THE MACROECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF CO-HOLDING LIQUID ASSETS AND DEBT

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EEA/ESEM, Barcelona

Disclaimer: The presented views are those of the authors, not necessarily of the Bank of Canada.

MOTIVATION

- 1. Liquid wealth distribution key state variable for policy transmission
 - Tight link between liquid wealth and marginal propensity to consume (MPC)
 - High MPC households key building block in heterogeneous agent models
 - Typically focus on *net*, not *gross* liquid wealth position:

MPC(a - d) vs MPC(a, d)

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- 2. Co-holding liquid assets and liquid debt is common in the US
 - 1/3 of Americans regularly borrow on their credit card
 - Vast majority simultaneously holds liquid assets
 - Distribution of liquid wealth \Longrightarrow joint distribution of liquid assets and debt

What are the implications of co-holding for fiscal policy?

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- 1. Empirical analysis
 - Study role of joint liquid asset/debt distribution for marginal propensities to
 - consume (MPC)
 - save (MPS)
 - repay debt (MPRD)
 - $\rightarrow~$ Gross liquid wealth position <code>matters:</code>
 - Neither gross nor net liquid wealth (a = o, d = o) \rightarrow High MPC
 - Gross but no net liquid wealth (e.g. a = 1000, d = 1000) \rightarrow High MPRD

What are the implications of co-holding for fiscal/monetary policy?

- 2. <u>Model</u>
 - Consumption-savings model w/ coholding via liquidity-in-advance constraint
 - \rightarrow Matches levels and slopes of MPC/MPS/MPRD across asset/debt distribution

What are the implications of co-holding for fiscal/monetary policy?


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 - ightarrow Matches levels and slopes of MPC/MPS/MPRD across asset/debt distribution

- 3. Fiscal policy implications
 - Targeted transfers difficult; consumption/deleveraging trade-off

Literature


DATA & EMPIRICS

CO-HOLDING OF LIQUID ASSETS AND DEBT IN THE US



(a) Fraction of Credit Card Holders

CO-HOLDING OF LIQUID ASSETS AND DEBT IN THE US



(a) Fraction of Credit Card Holders

(b) Liquid asset/debt ratio for credit card borrowers

Note: 2016 SCF. Liquid assets are defined as funds in checking and savings accounts.



- 1. Liquidity [Telyukova-Wright-2008, Telyukova-2013]
- 2. Credit access risk [Fulford-2015, Druedahl-Jørgensen-2018, Gorbachev-Luengo-Prado-2019]
- 3. Accountant-shopper models [Bertaut-et-al-2009]

New York FED Survey of Consumer Expectations (SCE), 2015-2018

- Repeated cross-section of households
- Data on demographics, income and **balance sheets**:
 - Liquid assets: Money in checking/savings accounts
 - Liquid debt: Credit card debt
- Marginal propensities to **consume**, **save** and **repay debt**:

"Suppose next year you were to find your household with 10 percent more income than you currently expect. What would you do with the extra income?" [spend/save/pay down debt (in %)]

• Alternative measure: usage of tax refund

$$MP_{i} = \beta_{0} + \beta_{1}A_{i} + \beta_{2}D_{i} + \gamma X_{i} + u_{i}$$

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Spend	Save	Repay Debt
Liquid Assets	0.0346	0.231***	-0.265***
	(0.0219)	(0.0308)	(0.0296)
Liquid Debt	-0.243***	-0.674***	0.918***
	(0.0523)	(0.0818)	(0.111)
N	2,578	2,578	2,578
R ²	0.069	0.119	0.174

Notes: Regressions control additionally for age, gender, race, marital status, education, geography, and survey date. Survey weights used. Liquid assets include money in checking/savings accounts. Liquid debt is credit card debt.

