Unemployment insurance (UI) entitlement and the wage effect of increasing the UI benefit rate[a]

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[a]This project uses data from the Austrian Labor Market Database (AMDB) and benefited from generous financial support for data access from the Chaire Sécurisation des Parcours Professionnels and Sciences Po Paris École de la Recherche.

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Introduction

Motivation

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- literature mostly concerned with extraordinary UI policy measures
  - UI extensions during the Great Recession
  - FPUC (US) during the Covid-19 pandemic

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- closest paper is Jäger, Schoefer, Young, and Zweimüller (2020)

Comparison to Jäger et al. (2020)

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- decomposition of $\frac{\Delta \bar{w}}{\Delta \bar{b}}$ to highlight

  - the heterogeneity of $\frac{\Delta \bar{w}}{\Delta \bar{b}}$ by UI entitlement status

    $\longrightarrow$ effect is **negative** for individuals **without UI entitlement**

  - the two channels through which the UI expiration rate affects $\frac{\Delta \bar{w}}{\Delta \bar{b}}$

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  - the reemployment wages of pre-reform UI-claimants
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- using observations from surrounding years as a control group
- to find that post-reform UI claimants have higher reemployment wages than pre-reform UI claimants
  - in accordance with what the theory predicts
  - although the difference is only marginally statistically significant

Theory

Conceptual framework

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- model à la Mortensen and Pissarides (1994)
  - exogenous job separations
  - wage renegotiation only by mutual agreement
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  - UI benefits indexed to the pre-separation wage (for calibration)
- introducing UI benefit entitlement
  - within the set of unemployed individuals $\mathcal{U}$

    $\Longrightarrow$ there is a subset of individuals $\mathcal{U}_0$ without UI entitlement
  - upon separation from employer

    $\Longrightarrow$ individual becomes entitled for UI benefit receipt
  - when unemployed with UI entitlement

    $\Longrightarrow$ individual loses entitlement for UI benefit receipt at rate ξ

Wage determination

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    - worker's threat point: continuation of current unemployment spell
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$\Longrightarrow$ worker's share of match surplus depends on

- worker's impatience regarding date of (re)employment T



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

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

- the bargained wage can be written as a function of two terms:

$$w = \phi(B, B')$$

where the B terms are expected discounted income flows when unemployed:

B	$\longrightarrow$	during the **current unemployment spell** U (before getting (re)employed)
B'	$\longrightarrow$	during **potential future unemployment spells** U' (after getting (re)employed)

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

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

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

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  - B' includes UI benefits b regardless of UI entitlement status

Partial wage effects of *current* $(+)$ versus *future* $(-)$ unemployment income

Partial wage effects of *current* (+) versus *future* (−) unemployment income

- the partial (i.e. ceteris paribus) wage effect

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- the partial (i.e. ceteris paribus) wage effect
  - of **current** unemployment income is **positive** $\frac{\partial w}{\partial B} > 0$ because

an increase in income during the current unemployment spell $B \uparrow$

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makes the worker **less impatient** regarding the date of (re)employment

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  - of **future** unemployment income is **negative** $\frac{\partial w}{\partial B'} < 0$ because

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    worker accepts a lower wage $w \downarrow$
- the effect through **current** unemployment income is **greater** in magnitude

$$\left|\frac{\partial w}{\partial B}\right| > \left|\frac{\partial w}{\partial B'}\right|$$

primarily because of discounting and uncertainty about the future.

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- for individuals **with** UI entitlement the partial wage effect is **positive**:

$$\left.\frac{\partial w_i}{\partial b}\right|_{i \notin \mathcal{U}_0} = \underbrace{\overbrace{\frac{\partial w_i}{\partial B_i}}^{>0} \times \overbrace{\left.\frac{\partial B_i}{\partial b}\right|_{i \notin \mathcal{U}_0}}^{>0}}_{\text{effect through } \textbf{current} \text{ unemployment income}} + \underbrace{\overbrace{\frac{\partial w_i}{\partial B_i'}}^{<0} \times \overbrace{\frac{\partial B_i'}{\partial b}}^{>0}}_{\text{effect through } \textbf{future} \text{ unemployment income}} > 0$$

because $\frac{\partial B_i}{\partial b} \approx \frac{\partial B_i'}{\partial b}$ and $\left|\frac{\partial w}{\partial B}\right| > \left|\frac{\partial w}{\partial B'}\right|$.

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because $\frac{\partial B_i}{\partial b} \approx \frac{\partial B'_i}{\partial b}$ and $\left|\frac{\partial w}{\partial B}\right| > \left|\frac{\partial w}{\partial B'}\right|$.

- for individuals **without** UI entitlement the partial wage effect is **negative**:

$$\left.\frac{\partial w_i}{\partial b}\right|_{i \in \mathcal{U}_0} = \underbrace{\overbrace{\frac{\partial w_i}{\partial B_i}}^{>0} \times \overbrace{\left.\frac{\partial B_i}{\partial b}\right|_{i \in \mathcal{U}_0}}^{=0}}_{\text{effect through } \textbf{current} \text{ unemployment income}} + \underbrace{\overbrace{\frac{\partial w_i}{\partial B'_i}}^{<0} \times \overbrace{\frac{\partial B'_i}{\partial b}}^{>0}}_{\text{effect through } \textbf{future} \text{ unemployment income}} = \underbrace{\overbrace{\frac{\partial w_i}{\partial B'_i}}^{<0} \times \overbrace{\frac{\partial B'_i}{\partial b}}^{>0}}_{\text{effect through } \textbf{future} \text{ unemployment income}} < 0$$

Numerical results

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- report $\frac{\Delta \bar{w}}{\Delta \bar{b}}$
  - with and without effect on labor market tightness

$$\text{Partial Effect} = \frac{\mathbb{E}\left[w \mid p_1, \boldsymbol{\theta_{p_0}}\right] - \mathbb{E}\left[w \mid p_0, \boldsymbol{\theta_{p_0}}\right]}{\mathbb{E}\left[b \mid p_1, \boldsymbol{\theta_{p_0}}\right] - \mathbb{E}\left[b \mid p_0, \boldsymbol{\theta_{p_0}}\right]}$$

$$\text{Total Effect} = \frac{\mathbb{E}\left[w \mid p_1, \boldsymbol{\theta_{p_1}}\right] - \mathbb{E}\left[w \mid p_0, \boldsymbol{\theta_{p_0}}\right]}{\mathbb{E}\left[b \mid p_1, \boldsymbol{\theta_{p_1}}\right] - \mathbb{E}\left[b \mid p_0, \boldsymbol{\theta_{p_0}}\right]}$$

  - also by UI entitlement status

Numerical results

Decomposition of the impact of ξ on the average partial wage effect

	All	UI-eligibles	UI-ineligibles
$\xi = 0.0 \quad \left(\frac{u_0}{u} = 0.37, \quad \frac{w_{p_0}}{y} = 0.66\right)$			
Partial Effect	0.293	0.562	−0.194
Total Effect	0.179	0.506	−0.407
$\xi = 0.0047 \quad \left(\frac{u_0}{u} = 0.61, \quad \frac{w_{p_0}}{y} = 0.6\right)$			
Partial Effect	0.0323	0.191	−0.0473
Total Effect	0.0297	0.189	−0.05

The model ignores many important but (plausibly orthogonal) effects like increased separation rates documented by Hartung, Jung, & Kuhn (2022) in the context of the Hartz reforms.

Empirics: testing the theory

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  $\longrightarrow$ average monthly UI benefits increased by 300-400 ATS ($\approx$ 25 EUR) and up to 700 ATS ($\approx$ 50 EUR) for some

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- Austria is an ideal context for testing the theory:
  - non-binding sectoral wage floors
  - no experience rating
  - possibility to claim UI benefits even in the case of quitting

Theoretical prediction: framework

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- consider a progressively introduced increase in flat UI benefits: $b_{post} > b_{pre}$

$$b(T_{job\ loss}) = \begin{cases} b_{pre} & \text{if } T_{job\ loss} < T_{reform} \\ b_{post} & \text{if } T_{job\ loss} > T_{reform} \end{cases}$$

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- expected reemployment wage of individual i as a function of the time of job loss:

$$w_i(T_{job\ loss}) = \phi_i(B_i(T_{job\ loss}), B_i'(T_{job\ loss}), T_{job\ loss})$$

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- the current unemployment income term $B_i(T_{job\ loss})$ writes

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with a **jump discontinuity** at $T_{job\ loss} = T_{reform}$.

