

Grants vs. Loans: the Role of Financial Aid in College Major Choice

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Introduction

- ▷ Choice of college major is an important investment decision
 - Comparable to decision of whether to attend university at all
 - Return heterog. across majors \geq college premium (Patnaik et al., 2020, Kirkeboen et al., 2016)
- ▷ Two margins why student loan recipients might differ from grant holders:
 - ① Concerns about repayment \implies choice of high return field
 - ② Uncertainty about graduation \implies choice of "easy" field

Preview of Talk and Findings

- ▷ We use quasi-random allocation of loans and grants in Chile
 - Test score threshold grants access: RD design
 - Estimate causal effect of being eligible for a grant as opposed to a loan
 - Combine the RDD with a discrete choice model to highlight mechanisms
- ▷ Being eligible for a grant as opposed to a loan:
 - Increases enrollment in higher education (mostly universities)
 - Increases STEM enrollment and graduation by up to 12.5%
 - Decreases worries about program-specific dropout probabilities and time to completion, but does not affect valuation of labor-market outcomes

Related Papers and Contribution

- ▶ Few papers on aid provision and college major choices List
 - Mainly focus on merit aid and sets of US universities
 - Lower STEM enrollment in response to more generous aid
 - Hampole (2022): \uparrow Aid \implies Low initial earnings, but steeper trajectory

- ▶ Key differences / contributions:
 1. Harmonized financial aid system across entire country
 2. Average students, not high-achievers
 3. Disentangling influence of several correlated program characteristics

Setting: Chilean Higher Education System

- ▶ As in most of Europe: students enroll in institution × major combination
- ▶ High tuition fees relative to median family income compared to rest of OECD
 - Median yearly tuition (family income): \$3,000 (\$5,600)
 - 10th percentile tuition: \$1,800
- ▶ State-backed financing of up to 90% of reference tuition (loan or grant)
- ▶ Access to financing determined as combination of:
 - (i) Family income (quintile bins)
 - (ii) Standardized Test taken after high school (*PSU*)

Details

Data and Empirical Strategy

- ▷ Merge Information from two data sources:
 - Ministry of Educ.: adm. records on universe of students (2011 - 2014)
 - DEMRE: PSU results and socio-dem. info for all test takers
- ▷ Our estimand of interest is the standard Sharp RD parameter:

$$\tau_{SRD} = \lim_{z \rightarrow 0^+} \mathbb{E}[Y_i | PSU_i^* = z] - \lim_{z \rightarrow 0^-} \mathbb{E}[Y_i | PSU_i^* = z]$$

- ▷ In practice, we estimate weighted local linear regressions:

$$Y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \mathbb{1}\{PSU_i^* \geq 0\} + \beta_2 \mathbb{1}\{PSU_i^* \geq 0\} \times PSU_i^* + \beta_3 PSU_i^* + X_i' \delta + \varepsilon_i$$

Grant Take-Up

McCrary Test

Balance Test

Effect of Being Eligible for Grants (Sharp RDD)

Table: Optimal Bandwidth

	STEM (=1) (1)	Engineering (=1) (2)	Sciences (=1) (3)
RD Estimate	0.029*** (0.007)	0.023*** (0.007)	0.005** (0.002)
Baseline Mean	0.253	0.232	0.021
Bandwidth	41	44	46
Effective N	52,522	56,358	58,733

By Year - Quintile


By Institution type

By Sociodemographics

Placebo Test

Different bandwidths

Figure: Non-parametric Evidence




General Enrollment

Effect of Grant Eligibility on All Fields

Rescaled

Figure: Effect of Grants vs. Loans: all Fields



- ▶ Hastings et al. (2013) estimate STEM, Social Sciences, and Health to be highest-return fields in Chile

Summary and Reason for a Model

- ▶ On average, grants increase enrollment in high return fields
 - But: STEM fields also those with highest dropout rates
 - Which characteristic interacts with aid is not clear from RDD
- ▶ Model allows us to consider narrower fields (up to data limitations)
 - Ideal: compare fields with comparable characteristics, expect for one dimension
 - I.e., consider variation within STEM degrees

- ▶ Mifuturo: transparency initiative of Chilean Ministry of Education
 - Provides information on programs, drawn from past cohorts
 - We use 206 programs defined as major by institution type (university, vocational)
 - Information on: earnings for graduates in first five years, employment rates after graduation, earnings percentiles, dropout rates, formal and realized time to graduation
- ▶ No subjective expectations data, but reasonable anchor

Discrete Choice Model and Estimation

- ▶ Consider $j = 1, \dots, J$ programs, with $k = 1, 2, \dots, K$ characteristics, and two groups $g = \{Loan, Grant\}$
 - Example for j : Chemistry at a University
 - Example for k : Expected Earnings for graduates of j
- ▶ Students maximize over j :

$$U_{ij}^g = \sum_k x_{j,k} (\tau_k^g + \beta_k^g PSU_i^*) + \varepsilon_{ij}$$

- PSU_i^* is individual i 's test score, normalized by grant cut-off
 - $\varepsilon_{i,j}$ is i.i.d. Extreme Value Taste Shock
 - Estimate $\{\tau_k^g, \beta_k^g\}_{g,k}$ by maximum-likelihood within a narrow bandwidth
- ⇒ Our target is $\Delta_k = \tau_k^{Grant} - \tau_k^{Loan}$

