $A$  but the incumbent succeeds. In that case, the entrant does not enter market  $A$  and the incumbent operates in market  $A$  as a monopolist selling a high-quality product. We denote the payoff it obtains by  $\pi_h^m$ , where the super-index  $m$  indicates monopoly. Finally, suppose both the start-up and the incumbent fail to complete project  $A$ . In that case, the entrant does not enter and the incumbent operates as a monopolist in market  $A$  selling a low-quality product. We denote the payoff it obtains by  $\pi_\ell^m$ . Naturally, we assume  $\pi_h^m > \pi_\ell^m$ .

We provide a schematic representation of our model in Figure 1. We refer to market  $A$  as the “rival market” to emphasize that successful completion of the project by the entrant breaks the initial monopoly position of the incumbent. Projects  $B$  and  $C$  are “non-rival” or independent projects in the sense that project  $B$  has nothing to do with the incumbent’s business and similarly project  $C$  does not affect the entrant’s profits. We specify the payoffs from successfully completing those projects as  $\pi_B$  and  $\pi_C$ . Projects  $B$  and  $C$  shape the optimal portfolios of the entrant and the incumbent, respectively, but they do not affect the acquisition rents directly. However, as we have explained in the introduction, they play a very important role when assessing the social welfare implications of acquisitions.




Figure 1: Schematic representation of the no-acquisition and acquisition games.

### 3 The investment decisions

This section puts forward an auxiliary result that helps to present our Propositions. The auxiliary result just describes how an agent (incumbent, entrant or social planner) ought to choose its investment portfolio to maximize its expected payoff. It has been used in the related work by Moraga-González et al. (2022) and Dijk et al. (2022) and we briefly reproduce it for the sake of completeness.

Consider a decision maker (incumbent, entrant or social planner) picking its investment portfolio  $(x, 1 - x)$  to maximize its objective function (profits or social welfare). The problem of the decision maker is to maximize an expected returns expression of the form:

$$\mathbb{E}R(x) = \frac{x}{x + \epsilon_A} R_A^S + \frac{\epsilon_A}{x + \epsilon_A} R_A^F + \frac{1 - x}{1 - x + \epsilon_z} R_z^S. \quad (3)$$

The first term of this expression is the probability that the rival project  $A$  turns successful, times its corresponding payoff denoted  $R_A^S$ . The second term is the probability that the rival project  $A$  fails, times its payoff in such a case  $R_A^F$ . Finally, the third term is the probability of success of the non-rival project  $z$ , which is project either  $B$  or  $C$  depending on which decision maker is considered, times its payoff in that event  $R_z^S$ . (We have normalized  $R_z^F$  to zero.)

**Lemma 1** *The unique interior maximizer of (3) is*

$$x(R_A/R_z; \epsilon_A, \epsilon_z) = \frac{1 + \epsilon_z - \epsilon_A \sqrt{\frac{\epsilon_z R_z}{\epsilon_A R_A}}}{1 + \sqrt{\frac{\epsilon_z R_z}{\epsilon_A R_A}}}, \quad (4)$$

where  $R_A \equiv R_A^S - R_A^F$  and  $R_z \equiv R_z^S - R_z^F$ .<sup>8</sup>

That the investment portfolio problem has (under quite general conditions) a closed-form interior solution is crucial for the tractability of the multi-stage games we analyze. Inspection of (4) immediately reveals that what truly matters for a decision maker is the ratio of relative returns  $R_A/R_z$ . A decision maker will tilt its investment portfolio toward a project when that project's innovation returns increase relative to the alternative one. Depending on the decision maker or the market structure (no-acquisition vs. acquisition), the returns  $R_A$  and  $R_z$  will take on different values, which we will specify later. It will be a comparison of  $R_A/R_z$  across market structures or decision makers what will lead to our positive and normative results on the impact of acquisitions.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>8</sup>Note that because  $R_A, R_z > 0$ ,  $x(R_A/R_z; \epsilon_A, \epsilon_z)$  is strictly between 0 and 1 when  $\frac{\sqrt{\epsilon_A \epsilon_z}}{1 + \epsilon_A} < \sqrt{\frac{R_z}{R_A}} < \frac{1 + \epsilon_z}{\sqrt{\epsilon_A \epsilon_z}}$ , which always holds if  $\epsilon_A, \epsilon_z \rightarrow 0$ .

<sup>9</sup>Assuming the decision makers have different budgets only impacts their investment volumes. In fact, if a decision

## 4 The no-acquisition game

In this section, we solve the no-acquisition game. As mentioned above, this game has three stages. In the first stage, the start-up invests  $x^E$  in the rival project  $A$  and  $1 - x^E$  in the independent project  $B$ . In the second stage, once the results of the entrant's projects have been realized, the incumbent invests  $x^I$  in the rival project  $A$  and  $1 - x^I$  in the independent project  $C$ . Finally, in the third stage, once the results of the incumbent's projects have been realized, if the start-up has successfully entered market  $A$ , then the entrant and the incumbent compete in market  $A$ ; otherwise, if the start-up has failed to enter the market, the incumbent serves it on its own. Moreover, if the start-up has entered market  $B$ , it serves market  $B$ . Finally, the incumbent serves market  $C$ .

To characterize the equilibrium (conditional) investments of the incumbent, we take advantage of equation (4). Suppose that the entrant has successfully entered market  $A$ . Then, the incumbent, anticipating that a successful project  $A$  will return a profit level  $\pi_{hh}$  and an unsuccessful project  $A$  will yield profits equal to  $\pi_{\ell h}$ , chooses to invest in project  $A$  an amount equal to:

$$x_s^{I,na} = x \left( \frac{\pi_{hh} - \pi_{\ell h}}{\pi_C}; \epsilon_A, \epsilon_C \right). \quad (5)$$

With the super-index  $I, na$  we indicate that the investment refers to the incumbent in the no-acquisition game; with the sub-index  $s$  we refer to the case in which the entrant has successfully entered market  $A$ .<sup>10</sup> The rest of the budget  $1 - x_s^{I,na}$  is invested in project  $C$ . Suppose now the entrant has failed to enter market  $A$  in which case the incumbent will stay as the only supplier of market  $A$ . Anticipating that a successful project  $A$  will return a profit level  $\pi_h^m$  and an unsuccessful project  $A$  will yield profits equal to  $\pi_\ell^m$ , the equilibrium investment in project  $A$  equals:

$$x_f^{I,na} = x \left( \frac{\pi_h^m - \pi_\ell^m}{\pi_C}; \epsilon_A, \epsilon_C \right). \quad (6)$$

The rest of the budget  $1 - x_f^{I,na}$  is invested in project  $C$ .

We now move to the first stage of the game where the entrant chooses its investment portfolio. Plugging the difference between the entrant's expected returns in case of a successful and an unsuccessful

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maker has a budget  $\gamma$ , the investment level becomes:  $x(R_A/R_z; \epsilon_A, \epsilon_z) = \frac{\gamma + \epsilon_z - \epsilon_A \sqrt{\frac{\epsilon_z}{\epsilon_A} \frac{R_z}{R_A}}}{1 + \sqrt{\frac{\epsilon_z}{\epsilon_A} \frac{R_z}{R_A}}}$  and when comparing this investment across distinct market structures, the only thing that matters is again the ratio of relative returns  $R_z/R_A$ . Because of this, the normalization of the research budget is, qualitatively, inconsequential.

<sup>10</sup>Later super- and sub-indices follow the same logic.

project  $A$  in (4) we obtain the equilibrium investment of the entrant in project  $A$ :

$$x^{E,na} = x \left( \frac{\frac{x_s^{I,na} \pi_{hh} + \epsilon_A \pi_{h\ell}}{x_s^{I,na} + \epsilon_A}}{\pi_B}; \epsilon_A, \epsilon_B \right). \quad (7)$$

In this expression,  $x_s^{I,na}$  is the anticipated investment in project  $A$  of the incumbent given by (5). Note that, because  $\pi_{h\ell} > \pi_{hh}$ , the entrant's effort put into project  $A$  is a decreasing function of the anticipated incumbent's effort in the same project. We return to this observation in Section 5.

## 5 The acquisition game

In this section, we solve the acquisition game. As described above, this game has four stages. In the first stage, the start-up chooses its portfolio of investments. In the second stage, once the results of the entrant's projects have been realized, the incumbent picks its investment portfolio. In the third stage, once the results of the incumbent's projects have been realized, the start-up and the incumbent bargain over the expected acquisition rents. This stage is only meaningful if the entrant's investment in project  $A$  turns successful, in which case an acquisition always occurs; otherwise, this stage is void of meaning. Finally, in the fourth stage, the joint entity serves markets  $A$ ,  $B$  and  $C$ .

To characterize the equilibrium (conditional) investments of the incumbent in the acquisition game we again use equation (4). In this equation we need to factor the difference between the incumbent's returns from a successful and an unsuccessful project  $A$ . Compared to the no-acquisition game, this difference varies due to the monopoly rents an acquisition generates in market  $A$ . (An acquisition does not generate additional rents in independent markets  $B$  and  $C$ .) Hence, suppose first the incumbent's investment in project  $A$  is successful. In such a case, the acquisition rents equal the extra profits from monopolizing a market initially served by two sellers of high quality, i.e.  $\pi_h^m - 2\pi_{hh} > 0$ . By contrast, when the incumbent's investment in project  $A$  is unsuccessful, the acquisition rents equal the excess profits of monopolizing a market with one seller of high quality and one seller of low quality, i.e.  $\pi_h^m - \pi_{\ell h} - \pi_{h\ell} > 0$ .

The Nash bargaining solution implies that the start-up and the incumbent divide the available surplus in proportions corresponding to their bargaining powers. Hence, using (4), in the acquisition game the incumbent's investment in project  $A$  conditional on the entrant's successfully entering market

$A$  is given by:<sup>11</sup>

$$x_s^{I,a} = x \left( \frac{\pi_{hh} + \delta(\pi_h^m - 2\pi_{hh}) - (\pi_{\ell h} + \delta(\pi_h^m - \pi_{\ell h} - \pi_{h\ell}))}{\pi_C}; \epsilon_A, \epsilon_C \right). \quad (8)$$

Notice that the reason why the investment of the incumbent in the acquisition case (8) differs from that in the no-acquisition case (5) is purely driven by rent-seeking. In fact, the profits of the joint entity equal  $\pi_h^m$  no matter whether the incumbent invests in project  $A$  or not. The only reason why the incumbent puts effort into project  $A$  is to enhance its bargaining position vis-à-vis the entrant. Naturally, such an incentive is modulated by the bargaining power  $\delta$ . If the incumbent could not capture any of the monopoly rents, it would not change its investment portfolio despite anticipating the acquisition of the start-up. Obviously, if the entrant fails to enter market  $A$ , the incumbent does not acquire it and its investment in project  $A$  is the same as in the no-acquisition scenario and is given by (6). Because this investment is equal across the no-acquisition and acquisition games, we will denote it from now on as  $x_f^I$ . To be clear:

$$x_f^{I,a} = x_f^{I,na} = x_f^I.$$

We now move back to the first stage of the game where the start-up chooses its portfolio of investments. In doing so, the entrant must anticipate the incumbent's equilibrium investment portfolio and the induced bargaining rents brought about by the acquisition. Plugging in (4) the difference between the entrant's expected returns in case of a successful and an unsuccessful project  $A$  we get the start-up's equilibrium investment portfolio:

$$x^{E,a} = x \left( \frac{\frac{x_s^{I,a} [\pi_{hh} + (1-\delta)(\pi_h^m - 2\pi_{hh})] + \epsilon_A [\pi_{h\ell} + (1-\delta)(\pi_h^m - \pi_{h\ell} - \pi_{\ell h})]}{x_s^{I,a} + \epsilon_A}}{\pi_B}; \epsilon_A, \epsilon_B \right). \quad (9)$$

Here  $x_s^{I,a}$  is the anticipated incumbent's investment in project  $A$  and is given by (8). The entrant's returns from a successful project  $A$  depend, on the one hand, on the outcome of the investment effort of the incumbent and, on the other hand, the outcome of the Nash bargaining with the incumbent over the monopolization rents. When the incumbent's project is successful, the entrant's bargaining rents amount to  $(1-\delta)(\pi_h^m - 2\pi_{hh})$ . However, when the incumbent's project is unsuccessful, the start-up's bargaining rents equal  $(1-\delta)(\pi_h^m - \pi_{h\ell} - \pi_{\ell h})$ . The numerator of the argument of  $x(\cdot)$  on the RHS of (9) thus gives the entrant's expected returns from investing in project  $A$ .

