

# RELAXING INSTRUMENT EXOGENEITY WITH COMMON CONFOUNDERS

## IV WITH MISMEASURED CONFOUNDERS

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# Outline

Setup

Linear Example

Identification

Returns to Education

Semiparametric Estimation

Conclusion

## General Idea

Quantity of interest: *Causal effect* of treatment  $A$      $\theta_0 = \int Y(a)\pi(a) d\mu_A(a)$   
on outcome  $Y$ .

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$A$  is endogenous (simultaneity, unobserved confounders).

$$Y(a) \not\perp\!\!\!\perp A$$

We want to use relevant instruments  $Z$  for  $A$ .

$$A(z) \neq A \text{ if } z \neq Z$$

Instruments NOT unconditionally exogenous.

$$Y(a) \not\perp\!\!\!\perp Z$$

The unobserved *common confounders*  $U$  fully explain the association between  $Z$  and proxies  $W$ .


$$Z \perp\!\!\!\perp W \mid U$$

Instruments would be exogenous conditional on the common confounders  $U$ .

$$Y(a) \perp\!\!\!\perp Z \mid U$$

## IV

Figure: DAG of an IV model




## Assumption (IV Model)

1. SUTVA:  $Y = Y(A, Z)$
- 2a. *Instrument Exogeneity*:  
 $Y(a, z) = Y(a) \perp\!\!\!\perp Z$ .
- 2b. *Instrument Relevance*:  
For any  $g(A) \in L_2(A)$ ,  
 $\mathbb{E}[g(A)|Z] = 0$  only if  $g(A) = 0$ .

# Unobservable Confounders $U$

Figure: DAG with unobserved confounders



Assumption (Confounded IV)

2a. *Cond. Instrument Exogeneity*:


$$Y(a, z) = Y(a) \perp\!\!\!\perp Z \mid \mathbf{U}.$$

2c. *Cond. Instrument Relevance*:

For any  $g(A, \mathbf{U}) \in L_2(A, \mathbf{U})$ ,  
 $\mathbb{E}[g(A, \mathbf{U})|Z] = 0$  only if  $g(A, \mathbf{U}) = 0$ .

# Proxies $W$ for Unobservables $U$

Figure: Introducing proxies  
 $W$



Assumption (Conounded IV with relevant proxies)

- 2a. *Cond. Instrument Exogeneity*:  
 $Y(a, z) = Y(a) \perp\!\!\!\perp Z \mid U.$


- 2c. *Cond. Instrument Relevance*:  
For any  $g(A, U) \in L_2(A, U)$ ,  
 $\mathbb{E}[g(A, U)|Z] = 0$  only if  $g(A, U) = 0$ .

- 3a. *Proxy Exogeneity*:  
 $W(z) = W \perp\!\!\!\perp Z \mid U.$

- 3b. *Proxy Relevance*:  
For any  $g(U) \in L_2(U)$ ,  
 $\mathbb{E}[g(U)|W] = 0$  only if  $g(U) = 0$ .

# Index Sufficiency

Figure: Focus on  $Z$



Assumption (Conounded IV with rel. proxies and index sufficiency)

2a. *Cond. Instrument Exogeneity*:

$$Y(a, z) = Y(a) \perp\!\!\!\perp Z \mid U.$$

2b. *Index sufficiency*:  $U \perp\!\!\!\perp Z \mid T$  for some  $T = \tau(Z)$ .

2c. *Cond. Instrument Relevance*:

For any  $g(A, T) \in L_2(A, T)$ ,  
 $\mathbb{E}[g(A, T)|Z] = 0$  only if  $g(A, T) = 0$ .

3a. *Proxy Exogeneity*:


$$W(z) = W \perp\!\!\!\perp Z \mid U.$$

3b. *Proxy Relevance*:

For any  $g(U) \in L_2(U)$ ,  
 $\mathbb{E}[g(U)|W] = 0$  only if  $g(U) = 0$ .

# Block Backdoor Path

**Figure:** Retrieving standard IV model



## Assumption 1.1

- 2a. *Cond. Instrument Exogeneity*:  
 $Y(a, z) = Y(a) \perp\!\!\!\perp Z \mid U.$
- 2b. *Index sufficiency*:  $U \perp\!\!\!\perp Z \mid T$  for some  $T = \tau(Z)$ .

2c. *Cond. Instrument Relevance*:  
For any  $g(A, T) \in L_2(A, T)$ ,  
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# Related literature

- ▶ Instrumental Variables
  - ▶ with linear separability of unobservables in the outcome model [Newey and Powell, 2003]
  - ▶ for average structural function identification with strict monotonicity in the first stage reduced form [Imbens and Newey, 2009]
- ▶ Proximal learning
  - ▶ General proximal learning [Deaner, 2018, Tchetgen Tchetgen et al., 2020, Cui et al., 2020]
  - ▶ Control function approach [Nagasakiwa, 2018]
- ▶ Index sufficiency assumption
  - ▶ on unobserved heterogeneity for average effect identification in panel data [Liu et al., 2021]
- ▶ Semiparametric estimation
  - ▶ with nested nuisances [Chernozhukov et al., 2022]
  - ▶ with nuisances as solutions to (possibly ill-posed) inverse problems [Bennett et al., 2023]

