

Activating Change: The Role of Information and Beliefs in Social Activism

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Motivation

- Citizen activism is important for democracy building and institutional transitions
 - An active civil society is often necessary to pressure government officials to implement public policy reforms and/or regime changes.
- **Successful activism requires high levels of participation**, but:
 - Participation involves a private cost (time, money, effort);
 - May lead to additional costs, depending on others' participation
 - e.g., punishment
 - Expected benefits depend on others' participation:
 - The action may lead to change only if others also act.

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 - The action may lead to change only if others also act.
- **We ask:** What can increase activism?

Research Questions

- Primary research questions:
 - Does **providing information** about the cause increase activism?
 - Does **correcting beliefs** about others' willingness to act matter?
- Which **form of activism** is more/less likely to be taken up?
 - Petition?
 - Donation?
 - Watching a video on how to act?
- Is it better to present subjects with a **choice** of possible ways to act, or encourage them to engage in one only?
- The **Cause**:
 - Fight fraud and corruption in the provision of health services during the COVID-19 pandemic (bribes, overcharging etc.)
- The **Context**:
 - India during the second wave of the pandemic.

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Our Contributions

- Limited evidence on the importance about others' propensity to act:
 - Game of strategic complements, as predicted by most of the theory?
 - Game of strategic substitutes?
 - Cantoni et al.(2019): Protests in Hong Kong;
 - Hager et al (2022): Political canvassing in a Western Europe country.
 - **Our study**: Participation in a spontaneous movement, rather than repeated (long-run) activism. More urgency? More uncertainty on others?;
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 - **Our study**: Participation in a spontaneous movement, rather than repeated (long-run) activism. More urgency? More uncertainty on others?;
 - **Our study**: Forms of activism other than protesting.
- Limited evidence on the role of information (about a cause) in collectivizing efforts to act in support of the cause.
 - Is more information always good? Could it lead to discouragement?
- Broadly: If the objective is to mobilize citizens, what is the most effective way to do so?

This paper

- We conduct an online survey experiment involving over 2000 Indian men in May-July 2021 employing a 4x4 experimental design.
 - Participants remain anonymous to the research team.


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 - **Information** about the problem/cause (fraud/corruption in health);
 - **Correction of misaligned beliefs** about others' willingness to act;
 - **Combination** of Information and Belief Correction
- Within each treatment, subjects are cross-randomized into 4 different **Action Treatments**, based on the type of activism that we present to them at the end of the survey:
 - **Petition signing**
 - **Donation**
 - **Video Watching**
 - **Choice** between the three actions

Design



Experiment Design: Activism Treatments

T1: Information about entitlements and the occurrence of fraud/corruption in the health sector during the pandemic: 3 minute video

You Might Be Cheated!

Did you know your state may have **price regulations for hospitals?**



Overbilling



ineffective implementation of capped charges



aggressive use of experimental treatments

Capped Rates for COVID Treatment

Routine ward



ICU bed



ICU bed + ventilator



Experiment Design: Activism Treatments

T2: Correction of misaligned beliefs about others' willingness to act against corruption (Bursztyn et al. (2020))

- We present 3 statements, and ask whether they agree or disagree;
 - We incentivize them to guess the % of previous participants who agreed;
- Statement of interest:
“I am willing to raise my voice and participate in a protest against corruption in the provision of health services”

Experiment Design: Activism Treatments

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 - We incentivize them to guess the % of previous participants who agreed;
- Statement of interest:
“I am willing to raise my voice and participate in a protest against corruption in the provision of health services”
- In the *Belief Correction* treatment, at the end of the survey **we show a table** with each statement and the *true* percentage of previous participants who had agreed with each statement.

T3: Combined Treatment:

- They watch the 3-minute information video

AND

- At the end of the survey **we show a table** with each statement and the *true* percentage of previous participants who had agreed with each statement.

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Screen

Content

Which forms of activism can subjects engage in?

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 - ① Sign a **petition** to be sent to the Ministry of Health Screen Content
 - ② Make a **donation** (out of earned bonus) to a non-profit organization working against corruption in health Screen

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 - ④ **Choose** between the petition, the donation and the video Screen.
- *Note on Outcomes*: Subjects can exit the survey or click on the action

Theoretical Framework

- We extend the benchmark model (Cantoni et al., 2019):
- Set of citizens N who need to choose whether to participate in activism. Utility when $P_i = 1$:

$$U_i = 1_{P_i=1}(V_i(n, S(n)) - C_i(n, S(n))) \quad (1)$$

- V =benefit of acting; n =number of people participating
- S =Success of action, as a function of number of people acting
- C =Cost of acting, as a function of others acting
- Assume strategic complementarities in costs and benefits.
- **Extension 1:** corruption could be high (H) or low (L). Assume it is H.
 - Citizens have priors p_i on the probability of H.
 - Some are better informed than others (higher p)
- **Extension 2:** Individuals get an intrinsic net benefit from participating $W_i(\theta)$, which we assume to be higher when $\theta = H$.

Theoretical Framework

- **Petition:** High Collective Action Component
 - Identification may lead to punishment
 - Less likely when more people sign: $\frac{\partial C_i}{\partial n_{-i}} < 0$.
 - Benefits Function: Assume $\frac{\partial V_i}{\partial S} > 0$ and $\frac{\partial S}{\partial n_{-i}} > 0$.
- **Donation:** Low Collective Action component
 - Cost does not depend on donations of others: $C_i = c(P_i)$
 - Individual believes that the benefits of donating (success function) increase when more people donate: $\frac{\partial V_i}{\partial S} > 0$ and $\frac{\partial S}{\partial n_{-i}} > 0$.
- **Video:** Lowest Collective Action Component
 - Cost that does not depend on others' decision watch video: $C_i = c(P_i)$.
 - Benefit function less likely to be a function of actions of others.
- **Some Predictions** (*in brief*)
 - Belief Correction treatment most likely to affect Petition and least likely to affect Video.
 - Effects of Information are ambiguous.