We finish this section by pointing out the strategic substitutability between the incumbent's investment in the rival market  $A$  and the entrant's investment in the same market.

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<sup>11</sup>Note that because  $\pi_{h\ell} > \pi_{hh} > \pi_{\ell h}$ , we have  $\pi_{hh} + \delta(\pi_h^m - 2\pi_{hh}) - (\pi_{\ell h} + \delta(\pi_h^m - \pi_{\ell h} - \pi_{h\ell})) > 0$ .

**Lemma 2** *No matter whether acquisitions are permitted or not, the entrant will cut its investment in the rival project A if it anticipates an increase in the incumbent’s effort into the same project.*

Lemma 2 implies that the incumbent’s investment in the rival project A is a strategic substitute to the entrant’s investment in the same project. This signifies that our game has effects akin to the “kill-zone” effects: an anticipation that the incumbent will invest more in the rival project A to defend its monopoly power in such a market will result in the entrant “giving up” and cutting investment in that project.

## 6 The impact of acquisitions on the entrant’s and incumbent’s investment portfolios

We are now ready to examine the impact acquisitions have on the investment portfolios of the entrant and the incumbent. For this purpose, it is useful to define the following critical incumbent’s bargaining power level:  $\bar{\delta}(\epsilon_A, \epsilon_C, \pi_C, \pi_h^m, \pi_{hh}, \pi_{hl}, \pi_{lh})$ .<sup>12</sup>

**Proposition 1** (a) *Suppose that acquisitions are allowed and  $\pi_h^m - 2\pi_{hh} < \pi_h^m - \pi_{hl} - \pi_{lh}$ . Then, compared to the no-acquisition case, the incumbent will invest less in the rival project A (and hence more in the alternative project C) while the entrant will invest more in the rival project A (and thus less in the alternative project B).*

(b) *Suppose that acquisitions are allowed and, alternatively,  $\pi_h^m - 2\pi_{hh} > \pi_h^m - \pi_{hl} - \pi_{lh}$ . Then, compared to the no-acquisition case:*

(i) *If*

$$\delta > \bar{\delta}(\epsilon_A, \epsilon_C, \pi_C, \pi_h^m, \pi_{hh}, \pi_{hl}, \pi_{lh}), \tag{10}$$

*the incumbent will invest more in the rival project A (and hence less in C) while the entrant will invest less in the rival project A (and thus more in B).*

(ii) *Otherwise, if  $\delta < \bar{\delta}(\cdot)$  both the incumbent and the entrant will invest more in the rival project A (and so less in the alternative projects B and C).*

Proposition 1 shows that acquisitions have a bearing on both the investment portfolios of target and acquirer. As explained above, both players’ incentives to invest in the rival and non-rival markets are shaped by the expected relative returns from these projects. Compared to the case in which acquisitions are forbidden, acquisitions modify the returns from these projects because the players anticipate getting

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<sup>12</sup>The exact expression of this critical threshold is given in the Appendix, as well as its derivation.



a share of the rents from monopolization of the rival market. If for a player these (expected) rents are larger when project  $A$  is successful than when it is not then the player in question will invest more in project  $A$  in anticipation of an acquisition.

We now provide intuition for the conditions in Proposition 1. Consider first the incumbent. Anticipating the acquisition of the entrant, the incumbent will invest more in project  $A$  (and so less in  $C$ ) whenever  $\pi_h^m - 2\pi_{hh} > \pi_h^m - \pi_{h\ell} - \pi_{\ell h}$ . This condition simply says that the monopolization rents from market  $A$  are greater when the incumbent produces high quality than when it produces low quality. In such a case, because the incumbent shares in the monopolization rents, its incentives to invest in project  $A$  will go up if acquisitions are permitted. In contrast, when this condition does not hold, the monopolization rents from market  $A$  are lower when the incumbent produces high quality than when it produces low quality, in which case the incumbent will invest less in the rival market  $A$  when acquisitions are allowed. The impact of permitting acquisitions on the incumbent’s incentives to allocate funding across the rival and non-rival projects is the analog of Katz’s (2021) “*incumbency for buyout*” effect, whereby an incumbent invests to strengthen its competitive position vis-à-vis the entrant in order to merge on more favorable terms. In our setting, the “incumbency for buyout” effect manifests itself as a change in the incumbent’s direction of innovation and we see that the nature of this effect depends on market fundamentals.

Consider now the entrant. The impact of allowing acquisitions on the entrant’s incentives to invest is a bit more complex because of the strategic interaction between the players. To see this, it is useful to assume momentarily the case of a “naive” incumbent that would not change its investment anticipating the acquisition of the entrant (or else an incumbent with no bargaining power whatsoever). If the incumbent did not alter its investment portfolio at all, the entrant, anticipating its acquisition by the incumbent, would always increase its investment in the rival market  $A$ . This is what Cabral (2021) and Motta and Peitz (2021) call the “*innovation for buyout effect*”: anticipating to gain monopolization rents in market  $A$  as a result of integration (and not in the alternative market  $B$ ), the entrant’s incentives to invest in the rival market go up compared to when acquisitions are not allowed. The “innovation for buyout effect” thus incentivizes the entrant to move research resources from the non-rival market to the rival market.

However, because the incumbent can also invest to protect its rents from the rival market  $A$ , the entrant’s investment decision is additionally affected by a “*strategic effect*”. This strategic effect arises due to the strategic substitutability of the players’ investments in market  $A$ . By this strategic effect, anticipating that the incumbent will invest more (less) in the rival market  $A$ , the entrant will reduce (raise) its investment in such a market.

Hence, expecting the incumbent to cut investment in market  $A$ , the “innovation for buyout effect”

and the strategic effect operate together to boost the entrant’s incentives to move funding towards the rival market  $A$ . This is the result in Proposition 1(a). By contrast, when the entrant anticipates that the incumbent increases its investment in market  $A$ , the “innovation for buyout effect” and the strategic effect operate in opposite directions. Proposition 1(b) provides the condition (10) under which the strategic effect has a dominating influence and therefore the entrant reduces its investment in the rival market. When condition (10) does not hold, the “innovation for buyout effect” is stronger than the strategic effect and the opposite occurs. To the best of our knowledge, that the “innovation for buyout” effect may not be observed at all due to strategic interaction in the R&D market (Proposition 1(b)(i)) has not yet been shown in the literature.

We illustrate Proposition 1 in Figure 2 using a micro-founded model with quadratic utility function and Cournot competition. Specifically, we assume that demand in market  $A$  stems from a unit mass of consumers with the well-known quality-augmented quadratic utility function introduced in Sutton (1997) (see also Sutton (2001)):

$$U_A = \sum_{i=1}^2 \left[ \alpha q_i - \left( \frac{\beta q_i}{s_i} \right)^2 \right] - \sigma \sum_{i=1}^2 \sum_{j<i} \frac{\beta q_i}{s_i} \frac{\beta q_j}{s_j} - \sum_{i=1}^2 p_i q_i.$$

For tractability reasons, we assume away horizontal product differentiation by setting  $\sigma = 2$ . The incumbent’s basic product has quality  $s_\ell > 0$ . If the start-up’s investment in project  $A$  turns out successful, we assume that the start-up enters the incumbent’s market with a product of higher quality  $s_h$  than the incumbent, with  $s_\ell < s_h < 2s_\ell$ .<sup>13</sup> Otherwise, the start-up does not enter. The start-up and the incumbent engage in quantity competition in market  $A$ . We normalize the marginal cost of production to zero.




Figure 2: The impact of acquisitions on the entrant’s and incumbent’s investment portfolios.

<sup>13</sup>The restriction  $s_h < 2s_\ell$  rules out drastic innovations.

In Figure 1, on the vertical axis we place the payoff received by the incumbent when its non-rival project is successful,  $\pi_C$ . Because  $U_C$  is fixed, a higher value of  $\pi_C$  can be interpreted as higher social surplus appropriability in market  $C$ . On the horizontal axis, we place the ratio of qualities  $s_h/s_\ell$ , which is a measure of social surplus appropriability in the rival market  $A$ . To construct this figure, we need expressions for the payoffs that appear in the proposition. These payoffs are straightforward to compute and we omit the details:<sup>14</sup>

$$\pi_{hh} = \frac{\alpha^2 s_h^2}{18\beta^2}, \quad \pi_h^m = \frac{\alpha^2 s_h^2}{8\beta^2}, \quad \pi_{h\ell} = \frac{\alpha^2 (2s_h - s_\ell)^2}{18\beta^2}, \quad \pi_{\ell h} = \frac{\alpha^2 (2s_\ell - s_h)^2}{18\beta^2}. \quad (11)$$

Using these formulas, the condition  $\pi_h^m - 2\pi_{hh} < \pi_h^m - \pi_{h\ell} - \pi_{\ell h}$  in the proposition is equivalent to  $s_h < \frac{5}{3}s_\ell$ . This condition is depicted by the dashed vertical threshold in Figure 2. Therefore, when  $s_h < \frac{5}{3}s_\ell$  anticipating the acquisition of the entrant the incumbent will cut investment in the rival project (and increase it in the non-rival one) while the entrant will do exactly the opposite. This occurs in Region I of Figure 2. Otherwise, when  $s_h > \frac{5}{3}s_\ell$  the incumbent will increase investment in the rival project (and cut it in the non-rival one) while the entrant, depending on whether the parameters satisfy condition (10), will do the opposite or the same. This condition holds for the parameter area to the right of the dashed blue curve in the graph, which represents the locus of parameters satisfying  $\delta = \bar{\delta}(\cdot)$ . Hence, in Region II of Figure 2 the entrant will reduce investment in project  $A$  and the incumbent will increase it, while in Region III both the entrant and the incumbent will raise investment in the rival project  $A$ .

