Experimental measures of intra-household resource control

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Motivation

Measuring individual decision power within households is difficult

- ▶ Yet important theoretically in intra-household bargaining models, and

- ▶ Within the context of <u>women's empowerment</u>

What is women's empowerment?

- ▶ "the process by which those who have been denied the ability to make strategic life choices acquire such an ability" (Kabeer 1999)

    - ▶ involves three interrelated domains:
      (1) access to resources, (2) agency, (3) achievement

- ▶ UN millennium/sustainable development goal

- ▶ An outcome of interest in many policy programs, and a

- ▶ Mediator affecting the effectiveness of policy interventions and thus policy design

Motivation

Two approaches commonly used in the literature to study and empirically identify how much say someone has in the household:

1. Write and empirically estimate household models of behavior

    ▶ See e.g., Chiappori and Mazzocco (2017)
    ▶ Requires rich consumption data sets often available in developed countries

2. Use data from survey modules measuring different aspects of intra-household behavior

    ▶ E.g., access to resources, decision-making power over expenditure categories, individual agency, marital quality, domestic violence incidence

    ▶ Map onto the different domains of empowerment *(Kabeer 1999)*
      (1) access to resources, (2) agency, (3) achievement

Our paper

Investigates a third approach

▶ Whether two simple, incentivized/lab measures of preferences for resource allocation between spouses provide an alternative way to measure access to resources, decision-making power, and to proxy for women's empowerment

Measures:

1. Willingness to pay for intra-household resource control (Almas et al 2018)

   Also used by Barr et al. (2020), Riley (2020), Jayachandran et al. (2021)

2. Dictator game decisions (e.g. Schaner 2017)

Research questions:

1. Can the dictator game be used to measure preferences for intra-household resource control?
2. Do our experimental measures of intra-household resource control correlate with survey measures of women's empowerment?

Contribution

We are not the first to

▶ use lab experiments to study intra-household behavior

(E.g, Ashraf 2009, Schaner 2015, Abbink et al 2020, Conlon et al 2022. See Munro 2018 for a review)

▶ ask how experimental measures correlate with behavior outside of the lab

(E.g. Dohmen et al 2011, Vieider et al 2015, Falk et al 2016, Buser et al 2020)

We contribute to the literature by

▶ Conducting the same experiment in 2 countries
(large sample size, different context)

▶ Before any intervention has occurred

▶ Eliciting all measures from both spouses (within-subject design)

▶ **Conducting a systematic analysis of how the measures correlate with each other and with survey measures commonly used as proxies for empowerment**

Goal: Advance our understanding of whether and when experimental measures of preferences for intra-household resource control are useful

Experimental design

Task 1: Willingness to pay for resource control in the household

▶ *Decision 1:* "We would like to give your household $X. Who would you choose to receive this money, yourself or your spouse?"

▶ *Decision 2:* "What if instead we were offering to give your household $X if received by (spouse chosen in D1) or $1.5X if received by (spouse <u>not</u> chosen in D1). Would that change your decision?"

Inspired by Almas et al (2018), coarse measure of willingness to sacrifice household resources to control income

Experimental design

Task 2: Dictator game played by spouses

- *Decision 1:* Private division of a sum $Y of money between spouses
    - 50-50 split NOT a choice option

- *Decision 2:* Repeat the decision jointly with spouse

Appealing due to its simplicity, yet lacks ideal theoretical properties

Similar design used by Schaner (2017), Carlsson et al (2012, 2013), and others

Measures preference alignment and individual influence over the joint decision

Y=1.4X to make the choices distinct yet stakes at play similar across decisions

- 8 choice options

Implementation

Lottery conducted first, allows participants to hide income

- ▶ Pays (z_A, z_B) to spouses A, B where $z_i \in [0, \bar{Z}]$
- ▶ $\bar{Z}$ is the maximum someone can earn from a choice in the experiment
- ▶ Followed by Task 1 and 2 (WTP task and DG, in fixed order)

Either the lottery or a decision made by a spouse randomly selected to be paid

- ▶ Feedback about decisions not provided to participants
- ▶ Participants never find out what their spouse chose in private

Information about decisions presented immediately before subjects make a decision

