

Modelling exposure and vulnerability to disaster risk: A dynamic household level approach

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EEA/ESEM 2023

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No theoretical framework able to replicate all empirical findings in the literature so far.

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 - in counterfactual scenarios
 - after policy interventions

as this can affect the set of strategies and constraints the households face in their decision making.


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
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
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
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- The **patterns might not hold** under different regimes, e.g.
 - in counterfactual scenarios
 - after policy interventionsas this can affect the set of strategies and constraints the households face in their decision making.
- A theoretical model deriving the **behavioural patterns directly from individual preferences** can
 - deliver more consistent results and predictions.
 - provide some explanation for behavioural patterns.

Model










Model



Main interactions and trade-offs

Less exposed settlement location $E \downarrow$

- Lower probability of being struck by natural disaster.
- More expensive.

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Disaster Experience $D = 1$

- Durable consumption goods get destroyed.
- Share of working income in following period is lost.

Mathematical Formulation

$$\max_{c_t, w_t, l_t, E_{t+1}, P_{t+1}, t \in \{1, 2, \dots\}} \mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{N}, \mathcal{D}, \mathcal{Y}} \left[\sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \left(\frac{1}{1 + \rho h} \right)^t u(c_t, W_{t+1}) \right]$$

$$S_{t+1} = y_t^h \cdot (1 - \Delta^Y D_t) + (1 + r_t) S_t - c_t - p^W(w_t) - p^P(E_{t+1}, W_{t+1}, P_{t+1}, h) - p^E(E_{t+1})$$

$$W_{t+1} = (1 - \delta)(1 - \Delta^W l_t)(1 - (1 - P_t)D_t)W_t + w_t$$

$$(E_{t+1} - E_t)(1 - l_t) = 0$$

$$\mathcal{N} \sim \begin{cases} \mathbb{P}[N_t = 1] = H_t \\ \mathbb{P}[N_t = 0] = 1 - H_t \end{cases}$$

$$\mathcal{D} \sim \begin{cases} \mathbb{P}[D_t = 1] = a_{t-1}^h E_t H_t \\ \mathbb{P}[D_t = 0] = 1 - a_{t-1}^h E_t H_t \end{cases}$$

- c_t ... consumption
- W_t ... durable consumption goods
- S_t ... financial assets
- E_t ... exposure level ($\in [0, 1]$)
- D_t ... disaster experience ($\in [0, 1]$)
- P_t ... prevention level ($\in [0, 1]$)
- l_t ... relocation decision ($\in [0, 1]$)
- y_t ... income realisation

To keep it short: In the model households

- obtain utility from period consumption and durable consumption goods;
- take the effects of their decisions on exposure and vulnerability into account;
- maximize their long-run expected utility.

Bellman Formulation

$V(E, S, W, y, D)$ is the value-function depending on the state variables.

⇒ Impact of location decision becomes more apparent:

$$V(E_t, S_t, W_t, y_t, D_t) = \max_{\substack{E_{t+1}, S_{t+1}, \\ W_{t+1}, P_{t+1}, \\ l_t, c_t, w_t}} \left\{ u(c_t, W_{t+1}) + \frac{1}{1 + \rho} \left[a_t E_{t+1} H_{t+1} \cdot \mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{Y}} V(E_{t+1}, S_{t+1}, W_{t+1}, P_{t+1}, \mathcal{Y}, D_{t+1} = 1) + (1 - a_t E_{t+1} H_{t+1}) \cdot \mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{Y}} V(E_{t+1}, S_{t+1}, W_{t+1}, \mathcal{Y}, D_{t+1} = 0) \right] \right\}$$

$$S_{t+1} = y_t \cdot (1 - \Delta^y D_t) + (1 + r_t) S_t - c_t - p^w(w_t) - p^P(E_{t+1}, W_{t+1}, P_{t+1}) - p^E(E_{t+1})$$

$$W_{t+1} = (1 - \delta)(1 - \Delta^w l_t) W_t + w_t$$

$$0 = (E_{t+1} - E_t) \cdot (1 - l_t)$$

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Analytical results Overview

Analytical results for the FOC are limited:

- Depend on intricate expectation operator.