We finish this section by commenting on the importance of the bargaining power parameter  $\delta$  in shaping the players' incentives to adjust their investment portfolios in anticipation of an acquisition. Specifically, we note that the threshold dashed blue curve that separates Regions II and III shifts south-westwards as the incumbent's bargaining power goes up. To see what this means, recall that if  $\delta$  were very small the incumbent would almost not change its investment portfolio and, hence, absent the strategic effect the entrant would definitely tilt its investment portfolio towards the rival market. Region II would simply be empty in the limit when  $\delta \rightarrow 0$ . As  $\delta$  increases, the strategic effect starts playing a significant role and Region II begins to exist. The higher  $\delta$  the more important is the strategic effect relative to the innovation for buyout effect. Hence, region II expands and region III shrinks, thereby making it more likely that the entrant reduces investment in anticipation of its acquisition. In the limit when  $\delta$  approaches 1, region III vanishes because the bargaining power of the entrant is negligible so that the innovation for buyout effect does no longer play a role.

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<sup>14</sup>For later use, we also provide here the utilities corresponding to the various market structures:  $U_h^m = \frac{\alpha^2 s_h^2}{16\beta^2}$ ,  $U_\ell^m = \frac{\alpha^2 s_\ell^2}{16\beta^2}$ ,  $U_{hh} = \frac{\alpha^2 s_h^2}{9\beta^2}$  and  $U_{\ell h} = \frac{\alpha^2 (s_h + s_\ell)^2}{36\beta^2}$ .

## 7 On the (in-)efficiency of entrant's and incumbent's investments

In this section, we compare the entrant's and incumbent's investment portfolios in the no-acquisition and acquisition games to the socially optimal portfolios in order to derive conditions under which acquisitions improve or worsen the direction of innovation.

### 7.1 Socially optimal investments

We start by characterizing the socially optimal investment portfolios for the entrant and incumbent. While doing this, we take the case in which acquisitions are not allowed as a benchmark. Further, we assume that the planner chooses the players' investment portfolios to maximize consumer surplus, but cannot control their production levels.<sup>15</sup>

We start by characterizing the socially optimal choice of the incumbent's investments. This choice occurs after the results of the start-up's projects are realized and hence depends on whether the entrant has successfully entered the rival market  $A$  or not. Suppose the entrant has not entered market  $A$ . Then, anticipating that the incumbent acts as a monopolist in market  $A$  selling high quality in case of success and low quality in case of failure, the socially optimal incumbent's portfolio follows from (4) and is given by:

$$x_f^{I,o} = x \left( \frac{U_h^m - U_\ell^m}{U_C}; \epsilon_A, \epsilon_C \right), \quad (12)$$

where  $U_h^m$  and  $U_\ell^m$  are the surpluses consumers obtain in market  $A$  when it is served by a monopolist selling high or low quality, respectively.

Suppose now that the entrant has successfully entered market  $A$ . In that case, the socially optimal incumbent's portfolio is given by:

$$x_s^{I,o} = x \left( \frac{U_{hh} - U_{\ell h}}{U_C}; \epsilon_A, \epsilon_C \right). \quad (13)$$

Here  $U_{hh}$  is the consumer surplus corresponding to the case in which both the start-up and the incumbent produce high quality. The expression  $U_{\ell h}$  refers to the case in which the incumbent sells low quality and the start-up sells high quality.

We now move to stage 1 where the planner chooses the entrant's portfolio that maximizes consumer surplus. In doing so, the planner anticipates the possible outcomes of the continuation game. Again,

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<sup>15</sup>Consumer surplus maximization has become the norm in modern US and EU merger control.

making use of (4), the socially optimal entrant's portfolio is:

$$x^{E,o} = x \left( \frac{\frac{x_s^{I,o} U_{hh} + \epsilon_A U_{\ell h}}{x_s^{I,o} + \epsilon_A} + \frac{1 - x_s^{I,o}}{1 - x_s^{I,o} + \epsilon_C} U_C - \left( \frac{x_f^{I,o} U_h^m + \epsilon_A U_\ell^m}{x_f^{I,o} + \epsilon_A} + \frac{1 - x_f^{I,o}}{1 - x_f^{I,o} + \epsilon_C} U_C \right)}{U_B}; \epsilon_A, \epsilon_B \right). \quad (14)$$

In this expression, notice that the social returns from the entrant successfully entering market  $A$  are given by the first two summands in the numerator of the RHS of (14). The first of these two summands equals the expected surplus from market  $A$ . This expected surplus “integrates” over the outcomes that may realize after the incumbent's investment. While deriving this expected value, we take into account the socially optimal (conditional) investment  $x_s^{I,o}$ . Meanwhile, the second summand is the expected surplus from market  $C$ . Likewise, the social returns from the entrant failing to enter market  $A$  are given by the third and fourth summands in the numerator of the RHS of (14). The third summand is the expected surplus from market  $A$  where we now “integrate” over the outcomes that may realize after the incumbent's (conditional) investment  $x_f^{I,o}$  is put in. The fourth summand is again the expected surplus from market  $C$ .

The expressions for  $x_f^{I,o}$ ,  $x_s^{I,o}$  and  $x^{E,o}$  are the socially optimal investments for the entrant and the incumbent. Next, we compare these investments with the private investments corresponding to the no-acquisition and acquisition games. Such comparisons give rise to our results on the (in-)efficiency of the private equilibria and on the impact of acquisitions on the direction of the innovative efforts of the entrant and the incumbent.

Consider first the incumbent's investment portfolio and focus on the case in which the entrant enters market  $A$  for otherwise allowing or disallowing acquisitions is inconsequential. Comparing (13) with (5), it is straightforward to conclude that when acquisitions are forbidden the incumbent excessively tilts its investment portfolio towards market  $A$  if and only if:

$$\frac{\pi_C}{U_C} < \frac{\pi_{hh} - \pi_{\ell h}}{U_{hh} - U_{\ell h}}. \quad (15)$$

The condition is rather intuitive. On the LHS we have a measure of appropriability of social surplus in market  $C$ , while on the RHS we have a similar measure but for market  $A$ . When social surplus appropriability in market  $C$  is small compared to appropriability in market  $A$ , the incumbent invests too little in market  $C$  (and hence too much in  $A$ ) from an efficiency point of view. If the condition holds with the opposite sign, then the incumbent invests too little in project  $A$ .

Comparing now (13) with (8), we conclude that the incumbent, anticipating the acquisition of the

entrant, invests too much in project  $A$  if and only if:

$$\frac{\pi_C}{U_C} < \frac{\pi_{hh} + \delta(\pi_h^m - 2\pi_{hh}) - \pi_{\ell h} - \delta(\pi_h^m - \pi_{\ell h} - \pi_{h\ell})}{U_{hh} - U_{\ell h}}. \quad (16)$$

Like before, if the condition holds with the opposite sign, then the incumbent invests too little in project  $A$ . The interpretation of this condition is similar to the one in the no-acquisition case.

We now examine the (in-)efficiency of the entrant's investment portfolios. Considering first the no-acquisition game, a comparison of (14) and (7) immediately yields the conclusion that the entrant over-invests in the rival project  $A$  if and only if:

$$\frac{\pi_B}{U_B} < \frac{\frac{x_s^{I,na} \pi_{hh} + \epsilon_A \pi_{h\ell}}{x_s^{I,na} + \epsilon_A}}{\frac{x_s^{I,o} U_{hh} + \epsilon_A U_{\ell h}}{x_s^{I,o} + \epsilon_A} + \frac{1 - x_s^{I,o}}{1 - x_s^{I,o} + \epsilon_C} U_C - \left( \frac{x_f^{I,o} U_h^m + \epsilon_A U_\ell^m}{x_f^{I,o} + \epsilon_A} + \frac{1 - x_f^{I,o}}{1 - x_f^{I,o} + \epsilon_C} U_C \right)} \quad (17)$$

If the inequality holds the other way around, then the entrant over-invests in the independent project  $B$ . Although this condition is more intricate than that for the incumbent, the intuition is similar. The condition basically states that the entrant will over-invest in the rival project when the surplus appropriability in such a project is higher than in the alternative project.

Finally, in the acquisition game, comparing (14) and (9) we come to the conclusion that entrant over-invests in the rival project  $A$  if and only if:

$$\frac{\pi_B}{U_B} < \frac{\frac{x_s^{I,a} [\pi_{hh} + (1-\delta)(\pi_h^m - 2\pi_{hh})] + \epsilon_A [\pi_{h\ell} + (1-\delta)(\pi_h^m - \pi_{h\ell} - \pi_{\ell h})]}{x_s^{I,a} + \epsilon_A}}{\frac{x_s^{I,o} U_{hh} + \epsilon_A U_{\ell h}}{x_s^{I,o} + \epsilon_A} + \frac{1 - x_s^{I,o}}{1 - x_s^{I,o} + \epsilon_C} U_C - \left( \frac{x_f^{I,o} U_h^m + \epsilon_A U_\ell^m}{x_f^{I,o} + \epsilon_A} + \frac{1 - x_f^{I,o}}{1 - x_f^{I,o} + \epsilon_C} U_C \right)} \quad (18)$$

If (18) holds with the opposite sign then the entrant under-invests in  $A$  and over-invests in  $B$ .

## 7.2 The impact of acquisitions on the efficiency of the direction of innovation

Equipped with the conditions presented above on the occurrence of excessive or insufficient investment in the rival project  $A$ , we can now show that circumstances exist under which allowing for acquisitions improves the direction of innovation for both the entrant and the incumbent. We start with a case in which in the absence of acquisitions the incumbent over-invests in  $A$  while the entrant under-invests in  $A$ .

**Proposition 2** *Assume that  $\pi_h^m - 2\pi_{hh} < \pi_h^m - \pi_{h\ell} - \pi_{\ell h}$  so that by Proposition 1(a), anticipating an acquisition, the incumbent reduces investment in the rival market and the entrant increases it. Assume*

further that

$$\frac{\pi_C}{U_C} < \frac{\pi_{hh} + \delta(\pi_h^m - 2\pi_{hh}) - \pi_{\ell h} - \delta(\pi_h^m - \pi_{\ell h} - \pi_{h\ell})}{U_{hh} - U_{\ell h}} \quad (19)$$

and that

$$\frac{\pi_B}{U_B} > \frac{\frac{x_s^{I,a}[\pi_{hh} + (1-\delta)(\pi_h^m - 2\pi_{hh})] + \epsilon_A[\pi_{h\ell} + (1-\delta)(\pi_h^m - \pi_{h\ell} - \pi_{\ell h})]}{x_s^{I,a} + \epsilon_A}}{\frac{x_s^{I,o}U_{hh} + \epsilon_A U_{\ell h}}{x_s^{I,o} + \epsilon_A} + \frac{1-x_s^{I,o}}{1-x_s^{I,o} + \epsilon_C}U_C - \left( \frac{x_f^{I,o}U_h^m + \epsilon_A U_\ell^m}{x_f^{I,o} + \epsilon_A} + \frac{1-x_f^{I,o}}{1-x_f^{I,o} + \epsilon_C}U_C \right)}. \quad (20)$$

Then, if acquisitions are allowed, both the incumbent and the entrant improve the direction of their innovation portfolios.