- ▶ Participants know that they will make several decisions
- ▶ Not what each decision entails

Payment

- ▶ Done separately and in private
- ▶ No receipts provided and no feedback on the decision chosen to be paid

Stakes

- ▶ Expected household earnings approximately twice the daily wage participants could have earned for work in the study area

Study samples

Ghana

- ▶ 1,024 couples who reside in the Upper East Region of Ghana
- ▶ Rely on subsistence farming, live in a remote area
- ▶ Setting where spouses cultivate different plots of land and control the income generated by their plot (e.g. Udry 1996)
- ▶ Scheduled to participate in an RCT randomizing contracts for irrigated land and whether the contract was assigned to the husband or wife
- ▶ HHs signed up to participate in an RCT as a couple, could choose which wife to sign up in polygamous households

Uganda

- ▶ 2,363 couples who reside near Jinja, Uganda
- ▶ Scheduled to participate in an RCT designed to increase women's empowerment
- ▶ All are small-scale sugarcane contract farmers who held contracts with a large sugarcane buyer
- ▶ In polygamous households, the wife most involved in sugar production is included

Implementation differences

Ghana

- ▶ Experiment piloted and conducted first
- ▶ Separately from the baseline household survey
- ▶ Experimental sessions conducted in a central place in the village
- ▶ Spouses interviewed simultaneously by a team of 12 enumerators interviewing multiple couples at the same time

Uganda

- ▶ Interviews conducted at home by 1 enumerator, followed by the RCT hh survey
- ▶ Spouses interviewed sequentially, could choose who goes first
- ▶ Varied stakes (25% of the sample randomized into a high stakes environment)

Summary statistics

Household characteristics	Ghana	Uganda
Household size	9.13	8.70
Polygamous household	0.33	0.34
Years of marriage	21.7	19.5
Any food insecurity	0.57	0.66

Summary statistics

	Ghana		Uganda	
Individual characteristics	*Women*	*Men*	*Women*	*Men*
Age group				
Under 25	0.07	0.01	0.10	0.01
25 to 39	0.49	0.34	0.46	0.30
40 to 64	0.40	0.45	0.42	0.60
65 or older	0.04	0.19	0.02	0.09
Has no schooling	0.76	0.58	0.18	0.06
Did not complete primary school	0.92	0.81	0.56	0.40
Reports individual income	0.71	0.70	0.25	0.94
Personal savings (USD)	34	118	50	216

WTP for resource control, Task 1

(a) Ghana

(b) Uganda

Task 1 decisions ordered by underlying wtp variable.

30-60% of women have displayed a negative WTP in past studies
(Almas et al. 2018, Jayachandran et al. 2021, Barr et al. 2020)

Gender differences within households

$$y_{ih} = \beta wife_{ih} + \gamma_{ih} + \delta_h + \epsilon_h$$

WTP task: Ordered logit model

	Dependent variable is Category of willingness to pay for resource control	
Panel A: Ghana		
Wife	0.343***	0.240**
	(0.0807)	[0.113]
N observations	1,510	1,510
Panel B: Uganda		
Wife	0.220***	0.332***
	(0.0567)	[0.111]
N observations	3,012	3,012
Control variables	No	Yes

Note: Ordered logit model with household FE (Baetschmann et al. 2020).

SE clustered at the household level. ▸ OLS

Dictator game decisions: OLS

Dependent variable:	*Dictator game*			
	Share assigned to wife		Abs. distance to joint |J-I|	
Panel A: Ghana				
Wife	-0.0216***	-0.0218**	0.0799***	0.0799***
	(0.00828)	(0.0109)	(0.00684)	(0.00902)
R-squared	0.505	0.506	0.560	0.565
N observations	2,048	2,048	2,048	2,048
Mean husbands	0.565		0.0929	
Panel B: Uganda				
Wife	0.0704***	0.0512***	0.0759***	0.0719***
	(0.00783)	(0.0162)	(0.00598)	(0.0122)
R-squared	0.416	0.420	0.509	0.512
N observations	4,726	4,726	4,726	4,726
Mean husbands	0.444		0.145	
Control variables	No	Yes	No	Yes

SE clustered at the household level.