Thought experiment:

- +1\$ A, +1\$ D, $\Delta W = 0$
- Gross wealth ↑, net wealth constant

$$\rightarrow$$
 Lower MPC! +0.03 - 0.24 = -0.21

Model

MODEL OVERVIEW

- Financial markets: liquid one-period instruments for assets, a, and debt, d
- Interest rate on borrowing higher than on saving, $\delta > {\rm O}$

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- Financial markets: liquid one-period instruments for assets, a, and debt, d
- Interest rate on borrowing higher than on saving, $\delta > {\rm O}$
- Exogenous stochastic persistent income process
- Households choose saving and borrowing to maximize utility:

$$E_{o}\sum_{t=0}^{\infty}\beta^{t}u(c_{t})$$

s.t. budget and borrowing constraints:

$$c_t + \underbrace{rac{a_{t+1}}{R}}_{ ext{saving}} - \underbrace{rac{d_{t+1}}{R+\delta}}_{ ext{borrowing}} = y_t + a_t - d_t, \qquad d_{t+1} \leq \phi$$

LIQUIDITY-IN-ADVANCE CONSTRAINT

Co-holding through liquidity-in-advance constraint Evidence
[Lucas 1982, Svensson 1985, Telyukova 2013]

 $\theta c_t \leq a_t$

• This is an intertemporal constraint!

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- This is an intertemporal constraint!
- Rational co-holding for consumption: borrow to smooth, save to finance
- Recursive formulation:

$$V(a,d,y) = \max_{c,a',d'} u(c(a,d,y)) + \beta EV(a',d',y')$$

s.t. BC, LIA, $a' \geq 0, 0 \leq d' \leq \phi$

• Extension with expenditure shock (not today)

Parameter	Description	Value	Source/Target
External			
γ	Risk aversion	2	Standard
r	Interest rate	0.0033	4.00% APR
δ	Credit card spread	0.0074	9.63% APR
θ	Share of liquid consumption	0.683	Telyukova 2013
ϕ	Borrowing limit	2.2	74% of quarterly income
$ ho_{y}$	Persistence of y_t	0.096	Gelman 2021
$\sigma_{\rm V}^2$	Variance of innovation in y _t	0.039	Gelman 2021

Internal

β Discount factor 0.9926 75th pct. of liquid debt-te	-income
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
Data versus model moments

	Data	Model
Targeted		
75th pct of liquid debt-to-income	0.42	0.42
Untargeted		
Median liquid debt-to-income	0.00	0.06
Median liquid asset-to-income	0.51	0.87
% of co-holders	25	37
Avg. MPC	17.1	13.6
Avg. MPRD	38.4	38.6
Avg. MPS	44.5	49.1

Notes: Balance sheet moments from SCF. MPX from unexpected and transitory income change of 500USD.


SCE/SCF Joint distribution Co-holding and income

DISTRIBUTION OF MARGINAL PROPENSITIES: MODEL VS DATA




(a) MPC - data

(b) MPC - model




(c) MPRD - data

(d) MPRD - model




MARGINAL PROPENSITIES ACROSS DISTRIBUTION OF LIQUID WEALTH



MPC ACROSS THE JOINT DISTRIBUTION

Fitted values from model regression: $MP_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 A_i + \beta_2 D_i + \gamma X_i + u_i$



FISCAL POLICY

- Frequent argument: target high MPC households to raise aggregate demand
- Who are the high MPC households? Liquid wealth is imperfect measure
- Fiscal policy experiment:
 - Simulate response to targeted transfers of \$500
 - Targeting based on income and wealth

Change in aggregate consumption and debt following transfers							
	Incon	ne-based	Wealth-based				
Targeted population	$\frac{\Delta C}{T}$	$\frac{\Delta D}{T}$	$\frac{\Delta C}{T}$	$\frac{\Delta D}{T}$			
Bottom 10%	14.4	-58.0	13.5	-86.0			
Bottom 30%	14.3	-49.1	12.1	-78.3			
Bottom 50%	14.0	-46.7	13.6	-66.2			
All	13.6	-39.3	13.6	-39.3			

- Hand-to-mouth behaviour not as straightforward as often modelled
- Joint distribution of liquid assets/debt matters beyond liquid wealth
- Simple model with liquidity-in-advance constraint generates:
 - Co-holding of liquid assets and debt
 - Empirically observed marginal propensities to consume, save and repay debt
- Novel implications for fiscal policy

