Which income comparisons matter to people, and how? Evidence from a large field experiment

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EEA-ESEM Barcelona 2023

Motivation: Income rank matters for well-being

Theoretical arguments:

- ► Social comparison theory (Festinger, 1954).
- ▶ Relative income hypothesis (Veblen, 1899; Duesenberry, 1949).
- ▶ Inequality aversion and fairness (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Cappelen et al. 2007).

Empirical evidence:

- ▶ People take actions to improve their rank (e.g. Kuziemko et al., 2014) or relative payoff (Bellemare et al. 2008)
- ► Stronger association of *rank* than *income* with satisfaction (Clark et al., 2008; Boyce et al., 2010)

Life Satisfaction of Finns: at a time point




Figure 1: Standardized life satisfaction for Finns in the workforce, aged 35 to 45, ESS Round 9 (2018).

This paper

- 1. **Causality**: We provide an experiment that implements exogenous variation in rank information to study the causal effects of rank on well-being
- 2. **Which comparisons matter?** What are the relevant reference groups?
 - compatriots, locals, colleagues, age cohort, educational peers?
 - We provide exogenous information on rank in one reference group only to disentangle the importance of different comparisons
- 3. How do they matter? Dimensions of welfare
 - income-related well-being measures satisfaction with disposable income, wage satisfaction, fairness perceptions
 - ▶ general well-being measures life satisfaction, job satisfaction

Related literature

- ► Effects of relative income or rank in one (assumed) reference group on happiness or satisfaction (Card et al. 2012; Clark et al. 2009; Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2005; Godechot and Senik 2015; McBride 2001; Alesina et al. 2004; Perez-Truglia, 2020)
- ► Descriptive evidence emphasizing the importance of comparisons in the workplace (Clark and Senik 2020)
- ► Misperceptions of rank in different reference groups and the effect of rank information on e.g. fairness views (Hvidberg et al. 2022)
- ▶ Information provision experiments effects of rank or relative income information on other outcomes (Karadja et al. 2017, Fehr et al. 2022, Haaland et al. 2023)

Research design: Survey experiment

Online survey to run a pre-registered information provision experiment

- 1. Background questions
- Belief elicitation: Respondent indicates perceived income rank among five different reference groups:
 - ► Age, Municipality, Education, Occupation, and National
- 3. Information treatment: Respondent receives information about her **actual rank** in one reference group
- 4. Standard survey questions and decision tasks


Research design: Treatment groups

Treatment	Description
CONTROL	No information about rank
AGE	Exogenous information: rank relative to people born in the same year
MUNICIPALITY	Exogenous information: rank relative to adults living in the same municipality
EDUCATION	Exogenous information: rank relative to people with same level of education (Basic, upper secondary, bachelor, master or higher)
OCCUPATION	Exogenous information: rank relative to people with same occupation (Classification on 2-digit level, e.g. "teaching professionals", "sales workers")
NATIONAL	Exogenous information: rank relative to adult Finns
CHOICE	Endogenous information: rank relative to the chosen reference group

Research design: Belief elicitation example

What was the proportion of **people with the same educational degree**, who had lower disposable income than you? You indicated your educational degree was Bachelor's or equivalent level. Please tap on the bar below to indicate your assessment.

"46% of people with the same educational degree had lower disposable income than I."



Research design: Treatment example



According to your assessment, 53% of people who had the same level of education had lower income than you in 2018.

Actually, based on register data, 73% of people who had the same level of education had lower income than you in 2018.

Research design: Outcomes

- ► Focus in this paper on individual well-being
 - income-related well-being measures fairness perceptions, satisfaction with disposable income, wage satisfaction
 - ▶ general well-being measures life satisfaction, job satisfaction
- ► The survey included also other outcomes: policy attitudes (redistribution, labor market, migration), trust in institutions, social preferences, just-world beliefs

Implementation and sampling

- ► Survey carried out in co-operation with Statistics Finland (SF)
- ► Representative sample of 20,000 Finns from the sub-population of interest (35 to 45 years olds)
- ▶ 6642 (33%) started the survey, of whom 6121 (92%) completed
- ► Starters and completers are both balanced across treatments
- Incentives: the payment to each participant was 15 € for finishing and 5 € for correct assessment of income rank (in a randomly chosen reference group)


Causal effects: Identification and main specification

Intuition: We can't generate exogenous variation in rank itself, but we can induce variation in "experienced rank" or, to be more precise, beliefs about rank.