▸ histograms decisions   ▸ histograms distance   ▸ MHT

Correlation between experimental measures: Ordered logit

	Ghana				Uganda			
Dependent variable:	Category of willingness to pay for resource control							
Share to wife: wife (W)	2.412***	2.435***			1.686***	1.606***		
	(0.311)	(0.314)			(0.156)	(0.160)		
Share to wife: husband (H)		0.409				-0.157		
		(0.390)				(0.177)		
Share to wife: joint (J)		-0.431				0.566***		
		(0.460)				(0.210)		
Abs. difference: J-W			0.757*				0.404**	
			(0.398)				(0.183)	
Abs. difference: H-W				0.901**				0.251
				(0.373)				(0.155)
N observations	1,024	1,024	1,024	1,024	2,363	2,363	2,363	2,363

Note: The dependent variable includes wife decisions only. Regressors are DG variables.

▸ OLS ▸ MHT

Correlation with survey measures: WTP, Ghana

Survey variables:

- ▶ Standardized indices using all data collected on a given topic
- ▶ Kling et al (2007), Heath et al (2020)

Regressors: Standardized indices (ordered logit)

	Survey measure				
	Wife's access to resources index	Decision making index	Agreement index	Psychological violence incidence index	Physical violence incidence index
	Dependent variable: Willingness to pay for resource control				
Survey measure	0.010	0.009	-0.094**	0.073	-0.073
	(0.055)	(0.060)	(0.046)	(0.054)	(0.080)
N observations	1,024	1,024	1,024	1,024	1,024

▸ OLS wtp   ▸ OLS dg

Correlation with survey measures: WTP, Uganda

Regressors: Standardized indices (ordered logit)

	Survey measure				
	Wife's access to resources index	Decision making index	Agreement index	Marital quality index	Intimate partner violence incidence index
	Dependent variable: Willingness to pay for resource control				
Survey measure	-0.986***	-0.117***	-0.092**	-0.263***	0.513***
	(0.144)	(0.043)	(0.038)	(0.048)	(0.149)
N observations	2,363	2,363	2,363	2,363	2,363

▸ OLS wtp ▸ MHT

Correlation with survey measures: DG, Uganda

Dependent variable: standardized indices (OLS)

	Wife's access to resources index	Decision making index	Agreement index	Marital quality index	Intimate partner violence incidence index
DG: Model 1					
Share to wife: wife (W)	-0.086***	-0.330***	-0.140	-0.320***	0.144**
	(0.023)	(0.087)	(0.086)	(0.084)	(0.058)
Share to wife: husband (H)	0.023	0.209**	0.041	0.055	-0.040
	(0.025)	(0.095)	(0.094)	(0.091)	(0.066)
Share to wife: joint (J)	-0.009	0.046	0.071	0.038	0.007
	(0.031)	(0.109)	(0.117)	(0.114)	(0.080)
R-squared	0.039	0.031	0.015	0.067	0.025
N observations	2,363	2,363	2,363	2,363	2,363

▸ MHT

Correlation with measures: DG, Uganda

Dependent variable: standardized indices (OLS)

	Wife's access to resources index	Decision making index	Agreement index	Marital quality index	Intimate partner violence incidence index
DG: Model 2					
Abs. difference: J-W	-0.069**	-0.370***	-0.108	-0.180*	0.189***
	(0.027)	(0.103)	(0.102)	(0.099)	(0.069)
R-squared	0.036	0.027	0.014	0.064	0.025
DG: Model 3					
Abs. difference: H-W	-0.052**	-0.222***	-0.064	0.008	0.143**
	(0.022)	(0.083)	(0.083)	(0.080)	(0.057)
R-squared	0.037	0.024	0.014	0.066	0.026
N observations	2,363	2,363	2,363	2,363	2,363

▸ MHT

Model 3 results consistent with Serra-Garcia (2020), Schaner (2015)

Concordance

We can also use H and W choices choices to define household types and examine whether women's empowerment varies with household type

Dictator game

- ▶ 4 types
- ▶ Defined by how much each spouse keeps for themselves in the private DG
- ▶ 2 bins: keep less or more than 50% of the endowment

  (50-50 not an option)

Willingness to pay task

- ▶ 9 types
- ▶ Defined by the possible prices each spouse could pay for resource control
- ▶ Prices: negative, zero, positive