Proposition 2 provides a first set of conditions under which permitting acquisitions increases the efficiency of the investment portfolios of both the acquirer and the target. Specifically, when conditions (19) and (20) hold, this boost in efficiency occurs in Region I of Figure 2 where, anticipating an acquisition, the incumbent reduces investment in the rival market and the entrant increases it. Conditions (19) and (20) basically state that, compared to project  $A$ , the appropriability of social surplus for project  $C$  is small while for project  $B$  is large, which ensure that in both the no-acquisition and acquisition games, the incumbent over-invests in  $A$  while the entrant under-invests in  $A$ . Because the incumbent's acquisition rents satisfy the inequality  $\pi_h^m - 2\pi_{hh} < \pi_h^m - \pi_{h\ell} - \pi_{\ell h}$  the incumbent, anticipating the acquisition of the start-up, moves funds away from the rival project to the independent project. This increases the efficiency of its innovation portfolio given that it over-invests in  $A$ . Likewise, the entrant, anticipating its acquisition and the change in the incumbent's investment portfolio, raises its effort in the rival project and reduces it in the alternative project. Given that the entrant under-invests in  $A$ , allowing for acquisitions increases the efficiency of its innovation portfolio.

We illustrate Proposition 2 in Figure 3 using the micro-founded model with quadratic utility function and Cournot competition. This figure shows the effect of acquisitions on the efficiency of the incumbent's and entrant's investment portfolios. We build this figure for parameters satisfying the inequality  $\pi_h^m - 2\pi_{hh} < \pi_h^m - \pi_{h\ell} - \pi_{\ell h}$ , thereby corresponding to region I in Figure 2 where the incumbent cuts investment in the rival market and the entrant increases it. On the vertical axis, we place the payoff  $\pi_C$  of the incumbent in case its investment in the non-rival project turns out successful. Because in this figure we fix the value of  $U_C$ , a higher value of  $\pi_C$  can be interpreted as higher social surplus appropriability in market  $C$ . On the horizontal axis we place  $\pi_B/U_B$ , i.e. a measure of appropriability in the entrant's non-rival project. The blue-dashed horizontal line is condition (15) and hence delimits the lower parameter space for which the incumbent's investment in the contestable market in the no-acquisition game is excessive from a social welfare viewpoint. Likewise, the red-dashed horizontal line is condition (16) and so demarcates the lower region of parameters for which the incumbent's investment in the contestable market in the acquisition game is excessive from an efficiency point of view. To-

gether, these two observations mean that if parameters fall in the area below the red-dashed horizontal line, then an acquisition enhances the efficiency of the incumbent’s investment portfolio (because its investment in the rival market is excessive both in the acquisition and no-acquisition scenario as stated in condition (19) and, anticipating the acquisition of the entrant, the incumbent decreases it). That is the reason why in this area we can read the label “Incumbent’s direction (of innovation) improves”. Above the blue-dashed horizontal line we have the opposite, an acquisition worsens the efficiency of the incumbent’s investment portfolio, hence the label “Incumbent’s direction (of innovation) worsens.”




Figure 3: Parameters areas where acquisitions improve (green) or worsen (red) both target’s and acquirer’s innovation direction ( $\pi_h^m - 2\pi_{hh} < \pi_h^m - \pi_{h\ell} - \pi_{\ell h}$ )

In the figure there are also two dashed increasing curves; these two curves refer to the entrant. The blue-dashed one is condition (17) which demarcates the right parameter space for which the entrant’s investment in the rival market in the no-acquisition game is insufficient from an efficiency point of view. Likewise, the red-dashed curve is condition (18) which delimits the right region of parameters for which the entrant’s investment in the rival market in the acquisition game is insufficient. Together, these two observations imply that if parameters fall in the area to the right of the red-dashed curve where we can read the label “Entrant’s direction (of innovation) improves”, then an acquisition enhances the efficiency of the entrant’s investment portfolio (because its investment in the rival market is insufficient both in the acquisition and no-acquisition scenario as stated in condition (20) and, anticipating its acquisition, the entrant increases it). To the left of the blue-dashed increasing curve we have the opposite, an acquisition worsens the efficiency of the entrant’s investment portfolio, hence the label “Entrant’s direction (of innovation) worsens.”

Overall, we conclude that permitting acquisitions increases the efficiency of both the entrant’s and



the incumbent's investment portfolios in the green area. On the contrary, in the red area, both players investment portfolios get worse from an efficiency point of view. Moreover, in the most south-west parameter area the incumbent's direction of innovation improves while that of the entrant worsens. The opposite occurs in the most north-east parameter area.<sup>16</sup>

Next we show that it is also possible that acquisitions increase the efficiency of the acquirer's and target's investment portfolios when the parameters fall in Regions II and III of Figure 2. Recall that these regions arise when the incumbent's acquisition rents in case of a successful project  $A$  are higher than in case the project turns out unsuccessful. Anticipating such conditional flows of rents, the incumbent raises its investment in the rival project and decreases it in the non-rival one.

**Proposition 3** (a) *Assume that  $\pi_h^m - 2\pi_{hh} > \pi_h^m - \pi_{h\ell} - \pi_{\ell h}$  and that condition (10) holds so that by Proposition 1(b)(i), anticipating an acquisition, the incumbent raises investment in the rival market and the entrant cuts it. Assume further that*

$$\frac{\pi_C}{U_C} > \frac{\pi_{hh} + \delta(\pi_h^m - 2\pi_{hh}) - \pi_{\ell h} - \delta(\pi_h^m - \pi_{\ell h} - \pi_{h\ell})}{U_{hh} - U_{\ell h}} \quad (21)$$

and that

$$\frac{\pi_B}{U_B} < \frac{\frac{x_s^{I,a}[\pi_{hh} + (1-\delta)(\pi_h^m - 2\pi_{hh})] + \epsilon_A[\pi_{h\ell} + (1-\delta)(\pi_h^m - \pi_{h\ell} - \pi_{\ell h})]}{x_s^{I,a} + \epsilon_A}}{\frac{x_s^{I,o}U_{hh} + \epsilon_A U_{\ell h}}{x_s^{I,o} + \epsilon_A} + \frac{1-x_s^{I,o}}{1-x_s^{I,o} + \epsilon_C} U_C - \left( \frac{x_f^{I,o}U_h^m + \epsilon_A U_\ell^m}{x_f^{I,o} + \epsilon_A} + \frac{1-x_f^{I,o}}{1-x_f^{I,o} + \epsilon_C} U_C \right)}. \quad (22)$$

Then, if acquisitions are allowed, both the incumbent and the entrant improve the direction of their innovation portfolios.

(b) *Assume again that  $\pi_h^m - 2\pi_{hh} > \pi_h^m - \pi_{h\ell} - \pi_{\ell h}$  and that condition (10) does not hold so that by Proposition 1(b)(ii), anticipating an acquisition, the incumbent and the entrant both raise their investments in the rival market (and lower that in the independent markets). Further, assume that (21) holds while (22) holds with the opposite sign. Then, if acquisitions are allowed, both the incumbent and the entrant improve the direction of their innovation portfolios.*

The first part of Proposition 3 states conditions under which the efficiency of the innovation portfolios of both the start-up and the incumbent improve because the incumbent raises investment in the rival market and the entrant cuts it. This occurs in Region II of Figure 2. Condition (21) means that the incumbent's investment in project  $A$  in the no-acquisition and acquisition games is insufficient from the point of view of social welfare maximization. Because the acquisition rents the incumbent gets

<sup>16</sup>The unlabeled regions are parameter areas where it is ambiguous whether a player's investment portfolio improves or worsens from an efficiency point of view. The reason for this is that in these regions a player typically moves from an under-investment situation to an over-investment one, or the other way around.

when the rival project is successful are higher than when the project is unsuccessful, the incumbent, anticipating the acquisition of the entrant, invests more in  $A$  and less in  $C$ . This adjustment makes its innovation portfolio more efficient than when acquisitions are not permitted.

Condition (22) signifies that the start-up's investment in project  $A$  in the no-acquisition and acquisition games is excessive from the point of view of social welfare maximization. As discussed after Proposition 1, when the strategic effect of acquisitions is sufficiently strong (so that condition (10) holds), the entrant, anticipating its acquisition and the incumbent's move of research funds from its non-rival project to the rival one, cuts its effort in the rival project. This cut improves the efficiency of its investment portfolio.

The second part of Proposition 3 states conditions under which the efficiency of the innovation portfolios of both the start-up and the incumbent improve because both move funds from their independent projects to the rival project. This occurs in Region III of Figure 2. The interpretation of the conditions provided is similar to Part (a) and we omit it to save space.

We now illustrate Proposition 3 in Figures 4(a) and 4(b) using the micro-founded model. The figures are constructed in the same way as Figure 3 and show the effect of acquisitions on the efficiency of the incumbent's and entrant's investment portfolios when  $\pi_h^m - 2\pi_{hh} > \pi_h^m - \pi_{hl} - \pi_{lh}$ . As stated above, this parameter constellation corresponds to regions II and III in Figure 2.

We now describe the various lines and curves of the figure. The black-dashed horizontal line corresponds to the threshold that separates regions II and III in Figure 2 (the locus  $\delta = \bar{\delta}(\cdot)$ ). Hence, in the parameter space above this line the entrant decreases investment in the rival market in anticipation of its acquisition. The blue-dashed horizontal line again represents condition (15) so in the area above it the incumbent under-invests in the rival project in the no-acquisition game. Likewise, the red-dashed horizontal line represents condition (16) so in the area above it the incumbent under-invests in the rival project in the acquisition game. We present two relevant orderings. First, the black-dashed line may lie above the red-dashed line (see Figure 4(a)). Second, the black-dashed line may lie below the blue-dashed line (see Figure 4(b)). In both cases conditions (15) and (16) imply that when parameters fall above the red-dashed horizontal line, an acquisition enhances the efficiency of the incumbent's investment portfolio. (This is because there is under-investment in the rival project and the incumbent, anticipating the acquisition of the entrant, increases its investment in such a project.) Meanwhile, when parameters fall below the blue-dashed horizontal line, an acquisition surely reduces the efficiency of the incumbent's investment portfolio.




Figure 4: Parameters areas where acquisitions improve (green) or worsen (red) both target's and acquirer's innovation direction ( $\pi_h^m - 2\pi_{hh} > \pi_h^m - \pi_{hl} - \pi_{lh}$ )

There are also two increasing dashed curves. The blue-dashed curve represents condition (17), to the right of which the entrant under-invests in the rival project in the no-acquisition game. Likewise, the red-dashed curve is condition (18), to the right of which the entrant under-invests in the rival project in the acquisition game. Hence, if parameters fall to the left of the red-dashed curve and above the blacked-dashed horizontal line, an acquisition enhances the efficiency of the entrant's investment portfolio (because in both the acquisition and no-acquisition scenario the entrant over-invests in the rival market and, anticipating the acquisition, the entrant cuts its investment). Likewise, if the parameters fall in the area to the right of the red-dashed curve and below the black-dashed horizontal line, then the entrant's direction of innovation will also improve (because here in both the acquisition and no-acquisition scenario the entrant under-invests in the rival project and, anticipating its acquisition, the entrant raises its investment in the rival project).

