The Political Economy of Alternative Realities

Adam Szeidl Ferenc Szucs

Central European University and Stockholm University

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Overview

- Contrary to the experts' consensus, most Republicans hold
 - Climate change not human made,
 - 2020 election not free and fair,
 - Government and media controlled by Satan-worshipping conspiracy.
- This paper models coherent but false alternative reality:
 - Members of intellectual elite conspire
 - Criticize politician about commonly important issue (competence) if disagree about divisive issue (e.g., cultural values).
- Politician chooses whether to supply alternative reality, which partially persuades voter.
- Once voter believes alternative reality, he engages with it strategically in Bayesian fashion.
 - He will distrust elite's criticism of politician and vote accordingly.
- Model explains salient facts about politics, media, and non-adoption of best practices.

- Supply of misinformation in politics: Glaeser (2005), Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011), Guriev and Treisman (2020), Ash, Mukand and Rodrik (2021).
- Persuasion and narratives: Galperti (2019), Eliaz and Spiegler (2020), Eliaz, Galperti and Spiegler (2022), Schwartzstein and Sunderam (2021), Charles and Kendall (2022).
- Populism and identity politics: Bonomi, Gennaioli and Tabellini (2021), Besley and Persson (2021), Bellodi, Morelli, Nicolo, and Roberti (2023).
- **Our contribution:** Theory of strategically-interacting alternative reality used to discredit the elite, implications for politics, media, and adoption of best practices.

1 Model and main result

- 2 Applications
- 3 Conclusion

- Two principals:
 - Intellectual elite: continuum of identical members report about competence of politician (s ∈ {0,1}).
 - Incumbent politician: may send propaganda (p ∈ {0,1}) to change voter's prior.
- One agent:
 - Voter: continuum of identical members decide on reelection.
- Key modeling idea: principals have "reality" types R or AR
 - AR types have zero objective probability.
 - But: we assume propaganda makes voter's prior of AR positive.
 - AR has real consequences since voter best-responds to it.
- AR is a conspiracy theory:
 - In R, atomistic elite cannot influence voter and messages truthfully.
 - In AR, elite can act collectively and sends message to influence voter.

Types, beliefs, and preferences

Politician:

- Divisive: pro-elite or pro-voter, $\theta_d \in \{0, 1\}$, observable to all.
 - Examples: cultural values or economic redistribution.
- Common: bad or good, $\theta_c \in \{0,1\}$, elite gets an imperfect signal.
 - Examples: uncorrupt or increases prosperity.
- Reality types: AR politician believes elite is AR.

$$U_p = E \cdot 1[\text{reelected}] - f \cdot p. \tag{1}$$

Elite has reality types $\theta_r \in \{R, AR\}$, objective equivalent to

$$U_e = \mathbf{1}_{\{\theta_r = R\}} \cdot \mathbf{1}_{\{s = \theta_c\}} + \mathbf{1}_{\{\theta_r = AR\}} \cdot (c\tilde{\theta}_c - \lambda\tilde{\theta}_d).$$
(2)

Voter has "mind types": normal and persuaded.

- Normal has correct beliefs: knows AR does not exist.
- Persuaded (reached by propaganda): puts positive weight on AR. $U_v = c\tilde{\theta}_c + \lambda \tilde{\theta}_d + \epsilon_{incumbent}.$ (3)

Timing

- 1 Politician's type realized. Voter observes only divisive type, elite also receives signal on common type (correct with prob π).
- 2 Elite sends message, politician decides whether to send propaganda.
 Voter observes elite signal, and propaganda with prob α.
- **3** Voter's preference shock realizes and he decides whether to reelect the politician.

Equilibrium concept

Perfect Bayesian equilibrium, adopted to voter updating from wrong prior if reached by propaganda.

Proposition

For α small and π large, the politician optimal equilibrium:

- **1** If division is small (λ small)
 - There is no propaganda and the elite is fully trusted.
- **2** If division is large (λ large)
 - In the reality (R):
 - Politician sends propaganda iff pro-voter and bad.
 - Elite reports common type truthfully.
 - In the alternative reality (AR):
 - Politician sends propaganda iff she is pro-voter.
 - Elite reports politician bad iff politician is pro-voter.
 - Propaganda increases reelection probability of bad pro-voter politician.


- When disagreement small, no propaganda.
 - Implausible that elite wants to remove good politician b/c disagree.
- When disagreement large, bad pro-voter politician uses propaganda.
 - Because she has both the opportunity and the motive.
- Equilibrium supported by behavior of AR principals:
 - AR elite conspires, always criticizes pro-voter politician.
 - AR politician believes elite is AR \rightarrow sends propaganda.
 - Voter cannot infer from propaganda that politician is bad: in AR even good politician sends propaganda.
- Once voter believes in the AR, elite criticism benefits politician
 - After propaganda and praise voter learns that politician is bad.

- CBS News Poll June 7 10, 2023
- If Donald Trump is indicted in the matter of his handling of classified documents, would that make you...

	Moderate	Conservative
More likely to vote for him	24%	44%
Less likely to vote for him	13%	3%
Not affect whether you vote for him	63%	53%
Observations	80	408

- We ask if scandals benefit Republican reps among Trump supporters
 - Federal scandals from Wikipedia,
 - Campaign contributions among Trump and other Rep donors.