LITERATURE

- 1. Co-holding puzzle [Gross-Souleles-2002, Bertaut-et-al-2009, Telyukova-Wright-2008, Telyukova-2013, Fulford-2015, Druedahl-Jørgensen- 2018, Gorbachev-Luengo-Prado-2019]
 - \rightarrow Focus on macroeconomic implications of co-holding (Explanations)
- 2. Marginal propensities to consume and policy transmission [...]
 - ightarrow Highlight role of joint distribution of liquid assets and debt
 - ightarrow Potential **resolution to conflicting evidence** on slope of MPC
 - \rightarrow Investigate marginal propensity to repay debt
- 3. Debt-dependent fiscal multipliers [Dynan-et al-2013, Mian-et-al-2013, Klein- 2017, Baker-2018, Bernardini-Peersman-2018, Demyanyk-et-al-2019, Bernardini-et-al-2020]
 - \rightarrow Focus on **liquid debt** instead of total debt



LIQUID BALANCE SHEET AND MARGINAL PROPENSITIES: JAPELLI-PISTAFERRI-2014

	(1) MPC	(2) MPC
I financial wealth quintile	0.175***	0.262***
	(0.019)	(0.021)
II financial wealth quintile	0.150***	0.169***
	(0.024)	(0.024)
III financial wealth quintile	0.109***	0.118***
	(0.020)	(0.020)
IV financial wealth quintile	0.044*	0.053**
	(0.019)	(0.019)
I financial debt tercile given pos. debt		-0.153***
		(0.022)
II financial debt tercile given pos. debt		-0.138***
		(0.024)
III financial debt tercile given pos. debt		-0.224***
		(0.026)
R-squared	0.071	0.078
Observations	7950	7950

Household liquid balance sheet and marginal propensities

LIQUID BALANCE SHEET AND MARGINAL PROPENSITIES: CHRISTELIS-ET-AL-2019

Household liquid balance sheet and marginal propensities						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	MPC	MPC	MPS	MPS	MPRD	MPRD
II financial wealth quartile	-0.010	-0.024	0.088***	0.055*	-0.106***	-0.052*
	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.022)	(0.021)
III financial wealth quartile	-0.038**	-0.054 ^{***}	0.097***	0.058*	-0.102***	-0.038
	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.023)	(0.025)	(0.022)	(0.023)
IV financial wealth quartile	-0.014	-0.030	0.143***	0.105***	-0.170***	-0.109***
	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.022)	(0.022)
Low financial debt		-0.039** (0.015)		-0.080** (0.029)		0.142*** (0.029)
High financial debt		-0.044** (0.016)		-0.108*** (0.029)		0.171*** (0.031)
R-squared	0.025	0.034	0.028	0.040	0.071	0.118
Observations	1332	1332	1326	1326	1332	1332




RESPONSE SCHEME FOR MPC QUESTION

• Qualitative:

- 1. Save or invest all of it
- 2. Spend or donate all of it
- 3. Use all of it to pay down debts
- 4. Spend some and save some
- 5. Spend some and use part of it to pay down debts
- 6. Save some and use part of it to pay down debts
- 7. Spend some, save some and use some to pay down debts
- <u>Quantitative</u> (if previously 4-7):
 - 1. Save or invest: %
 - 2. Spend or donate: %
 - 3. Pay down debts: %

		Data			Model		
	Spend	Save	Repay Debt	Spend	Save	Repay Debt	
Liquid Assets	0.037	0.214***	-0.250***	-0.280***	2.511***	-2.290***	
	(0.021)	(0.030)	(0.028)	(0.009)	(0.041)	(0.042)	
Liquid Debt	-0.229***	-0.640***	0.870***	-0.310***	-2.837***	3.174***	
	(0.053)	(0.080)	(0.110)	(0.013)	(0.046)	(0.050)	
Ν	2578	2578	2578	9800	9800	9800	
adj. R2	0.015	0.073	0.110	0.058	0.549	0.551	



Source: Greene-Stavings-2022, SCPC/DCPC.