Together, these observations imply that if the parameters satisfy  $\pi_h^m - 2\pi_{hh} > \pi_h^m - \pi_{hl} - \pi_{lh}$  and fall to the left of the red-dashed curve, above the blacked-dashed horizontal line and above the red-dashed horizontal line, an acquisition enhances the efficiency of the incumbent's and entrant's investments. This is because the incumbent under-invests in the rival market in both the acquisition and no-acquisition scenarios (as reflected in condition (21)), while the entrant over-invests (as reflected in condition (22)), and, anticipating the acquisition, the incumbent raises investment while the entrant cuts it. This parameter area, which corresponds to Region II in Figure 2, is located in the north-west parts of both Figures 4(a) and 4(b) and is colored green. The conditions for existence of this green area are in Proposition 3(a). Further, if the parameters fall in the area to the right of the red-dashed curve, below the black-dashed horizontal line but still above the red-dashed horizontal line, then the

incumbent's and entrant's direction of innovation also improves (because here in both the acquisition and no-acquisition scenarios both the incumbent and entrant under-invest in the rival project and, anticipating its acquisition, both raise their investments in it). This parameter area, which corresponds to Region III in Figure 2, is located in the mid-east part of Figure 4(a) and is also colored green. The conditions for existence of this area are in Proposition 3(b). Finally, Figure 4(b), in which the black-dashed line is below the blue-dashed line, illustrates the situation where the direction of innovation for both players worsens in the mid-east part of the figure.<sup>17</sup>

Overall, we conclude that permitting acquisitions increases the efficiency of both the incumbent's and entrant's portfolios in the green parameter areas. Further, both players' investment portfolios get worse from an efficiency point of view in the red areas. Finally, we observe that the direction of innovation of the entrant improves, while that of the incumbent worsens in the south-east corner of the figures. The opposite happens in the north-east part of the figures.<sup>18</sup> Hence, while acquisitions are expected to affect the acquirer and the target prices in the same way, they need not operate in the same way on their direction of innovation margins.

## 8 Consumer Surplus Analysis

To explore the impact of start-up acquisitions on the consumer welfare, we compare the expressions for the *overall* consumer surplus in the no-acquisition and acquisition cases. Because the entrant fails to enter the market with strictly positive probability and we need to take account of the surplus that realizes in such an event, we adopt the following assumptions:  $x_f^I > x_s^{I,na}$  and  $x_f^I > x_s^{I,a}$ .<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>17</sup>The overall direction of innovation worsens in the mid-east part of the figure when  $\pi_h^m - 2\pi_{hh} > \pi_h^m - \pi_{h\ell} - \pi_{\ell h}$ , conditions (10) and (15) hold and condition (17) holds with the opposite sign.

<sup>18</sup>In the middle part of the figure, the ordering of the horizontal lines has implications for the improvement or worsening of the direction of innovation. In Figure 4(a) where the dashed black line is above the horizontal red line, the incumbent's direction of innovation improves, while the entrant's worsens in the mid-west part of the figure. In Figure 4(b) where the dashed black line is below the horizontal blue line, the entrant's direction of innovation improves, while the incumbent's worsens in the mid-west part of the figure.

<sup>19</sup>These assumptions, which hold in our micro-founded model, require the incumbent's relative returns from investing in the rival project to be higher when the start-up fails to enter than when it enters both in the no-acquisition and acquisition games, i.e.  $\pi_h^m - \pi_\ell^m > \pi_{hh} - \pi_{\ell h}$  and  $\pi_h^m - \pi_\ell^m > \pi_{h\ell} - \pi_{hh}$ . These inequalities are implied by submodularity, which holds in many oligopoly games with an R&D stage (see e.g. Bagwell and Staiger (1994), Leahy and Neary (1997), and Schmutzler (2013)).

Consumer surplus in the no-acquisition game is given by:

$$\begin{aligned}
\mathbb{E}U^{na}(x_s^{I,na}, x_f^I, x^{E,na}) &= \frac{x^{E,na}}{x^{E,na} + \epsilon_A} \left[ \frac{x_s^{I,na}}{x_s^{I,na} + \epsilon_A} U_{hh} + \frac{\epsilon_A}{x_s^{I,na} + \epsilon_A} U_{lh} + \frac{1 - x_s^{I,na}}{1 - x_s^{I,na} + \epsilon_C} U_C \right] \\
&+ \frac{\epsilon_A}{x^{E,na} + \epsilon_A} \left[ \frac{x_f^I}{x_f^I + \epsilon_A} U_h^m + \frac{\epsilon_A}{x_f^I + \epsilon_A} U_\ell^m + \frac{1 - x_f^I}{1 - x_f^I + \epsilon_C} U_C \right] \\
&+ \frac{1 - x^{E,na}}{1 - x^{E,na} + \epsilon_B} U_B,
\end{aligned} \tag{23}$$

This expression for consumer surplus can be interpreted as follows. In the first line, we write out the expected consumer surplus resulting from the entrant entering the contestable market, which is equal to the probability of the entrant entering the market multiplied by the expected consumer surplus generated in markets  $A$  and  $C$  (given in square brackets). The latter expected consumer surplus (in the brackets) is given by the probability that the incumbent successfully innovates or fails to do so in those markets times the corresponding consumer surpluses. The second line is written following a similar logic but it corresponds to the case in which the entrant stays out of the contestable market. Finally, the last line gives the expected consumer surplus from market  $B$ , which is independent of the entrant entering or staying out of the rival market.

Consumer surplus in the acquisition game is given by:

$$\begin{aligned}
\mathbb{E}U^a(x_s^{I,a}, x_f^I, x^{E,a}) &= \frac{x^{E,a}}{x^{E,a} + \epsilon_A} \left[ U_h^m + \frac{1 - x_s^{I,a}}{1 - x_s^{I,a} + \epsilon_C} U_C \right] \\
&+ \frac{\epsilon_A}{x^{E,a} + \epsilon_A} \left[ \frac{x_f^I}{x_f^I + \epsilon_A} U_h^m + \frac{\epsilon_A}{x_f^I + \epsilon_A} U_\ell^m + \frac{1 - x_f^I}{1 - x_f^I + \epsilon_C} U_C \right] \\
&+ \frac{1 - x^{E,a}}{1 - x^{E,a} + \epsilon_B} U_B.
\end{aligned} \tag{24}$$

The interpretation of this consumer surplus expression is similar.

Next result provides the consumer surplus implications of prohibiting start-up acquisitions.

**Proposition 4** (a) *Assume that  $\pi_h^m - 2\pi_{hh} < \pi_h^m - \pi_{hl} - \pi_{lh}$  so that, by Proposition 1(a),  $x_s^{I,a} < x_s^{I,na}$  and  $x^{E,a} > x^{E,na}$ . Then, there exists  $\tilde{U}_C > 0$  such that for all  $U_C > \tilde{U}_C$ , a prohibition of acquisitions results in a decrease in consumer surplus. Otherwise, if  $U_C < \tilde{U}_C$ , a prohibition of acquisitions increases consumer surplus.*

(b) *Suppose instead that  $\pi_h^m - 2\pi_{hh} > \pi_h^m - \pi_{hl} - \pi_{lh}$  so that, by Proposition 1(b),  $x_s^{I,a} > x_s^{I,na}$ .*

(i) *If (10) holds so that  $x^{E,a} < x^{E,na}$ , there exists  $\hat{U}_B > 0$  such that for all  $U_B > \hat{U}_B$ , a prohibition of acquisitions results in a decrease in consumer surplus. Otherwise, a prohibition*

of acquisitions increases consumer surplus.

(ii) If (10) does not hold so that  $x^{E,a} > x^{E,na}$ , and if

$$\lim_{\delta \rightarrow 0} \frac{(x^{E,a} - x^{E,na}) \epsilon_A}{x^{E,na} (x^{E,a} + \epsilon_A)} > \frac{\frac{x_s^{I,na}}{x_s^{I,na} + \epsilon_A} (U_{hh} - U_h^m) + \frac{\epsilon_A}{x_s^{I,na} + \epsilon_A} (U_{lh} - U_h^m)}{\frac{\epsilon_A}{x_f^I + \epsilon_A} (U_h^m - U_\ell^m) + \left( \frac{1 - x_s^{I,a}}{1 - x_s^{I,a} + \epsilon_C} - \frac{1 - x_f^I}{1 - x_f^I + \epsilon_C} \right) U_C}, \quad (25)$$

there exist  $\tilde{U}_B > 0$  and  $\tilde{\delta} \in (0, \bar{\delta})$  such that for all  $U_B < \tilde{U}_B$  and  $\delta < \tilde{\delta}$ , a prohibition of acquisitions results in a decrease in consumer surplus. Otherwise, if (25) does not hold, a prohibition of acquisitions increases consumer surplus.

Proposition 4 reports on the impact of prohibiting start-up acquisitions on the welfare of consumers by putting together its effects on both the direction of innovation and consumer prices. When an acquisition worsens the direction of innovation for both players (red-colored regions in Figures 3 and 4), consumer surplus cannot increase because in such cases acquisitions have both detrimental innovation and price effects. However, when an acquisition improves the direction of innovation for both players (green-colored regions in Figures 3 and 4) it is possible that permitting acquisitions results in an increase in consumer surplus because the positive effects on the direction of innovation may outweigh the negative price effects.

Specifically, Proposition 4 puts forward three types of circumstances under which the positive effects of an acquisition on the direction of innovation dominate the detrimental price effects. The first situation, described in Proposition 4(a), arises in a subset of the parameters of Region I of Figure 2 and is depicted by the green areas located to the left of the dashed vertical line in Figures 5(a) and 5(b).<sup>20</sup> In this parameter space, the incumbent, in anticipation of an acquisition, moves investment funds away from the rival market while the entrant does the opposite and focuses more on the contestable market. When this occurs, under the conditions outlined in Proposition 2, the “industry” direction of innovation improves. Proposition 4(a) simply posits that when consumer surplus in the independent market  $C$  that receives additional research funds is sufficiently large, the decrease in the innovation distortion has a dominating influence over the increase in the price distortion and overall consumer surplus increases when acquisitions are allowed.

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<sup>20</sup>This figure is built from Figure 2, which uses the micro-founded model with quadratic utility and Cournot competition, by adding the parameter regions (in green) where consumer surplus increases if acquisitions are permitted. Parameter values for Figure 5(a) are  $\alpha = 4$ ,  $\beta = 5$ ,  $\delta = 0.85$ ,  $\epsilon_A = 0.3$ ,  $\epsilon_B = 5$ ,  $\epsilon_C = 1$ ,  $\pi_B = 1$ ,  $U_B = 40$  and  $U_C = 10$ . Parameter values for Figure 5(b) are  $\alpha = 4$ ,  $\beta = 5$ ,  $\delta = 0.05$ ,  $\epsilon_A = 0.3$ ,  $\epsilon_B = 5$ ,  $\epsilon_C = 1$ ,  $\pi_B = 1$ ,  $U_B = 1$  and  $U_C = 15$ .




Figure 5: Parameter regions (green) for which permitting acquisitions raises consumer surplus.