# Linear Example

## Equation

$$Y = A\beta + Wv_Y + U\gamma_Y + \varepsilon_Y,$$

$$A = Z\zeta + Wv_A + U\gamma_W + \varepsilon_A,$$

$$Z = U\gamma_Z + \varepsilon_Z,$$

$$W = U\gamma_W + \varepsilon_W,$$

## Exogeneity

$$\mathbb{E} [\varepsilon_Y Z] = \mathbf{0},$$

$$\text{rank} \left( \mathbb{E} [A^\top Z | T] \right) = d_A$$

$$\text{rank}(\gamma_Z) = d_U < d_Z,$$

$$\mathbb{E} [\varepsilon_W^\top \varepsilon_Z] = \mathbf{0},$$

$$\text{rank}(\gamma_W) = d_U \leq d_W$$

# 3SLS procedure I

1. Reduced form (rank-restricted) regression of  $W$  on  $Z$ :

1.1  $d_U$  known: With appropriate normalisation of  $\delta_{WU}$ ,

$$W_{N \times d_W} = Z_{N \times d_Z} \delta_{ZU} \delta_{WU}^\top + \epsilon_W \implies T_{N \times d_U} = Z_{N \times d_Z} \delta_{ZU}$$

$$(\hat{\delta}_{ZU}, \hat{\delta}_{WU}) = \arg \min_{(\delta_{ZU}, \delta_{WU})} \sum_{j=1}^{d_W} \sum_{i=1}^N (w_{i,j} - z_i^\top \delta_{ZU} \delta_{WU,j}^\top)^2$$

If  $d_W = d_U$ ,  $\hat{\delta}_{ZU} = (Z^\top Z)^{-1} Z^\top W$  (OLS),  $\delta_{WU} = I$ .

1.2  $d_U$  unknown:

$U$  are the set of unobserved variables explaining all correlation between  $W$  and  $Z$ .

- ▶ If  $d_U \geq \min\{d_W, d_Z\}$ , then  $\text{rank}(\mathbb{E}[w_i z_i^\top]) = \min\{d_W, d_Z\}$ .
- ▶ If  $d_U < \min\{d_W, d_Z\}$ , then  $d_U = \text{rank}(\mathbb{E}[w_i z_i^\top])$ .

## 3SLS procedure II

A test for a sufficient (not necessary) condition of  $W$ 's relevance for  $U$  (and necessary condition for  $Z$ 's relevance for  $A$  given  $T$ ) [Chen and Fang, 2019] is

$$\begin{aligned} H_0 &: \text{rank} \left( \mathbb{E} [w_i z_i^T] \right) \leq r_0 < \min\{d_W, d_Z\} \text{ vs} \\ H_1 &: \text{rank} \left( \mathbb{E} [w_i z_i^T] \right) > r_0. \end{aligned}$$

Reject  $H_0$  for  $r_0 = \min\{d_W, d_Z\} - 1$  (suggests  $d_U \geq \min\{d_W, d_Z\}$ ):

- ▶ If  $d_Z < d_W$ :  $d_U \geq d_Z$ , so  $Z$  never relevant for  $A$  given  $T$ .
- ▶ If  $d_W < d_Z$ :  $d_U \geq d_W$ , so either  $W$  just-relevant for  $U$  ( $d_W = d_U$ ), or  $W$  not relevant for  $U$  ( $d_W < d_U$ ). Both are observationally equivalent.

If  $H_0$  not rejected: Proceed with  $d_U = r_0$  in step 1.1.

## 3SLS procedure III

2. Reduced form OLS regression of  $A$  on any subset of instruments  $Z_0$  of dimension  $N \times (d_Z - d_U)$  and  $T, W$ .

$$\underset{N \times d_A}{A} = \underset{N \times (d_Z - d_U)(d_Z - d_U) \times d_A}{Z_0} \underset{d_{Z_0 A}}{\delta_{Z_0 A}} + \underset{N \times d_U d_U \times d_A}{T} \underset{d_{TA}}{\delta_{TA}} + \underset{N \times d_W d_W \times d_A}{W} \underset{d_{WA}}{\delta_{WA}} + \epsilon_A$$

Test of relevance of  $Z$  for  $A$  given  $T$  is an underidentification test [Windmeijer, 2021]:

$$H_0 : \text{rank}(\delta_{Z_0 A}) < d_A \text{ vs } H_1 : \text{rank}(\delta_{Z_0 A}) = d_A$$

Reject  $H_0$ :  $Z$  is relevant for  $A$  given  $T$ .

## 3SLS procedure IV

3. Outcome OLS regression of  $Y$  on exogenous variation in  $A$  ( $Z_0\delta_{Z_0A}$ ), and  $T$ ,  $W$ .

$$Y_{N \times 1} = (Z_0\delta_{Z_0A})_{N \times d_A} \delta_{AY}_{d_A \times d_1} + T_{N \times d_U} \delta_{TY}_{d_U \times 1} + W_{N \times d_W} \delta_{WY}_{d_W \times 1} + \epsilon_Y$$

Consistent estimator of  $\beta$ :  $\hat{\delta}_{AY}$ . Closed form expression:

$$\hat{\delta}_{AY} = (Z_0^\top M_{\hat{T}} Z_0)^{-1} (Z_0^\top M_{\hat{T}} Y)$$

$$M_{\hat{T}} = I - Z (Z^\top Z)^{-1} [Z^\top W]_{rr}$$

$$([W^\top Z]_{rr} (Z^\top Z)^{-1} [Z^\top W]_{rr})^{-1} [W^\top Z]_{rr} (Z^\top Z)^{-1} Z^\top$$

$$[Z^\top W]_{rr} := Z^\top Z \hat{\delta}_{ZU} \stackrel{\text{if } \{d_W=d_U\}}{=} Z^\top W$$

# Obtaining a valid control function $T$

## Lemma 1

Assume  $W \perp\!\!\!\perp Z | U$  (3a). Take any  $\tau \in L_2(Z)$ , where  $T := \tau(Z)$ , such that  $U \perp\!\!\!\perp Z | T$ . Then, also  $W \perp\!\!\!\perp Z | T$ .

