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Increasing Cross-Border Ownership of Real Estate: Evidence from Norway

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Foreign investment in real estate markets has been met with great interest

Balearic Islands seek to ban non-residents from buying property

Officials point to similar policy in Canada and ask Madrid to lobby EU as high prices push out local people

Stephen Burgen in
Barcelona

Mon 16 Jan 2023 13:52 GMT



At €6,091 a square metre, property in Deia, western Mallorca, is the second most expensive in Spain. Photograph: Greg Balfour Evans/Alamy

Research has started to quantify the extent of cross-border investments in real estate



- ▶ Morel and Uri '21:
 - ▶ Find that foreign residents own French residential real estate worth USD 140 billion at end of 2019.
- ▶ Bomare and Le Guern Herry '22:
 - ▶ Find that foreign corporations directly held real estate worth USD 143 billions in the UK in 2018 (and even more owned directly by foreign individuals).
 - ▶ At least 1.25 percent of investments in UK real estate was in reaction to the CRS during the period 2013-2016.
- ▶ Alstadsæter et al. '22:
 - ▶ The offshore share is 27 percent of the real estate market in Dubai in 2020. Amounts to USD 136 billion.
 - ▶ Offshore real estate is at least USD 2 trillion globally.



This project looks at how demand for cross-border investments in real estate affect **the host countries.**

Cross-border ownership of real estate is problematic for several reasons



- ▶ Influx of foreign capital in residential real estate markets may **increase prices** (Johannesen et al. '22).
- ▶ Facilitates corruption and tax evasion, by enabling **money laundering** (FATF '22).
- ▶ Unknown owners may wield **influence** over important infrastructure, development of cities etc.
- ▶ FATCA and CRS do not cover real estate ownership, which undermine **transparency and tax compliance**.

Ukraine war has highlighted the importance of knowing ultimate ownership of real estate



- ▶ Oligarchs are central to the war machinery, but sanctions enforcement has been paralysed by hidden ownership.
- ▶ [Collin et al. '23](#): Investment from offshore companies fell dramatically in the UK after the introduction of UBO registry.
- ▶ Properties are very sanction resilient compared to other assets.
- ▶ Alisher Usmanov was sanctioned in February 2022, his Bavarian properties were raided in September.
- ▶ Germany introduced UBO reporting for real estate in December 2022.

We answer some key questions about offshore real estate in a host country



- ▶ **How large it is:** We estimate the offshore ownership of Norwegian real estate – the first comprehensive overview in Western country.
- ▶ **How it develops over time:** Wealth tax records and comprehensive shareholder registry let us map it over time.
- ▶ **The role of tax havens:** The shareholder registry let us follow the actual owners, at least to the border.
- ▶ **Geographical patterns:** I will also show a preliminary graph using new data.



What we find

- ▶ **How large it is:** 2 percent of Norwegian real estate – 10 percent when we only look at corporate-owned real estate
- ▶ **How it develops over time:** From 7 percent in 2011 to 10 percent in 2017
- ▶ **The role of tax havens:** Sizeable share from tax havens - from 31 to 38 percent between 2011 and 2017
- ▶ **Geographical patterns:** Interesting variations across Norwegian municipalities.



Data preparations

We retrieve property values from tax records



- ▶ The nominal owners (individual or corporation) report the property in their tax records.
- ▶ The property values are produced in order to calculate the wealth tax burden. They are estimated using a common model.
 - ▶ Residential properties: Hedonic model
 - ▶ Commercial properties: $MV_{p,t} = \frac{R_{p,t}}{i_t}(1 - \sigma)$
where $R_{p,t}$ is the (imputed) rental value, σ a fixed discount for depreciation, and i_t a time-varying discount rate.
- ▶ Exemption: We use the financial accounts of listed firms, as they are not reporting property values for the purpose of the wealth tax.



We trust them because...

- ▶ Norwegian tax system is based on widespread third-party reporting and detailed central registries.
- ▶ The property market is well regulated and central registers strive to record all owners of properties as well as transfers of ownership.
- ▶ The tax administration makes use of this information and keep their own registry of Norwegian real estate and the legal owners.
- ▶ Wealth tax.

Registry data give us the residence country of the immediate owners



Nominal owner: Corporation

- ▶ We construct ownership chains from the Norwegian shareholder registry, which gives us the full ownership chain within Norway for all shares in the corporation.
- ▶ Thus ends up with either a Norwegian individual or a foreign individual or corporation as owner of each share.
- ▶ We know the residence country of the foreign owners, but not much else (like person/company and ownership).


Nominal owner: Individual

- ▶ Combine residence information from the Shareholder registry and emigration records.

Foreign majority-ownership is widespread




Figure 1: USD billions owned by foreigners, given different thresholds for 'valid' ownership



Foreign ownership increases in ownership concentration



Figure 2: Share owned by Norwegians and foreigners, given different thresholds for 'valid' ownership



Unit of observation at this point is
owners with assigned real estate values



- ▶ After this process we have a sample of owners with their **country background** and **real estate values** for each year between 2011 and 2017.
- ▶ We take the sum of real estate values over year and country.

Descriptive results

Foreign ownership mostly concentrated in commercial real estate




Table 1: Norwegian real estate stock, in billions of USD.

| | Individual | Corporate | Housing | Business | Other | Total |
|---------------|------------|-----------|---------|----------|-------|---------|
| Total stock | 878.8 | 178.5 | 841.3 | 151.6 | 64.5 | 1,057.3 |
| Foreign-owned | 5.3 | 18.8 | 5.2 | 15.9 | 3.0 | 24.1 |
| Tax haven | 0.5 | 7.1 | 0.5 | 6.4 | 0.7 | 7.5 |
| Foreign Share | 0.6 % | 10.5 % | 0.6 % | 10.5 % | 4.7 % | 2.3 % |
| Haven Share | 0.1 % | 4.0 % | 0.1 % | 4.2 % | 1.0 % | 0.7 % |

Foreign ownership has increased over time




Figure 3: Offshore ownership of corporate-owned real estate in Norway



Especially from Luxembourg


Figure 4: Corporate and foreign owned real estate, by country of owner



Only Sweden beats Luxembourg in terms of nominal values




Figure 5: Top foreign countries, real estate wealth (2017)



But other tax havens are also substantial compared to home GDP



Figure 6: Top foreign countries, real estate wealth vs. GDP (2017)





New data: Property-level data on ownership and estimates of value




This gives new possibilities

- ▶ Data limitations have held the project back for a while.
- ▶ We have now gained access to data that let us observe specific properties.
- ▶ New possibilities
 - ▶ Looking at geographical variations.
 - ▶ Investigate local effects of foreign investments.
 - ▶ Can build a gravity-like model that predicts foreign ownership.
- ▶ Can also see transactions.

Large variation across the country

Figure 7: Foreign ownership of residential real estate in Norwegian municipalities



Concluding remarks



Summary of findings

- ▶ **How large it is:** 2 percent of Norwegian real estate – 10 percent when we only look at corporate-owned real estate
- ▶ **How it develops over time:** From 7 percent in 2011 to 10 percent in 2017
- ▶ **The role of tax havens:** Sizeable share from tax havens - from 31 to 38 percent between 2011 and 2017
- ▶ **Geographical patterns:** Interesting variations across Norwegian municipalities.

No casual inference or evasion estimates, but gives an overview of the issue



- ▶ Foreign ownership, especially from tax havens, is associated with a range of problems.
 - ▶ Tax evasion and avoidance
 - ▶ Money laundering and other illicit finance activities
 - ▶ Secret PEP ownership
- ▶ Show the need for enhanced automatic exchange agreements