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  with a **jump discontinuity** at $T_{job\ loss} = T_{reform}$.

- and the future unemployment income term $B'_i(T_{job\ loss})$ writes

$$B'_i(T_{job\ loss}) = \begin{cases} B'_{i,pre}(T_{job\ loss}) & \text{if } T_{job\ loss} < T_{reform} \\ B'_{i,post}(T_{job\ loss}) & \text{if } T_{job\ loss} > T_{reform} \end{cases}$$

  with a **no jump discontinuity** at $T_{job\ loss} = T_{reform}$.

Theoretical prediction: discontinuity

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- the reemployment wage of individual i if job loss occurs **just before** T_{reform}:

$$w_{i,pre} = \lim_{T_{job\ loss} \uparrow T_{reform}} w_i(T_{job\ loss}) = \phi_i(B_{i,pre}(T_{reform}), B'_{i,post}(T_{reform}), T_{reform})$$

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- taking the difference and scaling by the change in UI benefits yields:

$$\frac{w_{i,post} - w_{i,pre}}{b_{post} - b_{pre}} \approx \underbrace{\frac{\partial w_i}{\partial B_i} \times \frac{\partial B_i}{\partial b}}_{\text{effect through } \textbf{current} \text{ unemployment income}}$$

(first-order approximation)

Theoretical prediction: size

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- using the same model
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Theoretical prediction: size

- using the same model
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- simulate labor market histories (employment, wages, UI entitlement) around an unanticipated change in UI replacement rate from 0.5 to 0.6
- when considering a 50-day window for $\boldsymbol{T_{job\ loss}}$ around $\boldsymbol{T_{reform}}$

  $\longrightarrow$ values for

$$\frac{\mathbb{E}\left[w \,\middle|\, \boldsymbol{T_{job\ loss}} \geq \boldsymbol{T_{reform}}\right] - \mathbb{E}\left[w \,\middle|\, \boldsymbol{T_{job\ loss}} < \boldsymbol{T_{reform}}\right]}{\mathbb{E}\left[b \,\middle|\, \boldsymbol{T_{job\ loss}} \geq \boldsymbol{T_{reform}}\right] - \mathbb{E}\left[b \,\middle|\, \boldsymbol{T_{job\ loss}} < \boldsymbol{T_{reform}}\right]}$$

  range from **0.3** ($\xi = 0.0065$) up to **0.8** ($\xi = 0$). details

Empirical strategy

Empirical strategy

Empirical strategy

Empirical strategy

Empirical strategy



Empirical strategy: difference-in-differences

Empirical strategy: difference-in-differences

$$\boldsymbol{W_i} = \beta_{\boldsymbol{P}} \cdot \boldsymbol{Post_i} + \beta_{\boldsymbol{P}\times\boldsymbol{R}} \cdot \boldsymbol{Post_i} \cdot \boldsymbol{Reform_i} + \sum_{\boldsymbol{y}\in\mathcal{Y}} \beta_{\boldsymbol{y}} \cdot \mathbb{1}\left[\boldsymbol{Y(i)} = \boldsymbol{y}\right] + \mathbf{X}_{\boldsymbol{i}}'\zeta + \epsilon_{\boldsymbol{i}}$$

where:

- $\boldsymbol{W_i}$ is the reemployment wage
- $\mathcal{Y}$ is the set of sample-years $\mathcal{Y} \equiv \{1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004\}$
- ***Post*** is an indicator for the UI claim starting on or after the 1st of January:

$$\boldsymbol{Post_i} = \mathbb{1}\left[\boldsymbol{T_{UI\ claim\ start}(i)} \geq \boldsymbol{January\ 1st\ of\ Y(i)}\right]$$

- ***Reform*** is an indicator for the sample-year being 2001:

$$\boldsymbol{Reform_i} = \mathbb{1}\left[\boldsymbol{Y(i)} = 2001\right]$$

- and $\mathbf{X}$ is a vector of covariates. Covariates

Sample

Sample

- summary statistics by sub-sample
  - demographics and earnings
    - by ***Post*** $\times$ ***Reform***: 20 | 40 | 20 (1 obs./ind.) | 40 (1 obs./ind.)
    - by sample-year $\boldsymbol{Y}$: 20 | 40 | 20 (1 obs./ind.) | 40 (1 obs./ind.)
  - distribution across sectors: 20 | 40 | 20 (1 obs./ind.) | 40 (1 obs./ind.)
  - distribution across states: 20 | 40 | 20 (1 obs./ind.) | 40 (1 obs./ind.)
  - distribution of $\boldsymbol{T_{UI\ claim\ start}}$: UI claim starting week
- great degree of similarity between ***Reform*** and ***Control***
  - partly not surprising because of overlaps across $\boldsymbol{Y}$: 20 days | 40 days
    - due to high share of seasonal workers: Seasonal share
      $\approx$ 26% with the conservative criterion of Del Bono and Weber (2008)
    - individuals who regularly claim UI benefits

Difference-in-Differences Estimation Results

Difference-in-Differences Estimation Results

- $\hat{\beta}_{\boldsymbol{P}\times\boldsymbol{R}}$ for the difference in reemployment wages is estimated using OLS
- baseline estimates: table figure
  - range from 100 ATS (bandwidth $\approx$ 30 days) to 700 ATS (BW $\approx$ 20 days)
  - for bandwidths of $\approx$ 20 days
    - marginally statistically significant with non-robust SE estimates
  - when keeping only 1 observation per individual table figure
    - slightly larger and statistically significant estimates (to be taken with a grain of salt!)

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    - slightly larger and statistically significant estimates
      (to be taken with a grain of salt!)
- robustness:
  - varying main covariates all 1 obs. per individual
    $\Longrightarrow$ results remain unchanged
  - leaving out one year from the control group all 1 obs. per individual
    $\Longrightarrow$ results vary slightly

PLACEBO Difference-in-Differences Estimation Results

PLACEBO Difference-in-Differences Estimation Results

- redoing the same exercise with
  - 2000 and 2002 being assigned to placebo reform
  - 1999, 2003, 2004 assigned to placebo control
- placebo estimates: table figure
  - smaller / closer to zero: vary between -300 ATS and 200 ATS
  - regardless of whether performing the analysis
    - with all observations (multiple observations per individual)
    - with only 1 observation per individual table figure

    none of the estimates is statistically significantly different from zero

Comparison to Jäger, Schoefer, Young, and Zweimüller (2020)

This Paper

- in contrast to Jäger et al. (2020):

  $\longrightarrow$ findings **consistent with theory** although statistically weak

- however not directly comparable because of
  - different strategy / comparison:

    $\rightarrow$ in my sample there are many regular UI-claimants

    $\rightarrow$ Jäger et al. (2020) focus on individuals with stable employment
  - lower statistical power:

    $\rightarrow$ I have data for only 1 reform

    $\rightarrow$ Jäger et al. (2020) have data for 4 different reforms

Appendix

Literature: job creation effect of UI benefits through wages

Back

- job creation effect of UI benefits:

  $\longrightarrow$ old topic:

  Ehrenberg and Oaxaca (1976)

  $\longrightarrow$ renewed interest following UI-extensions during the Great Recession:

  Hagedorn, Karahan, Manovskii, and Mitman (2013), Lalive, Landais, and Zweimüller (2015), Landais, Michaillat, and Saez (2018), Chodorow-Reich, Coglianese, and Karabarbounis (2019), Fredriksson and Söderström (2020)