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## Lemma 2

Assume  $W \perp\!\!\!\perp Z | U$  (3a), and for any  $g(U) \in L_2(U)$ ,  $\mathbb{E}[g(U)|W] = 0$  only when  $g(U) = 0$  (3b). Take any  $\tau \in L_2(Z)$ , where  $T := \tau(Z)$ , such that  $W \perp\!\!\!\perp Z | T$ . Then, also  $U \perp\!\!\!\perp Z | T$ .

# Linearly separable outcome model

## Assumption 3.1

*There exists some function  $k_0 \in L_2(A)$  such that*

$$Y = Y(A) = k_0(A) + \varepsilon, \quad \mathbb{E} [\varepsilon | Z, U] = \mathbb{E} [\varepsilon | U]. \quad (1)$$

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## Theorem 1

*Let assumptions (2b/2c/3a/3b) and 3.1 hold. Any  $h \in \mathcal{L}_2(A, T)$  for which  $\mathbb{E} [Y|Z] = \mathbb{E} [h(A, T)|Z]$ , satisfies  $h(A, T) = k_0(A) + \mathbb{E} [\varepsilon | T]$ .*

*Consequently,  $\theta_0 := \int_A Y(a)\pi(a) d\mu_A(a) = \mathbb{E}_T \left[ \int_A h(a, T)\pi(a) d\mu_A(a) \right]$ .*

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A simple plug-in estimator would be the empirical equivalent

$$\hat{\theta} = \mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{T},n} \left[ \int_A \hat{h}(a, T)\pi(a) d\mu_A(a) \right].$$

# First stage monotonicity

## Assumption 3.2 (Monotonicity)

$$A = h(Z, \eta) \quad (2)$$

1.  $h(Z, \eta)$  is strictly monotonic in  $\eta$  with probability 1.
2.  $\eta$  is a continuously distributed scalar with a strictly increasing conditional CDF  $F_{\eta|U}$  on the conditional support of  $\eta$ .
3.  $Z \perp\!\!\!\perp \eta | U$ .

# Disturbance conditional on $T$

## Lemma 3

$$F_{\eta|T} := \int_{\mathcal{U}} F_{A|Z,U}(A, Z, u) f_{U|T}(u, T) d\mu_U(u)$$

is a strictly increasing CDF on the conditional support of  $\eta$ , and  
 $Z \perp\!\!\!\perp \eta | T$ .

# Conditional unconfoundedness

## Theorem 2

Let

$$V := F_{A|Z}(A, Z). \quad (3)$$

Under assumption 3.2,  $V = F_{\eta|T}(\eta)$ , and

$$A \perp\!\!\!\perp Y(a) \mid (V, T), \text{ for all } a \in \mathcal{A}. \quad (4)$$

# Average structural function identification

## Assumption 3.3 (Common Support)

*For all  $a \in \mathcal{A}$ , the support of  $(V, T)$  equals the support of  $(V, T)$  conditional on  $A$ .*

## Theorem 3

*Suppose (2a/2b/3a/3b) [relaxed IV model], 3.2 [monotonicity], and 3.3 [common support] hold. Then,  $\theta_0 := \int_{\mathcal{A}} Y(a)\pi(a) d\mu_A(a)$  is identified by*

$$\theta = \mathbb{E}_{V,T} \left[ \int_{\mathcal{A}} \mathbb{E}[Y|A=a, (V, T)=(v, t)] \pi(a) d\mu_A(a) \right].$$

# NLS97 Data

- Y** Household net worth at 35: continuous, in USD
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- $X$  Covariates: sex, college GPA, parental education/net worth, siblings, region, etc

## Assumption 4.1

1. *Linear model*:  $Y = \alpha_Y + A\beta + U\gamma_Y + W\nu_Y + X\eta_Y + \varepsilon_Y.$

2a. *Cond. Instr. Exogeneity*:  $\mathbb{E} [\varepsilon_Y^\top Z] = 0.$

2c. *Cond. Instr. Relevance*:  $A = \alpha_A + Z\zeta + U\gamma_A + W\nu_A + X\eta_A + \varepsilon_A$   
 $\text{rank} \left( \mathbb{E} [(Z\zeta) A | T, X] \right) = d_A.$

3a. *Proxy Exogeneity*:  $W = \alpha_W + U\gamma_W + X\eta_W + \varepsilon_W, \quad \mathbb{E} [\varepsilon_W^\top Z] = 0.$

3b. *Proxy Relevance*:  $\text{rank}(\gamma_W) = d_U \leq d_W$

$$\implies \beta = \frac{\mathbb{E} [(Z\zeta) Y | T, X]}{\mathbb{E} [(Z\zeta) A | T, X]}$$

# 1. Find $T$ and test relevance of $Z, W$ for $U | I$

- ▶ Linear projection

$$\mathbb{E}[U|Z, X] = Z\delta_{ZU} + X\delta_{XU}$$

$$\mathbb{E}[W|Z, X] = \tilde{\alpha}_W + Z\delta_{ZW} + X\delta_{XW}$$

- ▶ By definition:  $\text{rank}(\delta_{ZW}) = \min\{d_U, \min\{d_Z, d_W\}\}$ .
- ▶ Hypothesis test: For some  $r < \min\{d_Z, d_W\}$ ,

$$H_0 : \text{rank}(\delta_{ZW}) \leq r, \text{ vs } H_1 : \text{rank}(\delta_{ZW}) > r.$$

Do not reject  $H_0$ :  $d_U \leq r < \min\{d_Z, d_W\}$ .