The second situation, described in Proposition 4(b)(i), arises in a subset of Region II of Figure 2 and is shown by the green area at the north-east of Figure 5(a). In this parameter area, the incumbent, in anticipation of the acquisition of the entrant, moves investment funds towards the rival market. Anticipating this defensive strategy, the entrant, despite the incentive provided by the innovation for buyout effect, strategically reduces its investment in the rival project. In such a case, under the condition in Proposition 3(a), the “industry” direction of innovation improves. Proposition 4(b)(i) simply states that when project  $B$ , which is receiving additional research funds in the acquisition game, is sufficiently valuable for society then the efficiency improvement in the direction of innovation dominates the negative price effects of acquisitions.

Finally, Proposition 4(b)(ii) describes the third scenario, which occurs within a subset of the parameters in Region III of Figure 2. This parameter area is located at the south-east of Figure 5(b) to the right of the dashed vertical line. In this scenario, the incumbent moves its investment funds toward the rival market in anticipation of the acquisition of the entrant. Despite the strategic substitutability, the entrant also increases its investment in the rival project because the innovation for buyout effect is stronger. Under the condition outlined in Proposition 3(b), the “industry” direction of innovation improves. Proposition 4(b)(ii) states conditions under which the price effects are limited and the efficiency improvement in the direction of innovation has a dominating influence.

We finish this section by pointing out to the reader that the circumstances under which acquisitions are consumer welfare improving are not exhausted by those described in Proposition 4. As pointed out in Section 7.2, there exist parameter constellations for which acquisitions make the investment portfolio of one of the players more efficient while that of the other player less efficient (see the non-colored regions in Figures 3 and 4). In such situations, and under conditions similar to those in Proposition 4, the improvement in the direction of innovation of just one player could be sufficient to outweigh the negative price effects of acquisitions.

## 9 Conclusions and policy recommendations

During the past years we have witnessed numerous acquisitions of start-ups by dominant firms, such as the tech giants GAFAM (*Google, Amazon, Facebook, Apple* and *Microsoft*). Notable examples include *Google's* \$3.1 billion acquisition of *DoubleClick* in 2008, *Microsoft's* \$8.5 billion acquisition of *Skype* in 2011, *Facebook's* \$1 billion acquisition of *Instagram* in 2012 and *Facebook's* \$22 billion acquisition of *WhatsApp* in 2014. As argued above, these examples have the common characteristic that the target firms held investment portfolios that partially overlapped with the acquirers' ones.

In such situations, this paper has shown that, when target and acquirer anticipate a transaction in the future, their incentives to allocate funding across their different interests are re-shaped by rent-seeking and strategic motives. More importantly, we have shown that sometimes this re-shaping causes the actors' investment portfolios to get more aligned with the social incentives, though the opposite may also occur. We have referred to the effect of reshuffling investments across projects as the impact of acquisitions on the actors' direction of innovation. When firms position their investments closer to the social optimum, a trade-off arises: on the direction of innovation margin, an acquisition increases consumer surplus; on the price margin, an acquisition reduces consumer surplus. We have shown that either of these effects may dominate and hence tighter regulations on acquisitions may have a positive or negative impact on the direction of innovation and overall consumer welfare. Therefore, we suggest a careful assessment of start-up acquisitions that takes into account not only the price effects due to increases in concentration but also possible changes in the R&D investment portfolios of both the acquirer and the target. This recommendation has a further consequence: examining integration processes of innovative multi-project firms using the traditional *definition-of-the-market* approach overlooks the crucial fact that it is precisely the shift of resources towards and away from non-rival projects what may cause the bulk of the welfare gains and losses.

More specifically, we provide the following guidelines for the assessment of start-up acquisitions in multi-project settings. First, because start-up acquisitions result in a shift of R&D resources away from (towards) non-overlapping areas of business and towards (and away from) overlapping ones, key variables for the assessment of start-up acquisitions are the levels of social surplus appropriability in the different business lines. This is because acquisitions that result in a move of research funds towards areas that deliver large social gains and small private gains are more likely to improve the direction of innovation and consumer surplus. Our analysis helps in identifying the conditions under which acquisitions have a potential to improve the composition of the firms' research portfolios and the direction of innovation. Identifying such conditions can help antitrust authorities to make more informed decisions about where behavioral remedies should be directed.



When the innovation is incremental and the incumbent moves its portfolio away from the rival market while the entrant towards it, the direction of innovation improves provided that social surplus appropriability in the entrant's alternative market is high and in the incumbent's alternative market is low. If this efficiency improvement in the direction of innovation is sufficiently large compared to the detrimental price effects, then permitting an acquisition will result in a consumer surplus increase. When the innovation is sizable and the incumbent moves its investment portfolio towards the contestable market, two things can happen. First, the entrant may shy away from the contestable market. In that case, which happens when the incumbent's bargaining power is high, the industry direction of innovation improves when appropriability in the incumbent's alternative market is high and in the entrant's is low.<sup>21</sup> Second, the entrant may choose to also allocate more resources to the contestable market. In that case, which occurs when the incumbent's bargaining power is low, the overall direction of innovation improves when appropriability in the incumbent's alternative market is intermediate and in the entrant's alternative market is high. This last situation is likely to result in a consumer surplus increase when the price effects associated with the acquisition are bounded.

## Appendix

**Proof of Lemma 1.** The expression in (3) is strictly concave in  $x$ . Hence, assuming an interior solution, the first-order condition (FOC) for maximization of (3) suffices for a maximum. Taking the FOC gives:

$$\frac{\epsilon_A}{(x + \epsilon_A)^2} R_A^S - \frac{\epsilon_A}{(x + \epsilon_A)^2} R_A^F - \frac{\epsilon_z}{(1 - x + \epsilon_z)^2} R_z^S = 0.$$

Solving for  $x$  gives the expression in (4). ■

**Proof of Lemma 2.** We prove this result for the acquisition game and notice that setting  $\delta = 1$  proves it for the no-acquisition game. We first observe that

$$\pi_{hl} + (1 - \delta)(\pi_h^m - \pi_{hl} - \pi_{\ell h}) > \pi_{hh} + (1 - \delta)(\pi_h^m - 2\pi_{hh}).$$

To see this, rewrite this inequality as

$$\delta\pi_{hl} + (1 - \delta)(\pi_h^m - \pi_{\ell h}) > \delta\pi_{hh} + (1 - \delta)(\pi_h^m - \pi_{hh})$$

and notice that this is always true because  $\pi_{hl} > \pi_{hh}$  and  $\pi_h^m - \pi_{\ell h} > \pi_h^m - \pi_{hh}$ .

The implication of this observation is that the entrant's expected returns from investing in project  $A$ , which are given by the numerator of the argument of the function  $x(\cdot)$  in (9), are decreasing in  $x_s^{I,a}$ . Hence,  $x^{E,a}$  decreases as  $x_s^{I,a}$  goes up.

In the no-acquisition case, we can set  $\delta = 1$  and notice that the entrant's expected returns from investing in project  $A$ , given by the numerator of the argument of the function  $x(\cdot)$  in (7), are decreasing in  $x_s^{I,na}$  when  $\pi_{hl} > \pi_{hh}$ . Hence,  $x^{E,na}$  decreases as  $x_s^{I,na}$  goes up. ■

<sup>21</sup>Assessing the relative bargaining power of the players can be challenging. Antitrust authorities may consider the strength of the startup's intellectual property, such as patents or trademarks, the level of investor interest in the start-up and the competitive landscape in the start-up's industry.

**Proof of Proposition 1.** (a) When comparing (5) and (8) we see that the latter is lower when  $\pi_h^m - 2\pi_{hh} < \pi_h^m - \pi_{hl} - \pi_{\ell h}$ .

Further  $x^{E,na} < x^{E,a}$  holds, when (7) is lower than (9), which is equivalent to

$$\frac{x_s^{I,na} \pi_{hh} + \epsilon_A \pi_{hl}}{x_s^{I,na} + \epsilon_A} < \frac{x_s^{I,a} [\pi_{hh} + (1 - \delta)(\pi_h^m - 2\pi_{hh})] + \epsilon_A [\pi_{hl} + (1 - \delta)(\pi_h^m - \pi_{hl} - \pi_{\ell h})]}{x_s^{I,a} + \epsilon_A}. \quad (26)$$

Note that because  $0 < x_s^{I,a} [(1 - \delta)(\pi_h^m - 2\pi_{hh})] + \epsilon_A [(1 - \delta)(\pi_h^m - \pi_{hl} - \pi_{\ell h})]$ , we have

$$\frac{x_s^{I,a} \pi_{hh} + \epsilon_A \pi_{hl}}{x_s^{I,a} + \epsilon_A} < \frac{x_s^{I,a} [\pi_{hh} + (1 - \delta)(\pi_h^m - 2\pi_{hh})] + \epsilon_A [\pi_{hl} + (1 - \delta)(\pi_h^m - \pi_{hl} - \pi_{\ell h})]}{x_s^{I,a} + \epsilon_A}$$

Finally, since  $\frac{x_s^{I,na} \pi_{hh} + \epsilon_A \pi_{hl}}{x_s^{I,na} + \epsilon_A} < \frac{x_s^{I,a} \pi_{hh} + \epsilon_A \pi_{hl}}{x_s^{I,a} + \epsilon_A}$  for all  $x_s^{I,na} > x_s^{I,a}$  and  $\pi_{hh} < \pi_{hl}$  we conclude that (26) holds and, hence, we have shown that  $x^{E,na} < x^{E,a}$ .

(b) When comparing (5) and (8) we see that the latter is higher when  $\pi_h^m - 2\pi_{hh} > \pi_h^m - \pi_{hl} - \pi_{\ell h}$ . Condition (10) follows from a comparison of  $x^{E,na}$  in (7) and  $x^{E,a}$  in (9).

We first note that  $x^{E,a} < x^{E,na}$  is equivalent to

$$\frac{x_s^{I,a} [\pi_{hh} + (1 - \delta)(\pi_h^m - 2\pi_{hh})] + \epsilon_A [\pi_{hl} + (1 - \delta)(\pi_h^m - \pi_{hl} - \pi_{\ell h})]}{x_s^{I,a} + \epsilon_A} < \frac{x_s^{I,na} \pi_{hh} + \epsilon_A \pi_{hl}}{x_s^{I,na} + \epsilon_A}, \quad (27)$$

which can be rewritten as  $\delta > \bar{\delta}(\epsilon_A, \epsilon_C, \pi_C, \pi_h^m, \pi_{hh}, \pi_{hl}, \pi_{\ell h})$ , where  $\bar{\delta}(\cdot)$  is the unique solution to

$$\frac{x_s^{I,a} [\pi_{hh} + (1 - \delta)(\pi_h^m - 2\pi_{hh})] + \epsilon_A [\pi_{hl} + (1 - \delta)(\pi_h^m - \pi_{hl} - \pi_{\ell h})]}{x_s^{I,a} + \epsilon_A} - \frac{x_s^{I,na} \pi_{hh} + \epsilon_A \pi_{hl}}{x_s^{I,na} + \epsilon_A} = 0, \quad (28)$$

which is strictly between 0 and 1 so the condition  $\delta > \bar{\delta}(\cdot)$  identifies a non-empty set of parameters. This follows from the following remarks. Observe that the LHS of (28) is a decreasing function of  $\delta$  because by Lemma 2 it decreases in  $x_s^{I,a}$  which itself increases in  $\delta$ . Further note that when  $\delta = 1$ , the LHS of (28) becomes

$$\frac{x_s^{I,a} \pi_{hh} + \epsilon_A \pi_{hl}}{x_s^{I,a} + \epsilon_A} - \frac{x_s^{I,na} \pi_{hh} + \epsilon_A \pi_{hl}}{x_s^{I,na} + \epsilon_A} < 0.$$

where the sign follows from  $x_s^{I,na} < x_s^{I,a}$  and  $\pi_{hh} < \pi_{hl}$ .