Scandal effect: Trump donors' share in donations



	Trump share	Trump donors	Other donors
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Scandal effect	0.076***	27.26**	5.07
	(0.008)	(11.03)	(18.02)
Control mean	0.065	16.12	119.0
Observations	3,384	4,372	4,372

▶ Placebo


- 1 Model and main result
- 2 Applications
- 3 Conclusion

- Main idea: Politician will follow policies that contradict elite consensus even if doing so is universally harmful.
 - To avoid praise from the discredited elite.
- Logic of the model:
 - Politician can take harmful action to influence precision of elite signal.
 - Without propaganda: bad politician prefers noisy elite signal.
 - With propaganda: bad politician prefers precise elite signal.

₩

• Politician prefers to act against elite concensus.

Evidence on government policy



- **Salient fact:** non-traditional media, including Fox News, spread and reinforce alternative realities.
- We propose an explanation based on competition for audiences.
 - The lower trust in the elite, the higher the demand for new media.
 - If pro-voter and cannot be part of conspiracy.
 - New media creates demand for itself by strengthening beliefs in alternative reality.
- Implications:
 - Propaganda increase demand for non-traditional media.
 - Non-traditional media messages to sustain alternative reality which reduces trust in elite/science.
- Consistent with evidence showing that Fox makes its veiwers
 - Social distance less: Bursztyn et al (2020), Simonov et al. (2020)
 - Vaccinate less: Pinna, Picard, and Goessman (2022)

- Why is alternative reality a conspiracy theory?
- Simpler version: elite members have low reputation/lying cost.
- Advantage of conspiracy: explains away more credible evidence.
 - Elite has a "public good" problem: members do not internalize that their lies benefit each other.
 - Low benefit from lying.
 - Conspiracy solves public good problem.
 - High benefit from lying.
- Implication: The more hard evidence presented in media, the more the politician prefers conspiracy to lying cost propaganda.

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Conclusion

- Our model of the political supply of alternative realities implies:
 - 1 Alternative reality is spread by bad politicians.
 - 2 Alternative reality only spread in divided societies.
 - 3 Alternative reality may make criticism beneficial.
 - **4** Government set policy to contradict elite concensus.
 - **5** AR creates demand for new media, which reinforces the AR.
 - 6 More credible evidence triggers conspiracy theory AR.
- Limitation: no theory of why voters believe alternative reality.
- Modeling strategic alternative reality can be useful in other domains, e.g., conflict.


Placebo: competition effect

	Trump share	Trump donors	Other donors
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Δ pred Dem vote margin	0.001	-1.07	1.43
	(0.001)	(1.60)	(3.57)
Old pred Dem vote margin	0.001	0.402	5.36***
	(0.0006)	(0.454)	(1.05)
Constant	0.109***	49.7***	346.4***
	(0.017)	(14.1)	(38.2)
Observations	266	296	296




- We assume propaganda changes prior beliefs.
- Consistent with empirical evidence.
 - Propaganda effects behavior: Yanagizawa-Drott (2014), Adena et. al (2015), Blouin and Mukand (2019), Barrera et al. (2020).
 - Consistent with declining trust in science.
 - Consistent with conspiracy theories: Douglas et al. (2019).
 - In line with hypersensitive agency detection.
- Calibrationally more satisfying than Bayesian persuasion.
 - If prior is small then conspiracy theory remains weak.
 - If prior is large then more conspiracies in reality.

Republicans' trust in science declined



Populism and distrust in the intellectual elite



New media

- Less informative than elite media in the R
- Not part of the conspiracy in the AR

Objectives

$$U_e = \mathbb{1}_{\{\theta_r = R\}} [\phi \mu_v(\theta_r = R) + \mathbb{1}_{\{s^e = \theta_c\}}] + \mathbb{1}_{\{\theta_r = AR\}} (c\tilde{\theta}_c - \lambda\tilde{\theta}_d)$$
$$U_n = \phi \mu_v(\theta_r = AR) + \mathbb{1}_{\{s^n = \theta_c\}}$$

• Audience-seeking preferences: maximize perceived prob of R or AR.

Timing

- Politician's type realized. Voter observes divisive type, elite and new media also observe the common type.
- 2 Elite and new media send message, politician decides whether to send propaganda. Voter always observes the elite message, the propaganda and new media message with probability α and γ .
- **3** Voter's preference shock realizes and he decides whether to reelect the politician.

Proposition

If α small, λ large, and the politician is pro-voter, then in the PO equilibrium:

- 1 Elite and politician behave as before.
- 2 New media always reports the politician good after a good signal and mixes after the bad signal.
- **3** Propaganda creates demand for new media.
- **4** New media amplifies the effect of propaganda:
 - Increases voter's perception of AR.
- Contradicting elite increases perception that elite is untrustworthy.
 - Increases demand for new media.

Framework with endogenous AR

Elite

- Finite number of media outlets N
 - each influences 1/N share of voters
- If there is a conspiracy, they influence all voters
- Conspiracy has organization cost: $\chi_o = \infty$
- Lying cost has two components: χ_f and χ_r

$$U_e = c\tilde{\theta}_c - \lambda\tilde{\theta}_d + \mathbb{1}_{\{s=\theta_c\}}(\chi_f + \chi_r) - \mathbb{1}_{\{conspiracy\}}\chi_o$$

Alternative realities

- Two potential AR:
 - Lying cost AR: $\chi_r = 0$
 - Conspiracy AR: $\chi_r = 0$ and $\chi_o < \infty$
 - Conspiracy AR is more costly: $f_c > f_l$

Proposition

If α small, λ large, and the politician is pro-voter, then the PO equilibrium is such that:

- **1** If χ_f is small, then bad politician uses lying cost AR.
- **2** If χ_f is medium, then bad politician uses conspiracy AR.
- **3** If χ_f is large, then no politician uses AR.
- Implication: Hard evidence may not improve accountability but trigger conspiracy theories.