Empirical Strategy

$$Y_{ia} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 T_{2i} + \beta_2 T_{3i} + \beta_3 T_{4i} + \delta X_i + \varepsilon_{ia}$$

- Y_i = decision to act by individual i on action a
- T_{2i} = **Information** treatment
- T_{3i} = **Belief Correction** treatment
- T_{4i} = **Combined** treatment
- X_i = vector of controls (demographics, beliefs, indices of experience of, information about and attitude towards corruption, controls for time and state of residence)
- Type of action (outcome variable) varies by treatment:
 - Willingness to petition, donate, watch video, choose one;
 - Actual action (signed, donated, watched, chose one)
- Willingness to act (or acted) when action presented alone vs. in Choice.


Data

| characteristics | Proportion | |
|------------------|-----------------|---------------------|
| | national sample | experimental sample |
| Age (45+) | 36 | 14 |
| College educated | 27 | 79 |
| Married | 69 | 51 |
| Income | 92 | 48 |
| Hindu | 79 | 78 |
| SC or ST | 18 | 28 |

Note: Income indicates the percentage with less than Rs 30K in monthly income. SC (Schedule Caste) and ST (Scheduled Tribe) are socio-economically deprived individuals in India. The sample of adult (18 years and above) urban men from the Periodic Labor Force Sample (PLFS) 2017-2018 are used for the national figures and experimental figures are from own experimental sample.

- More educated and wealthier than the national average;
- Comparable in terms of religion and caste.


Balance Tests




Results: Some Descriptive Statistics

- Nearly 91% of the respondents personally visited or had a household member visit a hospital since the beginning of the pandemic.
- More than 50% experienced corruption in accessing medical services.

Willing to raise your voice and participate in a protest against corruption in provision of health service?





What percentage of other respondents do you think agreed?



[view](#)

Results: Treatment Effects on Petition







Treatment Effects on Petition

| | Sign Petition? (1) | Willing to: Signed with Name (2) | Signed with Full Name (3) |
|---|-----------------------|---|---------------------------------|
| Information | 0.214*** (0.070) | 0.137** (0.070) | 0.110* (0.066) |
| Belief Correction | 0.151** (0.072) | 0.150** (0.073) | 0.140** (0.069) |
| Combined | 0.222*** (0.071) | 0.150** (0.072) | 0.156** (0.069) |
| Observations | 417 | 417 | 417 |
| Control Outcome Mean | 0.392 | 0.299 | 0.258 |
| <i>Equality of treatments [p-value]</i> | | | |
| Information = Belief Correction | [0.368] | [0.656] | [0.840] |
| Information = Combined | [0.912] | [0.498] | [0.131] |
| Belief Correction = Combined | [0.324] | [0.822] | [0.081] |
| Controls? | yes | yes | yes |





Note: Controls for indicators of age, marital status, religion, education, SC/ST dummy, income, presence of elderly at home, indices for: locus of control, risk, pro-sociality, corruption perception, information about corruption and about rights and entitlements, attitude towards corruption and past civic engagement; belief about others' willingness to protest, confidence in that belief, expected earning from the experiment, time and state of residence dummies included. Robust standard errors in parentheses; * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Results: No Treatment Effects on Donation and Video

- No impact of the treatments on the other actions.



Results: Giving a Choice of Actions



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 - Information increases petitioning the government by nearly 42%
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 - Individuals with downward biased beliefs are the ones +vely impacted;
 - Evidence of **complements** not substitutes in petition signing.

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- Information about the cause and others' willingness to act for the cause have no impact on donation and video watching.
 - Some evidence of a negative effect of information on Donation, driven by the uninformed - discouragement effect?

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- Information about the cause and others' willingness to act for the cause have no impact on donation and video watching.
 - Some evidence of a negative effect of information on Donation, driven by the uninformed - discouragement effect?
- Encouraging subjects to engage in an action is preferable to giving them a choice of actions.

T1 BLOCK

Before you exit the survey, we would like you to think of the problem of corruption and overcharging in Indian hospitals during the COVID-19 pandemic. The "**All India Drug Action Network**" (**A.I.D.A.N**) is a non-profit organization that has been pressuring local and central governments to better regulate health care in India, fostering transparency in hospitals and assisting patients who have been illegally overcharged.

Would you like to support the A.I.D.A.N.'s activities? If so, you could sign a **petition** to the Health Ministry asking for more regulation and transparency in health care charges. If you prefer to **exit the survey**, please click the "EXIT THE SURVEY" button below.

PETITION

EXIT THE SURVEY

Petition Content

Dear Health Minister,

Now is the time to put pressure on our leaders to safeguard our health! The private health sector today is accountable neither to the government nor to the public. This sector has enjoyed unbridled growth because of government subsidies and the lack of implementation of regulatory laws.

The Clinical Establishments (Registration and Regulation) Act (CEA in short), 2010 was enacted in Parliament of India to regulate all clinical establishments in India. The Act requires all clinical establishments to register themselves and provides a set of standard treatment guidelines for common diseases and conditions. However, as of 2018, only 11 states have implemented this and there's a strong lobby to prevent this from enactment so that the private hospitals can charge anything to dying patients and general public succumbs to such malpractice.