Next, note that when  $\delta = 0$ , the LHS of (28) becomes

$$\frac{x_s^{I,na} [\pi_{hh} + (\pi_h^m - 2\pi_{hh})] + \epsilon_A [\pi_{hl} + (\pi_h^m - \pi_{hl} - \pi_{\ell h})]}{x_s^{I,na} + \epsilon_A} - \frac{x_s^{I,na} \pi_{hh} + \epsilon_A \pi_{hl}}{x_s^{I,na} + \epsilon_A} > 0.$$

As a result, (28) has a unique solution in  $\delta$  and is strictly between 0 and 1.

To end the proof, note that  $x^{E,a} > x^{E,na}$  when condition in (27) does not hold, hence when  $\delta < \bar{\delta}(\cdot)$ , which also identifies a non-empty set of parameters. ■

**Proof of Proposition 2.** We start with the assumption that  $\pi_h^m - 2\pi_{hh} < \pi_h^m - \pi_{hl} - \pi_{\ell h}$  and so by Proposition 1,  $x_s^{I,a} < x_s^{I,na}$ . When we compare expressions (13), (8) and (5), we find that

$$\frac{\pi_C}{U_C} < \frac{\pi_{hh} + \delta(\pi_h^m - 2\pi_{hh}) - \pi_{\ell h} - \delta(\pi_h^m - \pi_{\ell h} - \pi_{hl})}{U_{hh} - U_{\ell h}} < \frac{\pi_{hh} - \pi_{\ell h}}{U_{hh} - U_{\ell h}}. \quad (29)$$

This holds because  $\pi_h^m - 2\pi_{hh} < \pi_h^m - \pi_{hl} - \pi_{\ell h}$ . As a result, the incumbent initially over-invests in project  $A$  in the no-acquisition and acquisition cases. The prospect of acquisition leads to a portfolio move away from project  $A$ . Hence, under conditions specified in Proposition 2 the incumbent's portfolio moves closer to that of the social planner and thereby the direction of innovation improves ( $x_s^{I,o} < x_s^{I,a} < x_s^{I,na}$ ).

Because of Proposition 1 we know that when the incumbent reduces its investment level in anticipation of the acquisition, the entrant will increase it, or  $x^{E,na} < x^{E,a}$ . Comparing expressions (9), (7) and (14) we obtain

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\pi_B}{U_B} &> \frac{\frac{x_s^{I,a}[\pi_{hh} + (1-\delta)(\pi_h^m - 2\pi_{hh})] + \epsilon_A[\pi_{hl} + (1-\delta)(\pi_h^m - \pi_{hl} - \pi_{\ell h})]}{x_s^{I,a} + \epsilon_A}}{\frac{x_s^{I,o}U_{hh} + \epsilon_A U_{\ell h}}{x_s^{I,o} + \epsilon_A} + \frac{1-x_s^{I,o}}{1-x_s^{I,o} + \epsilon_C} U_C - \left( \frac{x_f^{I,o}U_h^m + \epsilon_A U_\ell^m}{x_f^{I,o} + \epsilon_A} + \frac{1-x_f^{I,o}}{1-x_f^{I,o} + \epsilon_C} U_C \right)} \\ &> \frac{\frac{x_s^{I,na}\pi_{hh} + \epsilon_A \pi_{hl}}{x_s^{I,na} + \epsilon_A}}{\frac{x_s^{I,o}U_{hh} + \epsilon_A U_{\ell h}}{x_s^{I,o} + \epsilon_A} + \frac{1-x_s^{I,o}}{1-x_s^{I,o} + \epsilon_C} U_C - \left( \frac{x_f^{I,o}U_h^m + \epsilon_A U_\ell^m}{x_f^{I,o} + \epsilon_A} + \frac{1-x_f^{I,o}}{1-x_f^{I,o} + \epsilon_C} U_C \right)}. \end{aligned}$$

This holds because  $\frac{x_s^{I,a}[\pi_{hh} + (1-\delta)(\pi_h^m - 2\pi_{hh})] + \epsilon_A[\pi_{hl} + (1-\delta)(\pi_h^m - \pi_{hl} - \pi_{\ell h})]}{x_s^{I,a} + \epsilon_A} > \frac{x_s^{I,na}\pi_{hh} + \epsilon_A \pi_{hl}}{x_s^{I,na} + \epsilon_A}$ , where the inequality follows from the facts that  $x_s^{I,a} < x_s^{I,na}$  and  $[\pi_{hl} + (1-\delta)(\pi_h^m - \pi_{hl} - \pi_{\ell h})] > [\pi_{hh} + (1-\delta)(\pi_h^m - 2\pi_{hh})]$  (see also Proposition 1(a)). As a result, the entrant initially under-invests in project  $A$  in the no-acquisition and acquisition cases. Anticipating the acquisition, the entrant increases its investment in project  $A$ . Hence, the conditions of Proposition 2 imply that the entrant's portfolio moves closer to the social planner's one and thereby its direction of innovation improves ( $x^{E,na} < x^{E,a} < x^{E,o}$ ).

■

### Proof of Proposition 3.

- (a) We start with the assumption that  $\pi_h^m - 2\pi_{hh} > \pi_h^m - \pi_{hl} - \pi_{\ell h}$  so that by Proposition 1(b), anticipating an acquisition, the incumbent raises investment in the rival project. Comparing the expressions (13), (8) and (5), we find that

$$\frac{\pi_C}{U_C} > \frac{\pi_{hh} + \delta(\pi_h^m - 2\pi_{hh}) - \pi_{\ell h} - \delta(\pi_h^m - \pi_{hl} - \pi_{\ell h})}{U_{hh} - U_{\ell h}} > \frac{\pi_{hh} - \pi_{\ell h}}{U_{hh} - U_{\ell h}} \quad (30)$$

This holds because  $\pi_h^m - 2\pi_{hh} > \pi_h^m - \pi_{hl} - \pi_{\ell h}$ . As a result, the incumbent initially under-invests in project  $A$  in both the no-acquisition and acquisition cases. The prospect of an acquisition inclines the incumbent to allocate additional funds towards project  $A$ . Hence, under the conditions in Proposition 2, the incumbent's portfolio moves closer the social planner's one thereby increasing the efficiency of its direction of innovation ( $x_s^{I,na} < x_s^{I,a} < x_s^{I,o}$ ).

Assume that (10) holds so that by Proposition 1(b)(i), anticipating an acquisition, the entrant cuts investment in the rival market,  $x^{E,a} < x^{E,na}$ . Comparing (9), (7) and (14) we obtain:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\pi_B}{U_B} &< \frac{\frac{x_s^{I,a}[\pi_{hh} + (1-\delta)(\pi_h^m - 2\pi_{hh})] + \epsilon_A[\pi_{hl} + (1-\delta)(\pi_h^m - \pi_{hl} - \pi_{\ell h})]}{x_s^{I,a} + \epsilon_A}}{\frac{x_s^{I,o}U_{hh} + \epsilon_A U_{\ell h}}{x_s^{I,o} + \epsilon_A} + \frac{1-x_s^{I,o}}{1-x_s^{I,o} + \epsilon_C} U_C - \left( \frac{x_f^{I,o}U_h^m + \epsilon_A U_\ell^m}{x_f^{I,o} + \epsilon_A} + \frac{1-x_f^{I,o}}{1-x_f^{I,o} + \epsilon_C} U_C \right)} \\ &< \frac{\frac{x_s^{I,na}\pi_{hh} + \epsilon_A \pi_{hl}}{x_s^{I,na} + \epsilon_A}}{\frac{x_s^{I,o}U_{hh} + \epsilon_A U_{\ell h}}{x_s^{I,o} + \epsilon_A} + \frac{1-x_s^{I,o}}{1-x_s^{I,o} + \epsilon_C} U_C - \left( \frac{x_f^{I,o}U_h^m + \epsilon_A U_\ell^m}{x_f^{I,o} + \epsilon_A} + \frac{1-x_f^{I,o}}{1-x_f^{I,o} + \epsilon_C} U_C \right)}. \end{aligned}$$

This holds because  $\frac{x_s^{I,a}[\pi_{hh} + (1-\delta)(\pi_h^m - 2\pi_{hh})] + \epsilon_A[\pi_{h\ell} + (1-\delta)(\pi_h^m - \pi_{h\ell} - \pi_{\ell h})]}{x_s^{I,a} + \epsilon_A} < \frac{x_s^{I,na}\pi_{hh} + \epsilon_A\pi_{h\ell}}{x_s^{I,na} + \epsilon_A}$ , which is true because  $x_s^{I,a} > x_s^{I,na}$  and  $[\pi_{h\ell} + (1-\delta)(\pi_h^m - \pi_{h\ell} - \pi_{\ell h})] > [\pi_{hh} + (1-\delta)(\pi_h^m - 2\pi_{hh})]$ . As a result, the entrant initially over-invests in project  $A$  both in the no-acquisition and acquisition cases. Anticipating the acquisition, the entrant decreases its investment in project  $A$ . Hence, the conditions of Proposition 2 imply that the entrant's portfolio moves closer to that of the social planner, and thereby, its direction of innovation improves ( $x^{E,o} < x^{E,a} < x^{E,na}$ ).

- (b) Assume again that  $\pi_h^m - 2\pi_{hh} > \pi_h^m - \pi_{h\ell} - \pi_{\ell h}$  and that (10) does not hold so that by Proposition 1(b)(ii), anticipating an acquisition, the incumbent and the entrant both raise their investments in the rival market (and lower them in the independent markets),  $x_s^{I,na} < x_s^{I,a}$  and  $x^{E,na} < x^{E,a}$ . The direction of innovation of the incumbent improves under the same condition as in part (a): it initially under-invests, and anticipating the acquisition moves the portfolio closer to the social optimum. The direction of innovation of the entrant improves when condition (22) holds with the opposite sign. In such a case, the entrant initially under-invests and, anticipating its acquisition, moves the portfolio closer to the social optimum. ■

**Proof of Proposition 4.** (a) This part of the proposition analyses how acquisitions affect expected consumer surplus in Region I of Figure 2. Recall that by Proposition 1(a), in this region we have  $x_s^{I,a} < x_s^{I,na}$  and  $x^{E,a} > x^{E,na}$ . Consider

$$\lim_{U_C \rightarrow \infty} \frac{\mathbb{E}U^a(x_s^{I,a}, x_f^I, x^{E,a})}{\mathbb{E}U^{na}(x_s^{I,na}, x_f^I, x^{E,na})} = \frac{\frac{x^{E,a}}{x^{E,a} + \epsilon_A} \frac{1 - x_s^{I,a}}{1 - x_s^{I,a} + \epsilon_C} + \frac{\epsilon_A}{x^{E,a} + \epsilon_A} \frac{1 - x_f^I}{1 - x_f^I + \epsilon_C}}{\frac{x^{E,na}}{x^{E,na} + \epsilon_A} \frac{1 - x_s^{I,na}}{1 - x_s^{I,na} + \epsilon_C} + \frac{\epsilon_A}{x^{E,na} + \epsilon_A} \frac{1 - x_f^I}{1 - x_f^I + \epsilon_C}}. \quad (31)$$

Note that the numerator of this expression can be interpreted as the expected value of a random variable taking on values  $a = \frac{1 - x_s^{I,a}}{1 - x_s^{I,a} + \epsilon_C}$  and  $b = \frac{1 - x_f^I}{1 - x_f^I + \epsilon_C}$  with probabilities  $p = \frac{x^{E,a}}{x^{E,a} + \epsilon_A}$  and  $1 - p = \frac{\epsilon_A}{x^{E,a} + \epsilon_A}$ .