- ▶ Normalisation:  $\delta_{ZW} := \frac{\gamma_Z \gamma_W}{d_Z \times r \times d_Z}$  with  $\gamma_W$  unitary (columns form orthonormal vectors as in SVD):  $\hat{T} := Z\hat{\gamma}_Z$ .

# 1. Find $T$ and test relevance of $Z, W$ for $U \perp\!\!\!\perp$

- Equivalent test: For some  $r < \min\{d_Z, d_W\}$ ,

$$H_0 : \phi_r(\gamma_Z \gamma_W) = 0, \text{ vs } H_1 : \phi_r(\gamma_Z \gamma_W) > 0,$$

where  $\phi_r(A) := \sum_{j>r} \pi_j^2(A)$  (sum of  $(r+1)$ -th to smallest singular value squared).



# 1. Find $T$ and test relevance of $Z, W$ for $U$ III

- ▶  $d_U = \text{rank}(\delta_{ZW}) \leq 1$ : one-dimensional  $U$  explains correlation between  $Z, W$  given  $X$ .

## 2. Test relevance of $Z$ for $A$ given $T$

- ▶ Construct control function:  $\hat{T} := Z\hat{\gamma}_Z$
- ▶ Compare restricted and unrestricted  $R^2$ :


$$A = \tilde{\alpha}_{A,ur} + Z\tilde{\zeta} + X\tilde{\eta}_{A,ur} + \tilde{\varepsilon}_{A,ur} \implies R_{ur}^2 \quad (5)$$

$$A = \tilde{\alpha}_{A,r} + T\tilde{\gamma}_A + X\tilde{\eta}_{A,r} + \tilde{\varepsilon}_{A,r} \implies R_r^2 \quad (6)$$

Hypothesis test:

$$H_0 : R_r^2 = R_{ur}^2, \text{ vs } H_1 : R_r^2 < R_{ur}^2.$$

Bootstrap distribution of  $R_r^2$



### 3. Exogeneity of $Z$ conditional on $U$ |

$$Y = \alpha_Y + A\beta + U\gamma_Y + W\nu_Y + X\eta_Y + \varepsilon_Y.$$

2a. Cond. Instr. Exogeneity:

$$\mathbb{E} [\varepsilon_Y^\top Z] = 0.$$

- ▶ Untestable in this just-identified model
- ▶ Does  $T$  reflect the hypothesised confounder ability?

Table: Construction of  $\hat{T} = Z\hat{P}_{0,1}\hat{\Pi}_{0,1}$  (normalised to  $\sigma(\hat{T}) = 1$ )

	GPA				ASVAB
	English	Math	SocSci	LifeSci	percentile
$\hat{T}$	0.574	0.213	0.282	0.212	-0.278

- ▶ Weighted subject-GPA describes 94.4% of  $\hat{T}$ .
- ▶ Seems to reflect overall GPA and thus general ability.

### 3. Exogeneity of $Z$ conditional on $U \parallel$

Table: Effect of normalised  $\hat{T}$  on  $W$

	drink	smoke	try marijuana	run away	attack someone
$\hat{T}$	-0.071	-0.093	-0.101	-0.054	-0.093
Pr	0.653	0.468	0.296	0.106	0.189
	sell drugs	destroy property	steal < 50\$	steal > 50\$	
$\hat{T}$		-0.052	-0.051	-0.051	-0.036
Pr		0.089	0.320	0.379	0.079

- One standard-deviation increase in  $\hat{T}$  significantly reduces risky behaviour.
- Expected for confounder ability.

## 4. Estimation

$$\hat{\beta}_{OLS} = (A^\top M_{W,x} A)^{-1} (A^\top M_{W,x} Y)$$

$$\hat{\beta}_{PL} = (A^\top M_{\hat{T},x} A)^{-1} (A^\top M_{\hat{T},x} Y),$$

where  $\hat{T}$  is constructed from the correlation of  $(A, Z)$  and  $W$ .

$$\hat{\beta}_{IV} = (A^\top P_Z M_{W,x} A)^{-1} (A^\top P_Z M_{W,x} Y)$$

$$\hat{\beta}_{ICC} = (A^\top P_Z M_{\hat{T},x} A)^{-1} (A^\top P_Z M_{\hat{T},x} Y),$$

where  $\hat{T}$  is constructed from the correlation of  $Z$  and  $W$ .

Notation: Projection  $P_X = X(X^\top X)^{-1}X^\top$  and annihilator  $M_X = I - P_X$ .

# Results

Table: Estimates with different estimators (NLS97 data,  $n = 1,890$ )

	OLS	PL	IV	ICC
A	59,173 (9,542)	33,799 (10,765)	204,578 (34,265)	122,665 (49,138)
$\hat{T}$		27,879 (5,415)		15,829 (7,613)

- ▶ Positive ability bias (was ambiguous).
- ▶ Negative general selection bias (as expected).
- ▶ Standard error increases about 40% in ICC compared to IV.

