The Option Value of Occupations

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+ future jobs \implies option value

What I do & find

1. **Document** diverging occupational wage trajectories

Hungarian linked administrative data across employers and occupations

2. Model job mobility within and across occupations

Wage schedules, wage offers, labor market frictions, amenities, switching costs

3. **Estimate** substantial heterogeneity in the flow vs. option value of occupations Low-skill occs. have high flow value / high-skill occs. have high option value

4. Simulate counterfactual occupational wage trajectories

Starting in bottom-wage high-skill occs. \gg top-wage low-skill occs.



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Model in words

Opportunities vs. choices

Individual works in a job (occupation a, wage i), enjoys flow utility u_{ai}

Their wage may increase/decrease from \emph{i} to \emph{w} at rate $\chi^{a\emph{w}}_{a\emph{i}}$

They may separate from their job at rate δ_a

They may receive a job offer from occupation o at rate λ_a^o

- Wage offer $w \sim f^{o}$
- Stochastic switching cost $\tilde{c}_a^o \implies$ accept offer if $V_{ow} \tilde{c}_a^o > V_{ai}$

Model in math

Employed in occupation a earning wage i:

$$V_{ai} = \overbrace{\frac{\mathsf{u}_{ai}}{\Gamma}}^{\mathsf{flow value}} + \overbrace{\frac{\mathbb{E}_{w} \left[\chi_{ai}^{aw} \, \mathsf{V}_{aw} \right]}{\Gamma} + \frac{\delta_{a} \mathsf{V}_{n}}{\Gamma}}^{\mathsf{continuation value}} + \underbrace{\frac{\mathbb{E}_{o,w,\tilde{c}} \left[\lambda_{a}^{o} \, \mathsf{max} \{ \mathsf{V}_{ow} - \tilde{\mathsf{c}}_{a}^{o}, \mathsf{V}_{ai} \} \right]}{\Gamma}}_{\mathsf{option value}}^{\mathsf{continuation value}}$$

$$\Gamma = \sum_{o} \lambda_{a}^{o} + \sum_{w} \chi_{ai}^{aw} + \delta_{a} + \rho$$

Model in terms of CCPs

$$\tilde{c}_a^o \sim \text{Logistic}(c_a^o)$$
 (cf. Arcidiacono, Gyetvai, Maurel, and Jardim, 2022 NBER WP)

$$\begin{split} \rho V_{ai} &= \textbf{\textit{u}}_{ai} + \sum_{w} \chi_{ai}^{aw} \left(V_{aw} - V_{ai} \right) + \delta_a (V_n - V_{ai}) - \sum_{o,w} \lambda_a^o \log \left(1 - \textbf{\textit{p}}_{ai}^{ow} \right) f^{ow} \\ \text{where} \quad \textbf{\textit{p}}_{ai}^{ow} &= \frac{\exp(V_{ow} - V_{ai} - \textbf{\textit{c}}_a^o)}{1 + \exp(V_{ow} - V_{ai} - \textbf{\textit{c}}_a^o)} \end{split}$$

Identification in a nutshell

$$hazard = \underbrace{Pr(offer\ arrives)}_{opportunities} \times \underbrace{Pr(offer\ is\ accepted)}_{choices}$$

Separating opportunities from choices

- Frequent offers \Longrightarrow wait for a high-wage offer \Longrightarrow \uparrow transitions at high wages
- Strong preferences \Longrightarrow accept any wage offer \Longrightarrow \uparrow transitions at all wages




Labor market frictions

Estimates



The flow vs. option value of occupations


Estimates





Simulating job trajectories

Estimates





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Literature

Career decisions

Keane and Wolpin (1997), Neal (1999), Sullivan and To (2014), ...

Occupational choice

Miller (1984), McCall (1990), Antonovics and Golan (2012), ...

Heterogeneity in job search

Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002), Cahuc, Postel-Vinay, and Robin (2006), Taber and Vejlin (2020), ...

Option values

Rust (1987), Arcidiacono (2004), Stange (2012), ...