  $\longrightarrow$ current interest following emergency FPUC during the Covid-19 pandemic:

  Ganong, Noel, and Vavra (2020), Marinescu, Skandalis, and Zhao (2021), Finamor and Scott (2021)

- wage effect of UI-**extensions**: theoretically and empirically **ambiguous**

  Schmieder, Wachter, and Bender (2016), Nekoei and Weber (2017)

- wage effect of UI benefit **rate**: ***a priori*** unambiguously **positive**

  - Jäger, Schoefer, Young, and Zweimüller (2020) find **zero** effect

    $\Longrightarrow$ **contradicts** standard theory

UI entitlement in the literature

Back

- most UI systems (Tatsiramos and Van Ours, 2014)
  - condition receipt of UI benefits on prior (recent) employment (contribution)
  - limit the duration of UI benefit entitlement while unemployed
    (finite potential benefit duration)
- old idea of an entitlement effect:
  - prospect of gaining access to UI
    $\Longrightarrow$ additional incentive for labor market participation (Hamermesh, 1979)
  - negative effect of future potential UI benefits on current wages
    (Beissinger et al., 2004, in the context of union wage bargaining)
- UI benefits are not the only source of income while unemployed

  $\longrightarrow$ especially if potential benefit durations are short
  (Jäger et al. (2020); Chodorow-Reich et al. (2019))

Calibration

Back to Part 1 Back to Part 2

Arbitrarily set (targeted) values

	General Sample	Analysis Sample
θ_{p_0} [labor market tightness]	0.135	0.135
$\widehat{\left(\frac{w_{p_0}}{y}\right)}$ [targeted labor share]	0.6	0.6
ρ [time discount rate]	0.0001	0.0001
γ [worker bargaining power]	0.1	0.1
η [matching elasticity]	0.9	0.9
$\frac{\delta}{\delta+\mu}$ [separation rate divided by employment outflow rate]	0.67	0.67

Estimated values

	General Sample	Analysis Sample
f_{p_0} [job finding rate]	0.00716	0.0173
$\delta_{\min}$ [lower bound on separation rate]	0.000427	0.00366
$(\delta+\mu)$ [total employment outflow rate]	0.00135	0.00707
$\widehat{\xi}$ [est. UI expiration rate]	0.0047	0.0065

Indirectly assigned (implied) values

	General Sample	Analysis Sample
δ [separation rate]	0.000905	0.00474
ν [working population renewal rate]	0.000445	0.00233
μ [matching efficiency]	0.00875	0.0211
$\frac{\kappa}{y}$ [vacancy cost share]	14.6	7.15
$\frac{a}{y}$ [unemployment amenity share]	0.103	0.203
$\frac{z}{y}$ [ineligible unemployment income share]	0.213	0.218

Transition rate estimates

Back to Part 1 Back to Part 2

	Sample from the population (*)	Sample used in the analysis (**)
employment outflow rate ($\delta + \nu$)	.00135 (.0012)	.00707 (.00495)
job separation lower bound ($\delta_{\min}$)	.000427 (.000469)	.00366 (.00323)
employment inflow rate (f)	.00716 (.00856)	.0173 (.0188)
UI benefit expiration rate (ξ)	.0047 (.00288)	.0065 (.00483)
Avg. number of obs.	35,607	13,707

(*) Random sample drawn from the population of individuals who are between 25 and 55 in 2001.
(**) Sample used for the analysis about the effect of the 2001 UI reform.

Partial wage effect of increasing the UI benefit rate

Back

- consider a ceteris paribus increase in flat UI benefit rate $b \uparrow$
- the overall partial effect on the wage w of a given individual i can be written as:

$$\frac{\partial w_i}{\partial b} = \underbrace{\overbrace{\frac{\partial w_i}{\partial B_i}}^{>0} \times \frac{\partial B_i}{\partial b}}_{\text{effect through } \textbf{current} \text{ unemployment income}} + \underbrace{\overbrace{\frac{\partial w_i}{\partial B_i'}}^{<0} \times \frac{\partial B_i'}{\partial b}}_{\text{effect through } \textbf{future} \text{ unemployment income}}$$

- effect through future unemployment income

$\Longrightarrow$ all individuals regardless of current UI entitlement status

$$\frac{\partial B_i'}{\partial b} > 0 \text{ for all individuals}$$

- effect through current unemployment income

$\Longrightarrow$ only individuals who are currently entitled to receive UI benefits

$\Longrightarrow \frac{\partial B_i}{\partial b} > 0$ for individuals **with** current UI entitlement $i \notin \mathcal{U}_0$

$\Longrightarrow \frac{\partial B_i}{\partial b} = 0$ for individuals **without** current UI entitlement $i \in \mathcal{U}_0$

Impact of UI expiration rate ξ on the average partial wage effect

Back

- under flat UI benefits, the average partial effect $\frac{\partial \bar{w}}{\partial b}$ is a **weighted average** of
  - the partial effect for individuals **with** UI entitlement $\left.\frac{\partial w_i}{\partial b}\right|_{i \notin \mathcal{U}_0}$ weighted by the share of individuals with UI entitlement
  - and the partial effect for individuals **without** UI entitlement $\left.\frac{\partial w_i}{\partial b}\right|_{i \in \mathcal{U}_0}$ weighted by the share of individuals without UI entitlement

- $\xi \uparrow$ affects the average partial effect $\frac{\partial \bar{w}}{\partial b}$ through two channels
  - **relative attenuation**:

    b represent a smaller share of B

    $\Downarrow$

    pushes the partial effect towards zero in the case of both groups

    $\Downarrow$

    ambiguous sign

  - **composition**:

    higher share of individuals without UI entitlement

    $\Downarrow$

    higher share of individuals with negative partial effect

    $\Downarrow$

    negative sign

Simulation results

Back

	Assuming static expectations about the evolution of the job finding rate	Using the post-reform equilibrium job finding rate
$\xi = 0.0 \quad \left(\frac{u_0}{u} = 0.41, \quad \frac{w_{p_0}}{y} = 0.64\right)$	0.783	0.77
$\xi = 0.0065 \quad \left(\frac{u_0}{u} = 0.56, \quad \frac{w_{p_0}}{y} = 0.6\right)$	0.324	0.314

$$\frac{\mathbb{E}\left[w \mid \boldsymbol{T_{job\ loss}} \geq \boldsymbol{T_{reform}}\right] - \mathbb{E}\left[w \mid \boldsymbol{T_{job\ loss}} < \boldsymbol{T_{reform}}\right]}{\mathbb{E}\left[b \mid \boldsymbol{T_{job\ loss}} \geq \boldsymbol{T_{reform}}\right] - \mathbb{E}\left[b \mid \boldsymbol{T_{job\ loss}} < \boldsymbol{T_{reform}}\right]}$$

2001 Austrian UI Reform: Replacement Rate

Back



2001 Austrian UI Reform: Average Change

Back



Covariates

Back to empirical strategy

- reference earnings (Y-2);
- indicator for white-collar employment;
- indicator for Austrian citizenship (Y-2);
- indicator for gender interacted with
  - a cubic polynomial of age;
  - a cubic polynomial of employment days during the 18m before $T_{UI\ claim\ start}$;
- time-to-entry fixed effects (3 categories);
- sector fixed effects (20 categories);
- state (Bundesland) fixed effects (7 categories).