Moreover, the standards for registration of hospitals have not been notified by the Central government, rendering it unimplementable, even in States where it has been adopted. Any similar attempts of regulatory laws by the state governments have also been met with fierce opposition from private sector lobbies.

More than 70 percent of people use private facilities for medical treatment in India, due to the dismal condition of public healthcare. Overcharging and unethical practices are frequent concerns in privatised health care, & all of this is propagated due to the COVID-19 pandemic, which has wreaked havoc on our healthcare system.

With no public health law in place, India is fighting COVID-19 Pandemic using a 123-year-old Epidemic Diseases Act, an even older Indian Penal Code of 1860, and a recent Disaster Management Act of 2005. The violation of patients' rights has shot up to an astronomical level in absence of any regulation.

We ask the government to address the following demands:

- 1. Adoption of regulatory laws like the CEA**
- 2. Clear display of treatment protocol and prescription audit**
- 3. District level grievance redressal system for patients**

The right to affordable and accessible care will only be achieved if people start demanding that government health services be strengthened, expanded and improved; that the government stops outsourcing healthcare to the private sector, and the government introduces and implements strict regulations for private hospitals.

Addressed to:

1. Union health minister: Dr. Harsh Vardhan (hfm[at]gov[dot]in)
2. health ministers of the states:

T2 BLOCK

Before you exit the survey, we would like you to think of the problem of corruption and overcharging in Indian hospitals during the COVID-19 pandemic. The "**All India Drug Action Network**" (**A.I.D.A.N**) is a non-profit organization that has been pressuring local and central governments to better regulate health care in India, fostering transparency in hospitals and assisting patients who have been illegally overcharged.

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DONATION



EXIT THE SURVEY



T3 BLOCK

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VIDEO



EXIT THE SURVEY



T4 BLOCK

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Would you like to support the A.I.D.A.N.'s activities?

If so, you could sign a **petition** to the Health Ministry asking for more regulation and transparency in health care charges. Please click PETITION below, and you will be redirected to the page containing necessary instructions.

OR make a **donation** to A.I.D.A.N. Please click DONATION below, and you will be redirected to the page containing necessary instructions.

OR watch a **6 minute video** that explains AIDAN activities and how you could help. Please click VIDEO, and you will be redirected to the page containing

Information Video (T1)




<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8Ud5gla8gVI>

back

Video Action Treatment: Content

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xxG37wWmAv8> back

Beliefs



[back](#)

| | N | Mean | Std. Dev |
|-----------------------------------|------|-------|----------|
| <i>A. Demographics</i> | | | |
| Age 45+ | 1744 | 0.15 | 0.35 |
| Married | 1744 | 0.49 | 0.50 |
| SC\ST | 1744 | 0.26 | 0.44 |
| Hindu | 1744 | 0.77 | 0.42 |
| College | 1744 | 0.78 | 0.41 |
| Income | 1744 | 0.49 | 0.50 |
| Asset | 1744 | 5.99 | 2.31 |
| Elderly | 1744 | 0.56 | 0.50 |
| Hospital Visits | 1744 | 0.77 | 0.42 |
| <i>B. Preferences</i> | | | |
| Locus of Control | 1744 | 0.06 | 1.00 |
| Risk | 1744 | 0.00 | 1.06 |
| Pro-sociality | 1744 | -0.03 | 0.99 |
| <i>C. Corruption</i> | | | |
| Ever given a Gift? | 1744 | 0.51 | 0.50 |
| Ever did a Favor? | 1744 | 0.60 | 0.49 |
| Ever Paid a Bribe? | 1744 | 0.53 | 0.50 |
| Know ICU Rate? | 1744 | 0.34 | 0.47 |
| Charged Extra in Hospital? | 1744 | 0.14 | 0.34 |
| Opinion: Corruption has increased | 1744 | 0.71 | 0.46 |
| Opinion: Corruption a Problem? | 1744 | 0.82 | 0.38 |
| Prior Protest | 1744 | 0.37 | 0.48 |
| Prior Walkouts or Strike | 1744 | 0.29 | 0.46 |
| Prior Boycott | 1744 | 0.33 | 0.47 |
| Prior Petition | 1744 | 0.36 | 0.48 |
| Prior Lodging Complaints | 1744 | 0.39 | 0.48 |
| Prior Marching | 1744 | 0.26 | 0.44 |
| Prior Donation | 1744 | 0.77 | 0.42 |

Petition: Heterogeneity by Perception of Corruption

| | Willing to Sign (1) | Signed with Name (2) | Signed with Full Name (3) |
|----------------------------------|------------------------|-------------------------|------------------------------|
| Information x Perception | 0.055 (0.062) | 0.093 (0.065) | 0.077 (0.064) |
| Belief Correction x Perception | 0.012 (0.067) | 0.078 (0.073) | 0.063 (0.071) |
| Combined x Perception | 0.001 (0.064) | -0.035 (0.071) | -0.065 (0.071) |
| Information | 0.209*** (0.072) | 0.129* (0.070) | 0.104 (0.067) |
| Belief Correction | 0.147** (0.073) | 0.143* (0.074) | 0.134* (0.070) |
| Combined | 0.221*** (0.073) | 0.155** (0.073) | 0.165** (0.070) |
| Perception | -0.046 (0.049) | -0.092* (0.051) | -0.084 (0.051) |
| Observations | 417 | 417 | 417 |
| I + I x Perception [p value] | [0.002] | [0.016] | [0.041] |
| BC + BC x Perception [p value] | [0.098] | [0.028] | [0.040] |
| COM + COM x Perception [p value] | [0.009] | [0.195] | [0.260] |
| Control Outcome Mean | 0.392 | 0.299 | 0.258 |
| Controls? | yes | yes | yes |
| R ² | 0.165 | 0.116 | 0.145 |