Household types: DG, Uganda

Dependent variables: Standardized indices (OLS)

	Category mean	Wife's access to resources index	Decision making index	Agreement index	Marital quality index	Intimate partner violence index
Dictator game						
1 *Omitted category: Both want more*	*0.337*					
2 Both want spouse to receive more	*0.169*	0.046***	0.277***	0.107*	0.268***	-0.080**
		(0.017)	(0.062)	(0.064)	(0.054)	(0.040)
3 Both want W to receive more	*0.148*	0.007	0.151**	0.035	0.047	-0.014
		(0.018)	(0.059)	(0.063)	(0.066)	(0.047)
4 Both want H to receive more	*0.346*	0.052***	0.236***	0.109**	0.177***	-0.105***
		(0.014)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.034)
R-squared		0.044	0.037	0.020	0.076	0.033
N observations		2,363	2,363	2,363	2,363	2,363

▸ MHT

Household types: WTP task, Uganda

Dependent variables: Standardized indices (OLS)

	Category mean	Wife's access to resources index	Decision making index	Agreement index	Marital quality index	Intimate partner violence index
Willingness to pay task						
1 *Omitted cat.: Both max. hh income*	*0.218*					
2 Both pay not to control resources	*0.174*	0.077***	0.415***	0.113*	0.125*	-0.132***
		(0.018)	(0.067)	(0.067)	(0.064)	(0.040)
3 Both pay to control resources	*0.074*	-0.047*	0.198**	0.046	-0.171*	0.041
		(0.026)	(0.093)	(0.085)	(0.089)	(0.075)
4 Both pay for W to control	*0.102*	-0.037*	0.281***	-0.036	-0.322***	-0.020
		(0.022)	(0.077)	(0.081)	(0.086)	(0.054)
5 Both pay for H to control	*0.067*	0.074***	0.369***	0.159*	-0.104	-0.060
		(0.024)	(0.109)	(0.086)	(0.103)	(0.061)
6 H pays for W to control, W efficient	*0.130*	0.035*	0.096	-0.077	0.169***	0.004
		(0.019)	(0.064)	(0.071)	(0.061)	(0.049)
7 H pays for H to control, W efficient	*0.066*	0.031	-0.036	-0.143	0.025	0.046
		(0.025)	(0.086)	(0.096)	(0.084)	(0.065)
8 W pays for W to control, H efficient	*0.061*	-0.073**	-0.053	-0.109	-0.304***	0.091
		(0.030)	(0.089)	(0.095)	(0.096)	(0.070)
9 W pays for H to control, H efficient	*0.108*	0.046**	0.010	-0.040	0.185***	0.017
		(0.021)	(0.069)	(0.078)	(0.064)	(0.053)
N observations		2,363	2,363	2,363	2,363	2,363

▸ MHT

Summary

We study the correlation between WTP for resource control and DG choices

▶ Find robust correlations in both samples

▶ **Validate DG choices as measures of resource control in the household**

Study how predictive these measures are of behavior outside of the experiment

▶ Find no systematic correlation between behavior at home and in the lab in the Ghana sample (full sample of observations)

▶ Document strong correlations in Uganda

  Behavior in the lab experiment mirrors behavior at home in this sample

▶ Direction of correlations suggests

  ▶ women who want to control income are less empowered

  ▶ **those who pay not to control resources are <u>more</u> empowered**

    contradicts previous conjectures made in the literature

    (Almas et al. 2018, Jayachandran et al. 2021, Barr et al. 2020)

Thank you!

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Discussion

Implementation and sample size differences may help explain the different results

However, our results also suggest that contextual differences are important

- Experimental measures may better capture household behavior in settings where

    - literacy levels are not very low
    - individuals use money in important aspects of their everyday lives
    - looking at a subset of households in Ghana that look like those in Uganda supports these conjectures

Other insights

- When trade-offs are necessary, incentivized choices elicited from wives only can provide useful proxies