Diff-in-Diff estimates by bandwidth

Back

	Dependent variable: Earnings (reemployment)				
Bandwidth	10 days	20 days	30 days	40 days	50 days
UIB claim starts					
Post = 0	22 Dec - 31 Dec	12 Dec - 31 Dec	2 Dec - 31 Dec	22 Nov - 31 Dec	12 Nov - 31 Dec
Post = 1	1 Jan - 10 Jan	1 Jan - 20 Jan	1 Jan - 30 Jan	1 Jan - 9 Feb	1 Jan - 19 Feb
Post	−385.96	−267.58*	−211.82*	−199.35**	−91.62
	(243.50)	(149.62)	(120.68)	(97.15)	(83.10)
Post × Reform	180.35	635.85*	316.26	302.00	334.21*
	(568.87)	(343.37)	(272.27)	(215.01)	(181.60)
Earnings (Y-2)	0.52***	0.56***	0.58***	0.65***	0.69***
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sector FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Bundesland FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Number of obs.	3,029	6,619	9,747	14,368	19,585
Adjusted R^2	0.27	0.28	0.27	0.28	0.28

Diff-in-Diff estimates by bandwidth

Back



PLACEBO Diff-in-Diff estimates by bandwidth

Back

	Dependent variable: Earnings (reemployment)				
Bandwidth	10 days	20 days	30 days	40 days	50 days
UIB claim starts					
Post = 0	22 Dec - 31 Dec	12 Dec - 31 Dec	2 Dec - 31 Dec	22 Nov - 31 Dec	12 Nov - 31 Dec
Post = 1	1 Jan - 10 Jan	1 Jan - 20 Jan	1 Jan - 30 Jan	1 Jan - 9 Feb	1 Jan - 19 Feb
Post	−206.18	−263.54	−253.71	−277.40**	−147.36
	(317.59)	(195.21)	(155.68)	(125.37)	(106.38)
Post × Reform	−579.18	−88.42	36.36	106.64	106.02
	(470.81)	(290.31)	(231.46)	(183.45)	(154.72)
Earnings (Y-2)	0.53***	0.56***	0.59***	0.66***	0.70***
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sector FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Bundesland FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Number of obs.	2,505	5,466	8,048	11,857	16,240
Adjusted R^2	0.26	0.28	0.27	0.28	0.29

PLACEBO Diff-in-Diff estimates by bandwidth

Back



Diff-in-Diff estimates varying main covariates (20 days)

Back

	Dependent variable: Earnings (reemployment)					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Post	−262.12	−188.16	−188.82	−332.48**	−267.58*	−268.25*
	(162.91)	(156.70)	(156.86)	(155.06)	(149.62)	(149.71)
Post × Reform	674.35*	709.01*	698.05*	615.20*	635.85*	627.60*
	(376.98)	(362.53)	(362.89)	(355.92)	(343.37)	(343.59)
Earnings (Y-2)		0.62***			0.56***	
		(0.03)			(0.03)	
Log(Earnings (Y-2))			9425.39***			8603.70***
			(410.14)			(392.38)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sector FE	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Bundesland FE	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Number of obs.	6,685	6,685	6,685	6,619	6,619	6,619
Adjusted R^2	0.16	0.22	0.22	0.23	0.28	0.28

Diff-in-Diff estimates leaving out one year from control (20 days)

Back

	Dependent variable: Earnings (reemployment)				
Leave-out-year	1999	2000	2002	2003	2004
Post	−375.28**	−243.33	−228.52	−132.74	−329.24**
	(172.22)	(170.90)	(164.29)	(165.14)	(162.20)
Post × Reform	734.45**	626.17*	616.07*	536.68	676.57*
	(356.81)	(353.81)	(346.25)	(349.07)	(346.75)
Earnings (Y-2)	0.55***	0.59***	0.57***	0.57***	0.55***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sector FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Bundesland FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Number of obs.	5,414	5,404	5,536	5,595	5,680
Adjusted R^2	0.28	0.28	0.29	0.29	0.28

Diff-in-Diff estimates by bandwidth

Back

keeping only 1 observation per individual

	Dependent variable: Earnings (reemployment)				
Bandwidth	10 days	20 days	30 days	40 days	50 days
UIB claim starts					
Post = 0	22 Dec - 31 Dec	12 Dec - 31 Dec	2 Dec - 31 Dec	22 Nov - 31 Dec	12 Nov - 31 Dec
Post = 1	1 Jan - 10 Jan	1 Jan - 20 Jan	1 Jan - 30 Jan	1 Jan - 9 Feb	1 Jan - 19 Feb
Post	−319.00	−229.81	−265.22*	−227.96*	−109.34
	(294.04)	(185.04)	(151.99)	(125.80)	(110.07)
Post × Reform	614.78	1077.18**	666.85*	536.39*	508.26**
	(705.68)	(441.29)	(359.51)	(291.25)	(251.81)
Earnings (Y-2)	0.44***	0.50***	0.51***	0.58***	0.63***
	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sector FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Bundesland FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Number of obs.	2,242	4,820	6,981	9,948	12,970
Adjusted R^2	0.25	0.27	0.25	0.26	0.26

Diff-in-Diff estimates by bandwidth

Back

keeping only 1 observation per individual



PLACEBO Diff-in-Diff estimates by bandwidth

Back

keeping only 1 observation per individual

	Dependent variable: Earnings (reemployment)				
Bandwidth	10 days	20 days	30 days	40 days	50 days
UIB claim starts					
Post = 0	22 Dec - 31 Dec	12 Dec - 31 Dec	2 Dec - 31 Dec	22 Nov - 31 Dec	12 Nov - 31 Dec
Post = 1	1 Jan - 10 Jan	1 Jan - 20 Jan	1 Jan - 30 Jan	1 Jan - 9 Feb	1 Jan - 19 Feb
Post	−37.35	−158.65	−234.93	−300.80*	−138.01
	(381.28)	(239.18)	(194.02)	(160.26)	(139.87)
Post × Reform	−934.76	−85.25	26.79	159.44	64.42
	(582.69)	(364.44)	(297.44)	(242.47)	(210.53)
Earnings (Y-2)	0.48***	0.51***	0.53***	0.60***	0.64***
	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sector FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Bundesland FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Number of obs.	1,864	4,051	5,838	8,302	10,789
Adjusted R^2	0.24	0.26	0.25	0.26	0.26

PLACEBO Diff-in-Diff estimates by bandwidth

Back

keeping only 1 observation per individual



Diff-in-Diff estimates varying main covariates (20 days)

Back

keeping only 1 observation per individual

	Dependent variable: Earnings (reemployment)					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Post	−122.64	−109.95	−106.89	−164.29	−157.69	−155.71
	(198.80)	(193.15)	(193.27)	(188.74)	(184.24)	(184.30)
Post × Reform	922.07*	1027.61**	1007.01**	982.83**	1049.05**	1032.01**
	(475.70)	(462.19)	(462.47)	(449.16)	(438.46)	(438.59)
Earnings (Y-2)		0.57***			0.49***	
		(0.03)			(0.03)	
Log(Earnings (Y-2))			8631.67***			7538.03***
			(510.42)			(490.47)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sector FE	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Bundesland FE	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Number of obs.	4,927	4,927	4,927	4,867	4,867	4,867
Adjusted R^2	0.16	0.21	0.21	0.23	0.26	0.26

Diff-in-Diff estimates leaving out one year from control (20 days)

Back

keeping only 1 observation per individual

	Dependent variable: Earnings (reemployment)				
Leave-out-year	1999	2000	2002	2003	2004
Post	−353.82*	−219.79	−203.32	−94.18	−352.57*
	(214.07)	(212.80)	(200.94)	(201.71)	(200.05)
Post × Reform	989.93**	872.76*	863.18**	727.66*	933.93**
	(452.68)	(450.81)	(436.42)	(439.70)	(439.37)
Earnings (Y-2)	0.45***	0.51***	0.48***	0.48***	0.45***
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sector FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Bundesland FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Number of obs.	3,912	3,924	4,105	4,139	4,162
Adjusted R^2	0.27	0.26	0.28	0.27	0.26

Summary statistics by *Reform* × *Post* (20 days)