Note: Controls for indicators of age, marital status, religion, education, SC/ST dummy, income, presence of elderly at home, indices for: locus of control, risk, pro-sociality, corruption perception, information about corruption and about rights and entitlements, attitude towards corruption and past civic engagement; belief about others' willingness to protest, confidence in that belief, expected earning from the experiment, time and state of residence dummies included. Robust standard errors in parentheses; * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Petition: Heterogeneity by Tolerance of Corruption

| | Willing to Sign (1) | Signed with Name (2) | Signed with Full Name (3) |
|---------------------------------|------------------------|-------------------------|------------------------------|
| Information x Tolerance | 0.021 (0.063) | -0.033 (0.066) | -0.085 (0.064) |
| Belief Correction x Tolerance | -0.092 (0.069) | -0.111 (0.072) | -0.101 (0.069) |
| Combined x Tolerance | -0.068 (0.063) | -0.094 (0.069) | -0.114* (0.068) |
| Information | 0.211*** (0.070) | 0.137* (0.070) | 0.111* (0.066) |
| Belief Correction | 0.150** (0.072) | 0.149** (0.073) | 0.140** (0.069) |
| Combined | 0.223*** (0.071) | 0.153** (0.072) | 0.160** (0.068) |
| Tolerance | -0.005 (0.048) | 0.011 (0.050) | 0.037 (0.048) |
| Observations | 417 | 417 | 417 |
| I + I x Tolerance [p value] | [0.009] | [0.259] | [0.763] |
| BC + BC x Tolerance [p value] | [0.548] | [0.712] | [0.688] |
| COM + COM x Tolerance [p value] | [0.093] | [0.542] | [0.629] |
| Control Outcome Mean | 0.392 | 0.299 | 0.258 |
| Controls? | yes | yes | yes |
| R ² | 0.171 | 0.113 | 0.141 |

Note: Controls for indicators of age, marital status, religion, education, SC/ST dummy, income, presence of elderly at home, indices for: locus of control, risk, pro-sociality, corruption perception, information about corruption and about rights and entitlements, attitude towards corruption and past civic engagement; belief about others' willingness to protest, confidence in that belief, expected earning from the experiment, time and state of residence dummies included. Robust standard errors in parentheses; * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Petition: Heterogeneity by Information about Rights and Entitlements

| | Willing to Sign (1) | Signed with Name (2) | Signed with Full Name (3) |
|--|------------------------|-------------------------|------------------------------|
| Information x Information (Rights) | -0.040 (0.076) | 0.026 (0.076) | 0.040 (0.068) |
| Belief Correction x Information (Rights) | 0.099 (0.068) | 0.150** (0.071) | 0.104 (0.067) |
| Combined x Information (Rights) | -0.128** (0.064) | -0.109* (0.066) | -0.096 (0.063) |
| Information | 0.213*** (0.071) | 0.139** (0.070) | 0.115* (0.067) |
| Belief Correction | 0.170** (0.071) | 0.171** (0.072) | 0.155** (0.069) |
| Combined | 0.234*** (0.071) | 0.162** (0.072) | 0.167** (0.069) |
| Information (Rights) | 0.093** (0.047) | 0.051 (0.048) | 0.044 (0.043) |
| Observations | 417 | 417 | 417 |
| I + I x Information (Rights) [p value] | [0.103] | [0.137] | [0.122] |
| BC + BC x Information (Rights) [p value] | [0.006] | [0.002] | [0.009] |
| COM + COM x Information (Rights) [p value] | [0.235] | [0.569] | [0.424] |
| Control Outcome Mean | 0.392 | 0.299 | 0.258 |
| Controls? | yes | yes | yes |
| R ² | 0.184 | 0.132 | 0.151 |

Note: Controls for indicators of age, marital status, religion, education, SC/ST dummy, income, presence of elderly at home, indices for: locus of control, risk, pro-sociality, corruption perception, information about corruption and about rights and entitlements, attitude towards corruption and past civic engagement; belief about others' willingness to protest, confidence in that belief, expected earning from the experiment, time and state of residence dummies included. Robust standard errors in parentheses; * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

All Actions

| | Petition | | Donation | | Video | |
|---|--------------------|-----------------------|-------------------------|--------------------|----------------------|---------------------|
| | Signed with Name | Signed with Full Name | Donated Positive Amount | Percent Donated | Watched > 10 Seconds | Seconds Watched |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| Information | 0.145** (0.070) | 0.117* (0.067) | -0.054 (0.055) | 2.847 (3.215) | -0.003 (0.067) | -1.696 (23.509) |
| Belief Correction | 0.159** (0.073) | 0.151** (0.070) | -0.043 (0.053) | 0.741 (2.941) | -0.031 (0.070) | -27.185 (23.801) |
| Combined | 0.162** (0.072) | 0.167** (0.070) | -0.129** (0.053) | -4.773* (2.629) | -0.079 (0.069) | -13.379 (23.722) |
| Observations | 417 | 417 | 437 | 437 | 450 | 450 |
| Control Outcome Mean | 0.299 | 0.258 | 0.267 | 9.714 | 0.574 | 149.198 |
| <i>Equality of treatments</i> [p-value] | | | | | | |
| Information = Belief Correction | [0.851] | [0.617] | [0.829] | [0.542] | [0.684] | [0.275] |
| Information = Combined | [0.811] | [0.464] | [0.146] | [0.011] | [0.254] | [0.610] |
| Belief Correction = Combined | [0.961] | [0.821] | [0.090] | [0.056] | [0.493] | [0.554] |
| Controls? | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes |

Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy that equals 1 if the respondent chose to sign a petition with full name (col 1) or with any name (col 2); donated a positive amount of their experimental earnings (col 3) or percent donated (col 4); dummy indicating the subject watched more than 10 seconds of the video (col 5) or seconds spent watching the video (col 6). Controls include indicators of age, marital status, religion, education, SC/ST dummy, assets, presence of elderly at home, locus of control, indices for risk, trust, retaliation, altruism, experience of corruption, information about corruption and about rights and entitlements, attitude towards corruption and past civic engagement, belief about others' willingness to protest, expected earning from the experiment, time and state of residence dummies. Robust standard errors in parentheses; p-values reported in square brackets. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Heterogeneity by Information about Rights and Entitlements

Table: Treatment Effects by Information

| | Petition | | | Willing to Donate | Donation Donated Positive Amount | Video | | | |
|--|---------------------|--------------------|-----------------------|--------------------|-------------------------------------|--------------------|------------------------|----------------------|---------------------|
| | Willing to Sign | Signed with Name | Signed with Full Name | | | Percent Donated | Willing to Watch Video | Watched > 10 Seconds | Seconds Watched |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) |
| Information | 0.213*** (0.071) | 0.139** (0.070) | 0.115* (0.067) | -0.054 (0.055) | -0.056 (0.055) | 3.022 (3.154) | -0.026 (0.067) | -0.002 (0.068) | -1.711 (23.490) |
| Belief Correction | 0.170** (0.071) | 0.171** (0.072) | 0.155** (0.069) | -0.025 (0.055) | -0.045 (0.053) | 0.619 (2.970) | -0.062 (0.069) | -0.046 (0.069) | -24.896 (23.574) |
| Combined | 0.234*** (0.071) | 0.162** (0.072) | 0.167** (0.069) | -0.102* (0.056) | -0.132** (0.054) | -5.092* (2.629) | -0.084 (0.069) | -0.078 (0.070) | -11.619 (23.581) |
| Informed (Rights) | 0.093** (0.047) | 0.051 (0.048) | 0.044 (0.043) | -0.007 (0.043) | -0.005 (0.043) | 0.096 (1.946) | 0.044 (0.050) | 0.075 (0.051) | 30.677 (18.639) |
| Information x Informed (Rights) | -0.040 (0.076) | 0.026 (0.076) | 0.040 (0.068) | 0.051 (0.052) | 0.045 (0.051) | 1.548 (2.979) | 0.009 (0.067) | 0.005 (0.068) | -10.542 (23.773) |
| Belief Correction x Informed (Rights) | 0.099 (0.068) | 0.150** (0.071) | 0.104 (0.067) | 0.072 (0.065) | 0.047 (0.060) | 2.660 (3.411) | -0.002 (0.073) | 0.001 (0.074) | -18.168 (24.646) |
| Combined x Informed (Rights) | -0.128** (0.064) | -0.109* (0.066) | -0.096 (0.063) | -0.003 (0.049) | 0.013 (0.048) | 1.844 (2.281) | 0.007 (0.068) | -0.020 (0.069) | -22.244 (23.047) |
| Observations | 417 | 417 | 417 | 437 | 437 | 437 | 450 | 450 | 450 |
| I + I x Informed (Rights) [p value] | [0.103] | [0.137] | [0.122] | [0.964] | [0.877] | [0.289] | [0.858] | [0.977] | [0.728] |
| BC + BC x Information (Rights) [p value] | [0.006] | [0.002] | [0.009] | [0.581] | [0.976] | [0.455] | [0.500] | [0.641] | [0.211] |
| COM + COM x Information (Rights) [p value] | [0.235] | [0.569] | [0.424] | [0.120] | [0.075] | [0.352] | [0.403] | [0.302] | [0.320] |
| Control Outcome Mean | 0.392 | 0.299 | 0.258 | 0.267 | 0.267 | 9.714 | 0.620 | 0.574 | 149.198 |
| Controls? | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes |
| R ² | 0.184 | 0.132 | 0.151 | 0.286 | 0.302 | 0.344 | 0.121 | 0.119 | 0.101 |

Note: Controls for indicators of age, marital status, religion, education, SC/ST dummy, income, presence of elderly at home, indices for: locus of control, risk, pro-sociality, corruption perception, information, protest, confidence in that belief, expected earning from the experiment, time and state of residence dummies included. Robust standard errors in parentheses; * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Heterogeneity by Perception of Corruption