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Occupational ladders and skill levels





Skill levels and most frequent occupations

1–Managers	Managing directors	4–Commercial	Catering
College+HS	Legislators	Primary	Services
2-Professionals	STEM	5–Industry	Metal and electrical ind.
College	Business, legal, and soc. sci.	Primary	Construction
3-Technicians	STEM	6–Machine operators	Drivers
High school	Business	Primary	Assemblers
		7–Elementary	Elementary



Hungarian linked EE data with occupations


2003-2017, 50% sample

- 5 million individuals, 900 thousand firms per year
- Estimation sample: 22–50 males \longrightarrow 5 million job spells
- 1. (Virtually) continuous-time data
- 2. Reliable occupational classification \longrightarrow high vs. low-skill occupations


Various versions used in Koren and Tenreyro (2013 AER), Halpern, Koren, and Szeidl (2015 AER), DellaVigna, Lindner, Reizer, and Schmieder (2017 QJE), Harasztosi and Lindner (2019 AER), Verner and Gyöngyösi (2020 AER)




Observed EE transitions






















Flow vs. continuation value—formulas

$$V_{ai} = \overbrace{\frac{\textbf{u}_{ai}}{\Gamma}}^{\text{flow value}} + \underbrace{\frac{\textbf{E}_{w} \left[\chi_{ai}^{aw} \, \textbf{V}_{aw} \right]}{\Gamma} + \frac{\delta_{a} \textbf{V}_{n}}{\Gamma}}_{\text{continuation value}} + \underbrace{\frac{\textbf{E}_{o,w,\tilde{c}} \left[\lambda_{a}^{o} \, \text{max} \{ \textbf{V}_{ow} - \tilde{\textbf{c}}_{a}^{o}, \textbf{V}_{ai} \} \right]}{\Gamma}}_{\text{option value}}$$


$$\Gamma = \sum_{o} \lambda_{a}^{o} + \sum_{w} \chi_{ai}^{aw} + \delta_{a} + \rho$$



<u>Identifying variation</u> Hazards across destination jobs



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
Identifying variation

Hazards across origin and destination occupations at high wages




<u>Identifying variation</u>


Hazards across origin and destination occupations at high wages



Identifying variation Hazards across origin and destination jobs




Identifying variation Hazards across origin and destination jobs




Identifying variation

Hazards across origin and destination occupations at all wages



Identifying variation

Hazards across origin and destination occupations at all wages



Idea: compare hazards of moving to the same job as the current one. Differential rates across wages are due to differences in offer propensity.

Note that $p_{ai}^{ai} = p_{ai}^{aj}$ for all a, i, j

$$p_{ai}^{ai} = \frac{\exp(V_{ai} - V_{ai} - c_a^a)}{1 + \exp(V_{ai} - V_{ai} - c_a^a)} = \frac{\exp(-c_a^a)}{1 + \exp(-c_a^a)}$$

Therefore

$$rac{h_{ai}^{ai}}{h_{aj}^{ai}} = rac{\lambda_a^a p_{ai}^{ai} f^{ai}}{\lambda_a^a p_{aj}^{ai} f^{ai}} = rac{f^{ai}}{f^{aj}}$$
 $\implies f^{ai} = rac{h_{ai}^{ai}}{\sum_w h_{aw}^{aw}}$

Very simple estimation is appealing to wider audience



Idea: the odds of accepting an offer plus its reverse needs to be equal for all wages Log odds of accepting offers can be written in two ways:

1. Plugging in structural parameters for CCPs:

$$\varpi_{ai}^{bj} = \log\left(\frac{p_{ai}^{bj}}{1 - p_{ai}^{bj}}\right) = \log\left(\frac{h_{ai}^{bj}}{\lambda_a^b f^{bj} - h_{ai}^{bj}}\right)$$

Only unknown is $\lambda_a^b \implies \varpi_{ai}^{bj} \equiv \varpi_{ai}^{bj}(\lambda_a^b)$

2. Plugging in value functions for CCPs:

$$\varpi_{ai}^{bj} = \log\left(\frac{p_{ai}^{bj}}{1 - p_{ai}^{bj}}\right) = V_{bj} - V_{ai} - c_a^b$$



First, offer arrives from same occupation:

$$egin{aligned} arpi_{ai}^{aj} &= \mathsf{V}_{aj} - \mathsf{V}_{ai} - c_a^a \ \Longrightarrow & arpi_{ai}^{aj} + arpi_{aj}^{ai} &= arpi_{ak}^{a\ell} + arpi_{a\ell}^{ak} &\Longrightarrow & \lambda_a^a ext{ from any } (i,j,k,\ell) ext{ 4-tuple} \end{aligned}$$