## Generalised setting

For all  $k_0(\tau_0, g_0) \in \mathcal{K}_0(\tau_0, g_0)$ , and  $\tau_0(g_0) \in \mathcal{T}_{\text{valid}}(g_0)$ ,

$$\theta_0 = \mathbb{E} [m_0(O; k_0(\tau_0, g_0))] , \quad (7)$$

$$\mathcal{K}_0(\tau, g) := \left\{ k \in \mathcal{K} : \mathbb{E} [k(A; \tau, g)|Z] = g(Z) - \tau(Z) \right\} \quad (8)$$

$$\mathcal{T}_{\text{valid}}(g) := \left\{ \tau \in \mathcal{T} : \mathbb{E} [g(Z)|W] = \mathbb{E} [\tau(Z)|W] \right\} \quad (9)$$

$$g_0(Z) := \mathbb{E} [Y|Z] \quad (10)$$

## Generalised setting

For all  $k_0(\tau_0, g_0) \in \mathcal{K}_0(\tau_0, g_0)$ , and  $\tau_0(g_0) \in \mathcal{T}_{\text{valid}}(g_0)$ ,

$$\theta_0 = \mathbb{E} [m_0(O; k_0(\tau_0, g_0))] , \quad (7)$$

$$\mathcal{K}_0(\tau, g) := \left\{ k \in \mathcal{K} : \mathbb{E} [k(A; \tau, g)|Z] = g(Z) - \tau(Z) \right\} \quad (8)$$

$$\mathcal{T}_{\text{valid}}(g) := \left\{ \tau \in \mathcal{T} : \mathbb{E} [g(Z)|W] = \mathbb{E} [\tau(Z)|W] \right\} \quad (9)$$

$$g_0(Z) := \mathbb{E} [Y|Z] \quad (10)$$

Features of this setting:

- ▶ Identifiable  $\theta_0$  restricted by  $\mathcal{K}_0(\tau, g)$  and thus  $\mathcal{T}$ : More complex  $\tau$  can reduce the set of identifiable  $\theta_0$  (better choose valid  $\tau$  of small complexity)
- ▶ Nested dependence of nuisances [Chernozhukov et al., 2022]
- ▶ Weak identification of nuisances: Non-uniqueness and ill-posedness [Bennett et al., 2023]

# Continuous linear functionals

Assume that  $k \mapsto \mathbb{E} [m(O; k)]$  for  $k \in \mathcal{K}$  is a continuous linear functional over  $\mathcal{K}$ , such that by the Riesz representation theorem

$$\mathbb{E} [m_0(O; k)] = \mathbb{E} [\alpha_{k,0}(A)k(A)] \quad \forall k \in \mathcal{K}. \quad (11)$$

## Strong instrument relevance

Define the linear operator  $P_{\mathcal{L}_2(Z)}^{A,\mathcal{K}}$  and its adjoint  $P_{A,\mathcal{K}}^{\mathcal{L}_2(Z)}$  (where  $\Pi$  is the projection operator):

$$\left[ P_{\mathcal{L}_2(Z)}^{A,\mathcal{K}} k \right] (Z) := \mathbb{E} [k(A)|Z]$$

$$\left[ P_{A,\mathcal{K}}^{\mathcal{L}_2(Z)} q_k \right] (A) := \Pi_{\mathcal{K}} \mathbb{E} [q_k(Z)|A] = \Pi_{\mathcal{K}} [q_k(Z)|A]$$

### Assumption 5.1 (Strong instrument relevance)

$\alpha_{k,0} \in \mathcal{N}^\perp \left( P_{A,\mathcal{K}}^{\mathcal{L}_2(Z)} P_{\mathcal{L}_2(Z)}^{A,\mathcal{K}} \right)$ , i.e.

$$\Xi_{k,0} \neq \emptyset, \text{ where } \Xi_{k,0} := \arg \min_{\xi_k \in \mathcal{K}} \left( \frac{1}{2} \mathbb{E} [\mathbb{E} [\xi_k(A)|Z]^2] - \mathbb{E} [m_0(O; \xi_k)] \right) \quad (12)$$

$$= \left\{ \xi_k \in \mathcal{K} : P_{A,\mathcal{K}}^{\mathcal{L}_2(Z)} P_{\mathcal{L}_2(Z)}^{A,\mathcal{K}} \xi_k = \alpha_{k,0} \right\}. \quad (13)$$

# Debiasing step 1

Debiased moment wrt  $k$ :

$$m_1(O; k, \tau, g, q_k) = m_0(O; k) + q_k(Z) (g(Z) - \tau(Z) - k(A; \tau, g))$$

$$\mathcal{Q}_k := \left\{ q_k \in \mathcal{L}_2(Z) : q_k(Z) = \mathbb{E} [\xi_k(A)|Z] \quad \forall \xi_k \in \mathcal{K} \right\}$$

$$\mathcal{Q}_{k,0} := \left\{ q_k \in \mathcal{L}_2(Z) : q_k(Z) = \mathbb{E} [\xi_{k,0}(A)|Z] \quad \forall \xi_{k,0} \in \Xi_{k,0} \right\}$$