$$u_c(t) \left[p_W^P(t+1) + (p^W)'(t) \right] = u_W(t) + \frac{1-\delta}{1+\rho} \mathbb{E}_t \left\{ u_c(t+1) (p^W)'(t+1) (1 - \Delta^W I_{t+1}) (1 - (1 - P_{t+1}) D_{t+1}) \right\}$$

- Depend on derivatives of unknown value function.

$$u_c(t) \left[p_W^P(t+1) + (p^W)'(t) \right] = u_W(t) + \frac{1}{1+\rho} \left[aEH \cdot P \cdot \mathbb{E}_y \frac{\partial V}{\partial W}(E, S, W \cdot P, \mathcal{Y}, 1) + (1 - aEH) \cdot \mathbb{E}_y \frac{\partial V}{\partial W}(E, S, W, \mathcal{Y}, 0) \right]$$

Numerical Results

Numerical results overview

Solving the mathematical model numerically we derive two **main results**:



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- The **long-run equilibrium distributions** across the state variables (derived from Monte-Carlo-Simulations).

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 - for every possible scenario the household can potentially be in.
- The **long-run equilibrium distributions** across the state variables (derived from Monte-Carlo-Simulations).

We derive these results for different combinations of the household characteristics

- Prevention access (low, mid, high)
- Awareness (low, mid, high)
- Time preference (low, mid, high)
- Education (5 different educational levels)

which results in **135 different types of households**.

Calibration Data

We generate a synthetic population replicating the main results found in empirical data.


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We use data from the Thailand-Vietnam Socio-Economic Panel (TVSEP) to **calibrate the model** with respect to


- the **functional forms** and **parameters** used in the model;
- the **distribution** of households across the different **household characteristics**.

Distribution of households across key characteristics




Optimal household decisions

Household decisions ($E = 0.218, D = 0, Y = 2.67$
Edu cat. = 3, $\rho = 0.21, a = 0.70, \phi_p = 0.28$)




Optimal household decisions

Household decisions
($D = 0$, $Y = 2.67$, Edu cat. = 3, $\rho = 0.16$, $\phi_P = 0.05$)









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





Optimal relocation decision depending on current settlement location.



Equilibrium long-run distributions



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Policy Interventions

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


- Living cost subsidy → Reduce exposure coefficient by factor HC

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
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- Living cost subsidy → Reduce exposure coefficient by factor HC
- Relocation subsidy → Reduce losses from relocation to RS .
- Prevention subsidy → Reduce prevention cost by factor PS .



Cost-Benefit Analysis



Things to do!

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 - Awareness campaign
 - Education program
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- Assess how policy interventions change the household behaviour.
- Assess the benefits of modelling approach compared to econometric approach.

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
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

Correlations within stationary distributions



Optimal investment decision



Equ. dur. cons. good investment




Optimal investment decision



ASA


Equ. dur. cons. good investment

— Edu. level = 1 — Edu. level = 2 — Edu. level = 3 — Edu. level = 4 — Edu. level = 5



Optimal investment decision


Equ. financial Net-Savings



Optimal investment decision

Equ. financial Net-Savings

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Optimal household decisions

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Relocation	Exp. Dec.	Savings	Dur. Cons. invest.	Cons.	Prevention
Curr. Exp.	-0.578	1.906	0.646	0.197	-0.169	0.276
Curr. Assets	-0.296	-0.077	-0.251	0.226	0.113	-0.036
Curr. Dur. Cons.	-0.968	-0.232	0.054	-0.182	0.125	0.023
Curr. Income	0.203	-0.233	0.364	0.416	0.181	-0.007
Dis. Exp.	1.216	0.109	-0.392	0.318	-0.035	-0.005
Edu. Class 2	0.173	-0.089	-0.220	0.105	0.075	0.095
Edu. Class 3	-1.514	-0.456	-1.855	1.046	0.615	0.063
Edu. Class 4	-2.794	-0.788	-3.316	1.919	1.024	0.102
Edu. Class 5	-3.194	-0.978	-5.484	3.257	1.792	0.386
Mid Awareness	-0.133	-0.177	0.051	-0.065	-0.037	0.643
High Awareness	-0.303	-0.309	0.078	-0.113	-0.083	1.369
Mid Prev. Access	-0.484	0.013	-0.010	-0.006	-0.001	0.665
High Prev. Access	-0.753	0.041	-0.011	-0.008	0.003	0.985
Mid Time Disc.	0.016	0.010	-0.192	0.087	0.102	0.061
High Time Disc.	0.028	0.022	-0.287	0.131	0.151	0.122
Constant	-0.144	-0.103	-0.492	-0.501	0.289	-3.066