    - Little additional explanatory power provided by other choices

- Negative WTP for resource control is not just noise or reflects disempowerment

OLS

Dependent variable:	*Willingness to pay task*			
	Pays to control resources		Pays not to control resources	
Panel A: Ghana				
Wife	0.0605***	0.0492**	-0.115***	-0.0946***
	(0.0164)	(0.0217)	(0.0187)	(0.0253)
R-squared	0.515	0.518	0.530	0.537
N observations	2,048	2,048	2,048	2,048
Mean husbands	0.14		0.312	
Panel B: Uganda				
Wife	0.0288**	0.0461**	-0.0563***	-0.0936***
	(0.0112)	(0.0215)	(0.0131)	(0.0264)
R-squared	0.573	0.576	0.570	0.572
N observations	4,726	4,726	4,726	4,726
Mean husbands	0.207		0.406	
Control variables	No	Yes	No	Yes

▶ resume

MHT corrections: OLS

| | WTP for resource control | | Dictator game | |
	Pays to control	Pays not to control	Share to wife	Abs. distance |J-I|
Panel A: Ghana				
Wife				
Initial p-value	0.024	0.000	0.045	0.000
FWER adjusted p-value	0.037	0.000	0.053	0.038
Panel B: Uganda				
Wife				
Initial p-value	0.032	0.000	0.002	0.000
FWER adjusted p-value	0.033	0.000	0.001	0.233
Control variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: FWER adjusted p-values are corrected for the family wise error rate using the method detailed in List et al. (2019) and Barsbai et al. (2020) with 10,000 repetitions.

▸ resume

# Dictator game decisions, Task 2

(a) Ghana

resume

Dictator game decisions, Task 2

(b) Uganda

Dictator game decisions, Task 2

(a) Ghana

Relative Frequency vs Difference in share assigned to wife

Legend: J-H, J-W, H-W

resume

Dictator game decisions, Task 2

(b) Uganda

Relative Frequency — Difference in share assigned to wife

Legend: J-H, J-W, H-W

▸ resume

Correlation between experimental measures (OLS)

	Ghana				Uganda			
Dependent variable:	Wife pays to control resources							
Share to wife: wife (W)	0.443***	0.445***			0.242***	0.231***		
	(0.063)	(0.064)			(0.033)	(0.035)		
Share to wife: husband (H)		0.063				-0.002		
		(0.079)				(0.041)		
Share to wife: joint (J)		-0.041				0.100**		
		(0.089)				(0.047)		
Abs. difference: J-W			0.192**				0.054	
			(0.085)				(0.042)	
Abs. difference: H-W				0.176**				0.055
				(0.081)				(0.035)
R-squared	0.073	0.073	0.048	0.045	0.044	0.046	0.026	0.030
N observations	1,024	1,024	1,024	1,024	2,363	2,363	2,363	2,363

▸ resume

Correlation between experimental measures (OLS)

	Ghana				Uganda			
Dependent variable:	Wife pays not to control resources							
Share to wife: wife (W)	-0.418***	-0.424***			-0.405***	-0.400***		
	(0.066)	(0.065)			(0.038)	(0.040)		
Share to wife: husband (H)		-0.112				-0.010		
		(0.081)				(0.045)		
Share to wife: joint (J)		0.131				-0.072		
		(0.095)				(0.054)		
Abs. difference: J-W			-0.019				-0.107**	
			(0.076)				(0.048)	
Abs. difference: H-W				-0.030				-0.023
				(0.074)				(0.040)
R-squared	0.058	0.060	0.029	0.027	0.064	0.065	0.034	0.039
Number of observations	1,024	1,024	1,024	1,024	2,363	2,363	2,363	2,363

▶ resume

Correlation between experimental measures (OLS)

Dependent variable:	Ghana				Uganda			
				Wife pays to control resources				
Shareto wife: W								
Initial p-value	0.000	0.000			0.000	0.000		
FWER adjusted p-value	0.000	0.000			0.000	0.000		
Share to wife: H								
Initial p-value		0.422				0.960		
FWER adjusted p-value		0.868				0.961		
Share to wife: J								
Initial p-value		0.646				0.034		
FWER adjusted p-value		0.944				0.201		
Abs. distance: J-W								
Initial p-value			0.025				0.198	
FWER adjusted p-value			0.165				0.581	
Abs. distance: H-W								
Initial p-value				0.031				0.117
FWER adjusted p-value				0.196				0.477

