

PRESCRIPTION FOR KNOWLEDGE: PATIENT INFORMATION & GENERIC SUBSTITUTION

Linn Hjalmarsson

University of Bern & CSS Institute

Christian P.R. Schmid

CSS Institute for Empirical Health Economics

Nicolas Schreiner

CSS Institute & University of Basel

EEA ESEM 2023

Barcelona School of Economics

CSSINSTITUT

Does targeted information to patients increase generic drug use?

- Mailing campaign by health insurer with quasi-random timing
- Information triples generic substitution probability

GENERIC DRUGS

Same therapeutic effect as brand-name drug

- Typically 70%–90% cheaper than brand-name drugs

Policies to increase substitution primarily target financial incentives

- Higher co-insurance rate of 20% in Switzerland for expensive brands

Functioning markets require informed consumers

- Swiss providers required by law to inform patients about generics

INFORMATION TREATMENT

Mailings by Swiss health insurer from 2010–2022 (banned by FOPH)

- Letter sent to patients after claim of one of 26 brand-name drugs
- Campaign only active if drug on 20% co-insurance list


Letter contains information specific to purchased drug

- Names of available generic substitutes
- Maximum savings in %

GENERICS MAILING PROCESS

1. Patient purchases brand-name drug on mailing list
2. Health insurer receives claim and flags patient
3. Minimum wait period of 21 days
4. Check if other correspondence with higher priority
 - No: Dispatch of letter to patient
 - Yes: Re-check every 2 weeks for next 365 days

SUBSTITUTION AROUND LETTER



IDENTIFICATION STRATEGY

Patient knowledge may increase with repeated purchases

- Use claim number instead of “time” distance to treatment

Blocking results in quasi-random assignment of treatment timing

- Compare treated with untreated purchases at nth claim

DATA

Individual-level drug claims between 2010–2019


- Limit to drug for which patient received first letter

Claim “numbering” starts when first generic drug available

- Only first 10 claims of patient
- Patients treated between 3rd and 10th claim
- 620,000 claims from 73,000 patients

Binary measure whether claim was for generic or brand version

EFFECT BY FIRST TREATED CLAIM



ESTIMATION METHOD


Event study with staggered treatment adoption

- Evaluation at different claims, rather than different points in time


Callaway & Sant'anna (2021) estimator to avoid TWFE problems

- Not-yet-treated units as control group
- Estimation of 63 distinct ATTs, weighted aggregation with group size


EFFECT OF INFORMATION



EFFECT OF INFORMATION



EFFECT BY SPOT PRICE



DISCUSSION

Threefold increase in substitution due to personalized letter

- Additional yearly savings of CHF 36 per letter that costs CHF 0.3
- Some providers likely never inform patients

Effect of information greatly dominates individual financial incentives

- Price mechanism as policy tool requires market conditions

PRESCRIPTION FOR KNOWLEDGE: PATIENT INFORMATION & GENERIC SUBSTITUTION

Linn Hjalmarsson

University of Bern & CSS Institute

Christian P.R. Schmid

CSS Institute for Empirical Health Economics

Nicolas Schreiner


CSS Institute & University of Basel

EEA ESEM 2023

Barcelona School of Economics

CSSINSTITUT


GENERIC MAILING PROCESS




CLAIM DISTRIBUTION

Claim Treated Group	nth Claim										
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
10	2,078	2,078	2,078	2,078	2,078	2,078	2,078	2,078	2,078	2,078	2,078
9	2,692	2,692	2,692	2,692	2,692	2,692	2,692	2,692	2,692	2,692	2,550
8	3,106	3,106	3,106	3,106	3,106	3,106	3,106	3,106	3,106	2,950	2,787
7	3,956	3,956	3,956	3,956	3,956	3,956	3,956	3,728	3,499	3,292	
6	6,668	6,668	6,668	6,668	6,668	6,668	6,306	5,916	5,507	5,179	
5	10,261	10,261	10,261	10,261	10,261	9,634	9,061	8,459	7,933	7,425	
4	13,899	13,899	13,899	13,899	12,752	11,781	10,903	10,111	9,258	8,424	
3	19,245	19,245	19,245	17,406	15,846	14,362	13,068	11,909	10,733	9,512	


EFFECT BY TREATMENT GROUP




EFFECT WITH BALANCED PANEL



EFFECT BY SAVINGS POTENTIAL



EFFECT BY DISPENSER



INSURANCE MODEL