		Ś	SCE		n the SCE and SCF SCF				
Variable	Mean	p25	р50	p75	Mean	p25	р50	p75	
Liquid assets	18.15	0.00	2.00	13.50	22.19	0.50	3.20	12.50	
Liquid debt	9.62 0.00		1.40	7.50	2.88	0.00	0.00	2.20	
Liquid wealth	8.53 -4.70		0.00	10.50	19.31	0.00	1.20	10.16	
Total assets	454.16 22.00		197.00	475.00	718.63	26.10	176.70	457.00	
Total debt	148.08	6.00	40.00	150.00	114.79	3.00	44.95	153.60	
Total wealth	304.16	-1.00	99.00	317.00	603.83	8.25	81.44	307.08	
Income	109.01	35.00	66.00	110.00	111.05	31.39	60.76	105.31	
Share of co-holders	0.32				0.34				
Observations	2774				4580				

Distribution of assets, debt and income in the SCE and SCF




JOINT DISTRIBUTION OF LIQUID ASSETS AND DEBT





Go back


CO-HOLDING ACROSS THE INCOME DISTRIBUTION



Co-holding and income in the model



CO-HOLDING OF LIQUID ASSETS AND DEBT IN THE US



(a) Credit Card Holders by Income Quartile

(b) Average liquid assets and debt

Note: 2016 SCF. Liquid assets are defined as funds in checking and savings accounts.


MARGINAL PROPENSITIES ACROSS THE JOINT DISTRIBUTION

Data										
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)				
	Spend	Spend	Save	Save	Repay Debt	Repay Debt				
Liquid Wealth	0.070***	0.037	0.288***	0.214***	-0.357***	-0.250***				
	(0.018)	(0.021)	(0.028)	(0.030)	(0.028)	(0.028)				
Liquid Debt		-0.193**		-0.426***		0.621***				
		(0.060)		(0.089)		(0.118)				
Ν	2578	2578	2578	2578	2578	2578				
adj. R2	0.008	0.015	0.058	0.073	0.082	0.110				
			Mode	l						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)				
	Spend	Spend	Save	Save	Repay Debt	Repay Debt				
Liquid Wealth	0.000	-0.280***	2.666***	2.511***	-2.710***	-2.290***				
	(0.005)	(0.009)	(0.017)	(0.041)	(0.019)	(0.042)				
Liquid Debt		-0.590*** (0.021)		-0.326*** (0.081)		0.884*** (0.084)				
N	9800	9800	9800	9800	9800	9800				
IN .	9800	9800	9000	9000	9000	9000				






THE COMPOSITION OF DEBT IN THE US





HYPOTHETICAL VERSUS REPORTED MPC AND MPRD

Distribution of hypothetical and reported marginal propensities



(a) MPC

(b) MPRD




EXTERNAL VALIDITY

- What about external validity?
- Revisit empirical evidence in:
 - 1. Japelli-Pistaferri-2014 (Italy) Table
 - \rightarrow MPC decreasing in debt
 - 2. Christelis-Georgarakos-Jappelli-Pistaferri-Van Rooij-2019 (Netherlands) Table
 - $\rightarrow~$ MPC decreasing in debt
 - \rightarrow MPRD increasing in debt
 - 3. Parker-Souleles-Johnson-Mcclelland-2013 (CEX)
 - $\rightarrow~$ Low power, weak evidence for non-monotonic decrease of MPC in debt
- $\rightarrow~\textbf{Robust evidence}$ for role of (liquid) debt in consumption response