## Debiasing step 2

Debiased moment wrt  $k$  and  $\tau$ :

$$m_2(O; k, \tau, g, q_k, q_\tau) = m_1(O; k, \tau, g, q_k) + q_\tau(W; q_k) (\tau(Z) - g(Z))$$

$$\mathcal{Q}_\tau(q_k) := \left\{ q_\tau \in \mathcal{L}_2(W) : q_\tau = \mathbb{E} [\xi_\tau(Z; q_k) | W], \forall \xi_\tau(q_k) \in \mathcal{T}, q_k \in \mathcal{Q}_k \right\}$$

$$\mathcal{Q}_{\tau,0}(q_k) := \left\{ q_\tau \in \mathcal{L}_2(W) : q_\tau = \mathbb{E} [\xi_{\tau,0}(Z; q_k) | W], \forall \xi_{\tau,0}(q_{k,0}) \in \Xi_{\tau,0}(q_k), q_k \in \mathcal{Q}_k \right\}$$

$$\Xi_{\tau,0}(q_k) := \arg \min_{\xi_\tau(q_k) \in \mathcal{T}} \left( \frac{1}{2} \mathbb{E} [\mathbb{E} [\xi_\tau(Z; q_k) | W]^2] - \mathbb{E} [q_k(Z) \xi_\tau(Z; q_k)] \right).$$

For this step, use that the continuous linear functional  
 $\tau \mapsto \mathbb{E} [q_\tau(W; q_k) \tau(Z)]$  is strongly identified in this setting.

# Intermediate $\tau$ -functional strongly identified

## Theorem 4 (Strong identification of $\theta_0$ )

Suppose  $\Pi_{\mathcal{T}}[q(W)|Z] = \Pi_{\mathcal{T}}[\mathbb{E}[q(W)|U]|Z]$  for any  $q \in \mathcal{L}_2(W)$  for  $\mathcal{T} \subseteq \mathcal{L}_2(Z)$  (relaxation of  $W \perp\!\!\!\perp Z | U$ ), and assumption 3b (completeness of  $W$  for  $U$ ) hold. Also, suppose the functional  $\tau \mapsto \mathbb{E}[m(O; \tau)]$  is continuous and linear over  $\mathcal{T}$ . Then,  $\theta_0$  is strongly identified with the following holding true for the functional's Riesz representer:

$$\alpha \in \mathcal{N}^\perp(P_{Z,\mathcal{T}}^{\mathcal{L}_2(U)} P_{\mathcal{L}_2(U)}^{Z,\mathcal{T}}) = \mathcal{N}^\perp(P_{Z,\mathcal{T}}^{\mathcal{L}_2(W)} P_{\mathcal{L}_2(W)}^{Z,\mathcal{T}}). \quad (14)$$

# Debiasing step 3

Debiased moment wrt  $k$ ,  $\tau$ , and  $g$ :

$$m_3(O; k, \tau, g, q_k, q_\tau, \alpha_g) = m_2(O; k, \tau, g, q_k, q_\tau) + \alpha_g(Z; q_k, q_\tau) (Y - g(Z))$$

$$\begin{aligned} \Xi_{g,0}(q_k, q_\tau) := \arg \min_{\xi_g(q_k, q_\tau) \in \mathcal{L}_2(Z)} & \left( \frac{1}{2} \mathbb{E} [\xi_g(Z; q_k, q_\tau)^2] \right. \\ & \left. - \mathbb{E} [ (q_k(Z) - q_\tau(W; q_k)) \xi_g(Z; q_k, q_\tau) ] \right). \end{aligned}$$

# Each debiased moment identifies $\theta$

## Lemma 4

Assume  $\theta_0 = \mathbb{E} [m_0(O; k_0(\tau_0, g_0))]$  and 5.1. Then,

$$\begin{aligned}\theta_0 &= \mathbb{E} [m_0(O; k_0)] = \mathbb{E} [m_1(O; k_0, \tau_0, g_0, q_{k,0})] \\ &= \mathbb{E} [m_2(O; k_0, \tau_0, g_0, q_{k,0}, q_{\tau,0})] \\ &= \mathbb{E} [m_3(O; k_0, \tau_0, g_0, q_{k,0}, q_{\tau,0}, \alpha_{g,0})].\end{aligned}$$

Each of  $m_j$  for  $j \in \{1, 2, 3\}$  identify  $\theta_0$  because in each consecutive debiasing step a conditionally mean-zero term is added to the previous moment.

# Robustness of final debiased moment

## Theorem 5 (Robust error decomposition)

Suppose  $\theta_0 = \mathbb{E} [m_0(O; k_0(\tau_0, g_0))]$ , assumption 5.1, and the conditions for theorem 4 hold for  $q = q_\tau$ . Then,

$$\begin{aligned} & \mathbb{E} [m_3(O; k, \tau, g, q_k, q_\tau, \alpha_g)] - \theta_0 \\ &= \mathbb{E} \left[ (q_{k,0}(Z) - q_k(Z)) (k(A; \tau, g) - k_0(A; \tau_0, g_0)) \right] \\ &\quad + \mathbb{E} \left[ (q_{\tau,0}(W; q_k) - q_\tau(W; q_k)) (\tau_0(Z; g_0) - \tau(Z; g)) \right] \\ &\quad + \mathbb{E} \left[ (\alpha_{g,0}(Z; q_k, q_\tau) - \alpha_g(Z; q_k, q_\tau)) (g(Z) - g_0(Z)) \right]. \end{aligned}$$

Double robustness, Neyman orthogonality, and an error decomposition in terms of projections on more favourable subspaces (circumventing ill-posedness problems) follow.