Optimal household decisions

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>									
	Relocation		Exposure Decision		Fin. Net-Savings		Dur. Cons.	Good invest.	Consumption	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Curr. Exp.	0.003	-0.578	2.202	1.906	1.277	0.646	-0.122	0.197	-0.329	-0.16
Curr. Assets	-0.045	-0.296	-0.019	-0.077	0.020	-0.251	0.067	0.226	0.027	0.11
Curr. Dur. Cons.	-1.132	-0.968	-0.260	-0.232	-0.114	0.054	-0.080	-0.182	0.180	0.12
Curr. Income	0.199	0.203	-0.235	-0.233	0.343	0.364	0.429	0.416	0.189	0.18
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Mid Time Disc.		0.016		0.010+		-0.192		0.087		0.10
High Time Disc.		0.028		0.022		-0.287		0.131		0.15
Constant	-0.949	-0.144	-0.487	-0.103	-0.901	-0.492	-0.394	-0.501	0.387	0.28

$$\text{Disaster Risk} = \text{Hazard} \times \text{Exposure} \times \text{Vulnerability}$$

- **Hazard**: Exogenous from the household perspective.
- **Exposure** E : What is the probability of the household being affected in case a natural disaster occurs. \implies Exposure variable in the model.
- **Vulnerability** Vul : How strongly is a household affected in case it gets hit by natural disaster. \implies

$$Vul := \frac{\mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{Y}}[V(E, S, W, \mathcal{Y}, D = 0)] - \mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{Y}}[V(E, S, W, \mathcal{Y}, D = 1)]}{\mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{Y}}[V(E, S, W, \mathcal{Y}, D = 0)] - \underline{V}}$$

- **Risk** R : Combination of Vulnerability and Exposure in our framework.

$$R = E \times Vul$$

Risk, Exposure and Vulnerability

	Equilibrium Values					
	Exposure		Vulnerability		Disaster Risk	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Edu. Class = 2	-0.500*** (0.003)	-0.529*** (0.003)	0.043*** (0.001)	0.025*** (0.001)	-0.210*** (0.002)	-0.194*** (0.002)
Edu. Class = 3	-1.448*** (0.004)	-1.426*** (0.004)	0.145*** (0.001)	0.140*** (0.001)	-0.730*** (0.003)	-0.505*** (0.003)
Edu. Class = 4	-1.938*** (0.005)	-1.880*** (0.005)	0.220*** (0.001)	0.225*** (0.001)	-1.065*** (0.004)	-0.702*** (0.003)
Edu. Class = 5	-3.745*** (0.015)	-3.577*** (0.015)	0.208*** (0.002)	0.236*** (0.002)	-2.644*** (0.015)	-1.914*** (0.012)
Mid Awareness		-0.389*** (0.004)		-0.127*** (0.001)		-0.338*** (0.002)
High Awareness		-0.660*** (0.004)		-0.312*** (0.001)		-0.680*** (0.002)
Mid Prev. Acc.		-0.006 (0.005)		-0.088*** (0.001)		-0.082*** (0.003)
High Prev. Acc.		0.025*** (0.005)		-0.157*** (0.001)		-0.121*** (0.003)
Mid Disc. Rate		0.116*** (0.003)		-0.023*** (0.001)		0.052*** (0.002)
High Disc. Rate		0.192*** (0.004)		-0.042*** (0.001)		0.089*** (0.002)
Income		-0.035*** (0.001)		-0.006*** (0.0002)		-0.151*** (0.001)
Constant	0.468*** (0.003)	0.934*** (0.007)	-4.266*** (0.001)	-3.902*** (0.002)	-4.752*** (0.002)	-4.022*** (0.004)