Table: Treatment Effects by Corruption Perception

| | Petition | | | | Donation | | | Video | |
|----------------------------------|------------------------|-------------------------|------------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------------|------------------------|-------------------------------|-----------------------------|------------------------|
| | Willing to Sign (1) | Signed with Name (2) | Signed with Full Name (3) | Willing to Donate (4) | Donated Positive Amount (5) | Percent Donated (6) | Willing to Watch Video (7) | Watched > 10 Seconds (8) | Seconds Watched (9) |
| Information | 0.209*** (0.072) | 0.129* (0.070) | 0.104 (0.067) | -0.056 (0.055) | -0.057 (0.055) | 3.050 (3.175) | -0.021 (0.066) | 0.003 (0.067) | 0.031 (23.484) |
| Belief Correction | 0.147** (0.073) | 0.143* (0.074) | 0.134* (0.070) | -0.025 (0.054) | -0.044 (0.053) | 0.625 (2.982) | -0.053 (0.068) | -0.035 (0.069) | -23.113 (23.661) |
| Combined | 0.221*** (0.073) | 0.155** (0.073) | 0.165** (0.070) | -0.104* (0.054) | -0.130** (0.052) | -4.852* (2.605) | -0.076 (0.068) | -0.070 (0.069) | -10.393 (23.645) |
| Perception | -0.046 (0.049) | -0.092* (0.051) | -0.084 (0.051) | -0.151*** (0.040) | -0.140*** (0.040) | -5.333** (2.103) | 0.095** (0.047) | 0.071 (0.051) | 11.246 (17.124) |
| Information x Perception | 0.055 (0.062) | 0.093 (0.065) | 0.077 (0.064) | 0.089* (0.053) | 0.068 (0.054) | 1.156 (3.415) | -0.041 (0.058) | -0.034 (0.061) | -21.885 (23.448) |
| Belief Correction x Perception | 0.012 (0.067) | 0.078 (0.073) | 0.063 (0.071) | 0.063 (0.055) | 0.068 (0.052) | 2.316 (3.047) | -0.125** (0.062) | -0.120* (0.065) | -33.304 (22.543) |
| Combined x Perception | 0.001 (0.064) | -0.035 (0.071) | -0.065 (0.071) | 0.152*** (0.052) | 0.156*** (0.051) | 5.766** (2.647) | -0.136** (0.063) | -0.154** (0.066) | -44.913** (22.389) |
| Observations | 417 | 417 | 417 | 437 | 437 | 437 | 450 | 450 | 450 |
| I + I x Perception [p value] | [0.002] | [0.016] | [0.041] | [0.626] | [0.866] | [0.297] | [0.461] | [0.730] | [0.491] |
| BC + BC x Perception [p value] | [0.098] | [0.028] | [0.040] | [0.599] | [0.728] | [0.448] | [0.045] | [0.097] | [0.073] |
| COM + COM x Perception [p value] | [0.009] | [0.195] | [0.260] | [0.511] | [0.718] | [0.801] | [0.022] | [0.021] | [0.089] |
| Control Outcome Mean | 0.392 | 0.299 | 0.258 | 0.267 | 0.267 | 9.714 | 0.620 | 0.574 | 149.198 |
| Controls? | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes |
| R ² | 0.165 | 0.116 | 0.145 | 0.295 | 0.315 | 0.350 | 0.133 | 0.134 | 0.107 |

Note: Controls for indicators of age, marital status, religion, education, SC/ST dummy, income, presence of elderly at home, indices for: locus of control, risk, pro-sociality, corruption perception, information, protest, confidence in that belief, expected earning from the experiment, time and state of residence dummies included. Robust standard errors in parentheses; * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

FDR Adjustment

| | Willing to sign | Signed with full name | Signed with name |
|----------------------|------------------|-----------------------|------------------|
| Information | 0.214 (0.003) | 0.11 (0.098) | 0.137 (0.05) |
| FDR-adjusted p-value | [0.012] | [0.06] | [0.046] |
| Belief Correction | 0.151 (0.037) | 0.14 (0.044) | 0.15 (0.042) |
| FDR-adjusted p-value | [0.046] | [0.046] | [0.046] |
| Combined | 0.222 (0.002) | 0.156 (0.024) | 0.15 (0.037) |
| FDR-adjusted p-value | [0.012] | [0.046] | [0.046] |

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Lasso Method for Selection of Controls

| | Petition | | | Willing to Donate | Donation Donated Positive Amount | Percent Donated | Video | | |
|---|---------------------|--------------------|-----------------------|--------------------|----------------------------------|-------------------|------------------------|----------------------|---------------------|
| | Willing to Sign | Signed with Name | Signed with Full Name | | | | Willing to Watch Video | Watched > 10 Seconds | Seconds Watched |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) |
| Information | 0.207*** (0.071) | 0.130* (0.069) | 0.105 (0.066) | -0.059 (0.056) | -0.065 (0.056) | 2.086 (3.222) | -0.030 (0.066) | -0.003 (0.067) | 0.231 (23.468) |
| Belief Correction | 0.147** (0.073) | 0.151** (0.072) | 0.147** (0.068) | -0.021 (0.056) | -0.041 (0.054) | 0.477 (3.017) | -0.057 (0.068) | -0.041 (0.069) | -25.151 (23.239) |
| Combined | 0.236*** (0.069) | 0.156** (0.070) | 0.156** (0.067) | -0.091* (0.054) | -0.119** (0.052) | -3.845 (2.500) | -0.097 (0.069) | -0.095 (0.070) | -16.965 (23.560) |
| Observations | 417 | 417 | 417 | 437 | 437 | 437 | 450 | 450 | 450 |
| <i>Equality of treatments [p-value]</i> | | | | | | | | | |
| Information = Belief Correction | [0.393] | [0.768] | [0.527] | [0.497] | [0.649] | [0.639] | [0.679] | [0.565] | [0.269] |
| Information = Combined | [0.667] | [0.709] | [0.446] | [0.551] | [0.288] | [0.043] | [0.306] | [0.169] | [0.456] |
| Belief Correction = Combined | [0.204] | [0.944] | [0.896] | [0.181] | [0.109] | [0.125] | [0.550] | [0.439] | [0.724] |
| Control Outcome Mean | 0.392 | 0.299 | 0.258 | 0.267 | 0.267 | 9.714 | 0.620 | 0.574 | 149.198 |
| Controls? | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes |

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
Literature

- Beliefs about others' activism:
 - Theories:
 - Models of activism as a coordination game (e.g., Pasarelli and Tabellini, 2017; Barbera and Jackson, 2020)
 - Empirical evidence:
 - Social networks, mobile phones and activism of peers increase protest turnout (Enikolopv et al., 2020; Manacorda and Tesei, 2020; Bursztyn et al. 2021)
 - Direct study of belief correction: students in Hong Kong *less likely* to protest (Cantoni et al. 2019)

Literature

- **Beliefs** about others' activism:
 - Theories:
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 - Direct study of belief correction: students in Hong Kong *less likely* to protest (Cantoni et al. 2019)
- **Information** to mobilize citizens to improve accountability in public service delivery:
 - Information on corruption of politicians: effective (Aker et al. 2017; Ferraz and Finan 2008).
 - Not much specifically about fraud/misbehavior/corruption of not elected public servants, with some exceptions (in health and education: Reinikka & Svenson, 2005, Bjorkman and Svensson 2009, Afridi et al 2020, Bannerjee et al 2010)

Net Marginal Benefits with Strategic Complementarity



Petition - Heterogeneity by Bias in Prior Beliefs

| | Willing to Sign (1) | Signed with Name (2) | Signed with Full Name (3) |
|--------------------------------|------------------------|-------------------------|------------------------------|
| Information | 0.262*** (0.080) | 0.164** (0.079) | 0.156** (0.075) |
| Belief Correction | 0.303*** (0.082) | 0.260*** (0.083) | 0.259*** (0.079) |
| Combined | 0.307*** (0.080) | 0.191** (0.081) | 0.182** (0.076) |
| Information x Bias (↑) | -0.096 (0.162) | -0.043 (0.162) | -0.134 (0.154) |
| Belief Correction x Bias (↑) | -0.541*** (0.157) | -0.396** (0.166) | -0.421*** (0.154) |
| Combined x Bias (↑) | -0.305* (0.161) | -0.135 (0.167) | -0.068 (0.163) |
| Bias (↑) | 0.233** (0.114) | 0.092 (0.115) | 0.052 (0.109) |
| Observations | 417 | 417 | 417 |
| Control Outcome Mean | 0.392 | 0.299 | 0.258 |
| I + I x Bias (↑) [p value] | [0.242] | [0.391] | [0.875] |
| BC + BC x Bias (↑) [p value] | [0.078] | [0.347] | [0.221] |
| COM + COM x Bias (↑) [p value] | [0.988] | [0.704] | [0.432] |
| Controls? | yes | yes | yes |

Note: Controls for indicators of age, marital status, religion, education, SC/ST dummy, income, presence of elderly at home, indices for: locus of control, risk, pro-sociality, corruption perception, info standard errors in parentheses; * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Results: Giving Subjects a Choice of Actions

| | Willing to Sign (1) | Signed with Name (2) | Signed with Full Name (3) | Willing to Donate (4) | Donated Positive Amount (5) | Percent Donated (6) | Willing to Watch Video (7) | Watched Full Video (8) | Seconds Watched (9) |
|-----------------------------------|------------------------|-------------------------|------------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------------|------------------------|-------------------------------|---------------------------|------------------------|
| <i>Choice</i> | -0.237*** (0.061) | -0.151** (0.059) | -0.157*** (0.054) | -0.196*** (0.046) | -0.195*** (0.045) | -5.354** (2.282) | -0.292*** (0.067) | -0.231*** (0.056) | -81.478*** (20.990) |
| Information | 0.217*** (0.068) | 0.140** (0.067) | 0.114* (0.064) | -0.052 (0.054) | -0.057 (0.054) | 2.880 (3.074) | -0.016 (0.065) | 0.027 (0.065) | 3.513 (22.683) |
| Belief Correction | 0.143** (0.070) | 0.151** (0.069) | 0.137** (0.066) | -0.018 (0.054) | -0.037 (0.052) | 1.807 (2.956) | -0.050 (0.066) | -0.020 (0.065) | -20.929 (22.464) |
| Combined | 0.238*** (0.068) | 0.156** (0.068) | 0.164** (0.065) | -0.088* (0.052) | -0.115** (0.050) | -3.616 (2.400) | -0.094 (0.067) | -0.002 (0.065) | -14.889 (22.824) |
| Information x <i>Choice</i> | -0.212** (0.085) | -0.144* (0.082) | -0.088 (0.076) | 0.018 (0.062) | 0.023 (0.062) | -5.686 (3.543) | -0.114 (0.089) | -0.010 (0.079) | -20.927 (28.767) |
| Belief Correction x <i>Choice</i> | -0.212** (0.085) | -0.228*** (0.082) | -0.180** (0.077) | -0.028 (0.061) | -0.010 (0.059) | -5.224 (3.404) | 0.033 (0.096) | 0.029 (0.081) | 6.795 (29.178) |
| Combined x <i>Choice</i> | -0.257*** (0.084) | -0.180** (0.082) | -0.152** (0.077) | 0.087 (0.061) | 0.111* (0.059) | 3.030 (3.137) | -0.074 (0.091) | -0.031 (0.078) | -12.340 (28.768) |
| Control Outcome Mean | 0.392 | 0.299 | 0.258 | 0.267 | 0.267 | 9.714 | 0.620 | 0.343 | 149.198 |
| Controls? | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Observations | 857 | 857 | 857 | 877 | 877 | 877 | 890 | 890 | 890 |

Note: Each column includes the sub-sample of the relevant action group (P: columns 1-3; D: columns 4-6; V: columns 7-9) and the choice group. Robust standard errors in parentheses; * $p < .10$.