Note: FWER adjusted p-values are corrected for the family wise error rate using the method detailed in List et al. (2019) and Barsbai et al. (2020) with 10,000 repetitions.

resume

Correlation WTP and survey measures, Ghana

Dependent variables: Standardized indices (OLS)

	Wife's access to resources index	Decision making index	Agreement index	Psychological violence incidence index	Physical violence incidence index
Pays to control resources	0.086	0.120	-0.046	-0.019	-0.024
	(0.080)	(0.083)	(0.075)	(0.081)	(0.094)
Pays not to control resources	0.062	0.102	0.072	-0.131*	0.080
	(0.079)	(0.084)	(0.072)	(0.078)	(0.106)
R-squared	0.036	0.015	0.016	0.031	0.022
N observations	1,024	1,024	1,024	1,024	1,024

▶ resume

Correlation DG and survey measures, Ghana

Dependent variables: Standardized indices (OLS)

	Wife's access to resources index	Decision making index	Agreement index	Psychological violence incidence index	Physical violence incidence index
DG: Model 1					
Share to wife: wife (W)	0.155	-0.176	-0.032	0.554***	0.007
	(0.160)	(0.178)	(0.188)	(0.178)	(0.121)
Share to wife: husband (H)	0.089	0.215	0.296	0.035	-0.137
	(0.193)	(0.199)	(0.269)	(0.199)	(0.142)
Share to wife: joint (J)	0.084	0.061	-0.200	-0.481*	0.126
	(0.220)	(0.218)	(0.333)	(0.254)	(0.266)
R-squared	0.036	0.015	0.017	0.044	0.021
N observations	1,024	1,024	1,024	1,024	1,024

▸ resume wtp GH   ▸ resume DG UG

Correlation DG and survey measures, Ghana

Dependent variables: Standardized indices (OLS)

	Wife's access to resources index	Decision making index	Agreement index	Psychological violence incidence index	Physical violence incidence index
DG: Model 2					
Abs. difference: J-W	-0.013	0.008	-0.135	0.359	-0.022
	(0.188)	(0.191)	(0.232)	(0.225)	(0.122)
R-squared	0.035	0.015	0.015	0.037	0.020
DG: Model 3					
Abs. difference: H-W	0.036	-0.019	0.153	0.038	-0.191
	(0.191)	(0.192)	(0.160)	(0.186)	(0.163)
R-squared	0.035	0.012	0.015	0.030	0.021
N observations	1,024	1,024	1,024	1,024	1,024

▶ resume

Correlation WTP and survey measures, Uganda

Dependent variables: Standardized indices (OLS)

	Wife's access to resources index	Decision making index	Agreement index	Marital quality index	Intimate partner violence incidence index
Pays to control resources	-0.064***	0.137***	0.021	-0.314***	0.018
	(0.015)	(0.053)	(0.054)	(0.055)	(0.039)
Pays not to control resources	0.051***	0.247***	0.121**	0.046	-0.083***
	(0.012)	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.045)	(0.031)
R-squared	0.056	0.031	0.016	0.080	0.026
N observations	2,363	2,363	2,363	2,363	2,363

▶ resume

Correlation WTP and survey measures, Uganda

Dependent variables: Standardized indices (OLS)

	Wife's access to resources index	Decision making index	Agreement index	Marital quality index	Intimate partner violence incidence index
Pays to control resources					
Initial p-value	0.000	0.009	0.694	0.000	0.653
FWER adjusted p-value	0.000	0.044	0.697	0.000	0.881
Pays not to control resources					
Initial p-value	0.000	0.000	0.011	0.309	0.006
FWER adjusted p-value	0.000	0.000	0.050	0.659	0.032

Note: FWER adjusted p-values are corrected for the family wise error rate using the method detailed in List et al. (2019) and Barsbai et al. (2020) with 10,000 repetitions.