Back

	Reform = 0		Reform = 1	
	Post = 0	Post = 1	Post = 0	Post = 1
Female	**.304**	**.45**	**.347**	**.463**
	(0.460)	(0.498)	(0.477)	(0.499)
	[0; 1]	[0; 1]	[0; 1]	[0; 1]
Age	**38.2**	**38.8**	**38**	**39.3**
	(8.476)	(8.490)	(8.458)	(8.133)
	[24; 56]	[25; 56]	[24; 56]	[25; 56]
Austrian (Y-2)	**.624**	**.635**	**.558**	**.609**
	(0.484)	(0.481)	(0.497)	(0.488)
	[0; 1]	[0; 1]	[0; 1]	[0; 1]
Earnings (Y-2)	**16, 919**	**16, 640**	**16, 758**	**16, 407**
	(2, 708)	(2, 823)	(2, 603)	(2, 623)
	[10, 005; 21, 528]	[10, 014; 21, 523]	[9, 966; 19, 980]	[9, 993; 19, 987]
Earnings (reemployment)	**20, 057**	**19, 298**	**19, 233**	**19, 207**
	(6, 285)	(6, 217)	(6, 234)	(6, 116)
	[4, 549; 53, 940]	[4, 549; 53, 940]	[4, 640; 45, 649]	[4, 755; 44, 400]
White-collar job	**.0992**	**.148**	**.108**	**.141**
	(0.299)	(0.355)	(0.310)	(0.348)
	[0; 1]	[0; 1]	[0; 1]	[0; 1]
Emp. days in 18m before UIB spell	**385**	**419**	**388**	**420**
	(107.395)	(103.494)	(109.310)	(97.728)
	[0; 549]	[0; 549]	[0; 550]	[62; 550]
Time to entry	**92.9**	**93.6**	**90.5**	**92.1**
	(114.197)	(97.620)	(115.088)	(91.310)
	[1; 1330]	[1; 1150]	[1; 741]	[1; 730]
Number of obs.	2,338	3,179	464	704

Summary statistics by sample-year (20 days)

Back

Sample year	Y = 1999 (control)	Y = 2000 (control)	Y = 2001 (reform)	Y = 2002 (control)	Y = 2003 (control)	Y = 2004 (control)
Female	**.367**	**.396**	**.417**	**.413**	**.39**	**.374**
	(0.482)	(0.489)	(0.493)	(0.493)	(0.488)	(0.484)
	[0; 1]	[0; 1]	[0; 1]	[0; 1]	[0; 1]	[0; 1]
Age	**37.8**	**37.8**	**38.8**	**38.8**	**39.5**	**39**
	(8.346)	(8.318)	(8.283)	(8.578)	(8.471)	(8.654)
	[24; 56]	[24; 56]	[24; 56]	[24; 56]	[24; 56]	[24; 56]
Austrian (Y-2)	**.601**	**.616**	**.589**	**.625**	**.641**	**.682**
	(0.490)	(0.486)	(0.492)	(0.484)	(0.480)	(0.466)
	[0; 1]	[0; 1]	[0; 1]	[0; 1]	[0; 1]	[0; 1]
Earnings (Y-2)	**16, 223**	**16, 099**	**16, 546**	**16, 760**	**17, 259**	**17, 750**
	(2, 400)	(2, 598)	(2, 620)	(2, 647)	(2, 906)	(3, 055)
	[10, 291; 19, 382]	[10, 005; 19, 618]	[9, 966; 19, 987]	[10, 192; 20, 355]	[10, 148; 21, 010]	[10, 187; 21, 528]
Earnings (reemployment)	**18, 830**	**19, 178**	**19, 217**	**19, 716**	**20, 138**	**20, 526**
	(5, 787)	(6, 133)	(6, 160)	(6, 438)	(6, 252)	(6, 616)
	[4, 549; 49, 700]	[4, 640; 48, 300]	[4, 640; 45, 649]	[4, 841; 47, 897]	[4, 966; 53, 940]	[5, 076; 52, 635]
White-collar job	**.114**	**.121**	**.128**	**.134**	**.127**	**.145**
	(0.318)	(0.326)	(0.334)	(0.340)	(0.333)	(0.353)
	[0; 1]	[0; 1]	[0; 1]	[0; 1]	[0; 1]	[0; 1]
Emp. days in 18m before UIB spell	**403**	**404**	**408**	**404**	**409**	**403**
	(107.959)	(104.423)	(103.635)	(107.124)	(104.000)	(108.996)
	[0; 549]	[0; 549]	[0; 550]	[0; 549]	[48; 549]	[0; 549]
Time to entry	**96.9**	**89.5**	**91.5**	**95.2**	**94.8**	**90.1**
	(109.330)	(96.341)	(101.380)	(113.792)	(104.114)	(100.117)
	[1; 1018]	[1; 815]	[1; 741]	[1; 1150]	[1; 1330]	[1; 1008]
Number of obs.	1,214	1,228	1,168	1,092	1,033	950

Sector of reemployment by *Reform* × *Post* (20 days)

Back

	Reform = 0		Reform = 1	
	Post = 0	Post = 1	Post = 0	Post = 1
Accommodation and food service activities	**17.5**%	**26.9**%	**18.8**%	**24.9**%
Activities of extraterritorial organisations and bodies	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Activities of households as employers; undifferentiated goods - and services - producing activities of households for own use	0.1%	0.3%	0.4%	0.0%
Administrative and support service activities	**21.1**%	**13.6**%	**21.2**%	**13.9**%
Agriculture, forestry and fishing	**5.4**%	2.7%	2.6%	3.4%
Arts, entertainment and recreation	1.1%	1.1%	1.8%	0.7%
Construction	**16.9**%	**17.0**%	**16.2**%	**19.4**%
Education	3.6%	1.2%	4.8%	0.7%
Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply	0.1%	0.1%	0.0%	0.0%
Financial and insurance activities	0.1%	0.1%	0.0%	0.3%
Human health and social work activities	1.1%	0.7%	0.7%	1.1%
Information and communication	0.6%	0.4%	0.4%	0.3%
Manufacturing	**7.4**%	**9.1**%	**6.1**%	**9.2**%
Mining and quarrying	0.3%	0.3%	0.0%	0.3%
Other services activities	1.2%	1.4%	0.4%	1.7%
Professional, scientific and technical activities	1.3%	1.2%	1.1%	1.4%
Public administration and defence; compulsory social security	4.5%	4.7%	**5.0**%	4.2%
Real estate activities	0.6%	0.6%	0.4%	0.6%
Transporting and storage	**12.2**%	**9.5**%	**14.2**%	**10.1**%
Water supply; sewerage; waste managment and remediation activities	0.2%	0.3%	0.4%	0.4%
Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles	4.7%	**8.8**%	**5.3**%	**7.3**%
Number of obs.	2,338	3,179	464	704

Bundesland of reemployment by *Reform* × *Post* (20 days)

Back

	Reform = 0		Reform = 1	
	Post = 0	Post = 1	Post = 0	Post = 1
Unknown	0.8%	0.6%	1.1%	0.3%
Burgenland	3.3%	4.6%	3.4%	4.8%
Kärnten	12.8%	14.9%	11.0%	15.1%
Niederösterreich	14.8%	17.4%	10.8%	16.3%
Oberösterreich	15.7%	15.7%	16.6%	18.6%
Salzburg	10.4%	7.1%	11.6%	7.8%
Steiermark	12.6%	16.7%	11.4%	15.9%
Tirol	15.6%	11.2%	17.2%	9.8%
Vorarlberg	2.4%	1.4%	3.2%	1.4%
Wien	11.7%	10.4%	13.6%	9.9%
Number of obs.	2,338	3,179	464	704

Overlaps across sample-years (20 days) Back

	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
2004	58	64	89	107	135	950
2003	74	82	118	151	1,033	
2002	82	112	147	1,092		
2001	110	134	1,168			
2000	136	1,228				
1999	1,214					

Summary statistics by *Reform* × *Post* (20 days) (1 obs. per individual)