CO-HOLDING SHARES OVER TIME



Go back

Comparison of co-holders and non co-holders in the SCE


		Co-ł	nolders		Not co-holders				
Variable	Mean	p25	p50	p75	Mean	p25	р50	p75	
Age	45.81	36.00	46.00	55.00	46.56	36.00	48.00	57.00	
Female	0.44	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.51	0.00	1.00	1.00	
College degree	0.44	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.34	0.00	0.00	1.00	
Financial literacy	5.62	5.00	6.00	7.00	7.00 5.22		5.00	7.00	
Income	107.69	55.00	80.00	134.00 109.6		30.00	56.00	100.00	
Liquid assets	25.26	2.58	8.00	25.00	14.84	0.00	0.00	9.00	
Liquid debt	12.57	2.00	5.00	12.00	8.24	0.00	0.00	4.40	
Liquid wealth	12.69	-5.00	2.00	17.50	6.60	-4.40	0.00	9.00	
Liquid and fin. assets	77.82	5.00	15.00	60.00	59.76	0.00	0.50	25.00	
Non-housing debt	38.07	7.00	20.00	50.00	35.01	0.00	8.80	30.00	
Total assets	459.69	125.00	290.00	597.00	451.56	5.50	155.20	405.00	
Total debt	132.78	15.60	75.00	195.00	155.22	3.00	30.00	120.00	
Total wealth	327.11	26.35	160.00 420.00		293.37	-4.25	65.00	270.30	
Home-owner	0.80	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.65	0.00	1.00	1.00	
Mortgage-owner	0.52	0.00	1.00	1.00	0.38	0.00	0.00	1.00	
Observations	962				1812				

MARGINAL PROPENSITIES ACROSS HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS


	in 'ooo USD						Standardized					
	Spend	Save	Repay Debt	Spend	Save	Repay Debt	Spend	Save	Repay Debt	Spend	Save	Repay Debt
Liquid Assets	0.009	0.240***	-0.249***	0.011	0.224***	-0.234***	0.733	18.683***	-19.359***	0.866	17.406***	-18.214***
	(0.016)	(0.027)	(0.024)	(0.016)	(0.028)	(0.025)	(1.275)	(2.135)	(1.898)	(1.280)	(2.172)	(1.946)
Liquid Debt	-0.209***	-0.656***	0.866***	-0.225***	-0.693***	0.919***	-13.166***	-41.442***	54.671***	-14.191***	-43.744***	57.993***
	(0.037)	(0.059)	(0.078)	(0.038)	(0.059)	(0.075)	(2.321)	(3.747)	(4.902)	(2.403)	(3.723)	(4.733)
Illiquid Assets				-0.000	0.000**	-0.000				-0.322	1.179**	-0.847
				(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)				(0.317)	(0.380)	(0.588)
Illiquid Debt				0.004**	0.003	-0.006**				7.799**	5.441	-13.285**
				(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)				(2.726)	(4.499)	(4.607)
Income				-0.001	0.005***	-0.004***				-0.244	1.573***	-1.331***
				(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)				(0.139)	(0.214)	(0.224)
Mortgager				-5.537***	2.330	3.195				-5.537***	2.330	3.195
				(1.469)	(2.304)	(2.434)				(1.469)	(2.304)	(2.434)
Homeowner				-3.194	8.279**	-5.154				-3.194	8.279**	-5.154
				(1.759)	(2.600)	(2.657)				(1.759)	(2.600)	(2.657)
Moderate fin. literacy				0.225	2.739	-2.671				0.225	2.739	-2.671
				(2.000)	(3.210)	(3.427)				(2.000)	(3.210)	(3.427)
High fin. literacy				2.853	0.745	-3.284				2.853	0.745	-3.284
- /				(2.226)	(3.540)	(3.812)				(2.226)	(3.540)	(3.812)
N	2648	2648	2648	2528	2528	2528	2648	2648	2648	2528	2528	2528
R ²	0.056	0.161	0.195	0.069	0.177	0.211	0.056	0.161	0.195	0.069	0.177	0.211

Regressions of Marginal Propensities on Household Characteristics


MARGINAL PROPENSITIES ACROSS DISTRIBUTION OF LIQUID ASSETS



MARGINAL PROPENSITIES ACROSS DISTRIBUTION OF LIQUID DEBT




MARGINAL PROPENSITIES ACROSS THE JOINT DISTRIBUTION



(a) Data

MARGINAL PROPENSITIES ACROSS THE JOINT DISTRIBUTION





Regression

(b) Model