Next, offer arrives from another occupation:

$$\varpi_{ai}^{bj} = V_{bj} - V_{ai} - c_a^b$$

$$\implies \varpi_{ai}^{bj} + \varpi_{bj}^{ai} = \varpi_{ak}^{b\ell} + \varpi_{b\ell}^{ak} \implies \lambda_a^b, \lambda_b^a \text{ from any two } (i, j, k, \ell), (i', j', k', \ell') \text{ 4-tuples}$$

CCPs

Idea: having identified the offered wages and arrival rates, CCPs map to hazards

By the hazard definition,

$$h_{ai}^{bj} = \lambda_a^b p_{ai}^{bj} f^{bj}$$
 $\implies p_{ai}^{bj} = rac{h_{ai}^{bj}}{\lambda_a^b f^{bj}}$

Idea: remaining parameters come from changes across wages vs. occupations Plug the structural parameters in the values in the log odds:

$$\begin{split} \varpi_{ai}^{bj} &= V_{bj} - V_{ai} - c_a^b \\ &= \frac{1}{\delta_b + \rho} \left(u_{bj} + \sum_w \chi_{bj}^{bw} (\varpi_{bj}^{bw} + c_b^b) - \sum_{o,w} \lambda_b^o \log(1 - p_{bj}^{ow}) f^{ow} \right) \\ &- \frac{1}{\delta_a + \rho} \left(u_{ai} + \sum_w \chi_{ai}^{aw} (\varpi_{ai}^{aw} + c_a^a) - \sum_{o,w} \lambda_a^o \log(1 - p_{ai}^{ow}) f^{ow} \right) \\ &+ \frac{\delta_b - \delta_a}{(\delta_b + \rho)(\delta_a + \rho)} \left(u_n - \sum_{o,w} \lambda_n^o \log(1 - p_n^{ow}) f^{ow} \right) - c_a^b \end{split}$$

This expression is linear in u_{bi} , u_{ai} , u_n , and c_a^b


We can write this in matrix form as

◆ Back

$$\kappa = A\theta$$

$$\Longrightarrow$$

Additional structure: relative symmetry along skill content



Two-stage MLE, competing risks with exponential hazards and two-sided censoring

1. Estimate wage change rates γ and separation rates δ

2. Estimate hazards, imposing structure

$$L(h) = L\left(\underbrace{\lambda f}_{\text{Pr(offer arrives)}} \times \underbrace{p(\lambda, f, u, c, \hat{\chi}, \hat{\delta})}_{\text{Pr(offer is accepted)}}\right)$$

CCPs come from iterating the value function to a fixed point

Additional structure on offered wages, switching costs, flow utilities







I allow for two unobserved heterogeneity types

$$\left(\hat{\chi}_{ai}^{aw}\right)_{r} = \frac{\sum_{\iota} q_{\iota r} \sum_{s} \mathbb{1}(a_{s} = a, i_{s} = i, d_{s} = WW, j_{s} = w)}{\sum_{\iota} q_{\iota r} \sum_{s} \mathbb{1}(a_{s} = a, i_{s} = i) t_{s}}$$

$$\left(\hat{\delta}_a\right)_r = \frac{\sum_{\iota} q_{\iota r} \sum_{s} \mathbb{1}(a_s = a, d_s = EN)}{\sum_{\iota} q_{\iota r} \sum_{s} \mathbb{1}(a_s = a) t_s}$$



Likelihood contribution of a single spell s:

$$L_{\mathsf{s}}(h) = \prod_{a,i} \prod_{b,j} \left[\left(h_{ai}^{bj} \right)^{\mathbb{1}(b_{\mathsf{s}}=b,j_{\mathsf{s}}=j)} \, \exp\left(- h_{ai}^{bj} \, \mathsf{t}_{\mathsf{s}}
ight) \right]^{\mathbb{1}(a_{\mathsf{s}}=a,i_{\mathsf{s}}=i)}$$

Full likelihood:

$$L(h) = \sum_{i=1}^{l} \sum_{s=1}^{S_{i}} \log L_{s}(h)$$

Imposing structure:

$$L(\lambda, f, u, c) = \sum_{i=1}^{l} \sum_{s=1}^{S_{i}} \log L_{s}(\lambda f \, p(\lambda, f, u, c, \hat{\chi}, \hat{\delta}))$$



mth iteration:

$$\left(\sum_{o} \lambda_{a}^{o} + \sum_{w} \chi_{ai}^{aw} + \delta_{a} + \rho\right) V_{ai}^{(m)} = u_{ai} + \sum_{o} \lambda_{a}^{o} V_{ai}^{(m-1)} + \sum_{w} \chi_{ai}^{aw} V_{aw}^{(m-1)} + \delta_{a} V_{n}^{(m-1)} + \sum_{o,w} \lambda_{a}^{o} \log\left(1 + \exp\left(V_{ow}^{(m-1)} - V_{ai}^{(m-1)} - c_{a}^{b}\right)\right) f^{ow}$$