# Conclusion

- ▶ Identification approach between IV and proximal learning
- ▶ Allows some endogeneity in instruments, as long as relevant proxies exist for the unobserved causes of instrument endogeneity
- ▶ Motivated by traditional economic identification problems with self-selection into treatment (returns to education)
- ▶ Semiparametric estimation with  $\sqrt{n}$ -rates possible under assumptions on nuisance convergence rates in terms of more favourable projected errors (circumvents potential ill-posedness of inverse problems)


# THANK YOU

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# Appendix

# Proximal Learning [Tchetgen Tchetgen et al., 2020]

Figure: Proximal learning



## Assumption (Proximal learning)


2. *Cond. Exogeneity of action and its aligned proxy:*  
 $Y(a, z) = Y(a) \perp\!\!\!\perp (A, Z) \mid U.$
3. *Relevance of both proxies:*  
 For any  $g(U) \in L_2(U)$ ,  
 $\mathbb{E}[g(U)|Z] = 0$  only if  $g(U) = 0$ ,  
 $\mathbb{E}[g(U)|W] = 0$  only if  $g(U) = 0$ .
4. *Exogeneity of outcome-aligned proxies:*  
 $W(a, z) = W \perp\!\!\!\perp (A, Z) \mid U.$

# Relaxations compared to proximal learning

## Assumption

- 2a. *Cond. Exogeneity of action-aligned proxy:*  
 $Y(a, z) = Y(a) \perp\!\!\!\perp Z \mid U.$


Figure: Proximal learning



- 3a. *Proxy Exogeneity:*  
 $W(z) = W \perp\!\!\!\perp Z \mid U.$
- 3b. *Relevance of outcome-aligned proxy:*  
For any  $g(U) \in L_2(U)$ ,  
 $\mathbb{E}[g(U)|W] = 0$  only if  $g(U) = 0$ .

# Additional assumptions compared to proximal learning

Figure: Proximal learning



## Assumption

- 2a. *Cond. Instrument Exogeneity*:  
 $Y(a, z) = Y(a) \perp\!\!\!\perp Z \mid U.$
- 2b. *Index sufficiency*:  $U \perp\!\!\!\perp Z \mid T$  for some  $T = \tau(Z)$ .
- 2c. *Cond. Instrument Relevance*:  
 For any  $g(A, T) \in L_2(A, T)$ ,  
 $\mathbb{E}[g(A, T)|Z] = 0$  only if  $g(A, T) = 0$ .
- 3a. *Proxy Exogeneity*:  
 $W(z) = W \perp\!\!\!\perp Z \mid U.$
- 3b. *Relevance of outcome-aligned proxy*:  
 For any  $g(U) \in L_2(U)$ ,  
 $\mathbb{E}[g(U)|W] = 0$  only if  $g(U) = 0$ .

# Intuition for relevance requirements

1.  $\text{rank}(\gamma_W) = d_U \leq d_W$  ensures that  $\mathbb{E}_L [U|Z]$  is proportional to  $\mathbb{E}_L [W|Z]$ . Keep  $\mathbb{E}_L [U|Z]$  fixed by keeping  $\mathbb{E}_L [W|Z]$  fixed (via  $T$ ).

# Intuition for relevance requirements

1.  $\text{rank}(\gamma_W) = d_U \leq d_W$  ensures that  $\mathbb{E}_L [U|Z]$  is proportional to  $\mathbb{E}_L [W|Z]$ . Keep  $\mathbb{E}_L [U|Z]$  fixed by keeping  $\mathbb{E}_L [W|Z]$  fixed (via  $T$ ).
2.  $\mathbb{E} [A^T Z | T] = d_A$ : Use remaining variation in  $Z$  to instrument for  $A$  while keeping  $\mathbb{E}_L [U|Z]$  fixed (via  $T$ ). Necessary for this is  $(d_Z - d_U) \geq d_A$ .

# The obvious

## Lemma 5

Assume  $W \perp\!\!\!\perp Z | U$  (3a). Take any  $\tau \in L_2(Z)$ , where  $T := \tau(Z)$ , such that  $U \perp\!\!\!\perp Z | T$ . Then, also  $W \perp\!\!\!\perp Z | T$ .

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$$\begin{aligned} f_{W,Z|\tau}(W, Z|T) &= \int_U \underbrace{f_{W|Z,U,\tau}(W|Z, u, T)}_{=f_{W|U}(W|u)} \underbrace{f_{Z|U,\tau}(Z|u, T)}_{=f_{Z|T}(Z|T)} f_{U|\tau}(u, T) d\mu_U(u) \\ &= f_{Z|T}(Z|T) \underbrace{\int_U f_{W|U}(W|u) f_{U|\tau}(u, T) d\mu_U(u)}_{f_{W|\tau}(W|T)} \implies W \perp\!\!\!\perp Z | T \end{aligned}$$

# The slightly less obvious I

## Lemma 6

Assume  $W \perp\!\!\!\perp Z | U$  (3a), and for any  $g(U) \in L_2(U)$ ,  $\mathbb{E}[g(U)|W] = 0$  only when  $g(U) = 0$  (3b). Take any  $\tau \in L_2(Z)$ , where  $T := \tau(Z)$ , such that  $W \perp\!\!\!\perp Z | T$ . Then, also  $U \perp\!\!\!\perp Z | T$ .

