Why Divest? The Political and Informational Roles of Institutions in Asset Stranding

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- Key point: Divestment has a political angle

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- Divestment is not just noise/taste because it mitigates political failures: voter ignorance, policy gridlock and, tragedy of commons.

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• Stranding (t = 2)

- A unit mass of all citizen vote based on supermajority ($\kappa > 1/2)$
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- Implications of divestment:
 - Political channel: Eliminate institutional ownership of harmful asset, converting stakeholders to strand supporters.
 - Informational channel: Potentially conveys information, altering financial market prices and tradeoff calculus of non-stakeholders

Literature

- Carbon Transition Risk (Bolton and Kaczperczyk, 2021, 2022): We offer a formal channel through which institutional divestment drives carbon transition risk, political and regulatory non-neutrality of divestment.
- Political Economy of Green Transitions (Besley and Persson, 2023): Institutional divestment strengthens "green values" by severing economic ties of institutional stakeholders to harmful asset, provides stable group of committed voters for green transition.
- Voice through Divestment (Becht, Pajuste, and Toniolo, 2023): Finds evidence of divestment announcement effects, as in our theory. We provide a formal grounding for political and information channels complementary to their "narrative" interpretation.
- Feedback effects from financial prices to real decisions (Bond, Edmans, and Goldstein, 2012): In our theory financial prices, driven by divestment, impact political outcomes: voting and regulation.

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
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 - Divested securities are sold to foreign non voting buyers (explore alternative assumptions)
- Voting
 - Continuum of forward looking voters
 - Heterogeneity is stakeholders harm is the same as the general population
 - Sincere voting: although no voter is pivotal, each votes as if she were a dictator
- Join determination of political outcome and market outcome: **Pure Bayesian equilibrium**

Tensions in the divestment decision

- The median stakeholder wants to divest when :
 - Divestment weakens the supermajority rule and make it closer to the preferred majority rule
 - When the information revelation necessitates divestment as a signal
- The median stakeholders rejects divestment when
 - Divestment weakens the supermajority rule and make it more distant from the preferred majority rule
 - > When the information revelation necessitates to reject divestment as a signal
- An equilibrium resolving these tensions may or may not exist: It depends on the values of $(\delta, \lambda, \kappa)$
- Equilibria in pure strategies can be of the pooling type or separating type

Equilibrium Existence



Extensions

- Domestic Repurchase
- Continuous signal (partially revealing equilibrium)

Conclusion

- Divestment is not politically neutral: changes incentives of citizens to vote for stranding/regulation
- Our model shows the flip side of concentrated shareholdings and lobbying: loss of broad-based economic stakes in harmful asset weakens political support
- Divestment should be understood as an institutional phenomenon with political and informational implications
- Feedback of financial prices: To political outcomes and regulation!