$$Y_{i}^{k} = \beta_{0} + \beta_{1} (ER_{i}^{j} - R_{i}^{j}) + \beta_{2} T_{i}^{j} + \beta_{3} T_{i}^{j} (ER_{i}^{j} - R_{i}^{j}) + \gamma \mathbf{X}_{i} + u_{i}$$
 (1)

- \triangleright Y_i is the value of outcome k for individual i
- $ightharpoonup R_i^j$ is i's actual rank in distribution j
- ► ER_i^j is the same individual's belief about her rank in j, so that $ER_i^j R_i^j$ is her misperception about rank
- ▶ T_i^j is a treatment indicator that is equal to 1 if i is shown her actual rank, and 0 otherwise
- \triangleright X_i is a vector of controls

Misperceptions (perceived rank - actual rank)




Satisfaction with disposable income


	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Age	Municipality	Education	Occupation	National
Treatment	-0.003	-0.041	-0.108	-0.083	0.120
	(0.057)	(0.075)	(0.064)	(0.054)	(0.080)
Misperception	0.051	0.675***	0.583***	0.223	0.495*
	(0.189)	(0.200)	(0.164)	(0.138)	(0.202)
Treatment \times Misperception	-0.768 ^{**}	-0.735 ^{**}	-0.871***	-0.594**	-0.074
	(0.258)	(0.268)	(0.227)	(0.199)	(0.284)
Female	-0.217***	-0.156**	-0.212***	-0.226***	-0.210***
	(0.048)	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.050)	(0.051)
High education	0.420***	0.363***	0.309***	0.374***	0.385***
	(0.057)	(0.056)	(0.060)	(0.062)	(0.061)
Spouse	0.201**	0.234***	0.206**	0.162*	0.197**
	(0.064)	(0.063)	(0.065)	(0.067)	(0.066)
Child(ren)	-0.079	-0.018	0.057	0.008	-0.008
	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.063)	(0.063)
Metropolitan area	0.275***	0.268***	0.302***	0.283***	0.236***
	(0.055)	(0.056)	(0.057)	(0.060)	(0.060)
Constant	-0.141*	-0.082	-0.113	-0.137	-0.071
	(0.070)	(0.079)	(0.074)	(0.070)	(0.083)
Observations	1521	1501	1519	1505	1498

^{*} $\rho < 0.05$, ** $\rho < 0.01$, *** $\rho < 0.001$


Satisfaction with disposable income



Fairness of own income




Life satisfaction



Robustness

- ► We conduct a multiverse analysis (Simonsohn et al., 2020; Young & Holsteen, 2017)
- ► We estimate the effect of interest, i.e. coefficient on Treatment×Misperception, in various model specifications
 - restricting the sample;
 - operationalizing the misperception;
 - including covariates.
- ► An example with education as the reference group and fairness as the outcome on the following slide
 - ► The coefficient of interest in the main specification is -0.69 (s.e. 0.23)

Treatment (Education) × Misperception on Fairness



Notes: 1548 of 1824 (85%) specifications show p < 0.05.

Concluding remarks

- ► We provided participants randomized information about rank in different reference groups
- ► The results are informative about fundamental preference parameters: nature of social preferences
- Our information treatments were successful in undoing the effects of individuals' initial misperceptions
- ► Reference group matters: (Information on) rank in narrowly-defined reference groups is particularly important for well-being
- ▶ Dimensions of welfare: rank information affects income satisfaction but not life satisfaction

Regressions of misperception

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Age	Municipality	Education	Occupation	National
Female	-0.01	-0.033***	-0.007	-0.035***	-0.027***
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.005)
Age	0.004***	-0.003***	-0.007***	-0.005***	-0.002**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Spouse	0.027***	0.028***	0.045***	0.048***	0.032***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.006)
Chil(dren)	-0.051***	-0.032***	-0.058***	-0.080***	-0.039***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.006)
Private sector	0.022***	0.023***	0.012*	0.025***	0.020***
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.005)
High education	0.002	0.044***	0.16***	0.040***	0.046***
	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.005)
Metropolitan area	-0.031***	0.052***	-0.007	-0.025**	0.013*
	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.005)
Constant	-0.26***	-0.13***	0.044	0.086*	-0.15***
	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.034)	(0.040)	(0.028)
Observations	6337	6337	6337	6337	6337

^{*} p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Joint tests for Treatment (Edu)×Misperception

Outcome	Treatment	Test statistic	Observed result	P value
Fairness of income	of income Education Share of significant results 1548 of 1824 specification		1548 of 1824 specifications	P < 0.002
		Median effect size	Rank info. decreases the slope of misperception by 0.702 SD	P < 0.002
		Aggregate all P-values	Stouffer $Z = 126.59$	P < 0.002