Back

	Reform = 0		Reform = 1	
	Post = 0	Post = 1	Post = 0	Post = 1
Female	**.277**	**.39**	**.299**	**.398**
	(0.448)	(0.488)	(0.459)	(0.490)
	[0; 1]	[0; 1]	[0; 1]	[0; 1]
Age	**37.5**	**37.9**	**37.1**	**38.5**
	(8.465)	(8.580)	(8.494)	(8.340)
	[24; 56]	[25; 56]	[24; 56]	[25; 56]
Austrian (Y-2)	**.638**	**.648**	**.568**	**.632**
	(0.481)	(0.478)	(0.496)	(0.483)
	[0; 1]	[0; 1]	[0; 1]	[0; 1]
Earnings (Y-2)	**16, 941**	**16, 734**	**16, 793**	**16, 442**
	(2, 720)	(2, 867)	(2, 645)	(2, 591)
	[10, 005; 21, 521]	[10, 032; 21, 523]	[9, 966; 19, 980]	[10, 073; 19, 987]
Earnings (reemployment)	**20, 510**	**19, 936**	**19, 900**	**19, 857**
	(6, 644)	(6, 732)	(6, 923)	(6, 501)
	[4, 549; 53, 940]	[4, 549; 53, 940]	[4, 640; 45, 649]	[4, 755; 44, 400]
White-collar job	**.0886**	**.141**	**.0997**	**.121**
	(0.284)	(0.348)	(0.300)	(0.327)
	[0; 1]	[0; 1]	[0; 1]	[0; 1]
Emp. days in 18m before UIB spell	**385**	**416**	**387**	**415**
	(110.285)	(110.569)	(115.669)	(105.552)
	[0; 549]	[0; 549]	[0; 550]	[64; 550]
Time to entry	**97.5**	**97**	**97.7**	**97**
	(115.283)	(105.450)	(120.626)	(104.335)
	[1; 945]	[1; 1150]	[1; 741]	[1; 730]
Number of obs.	1,805	2,268	331	487

Summary statistics by sample-year (20 days) (1 obs. per individual)

Back

Sample year	Y = 1999 (control)	Y = 2000 (control)	Y = 2001 (reform)	Y = 2002 (control)	Y = 2003 (control)	Y = 2004 (control)
Female	**.318**	**.352**	**.36**	**.366**	**.349**	**.323**
	(0.466)	(0.478)	(0.480)	(0.482)	(0.477)	(0.468)
	[0; 1]	[0; 1]	[0; 1]	[0; 1]	[0; 1]	[0; 1]
Age	**37.4**	**37.1**	**38**	**37.8**	**38.7**	**37.8**
	(8.423)	(8.313)	(8.373)	(8.711)	(8.469)	(8.657)
	[24; 56]	[24; 56]	[24; 56]	[24; 56]	[24; 56]	[24; 56]
Austrian (Y-2)	**.626**	**.635**	**.59**	**.644**	**.636**	**.698**
	(0.484)	(0.482)	(0.492)	(0.479)	(0.482)	(0.459)
	[0; 1]	[0; 1]	[0; 1]	[0; 1]	[0; 1]	[0; 1]
Earnings (Y-2)	**16, 417**	**16, 163**	**16, 614**	**16, 729**	**17, 427**	**17, 736**
	(2, 368)	(2, 641)	(2, 633)	(2, 714)	(2, 953)	(3, 162)
	[10, 294; 19, 382]	[10, 005; 19, 618]	[9, 993; 19, 980]	[10, 192; 20, 355]	[10, 148; 21, 010]	[10, 187; 21, 523]
Earnings (reemployment)	**19, 485**	**19, 802**	**19, 801**	**20, 419**	**20, 781**	**21, 046**
	(6, 160)	(6, 562)	(6, 611)	(7, 156)	(6, 666)	(7, 106)
	[4, 549; 49, 700]	[4, 640; 48, 300]	[4, 640; 45, 649]	[4, 841; 47, 897]	[4, 966; 53, 940]	[5, 076; 52, 635]
White-collar job	**.0989**	**.108**	**.111**	**.119**	**.122**	**.134**
	(0.299)	(0.310)	(0.314)	(0.325)	(0.328)	(0.341)
	[0; 1]	[0; 1]	[0; 1]	[0; 1]	[0; 1]	[0; 1]
Emp. days in 18m before UIB spell	**404**	**402**	**404**	**403**	**407**	**400**
	(109.406)	(108.755)	(108.852)	(114.238)	(108.305)	(113.188)
	[0; 549]	[0; 549]	[0; 550]	[0; 549]	[56; 549]	[0; 549]
Time to entry	**103**	**90.9**	**98.5**	**104**	**100**	**91.7**
	(118.159)	(98.958)	(112.482)	(129.791)	(106.086)	(106.296)
	[1; 1018]	[1; 694]	[1; 741]	[1; 1150]	[1; 835]	[1; 1008]
Number of obs.	940	920	814	745	736	702

Sector of reemployment by *Reform* × *Post* (20 days) (1 obs. per individual)

Back

	Reform = 0		Reform = 1	
	Post = 0	Post = 1	Post = 0	Post = 1
Accommodation and food service activities	**13.7**%	**21.0**%	**14.3**%	**18.0**%
Activities of extraterritorial organisations and bodies	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Activities of households as employers; undifferentiated goods - and services - producing activities of households for own use	0.1%	0.2%	0.6%	0.0%
Administrative and support service activities	**23.3**%	**15.8**%	**23.8**%	**16.6**%
Agriculture, forestry and fishing	4.9%	2.1%	2.1%	2.3%
Arts, entertainment and recreation	1.2%	1.2%	1.8%	0.8%
Construction	**19.4**%	**19.7**%	**21.0**%	**21.5**%
Education	2.6%	1.3%	2.4%	0.8%
Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply	0.1%	0.1%	0.0%	0.0%
Financial and insurance activities	0.1%	0.1%	0.0%	0.2%
Human health and social work activities	1.3%	1.0%	0.9%	1.6%
Information and communication	0.6%	0.4%	0.6%	0.4%
Manufacturing	**8.5**%	**9.9**%	**5.8**%	**10.2**%
Mining and quarrying	0.3%	0.4%	0.0%	0.4%
Other services activities	1.1%	1.1%	0.3%	1.4%
Professional, scientific and technical activities	1.3%	1.4%	1.5%	1.6%
Public administration and defence; compulsory social security	4.7%	**5.0**%	4.9%	3.9%
Real estate activities	0.6%	0.7%	0.3%	0.6%
Transporting and storage	**11.5**%	**9.3**%	**12.8**%	**10.5**%
Water supply; sewerage; waste managment and remediation activities	0.3%	0.4%	0.6%	0.6%
Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles	4.5%	**8.8**%	**6.1**%	**8.4**%
Number of obs.	1,831	2,274	334	495

Bundesland of reemployment by *Reform* × *Post* (20 days) (1 obs. per individual)

Back

	Reform = 0		Reform = 1	
	Post = 0	Post = 1	Post = 0	Post = 1
Unknown	1.0%	0.7%	0.6%	0.4%
Burgenland	3.0%	4.5%	3.6%	3.8%
Kärnten	12.3%	13.1%	10.9%	12.8%
Niederösterreich	15.7%	18.2%	12.7%	17.0%
Oberösterreich	16.8%	15.8%	19.5%	18.7%
Salzburg	9.6%	7.5%	10.4%	8.2%
Steiermark	12.6%	16.2%	12.1%	14.1%
Tirol	13.9%	10.4%	13.6%	10.5%
Vorarlberg	2.3%	1.5%	3.3%	1.7%
Wien	12.8%	12.1%	13.3%	12.8%
Number of obs.	1,788	2,294	338	476

Summary statistics by *Reform* × *Post* (40 days)