Likewise, the denominator is the expected value of a random variable taking on values  $a' = \frac{1 - x_s^{I,na}}{1 - x_s^{I,na} + \epsilon_C}$  and  $b$  with probabilities  $p' = \frac{x^{E,na}}{x^{E,na} + \epsilon_A}$  and  $1 - p' = \frac{\epsilon_A}{x^{E,na} + \epsilon_A}$ .

Now, because  $x_s^{I,na} > x_s^{I,a}$ ,  $x_f^I > x_s^{I,na}$  and  $x^{E,a} > x^{E,na}$  we have  $a > a' > b$  and  $p > p'$ . This implies that the random variable corresponding to the numerator first order stochastically dominates the random variable corresponding to the denominator. Hence, the limit in expression (31) is bigger than 1. To finish the argument, note that because the expressions for expected consumer surpluses are continuous in  $U_C$ , allowing acquisitions results in an increase in consumer surplus provided that  $U_C$  is sufficiently large.

(b)(i) This part of the proposition analyses how acquisitions affect expected consumer surplus in Region II of Figure 2. Recall that under the conditions of Proposition 1(b)(i), in this region we have  $x_s^{I,a} > x_s^{I,na}$  and  $x^{E,a} < x^{E,na}$ . Consider

$$\lim_{U_B \rightarrow \infty} \frac{\mathbb{E}U^a(x_s^{I,a}, x_f^I, x^{E,a})}{\mathbb{E}U^{na}(x_s^{I,na}, x_f^I, x^{E,na})} = \frac{\frac{1 - x^{E,a}}{1 - x^{E,a} + \epsilon_B}}{\frac{1 - x^{E,na}}{1 - x^{E,na} + \epsilon_B}}, \quad (32)$$

and note that  $\frac{1-x}{1-x+\epsilon_B}$  is a decreasing function of  $x$ . Because  $x^{E,a} < x^{E,na}$ , this limit is bigger than 1. Hence, because the expressions for expected consumer surpluses are continuous in  $U_B$ , for sufficiently large  $U_B$ , allowing acquisitions results in an increase in consumer surplus.

(b)(ii) This part of the proposition analyses how acquisitions affect expected consumer surplus in Region III of Figure 2. Recall that under the conditions of Proposition 1(b)(ii) we have  $x_s^{I,a} > x_s^{I,na}$

and  $x^{E,a} > x^{E,na}$ . Consider

$$\lim_{U_B \rightarrow 0} \frac{\mathbb{E}U^a(x_s^{I,a}, x_f^I, x^{E,a})}{\mathbb{E}U^{na}(x_s^{I,na}, x_f^I, x^{E,na})} = \frac{\frac{x^{E,a}}{x^{E,a} + \epsilon_A} \left[ U_h^m + \frac{1-x_s^{I,a}}{1-x_s^{I,a} + \epsilon_C} U_C \right] + \frac{\epsilon_A}{x^{E,a} + \epsilon_A} \left[ \frac{x_f^I}{x_f^I + \epsilon_A} U_h^m + \frac{\epsilon_A}{x_f^I + \epsilon_A} U_\ell^m + \frac{1-x_f^I}{1-x_f^I + \epsilon_C} U_C \right]}{\frac{x^{E,na}}{x^{E,na} + \epsilon_A} \left[ \frac{x_s^{I,na}}{x_s^{I,na} + \epsilon_A} U_{hh} + \frac{\epsilon_A}{x_s^{I,na} + \epsilon_A} U_{lh} + \frac{1-x_s^{I,na}}{1-x_s^{I,na} + \epsilon_C} U_C \right] + \frac{\epsilon_A}{x^{E,na} + \epsilon_A} \left[ \frac{x_f^I}{x_f^I + \epsilon_A} U_h^m + \frac{\epsilon_A}{x_f^I + \epsilon_A} U_\ell^m + \frac{1-x_f^I}{1-x_f^I + \epsilon_C} U_C \right]}. \quad (33)$$

The numerator of this expression is the expected value of a random variable taking on values  $a = U_h^m + \frac{1-x_s^{I,a}}{1-x_s^{I,a} + \epsilon_C} U_C$  and  $b = \frac{x_f^I}{x_f^I + \epsilon_A} U_h^m + \frac{\epsilon_A}{x_f^I + \epsilon_A} U_\ell^m + \frac{1-x_f^I}{1-x_f^I + \epsilon_C} U_C$  with probabilities  $p = \frac{x^{E,a}}{x^{E,a} + \epsilon_A}$  and  $1 - p$ . Likewise, the denominator is the expected value of a random variable taking on values  $a' = \frac{x_s^{I,na}}{x_s^{I,na} + \epsilon_A} U_{hh} + \frac{\epsilon_A}{x_s^{I,na} + \epsilon_A} U_{lh} + \frac{1-x_s^{I,na}}{1-x_s^{I,na} + \epsilon_C} U_C$  and  $b$  with probabilities  $p' = \frac{x^{E,na}}{x^{E,na} + \epsilon_A}$  and  $1 - p'$ .

Now, because  $x_s^{I,a} > x_s^{I,na}$ ,  $x_f^I > x_s^{I,a}$  and  $x^{E,a} > x^{E,na}$  we have  $a' > a > b$  and  $p > p'$ .<sup>22</sup> This implies that the random variables corresponding to the numerator and the denominator of (33) cannot be ranked according to the first-order stochastic dominance criterion. We now show that the conditions in the proposition ensure that the random variable corresponding to the numerator second-order stochastically dominates the random variable corresponding to the denominator, which ensures that the limit above is greater than 1. For this we need that  $(a - b)(p - p') > (a' - a)p'$ , or using the expressions above:

$$\begin{aligned} & \left( \left[ U_h^m + \frac{1-x_s^{I,a}}{1-x_s^{I,a} + \epsilon_C} U_C \right] - \left[ \frac{x_f^I}{x_f^I + \epsilon_A} U_h^m + \frac{\epsilon_A}{x_f^I + \epsilon_A} U_\ell^m + \frac{1-x_f^I}{1-x_f^I + \epsilon_C} U_C \right] \right) \left( \frac{x^{E,a}}{x^{E,a} + \epsilon_A} - \frac{x^{E,na}}{x^{E,na} + \epsilon_A} \right) \\ & > \left( \left[ \frac{x_s^{I,na}}{x_s^{I,na} + \epsilon_A} U_{hh} + \frac{\epsilon_A}{x_s^{I,na} + \epsilon_A} U_{lh} + \frac{1-x_s^{I,na}}{1-x_s^{I,na} + \epsilon_C} U_C \right] - \left[ U_h^m + \frac{1-x_s^{I,a}}{1-x_s^{I,a} + \epsilon_C} U_C \right] \right) \left( \frac{x^{E,na}}{x^{E,na} + \epsilon_A} \right) \end{aligned}$$

which can be rewritten as

$$\frac{(x^{E,a} - x^{E,na}) \epsilon_A}{x^{E,na} (x^{E,a} + \epsilon_A)} > \frac{\frac{x_s^{I,na}}{x_s^{I,na} + \epsilon_A} (U_{hh} - U_h^m) + \frac{\epsilon_A}{x_s^{I,na} + \epsilon_A} (U_{lh} - U_h^m) + \left( \frac{1-x_s^{I,na}}{1-x_s^{I,na} + \epsilon_C} - \frac{1-x_s^{I,a}}{1-x_s^{I,a} + \epsilon_C} \right) U_C}{\frac{\epsilon_A}{x_f^I + \epsilon_A} (U_h^m - U_\ell^m) + \left( \frac{1-x_s^{I,a}}{1-x_s^{I,a} + \epsilon_C} - \frac{1-x_f^I}{1-x_f^I + \epsilon_C} \right) U_C}. \quad (34)$$

Now we make two observations about inequality (34). First, note that the LHS of (34) decreases in  $\delta$  and converges to 0 as  $\delta \rightarrow \bar{\delta}(\cdot)$  because  $x_s^{E,a} \rightarrow x_s^{E,na}$ . Second, the RHS of (34) increases in  $\delta$  and is greater than zero for all  $\delta < \bar{\delta}(\cdot)$ . This implies that if

$$\lim_{\delta \rightarrow 0} \frac{(x^{E,a} - x^{E,na}) \epsilon_A}{x^{E,na} (x^{E,a} + \epsilon_A)} > \frac{\frac{x_s^{I,na}}{x_s^{I,na} + \epsilon_A} (U_{hh} - U_h^m) + \frac{\epsilon_A}{x_s^{I,na} + \epsilon_A} (U_{lh} - U_h^m)}{\frac{\epsilon_A}{x_f^I + \epsilon_A} (U_h^m - U_\ell^m) + \left( \frac{1-x_s^{I,a}}{1-x_s^{I,a} + \epsilon_C} - \frac{1-x_f^I}{1-x_f^I + \epsilon_C} \right) U_C}, \quad (35)$$

which is the condition in the Proposition, then, by monotonicity of the LHS and RHS of the inequality (34) with respect to  $\delta$ , there exists a critical  $\tilde{\delta} \in (0, \bar{\delta})$  such that (34) holds for all  $\delta < \tilde{\delta}$ . Hence,

<sup>22</sup>Note also that here we make use of the following set of inequalities:  $U_{hh} > U_h^m$ ,  $U_{lh} > U_h^m$ ,  $U_h^m > U_\ell^m$ , which are trivially satisfied.

under the condition in the Proposition, the random variable corresponding to the numerator of (33) second-order stochastically dominates the random variable corresponding to the denominator for all  $\delta < \tilde{\delta}$ , which implies that consumer surplus in markets  $A$  and  $C$  increases if acquisitions are allowed.

To complete the argument, we finally notice that allowing for acquisitions decreases consumer surplus from market  $B$  because when  $x_s^{E,a} > x_s^{E,na}$  we have  $\frac{1-x^{E,a}}{1-x^{E,a}+\epsilon_B}U_B < \frac{1-x^{E,na}}{1-x^{E,na}+\epsilon_B}U_B$ . Because the expressions for expected consumer surpluses are continuous in  $U_B$ , there exists  $\tilde{U}_B$  such that for all  $U_B < \tilde{U}_B$  this decrease is negligible and allowing for acquisitions results in a consumer surplus increase.

We finish the proof by pointing out that when (35) does not hold, then (34) holds with the opposite sign for all  $\delta$ . Because the distribution functions of the random variables corresponding to the numerator and the denominator of (33) cross one another only once, this implies that acquisitions always result in a decrease in consumer surplus. ■

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