# The slightly less obvious II

Write  $f_{W|Z}(W, Z)$  in two separate ways using  $T$  and relate them.

- $f_{W|Z}(W, Z) = \int_U f_{W|U}(W|u) f_{U|Z}(u|Z) d\mu_U(u)$  by  $W \perp\!\!\!\perp Z | U$
- $f_{W|Z}(W, Z) = f_{W|T}(W, T) = \int_U f_{W|U}(W, u) f_{U|T}(u, T) d\mu_U(u)$  by construction of  $T = \tau(Z)$  such that  $W \perp\!\!\!\perp Z | T$ .

$$\int_U f_{W|U}(W, u) \left( f_{U|Z}(u|Z) - f_{U|T}(u|T) \right) d\mu_U(u) = 0$$

$$\int_U \left( f_{U|Z}(u|Z) - f_{U|T}(u|T) \right) \frac{f_W(W)}{f_U(u)} f_{U|W}(u, W) d\mu_U(u) = 0$$

$$\mathbb{E}_U \left[ \frac{\left( f_{U|Z}(u|Z) - f_{U|T}(u|T) \right)}{f_U(u)} \middle| W \right] f_W(W) = 0$$

# The slightly less obvious III

Then, for any  $Z$ , let  $g_Z(U) := \frac{(f_{U|Z}(u|Z) - f_{U|T}(u|T))}{f_U(u)}$ .

$$\mathbb{E}_U [g_Z(u) | W] f_W(W) = 0$$

Completeness of  $W$  for  $U$  (3b) implies  $g_Z(U) = 0$ , and thus  $f_{U|Z}(U|Z) = f_{U|T}(U|T)$ , meaning  $U \perp\!\!\!\perp Z | T$ .

# Valid control functions

Valid control functions  $\tau \in L_2(Z)$  satisfy two conditions:


1. Conditional independence of  $W$  and  $Z$ :

$$W \perp\!\!\!\perp Z \mid \tau(Z).$$

2. Conditional relevance of  $Z$  for  $A$ :

$$\mathbb{E} [g(A, \tau(Z))|Z] = 0 \text{ only if } g(A, \tau(Z)) = 0.$$

# Optimal control functions



- Optimal: minimum complexity  $\tau(Z)$  subject to validity, e.g.  
 $f(W|Z)$

# Specification test

- ▶ Standard specification test for sufficient complexity of  $\tau_1$  vs  $\tau_2$ .

$$H_0 : Z \perp\!\!\!\perp Y(a) \mid \tau_1(Z), \text{ vs } H_1 : Z \not\perp\!\!\!\perp Y(a) \mid \tau_1(Z).$$

- ▶ Test whether  $\tau_1(\cdot)$  valid, if  $\tau_2(\cdot)$  valid.
- ▶ Under  $H_0$ :
  - ▶  $\text{plim} (\hat{\theta}(\tau_1)) = \text{plim} (\hat{\theta}(\tau_2))$ ,
  - ▶  $\text{avar} (\hat{\theta}(\tau_1)) < \text{avar} (\hat{\theta}(\tau_2))$ .
- ▶ Under  $H_1$ :
  - ▶  $\text{plim} (\hat{\theta}(\tau_1)) \neq \text{plim} (\hat{\theta}(\tau_2))$ .

# Simple linear model

$$Y = \alpha_Y + A\beta + U \underset{d_U \times 1}{\gamma_Y} + W \underset{d_W \times 1}{\nu_Y} + X \underset{d_X \times 1}{\eta_Y} + \varepsilon_Y,$$

- $U\gamma_Y$  Probably positive effect of ability  $U$  on net worth  $Y$ , by salary and non-salary mediation [Griliches, 1977].
- $\varepsilon_Y$  All variation in  $Y$ , which is jointly unexplained by  $(A, U, W, X)$ . Individual-specific, heterogeneous characteristics.

# Expected bias I

- $i$  chooses whether to obtain a BA degree by maximising expected utility subject to information set  $\mathcal{I}$ :

$$A = \arg \max_{a \in \{0,1\}} \left( \mathbb{E} [u(Y(a)) - c(a) | A = a, \mathcal{I}] \right),$$

$u : \mathcal{Y} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$  is a diminishing returns utility function

$c : \{0, 1\} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$  is a cost function for obtaining a BA degree.

- Optimal decision rule assuming full information:

$$\begin{aligned} A &= \arg \max_{a \in \{0,1\}} (u(Y(a)) - c(a)), \\ &= \mathbb{1}(u(Y(1)) - u(Y(0)) > c(1) - c(0)). \end{aligned}$$

# Expected bias II

$U \uparrow$  Ambiguous bias direction

$$\mathbb{1}\left( \underbrace{u(Y(1)) - u(Y(0))}_{\Downarrow \text{as } Y(a) \uparrow \text{ and } \Delta(Y(1) - Y(0)) = 0} > \underbrace{c(1) - c(0)}_{\Downarrow \text{when ability higher}} \right)$$

$\varepsilon_Y \uparrow$  Positive bias direction

$$\mathbb{1}\left( \underbrace{u(Y(1)) - u(Y(0))}_{\Downarrow \text{as } Y(a) \uparrow \text{ and } \Delta(Y(1) - Y(0)) = 0} > c(1) - c(0) \right)$$

- ▶ Byproduct: Separate ability bias from other biases.
- ▶ Theoretical models can produce differing bias directions.
- ▶ Empirical validation would be useful.

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