Back

	Reform = 0		Reform = 1	
	Post = 0	Post = 1	Post = 0	Post = 1
Female	**.441**	**.468**	**.487**	**.483**
	(0.496)	(0.499)	(0.500)	(0.500)
	[0; 1]	[0; 1]	[0; 1]	[0; 1]
Age	**38.4**	**38.9**	**38.3**	**39.1**
	(8.437)	(8.445)	(8.658)	(8.183)
	[24; 56]	[25; 56]	[24; 56]	[25; 56]
Austrian (Y-2)	**.545**	**.629**	**.514**	**.624**
	(0.498)	(0.483)	(0.500)	(0.485)
	[0; 1]	[0; 1]	[0; 1]	[0; 1]
Earnings (Y-2)	**16, 948**	**16, 616**	**16, 715**	**16, 308**
	(2, 683)	(2, 836)	(2, 579)	(2, 676)
	[10, 005; 21, 533]	[10, 014; 21, 523]	[9, 965; 19, 991]	[9, 975; 19, 991]
Earnings (reemployment)	**19, 262**	**19, 131**	**18, 807**	**18, 963**
	(5, 620)	(6, 213)	(5, 610)	(6, 069)
	[4, 549; 53, 940]	[4, 549; 55, 385]	[4, 640; 52, 496]	[4, 755; 47, 880]
White-collar job	**.107**	**.16**	**.129**	**.159**
	(0.309)	(0.367)	(0.336)	(0.365)
	[0; 1]	[0; 1]	[0; 1]	[0; 1]
Emp. days in 18m before UIB spell	**390**	**419**	**389**	**416**
	(103.294)	(102.278)	(104.658)	(102.288)
	[0; 549]	[0; 549]	[0; 550]	[0; 550]
Time to entry	**83.6**	**93.3**	**85.1**	**90.7**
	(107.120)	(97.456)	(107.776)	(89.199)
	[1; 1885]	[1; 1150]	[1; 1058]	[1; 759]
Number of obs.	6,680	5,293	1,344	1,198

Summary statistics by sample-year (40 days)

Back

Sample year	Y = 1999 (control)	Y = 2000 (control)	Y = 2001 (reform)	Y = 2002 (control)	Y = 2003 (control)	Y = 2004 (control)
Female	**.442**	**.457**	**.485**	**.471**	**.443**	**.451**
	(0.497)	(0.498)	(0.500)	(0.499)	(0.497)	(0.498)
	[0; 1]	[0; 1]	[0; 1]	[0; 1]	[0; 1]	[0; 1]
Age	**37.8**	**38.2**	**38.7**	**39**	**39.2**	**39.3**
	(8.380)	(8.332)	(8.448)	(8.450)	(8.420)	(8.567)
	[24; 56]	[24; 56]	[24; 56]	[24; 56]	[24; 56]	[24; 56]
Austrian (Y-2)	**.555**	**.556**	**.566**	**.578**	**.601**	**.637**
	(0.497)	(0.497)	(0.496)	(0.494)	(0.490)	(0.481)
	[0; 1]	[0; 1]	[0; 1]	[0; 1]	[0; 1]	[0; 1]
Earnings (Y-2)	**16, 265**	**16, 279**	**16, 523**	**16, 830**	**17, 280**	**17, 665**
	(2, 381)	(2, 552)	(2, 632)	(2, 649)	(2, 938)	(3, 074)
	[10, 288; 19, 382]	[10, 005; 19, 618]	[9, 965; 19, 991]	[10, 192; 20, 355]	[10, 147; 21, 010]	[10, 187; 21, 533]
Earnings (reemployment)	**18, 499**	**18, 791**	**18, 880**	**19, 400**	**19, 719**	**19, 924**
	(5, 270)	(5, 615)	(5, 831)	(6, 194)	(6, 069)	(6, 323)
	[4, 549; 49, 700]	[4, 549; 50, 600]	[4, 640; 52, 496]	[4, 755; 52, 496]	[4, 841; 53, 940]	[4, 966; 55, 385]
White-collar job	**.118**	**.12**	**.143**	**.141**	**.133**	**.146**
	(0.323)	(0.325)	(0.350)	(0.348)	(0.339)	(0.354)
	[0; 1]	[0; 1]	[0; 1]	[0; 1]	[0; 1]	[0; 1]
Emp. days in 18m before UIB spell	**401**	**402**	**402**	**403**	**405**	**405**
	(104.652)	(103.546)	(104.409)	(103.269)	(103.040)	(104.753)
	[0; 549]	[0; 549]	[0; 550]	[0; 549]	[0; 549]	[0; 549]
Time to entry	**91.3**	**84.4**	**87.7**	**90.7**	**88.2**	**84.4**
	(104.978)	(93.773)	(99.476)	(109.232)	(105.931)	(101.707)
	[1; 1018]	[1; 903]	[1; 1058]	[1; 1157]	[1; 1521]	[1; 1885]
Number of obs.	2,757	2,682	2,542	2,327	2,131	2,076

Sector of reemployment by *Reform* × *Post* (40 days)

Back

	Reform = 0		Reform = 1	
	Post = 0	Post = 1	Post = 0	Post = 1
Accommodation and food service activities	**38.9**%	**26.4**%	**39.5**%	**24.7**%
Activities of extraterritorial organisations and bodies	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Activities of households as employers; undifferentiated goods - and services - producing activities of households for own use	0.0%	0.3%	0.2%	0.0%
Administrative and support service activities	**14.2**%	**13.5**%	**14.0**%	**14.2**%
Agriculture, forestry and fishing	3.5%	2.5%	2.0%	3.2%
Arts, entertainment and recreation	1.0%	1.2%	1.3%	1.3%
Construction	**9.8**%	**16.1**%	**9.2**%	**17.6**%
Education	4.0%	1.2%	4.3%	1.2%
Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply	0.0%	0.1%	0.0%	0.0%
Financial and insurance activities	0.2%	0.2%	0.0%	0.3%
Human health and social work activities	0.9%	0.8%	0.8%	1.1%
Information and communication	0.3%	0.5%	0.3%	0.3%
Manufacturing	**5.0**%	**9.5**%	**5.0**%	**9.4**%
Mining and quarrying	0.1%	0.3%	0.0%	0.3%
Other services activities	1.2%	1.4%	1.1%	1.7%
Professional, scientific and technical activities	0.9%	1.4%	0.4%	1.6%
Public administration and defence; compulsory social security	3.8%	4.8%	3.6%	4.1%
Real estate activities	0.4%	0.6%	0.3%	0.4%
Transporting and storage	**10.9**%	**9.8**%	**12.2**%	**9.9**%
Water supply; sewerage; waste managment and remediation activities	0.2%	0.4%	0.3%	0.3%
Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles	4.6%	**9.1**%	**5.5**%	**8.5**%
Number of obs.	6,680	5,293	1,344	1,198

Bundesland of reemployment by *Reform* × *Post* (40 days)

Back

	Reform = 0		Reform = 1	
	Post = 0	Post = 1	Post = 0	Post = 1
Unknown	0.7%	0.6%	0.5%	0.3%
Burgenland	1.9%	4.1%	1.9%	4.5%
Kärnten	10.5%	14.5%	10.2%	13.8%
Niederösterreich	9.8%	16.9%	8.3%	17.3%
Oberösterreich	12.0%	16.4%	12.8%	18.4%
Salzburg	14.7%	7.3%	14.4%	7.3%
Steiermark	9.7%	16.5%	9.6%	16.3%
Tirol	27.5%	10.5%	26.6%	9.5%
Vorarlberg	4.0%	1.4%	5.7%	1.3%
Wien	9.3%	11.8%	10.0%	11.4%
Number of obs.	6,680	5,293	1,344	1,198

Overlaps across sample-years (40 days) Back

	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
2004	142	166	247	310	379	2,076
2003	192	207	331	399	2,131	
2002	235	326	439	2,327		
2001	333	422	2,542			
2000	450	2,682				
1999	2,757					

Summary statistics by *Reform* × *Post* (40 days) (1 obs. per individual)