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Additional Findings

- *Heterogeneity by information on rights and entitlements:*
 - The information treatments are more impactful on the less informed; [Information](#) [Rights](#)
- *Heterogeneity by perceptions of corruption in health:*
 - None: The treatments are impactful no matter the initial perceptions of corruption in health; [Perceptions](#) [Perceptions Questions](#)
- *Heterogeneity by tolerance of corruption:*
 - The Information and Belief Correction treatments are impactful only on the less tolerant of corruption. [Tolerance](#) [Tolerance Questions](#)
- *Robustness:*
 - Multiple hypothesis correction: Sharpened q-values (Benjamini et al., 2006) indicating the minimum false discovery rate (i.e., the expected proportion of false positives) [FDR adjusted](#)
 - Double Lasso method for selection of controls (Belloni et al., 2014). [Lasso](#)

Balance on Observables

| Variable | Total | Control | Information | Belief Correction | Combined | Difference | | | | | |
|---|---------|---------|-------------|-------------------|----------|------------|---------|----------|---------|---------|---------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (2)-(3) | (2)-(4) | (2)-(5) | (3)-(4) | (3)-(5) | (4)-(5) |
| <i>A. Demographics</i> | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Age 45+ | 0.145 | 0.129 | 0.149 | 0.144 | 0.157 | -0.020 | -0.015 | -0.029 | 0.005 | -0.009 | -0.014 |
| Married | 0.490 | 0.464 | 0.480 | 0.503 | 0.512 | -0.016 | -0.040 | -0.049 | -0.023 | -0.032 | -0.009 |
| SC\ST | 0.264 | 0.272 | 0.264 | 0.246 | 0.275 | 0.007 | 0.026 | -0.003 | 0.019 | -0.011 | -0.029 |
| Hindu | 0.769 | 0.784 | 0.769 | 0.740 | 0.783 | 0.015 | 0.044 | 0.001 | 0.029 | -0.014 | -0.043 |
| College | 0.782 | 0.779 | 0.802 | 0.763 | 0.780 | -0.023 | 0.016 | -0.001 | 0.039 | 0.022 | -0.017 |
| Income | 0.494 | 0.517 | 0.513 | 0.480 | 0.466 | 0.004 | 0.037 | 0.051 | 0.033 | 0.048 | 0.015 |
| Elderly | 0.563 | 0.563 | 0.549 | 0.538 | 0.599 | 0.014 | 0.025 | -0.036 | 0.011 | -0.050 | -0.060* |
| <i>B. Preferences</i> | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Locus of Control | 0.059 | 0.000 | 0.039 | 0.099 | 0.093 | -0.039 | -0.099 | -0.093 | -0.060 | -0.054 | 0.006 |
| Risk | 0.001 | -0.000 | -0.044 | 0.028 | 0.022 | 0.044 | -0.028 | -0.022 | -0.072 | -0.065 | 0.006 |
| Pro-sociality | -0.034 | -0.000 | -0.029 | -0.041 | -0.062 | 0.029 | 0.041 | 0.062 | 0.012 | 0.032 | 0.021 |
| <i>C. Corruption</i> | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Perception | 0.053 | -0.000 | 0.067 | 0.043 | 0.097 | -0.067 | -0.043 | -0.097 | 0.024 | -0.029 | -0.053 |
| Information (Rights) | 0.027 | -0.000 | 0.002 | -0.000 | 0.102 | -0.002 | 0.000 | -0.102 | 0.002 | -0.100 | -0.103 |
| Tolerance | 0.052 | -0.000 | 0.038 | 0.087 | 0.081 | -0.038 | -0.087 | -0.081 | -0.050 | -0.043 | 0.006 |
| Civic Engagement | 0.064 | -0.000 | 0.054 | 0.040 | 0.157 | -0.054 | -0.040 | -0.157** | 0.015 | -0.102 | -0.117* |
| <i>D. Belief and Earning from Survey</i> | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Bias (t) | 0.222 | 0.238 | 0.213 | 0.255 | 0.184 | 0.025 | -0.017 | 0.054* | -0.042 | 0.029 | 0.071** |
| belief about others' willingness to protest (%) | 64.077 | 64.709 | 63.044 | 65.986 | 62.705 | 1.664 | -1.277 | 2.004 | -2.942* | 0.339 | 3.281** |
| Confidence | 4.268 | 4.260 | 4.251 | 4.316 | 4.246 | 0.009 | -0.056 | 0.014 | -0.064 | 0.005 | 0.069 |
| Expected Bonus Earning | 138.801 | 138.532 | 136.778 | 142.497 | 137.534 | 1.754 | -3.965 | 0.997 | -5.719 | -0.757 | 4.962 |
| N | 1744 | 412 | 450 | 431 | 451 | | | | | | |
| F-test of joint significance [p-value] | | | | | | [0.994] | [0.841] | [0.522] | [0.830] | [0.892] | [0.303] |

More Stats

back