I calculate the CCPs as

$$p_{ai}^{bj} = \frac{\exp\left(V_{bj}^* - V_{ai}^* - c_a^b\right)}{1 + \exp\left(V_{bj}^* - V_{ai}^* - c_a^b\right)}$$

1. Estimate posterior type distribution using reduced-form full loglikelihood:

$$\max \sum_{\iota} \log \left[\sum_{r} \pi_{r} \left(\underline{\mathit{L}}_{\iota r} \prod_{\mathsf{s}} \widetilde{\mathit{L}}_{\mathsf{s} r} \right) \right] \quad \sim q_{\iota r}$$

2. Calculate wage change rates, job separation rates:

$$\left(\hat{\chi}_{ai}^{aw}\right)_r = \frac{\sum_{\iota} q_{\iota r} \sum_s \mathbb{1}(a_s = a, i_s = i, d_s = WW, j_s = w)}{\sum_{\iota} q_{\iota r} \sum_s \mathbb{1}(a_s = a, i_s = i) \, t_s}, \quad \left(\hat{\delta}_a\right)_r = \frac{\sum_{\iota} q_{\iota r} \sum_s \mathbb{1}(a_s = a, d_s = EN)}{\sum_{\iota} q_{\iota r} \sum_s \mathbb{1}(a_s = a) \, t_s}$$

3. Estimate remaining structural parameters using expected complete loglikelihood:

$$\max \sum_{l} \sum_{r} q_{lr} \sum_{s} \log L_{sr}(\lambda f p(\lambda, f, u, c, \hat{\chi}, \hat{\delta}))$$



Cutoffs:

$$\phi_{\text{W}} = \begin{cases} \theta_{\text{1}}^{\phi} & \text{for W} = \text{1} \\ \phi_{\text{W}-\text{1}} + \exp(\theta_{\text{2}}^{\phi} + \theta_{\text{3}}^{\phi} \log w_{\text{W}} + \theta_{\text{4}}^{\phi} \log w_{\text{W}}^{2}) & \text{for W} > \text{1} \end{cases}$$

Logit structure:


$$f^{ow} = egin{cases} \Lambda(\phi_{\mathsf{W}} + heta^o) & ext{for } \mathsf{w} = \mathsf{1} \ \Lambda(\phi_{\mathsf{W}} + heta^o) - \Lambda(\phi_{\mathsf{W}-1} + heta^o) & ext{for } \mathsf{1} < \mathsf{w} < \mathsf{W} \ \mathsf{1} - \Lambda(\phi_{\mathsf{W}-1} + heta^o) & ext{for } \mathsf{w} = \mathsf{W} \end{cases}$$

- **1.** Optimize from "reasonable" starting values (R = 1)
- 2. Evaluate objective function in a Sobol sequence near local optimum
 - 1,000 points, \pm 50% vicinity
- 3. If higher value found, optimize using corresponding arg max as starting values If not, global optimum found

Iterate steps 2-3 until convergence

Offered wages

Estimates











Job separation rates

Estimates






Hazards






Offer arrival rates Estimates






CCPs Estimates





Mean switching costs

Estimates




Maragers clother control in the control of the rest of the control of the control

(utils)



Value functions Estimates





How much would a median-wage worker in occupation *a* have to be compensated to accept a machine operator job?

$$\psi_a + \beta \log \bar{\mathbf{w}}_a = \psi_{\mathsf{MO}} + \beta \log \mathbf{w}_a^{\mathsf{MO}}$$

Occupation	β	ψ_{a}	Comp. diff.
Managers	1.01	-0.20	0.89
Professionals		-0.52	0.65
Technicians		-0.24	0.85
Commercial		0.04	1.14
Industry		0.13	1.24
Machine operators		-0.09	_
Elementary		-0.69	0.55

- **o.** Initialize G number of individuals in each occupation and wage bin G = 1,000
- 1. Draw exponential durations using hazards \emph{h} , wage change rates χ , and job separation rates δ
- 2. Take minimum duration (competing hazards), record new job

Repeat steps 1-2 until sufficient years of cumulative durations are drawn (45 years)