Back

	Reform = 0		Reform = 1	
	Post = 0	Post = 1	Post = 0	Post = 1
Female	**.386**	**.413**	**.441**	**.439**
	(0.487)	(0.493)	(0.497)	(0.497)
	[0; 1]	[0; 1]	[0; 1]	[0; 1]
Age	**37.6**	**38**	**37.9**	**38.6**
	(8.480)	(8.522)	(8.855)	(8.313)
	[24; 56]	[25; 56]	[24; 56]	[25; 56]
Austrian (Y-2)	**.579**	**.64**	**.548**	**.631**
	(0.494)	(0.480)	(0.498)	(0.483)
	[0; 1]	[0; 1]	[0; 1]	[0; 1]
Earnings (Y-2)	**16, 956**	**16, 688**	**16, 701**	**16, 284**
	(2, 731)	(2, 872)	(2, 645)	(2, 762)
	[10, 005; 21, 533]	[10, 014; 21, 523]	[9, 965; 19, 991]	[9, 975; 19, 991]
Earnings (reemployment)	**19, 792**	**19, 630**	**19, 264**	**19, 448**
	(6, 161)	(6, 753)	(6, 281)	(6, 672)
	[4, 549; 53, 940]	[4, 549; 53, 940]	[4, 640; 52, 496]	[4, 755; 47, 880]
White-collar job	**.104**	**.149**	**.121**	**.16**
	(0.305)	(0.356)	(0.327)	(0.367)
	[0; 1]	[0; 1]	[0; 1]	[0; 1]
Emp. days in 18m before UIB spell	**387**	**417**	**384**	**413**
	(108.101)	(107.792)	(109.898)	(107.702)
	[0; 549]	[0; 549]	[0; 550]	[0; 550]
Time to entry	**92**	**97.8**	**98**	**96.6**
	(110.494)	(108.284)	(123.524)	(101.510)
	[1; 965]	[1; 1150]	[1; 1058]	[1; 759]
Number of obs.	4,575	3,815	850	830

Summary statistics by sample-year (40 days) (1 obs. per individual)

Back

Sample year	Y = 1999 (control)	Y = 2000 (control)	Y = 2001 (reform)	Y = 2002 (control)	Y = 2003 (control)	Y = 2004 (control)
Female	**.395**	**.403**	**.422**	**.412**	**.387**	**.395**
	(0.489)	(0.491)	(0.494)	(0.492)	(0.487)	(0.489)
	[0; 1]	[0; 1]	[0; 1]	[0; 1]	[0; 1]	[0; 1]
Age	**37.4**	**37.7**	**38.1**	**38**	**38.2**	**38.2**
	(8.455)	(8.379)	(8.536)	(8.568)	(8.518)	(8.653)
	[24; 56]	[24; 56]	[24; 56]	[24; 56]	[24; 56]	[24; 56]
Austrian (Y-2)	**.582**	**.585**	**.588**	**.607**	**.615**	**.666**
	(0.493)	(0.493)	(0.492)	(0.489)	(0.487)	(0.472)
	[0; 1]	[0; 1]	[0; 1]	[0; 1]	[0; 1]	[0; 1]
Earnings (Y-2)	**16, 428**	**16, 323**	**16, 488**	**16, 829**	**17, 335**	**17, 659**
	(2, 368)	(2, 597)	(2, 693)	(2, 730)	(3, 004)	(3, 133)
	[10, 288; 19, 382]	[10, 005; 19, 618]	[9, 965; 19, 989]	[10, 192; 20, 355]	[10, 147; 21, 010]	[10, 187; 21, 533]
Earnings (reemployment)	**19, 050**	**19, 406**	**19, 462**	**19, 909**	**20, 238**	**20, 290**
	(5, 712)	(6, 171)	(6, 429)	(6, 975)	(6, 613)	(6, 793)
	[4, 549; 49, 700]	[4, 549; 50, 600]	[4, 640; 52, 496]	[4, 755; 52, 496]	[4, 841; 53, 940]	[4, 966; 55, 385]
White-collar job	**.112**	**.118**	**.137**	**.129**	**.123**	**.143**
	(0.315)	(0.323)	(0.344)	(0.335)	(0.329)	(0.350)
	[0; 1]	[0; 1]	[0; 1]	[0; 1]	[0; 1]	[0; 1]
Emp. days in 18m before UIB spell	**400**	**400**	**398**	**400**	**402**	**402**
	(108.501)	(109.680)	(110.784)	(110.020)	(107.254)	(110.357)
	[0; 549]	[0; 549]	[0; 550]	[0; 549]	[0; 549]	[0; 549]
Time to entry	**98.5**	**90.6**	**95.4**	**100**	**95**	**87.8**
	(114.156)	(100.842)	(109.543)	(120.053)	(113.218)	(100.430)
	[1; 1018]	[1; 903]	[1; 1058]	[1; 1150]	[1; 1521]	[1; 1008]
Number of obs.	2,074	1,881	1,667	1,518	1,438	1,466

Sector of reemployment by *Reform* × *Post* (40 days) (1 obs. per individual)

Back

	Reform = 0		Reform = 1	
	Post = 0	Post = 1	Post = 0	Post = 1
Accommodation and food service activities	**30.5**%	**21.5**%	**31.9**%	**18.4**%
Activities of extraterritorial organisations and bodies	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Activities of households as employers; undifferentiated goods - and services - producing activities of households for own use	0.0%	0.3%	0.2%	0.0%
Administrative and support service activities	**17.8**%	**15.9**%	**17.9**%	**16.9**%
Agriculture, forestry and fishing	3.1%	2.1%	1.5%	2.7%
Arts, entertainment and recreation	1.2%	1.0%	1.3%	1.3%
Construction	**12.7**%	**18.3**%	**13.0**%	**20.4**%
Education	3.2%	1.2%	2.8%	1.3%
Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply	0.0%	0.1%	0.0%	0.0%
Financial and insurance activities	0.2%	0.2%	0.0%	0.4%
Human health and social work activities	1.1%	1.0%	1.1%	1.5%
Information and communication	0.5%	0.4%	0.4%	0.4%
Manufacturing	**6.3**%	**9.9**%	**5.6**%	**10.2**%
Mining and quarrying	0.1%	0.4%	0.0%	0.2%
Other services activities	1.3%	1.2%	0.9%	1.8%
Professional, scientific and technical activities	1.0%	1.4%	0.6%	1.9%
Public administration and defence; compulsory social security	4.1%	**5.0**%	4.6%	3.8%
Real estate activities	0.4%	0.6%	0.1%	0.4%
Transporting and storage	**11.6**%	**9.5**%	**12.3**%	**9.2**%
Water supply; sewerage; waste managment and remediation activities	0.2%	0.5%	0.5%	0.5%
Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles	4.6%	**9.4**%	**5.6**%	**8.6**%
Number of obs.	4,563	3,835	872	835

Bundesland of reemployment by *Reform* × *Post* (40 days) (1 obs. per individual)

Back

	Reform = 0		Reform = 1	
	Post = 0	Post = 1	Post = 0	Post = 1
Unknown	0.6%	0.7%	0.7%	0.4%
Burgenland	2.1%	4.1%	2.4%	3.8%
Kärnten	10.3%	13.0%	9.8%	12.0%
Niederösterreich	11.4%	17.7%	9.5%	17.8%
Oberösterreich	14.2%	16.4%	16.2%	19.9%
Salzburg	12.7%	7.5%	12.6%	7.3%
Steiermark	10.5%	15.2%	10.9%	14.6%
Tirol	23.1%	10.4%	20.8%	8.8%
Vorarlberg	3.3%	1.7%	4.7%	1.9%
Wien	11.7%	13.3%	12.3%	13.4%
Number of obs.	4,561	3,799	864	833

Share of workers reemployed in a seasonal job

Back

based on the conservative criterion of Del Bono and Weber (2008)

Bandwidth	10 days	20 days	30 days	40 days	50 days
1999	23.2%	23.9%	23.1%	22.9%	21.6%
2000	22.4%	23%	23.7%	23.7%	22.5%
2001	27.2%	26.7%	25.6%	24.5%	23.2%
2002	26.7%	25.7%	25.2%	25.4%	23.6%
2003	27.7%	27.3%	26.6%	27%	23.8%
2004	26.7%	24.3%	23.5%	23.4%	22.1%

Distribution of the week of $T_{UI\ claim\ start}$

Back