▶ resume

Correlation DG and survey measures, Uganda

Dependent variables: Standardized indices (OLS)

	Wife's access to resources index	Decision making index	Agreement index	Marital quality index	Intimate partner violence incidence index
DG: Model 1					
Share to wife: W					
Initial p-value	0.000	0.000	0.102	0.000	0.013
FWER adjusted p-value	0.001	0.002	0.653	0.000	0.131
Share to wife: H					
Initial p-value	0.352	0.029	0.660	0.548	0.540
FWER adjusted p-value	0.972	0.277	0.996	0.990	0.996
Share to wife: J					
Initial p-value	0.773	0.675	0.541	0.740	0.932
FWER adjusted p-value	0.949	0.990	0.998	0.983	0.932

Note: FWER adjusted p-values are corrected for the family wise error rate using the method detailed in List et al. (2019) and Barsbai et al. (2020) with 10,000 repetitions.

▶ resume

Correlation DG and survey measures, Uganda

Dependent variables: Standardized indices (OLS)

	Wife's access to resources index	Decision making index	Agreement index	Marital quality index	Intimate partner violence incidence index
DG: Model 2					
Abs. distance: J-W					
Initial p-value	0.010	0.000	0.287	0.070	0.006
FWER adjusted p-value	0.031	0.002	0.290	0.145	0.030
DG: Model 3					
Abs. distance: H-W					
Initial p-value	0.021	0.007	0.440	0.920	0.013
FWER adjusted p-value	0.068	0.033	0.681	0.922	0.048

Note: FWER adjusted p-values are corrected for the family wise error rate using the method detailed in List et al. (2019) and Barsbai et al. (2020) with 10,000 repetitions.

▶ resume

Household types: DG, Uganda

Dependent variables: Standardized indices (OLS)

	Wife's access to resources index	Decision making index	Agreement index	Marital quality index	Intimate partner violence incidence index
Dictator game					
1 *Omitted category: Both want more*					
2 Both want spouse to receive more					
Initial p-value	0.007	0.000	0.069	0.000	0.029
FWER adjusted p-value	0.062	0.000	0.297	0.000	0.164
3 Both want H to receive more					
Initial p-value	0.000	0.000	0.033	0.000	0.003
FWER adjusted p-value	0.000	0.000	0.175	0.001	0.014
4 Both want W to receive more					
Initial p-value	0.718	0.013	0.546	0.542	0.679
FWER adjusted p-value	0.716	0.082	0.953	0.906	0.900

Note: FWER adjusted p-values are corrected for the family wise error rate using the method detailed in List et al. (2019) and Barsbai et al. (2020) with 10,000 repetitions.

▶ resume

Household types: WTP, Uganda

Dependent variables: Standardized indices (OLS)

	Wife's access to resources index	Decision making index	Agreement index	Marital quality index	Intimate partner violence incidence index
Willingness to pay task					
1 *Omitted cat.: Agree to max. hh income*					
2 Both pay not to control resources					
Initial p-value	0.000	0.000	0.087	0.030	0.001
FWER adjusted p-value	0.000	0.000	0.846	0.650	0.034
3 Both pay to control resources					
Initial p-value	0.080	0.048	0.614	0.070	0.598
FWER adjusted p-value	0.819	0.688	1.000	0.800	1.000
4 Both pay for W to control					
Initial p-value	0.118	0.000	0.740	0.000	0.615
FWER adjusted p-value	0.870	0.000	0.998	0.025	0.999
5 Both pay for H to control					
Initial p-value	0.001	0.001	0.079	0.424	0.380
FWER adjusted p-value	0.057	0.039	0.802	0.996	0.993
6 H pays for W to control, W efficient					
Initial p-value	0.026	0.156	0.228	0.006	0.977
FWER adjusted p-value	0.740	0.962	0.988	0.169	0.995
7 H pays for H to control, W efficient					
Initial p-value	0.276	0.737	0.106	0.828	0.366
FWER adjusted p-value	0.985	0.999	0.867	0.997	0.998
8 W pays for W to control, H efficient					
Initial p-value	0.027	0.714	0.290	0.003	0.195
FWER adjusted p-value	0.426	1.000	0.990	0.113	0.975
9 W pays for H to control, H efficient					
Initial p-value	0.023	0.882	0.551	0.006	0.890
FWER adjusted p-value	0.606	0.971	1.000	0.207	0.998

Note: FWER adjusted p-values are corrected for the family wise error rate using the method detailed in List et al. (2019) and Barsbai et al. (2020) with 10,000 repetitions.

▶ resume