Difference in Valuation of Characteristics across Aid Types

Table: Difference in Valuation of Characteristics across Aid Types: Δ_k

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Excess Study Time	0.05 (0.035)	0.055* (0.03)	0.054** (0.027)
Share Dropout	1.83** (0.824)	1.269* (0.714)	0.907 (0.638)
Earnings, year 1	-0.035 (0.033)	-0.023 (0.028)	-0.018 (0.024)
Earnings Growth, year 1 to 5	0.364 (0.358)	0.407 (0.309)	0.339 (0.276)
Earnings Pct.90/Pct.10	-0.047 (0.081)	-0.036 (0.070)	-0.023 (0.062)
Share Employed	-0.014 (2.000)	-0.619 (1.715)	-0.767 (1.525)
<i>N</i>	15,114	20,298	25,293
Bandwidth	15	20	25

- ▷ This **does not** translate into higher realized dropout rates and time spent at college

Discussion

- ▶ Type of Financial Aid affects Students' Major Choices
 - Suggest uncertainty about degree completion as channel
- ▶ We estimate local treatment effects around PSU cut-off
 - Considered students are of average academic preparedness (contrast to e.g., Sjoquist and Winters, 2015)
- ▶ Chilean aid system is highly transparent; students are well informed
 - Previous research: uncertainty about aid eligibility impacts effectiveness (Bettinger et al., 2012; Dynarski et al., 2021)

Thank you

References

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Prueba de Selección Universitaria (PSU)

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- ▶ Administered yearly in early December by *DEMRE* (part of UChile) in country-wide testing centers
- ▶ Nationally standardized multiple choice test:
 - Two mandatory components: *Mathematics* and *Language*
 - At least one of: *Science* or *History, Geography, and Social Science*
 - Results are standardized ($\mu = 500$, $\sigma = 110$, Range: 150–850)
- ▶ Only average of mandatory fields used for grant eligibility

Eligibility Criteria for Grants

why excluding 500?

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Table: PSU Threshold for Grant Eligibility


Bicentennial and Juan Gomez Millas (JGM)				
	<i>2012</i>	<i>2013</i>	<i>2014</i>	<i>2015</i>
<i>Quintile 1</i>	550	500	500	500
<i>Quintile 2</i>	550	525	525	500
<i>Quintile 3</i>	550	550	550	500
<i>> Quintile 3</i>	N.E.	N.E.	N.E.	N.E. / 500

Note: Displayed are the minimum test score averages of math and language that grant eligibility to either of the two scholarships, by year and family income quintile. N.E.: not eligible. Bicentennial and JGM grants are received conditional on enrolling in CRUCH and accredited universities, respectively.

First Stage: Take-Up of Grants around Cut-off

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
Figure: Take-up of any grant in 1.25 PSU point bins



Identification: No Sorting

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Figure: McCrary Test for Discontinuity in Running Variable



Identification: Continuity Potential Outcomes

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Table: Covariate Balance around Grant Eligibility Cut-off

	Baseline (β_0)	RD Estimate (β_1)	SE ($\hat{\beta}_1$)
High School GPA	5.725	0.002	0.008
# Working Family Members	1.159	-0.001	0.011
# Studying Family Members	0.100	-0.004	0.005
Female	0.540	0.004	0.007
Single Mother HH	0.188	-0.004	0.004
Academic Parents	0.445	-0.015**	0.009
Took Science Test	0.667	0.002	0.009
Municipal School	0.271	-0.007	0.004
Subsidized School	0.673	-0.010**	0.004
Academic School	0.809	-0.006	0.006

** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$.

Effect on STEM: by year and family income quintile

		Year 2012	Year 2013	Year 2014
Quintile 1	RD Estimate	0.034* (0.018)		
	Baseline	0.243		
	PSU Cut-off	550		
	N	11,654		
Quintile 2	RD Estimate	0.013 (0.024)	0.042** (0.017)	0.032** (0.014)
	Baseline	0.251	0.261	0.263
	PSU Cut-Off	550	525	525
	N	7,669	11,263	11,368
Quintile 3	RD Estimate	0.037* (0.021)	0.027 (0.019)	0.006 (0.020)
	Baseline	0.211	0.262	0.270
	PSU Cut-off	550	550	550
	N	5,777	7,772	7,911

Effect on STEM: by year and family income quintile

Table: Effect of Grants vs. Loans on Enrollment in STEM, by Institution Types

	STEM in...		
	CRUCH	Private Uni	Vocational
RD_Estimate	0.020*** (0.005)	0.007** (0.003)	0.001 (0.004)
Baseline Mean	0.140	0.043	0.070
Bandwidth	50	50	50
Effective N	62,668	62,668	62,668

** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.





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Heterogeneity: Effect on STEM by Subgroups

	Gender		
	Male	Female	Δ of Coefficients
RD_Estimate	0.042*** (0.013)	0.020** (0.008)	-0.022 (0.015)
Baseline Mean	0.398	0.130	
Effective N	28,167	27,210	
	Parental Education		
	Second-Gen	First-Gen	Δ of Coefficients
RD_Estimate	0.025*** (0.009)	0.033*** (0.010)	0.008 (0.013)
Baseline Mean	0.251	0.252	
Effective N	28,202	28,344	
	Parental Income		
	Quintile 2+3	First Quintile	Δ of Coefficients
RD_Estimate	0.028*** (0.008)	0.034** (0.017)	0.006 (0.019)
Baseline Mean	0.255	0.243	
Effective N	42,475	12,969	

Placebo Test: RD Estimate on Non-Eligible Population


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RD Estimates for Various Bandwidths

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Figure: Effect on STEM Enrollment



RD Estimates on General Enrollment

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Table: Effect of Grants vs. Loans on Enrollment in Different Institution Types


	Enrolled in...			
	Any Institution	CRUCH	Private Uni	Vocational
RD_Estimate	0.032*** (0.006)	0.029*** (0.007)	0.009 (0.008)	-0.005 (0.006)
Baseline Mean	0.797	0.357	0.295	0.146
Bandwidth	50	50	50	50
Effective N	62,668	62,668	62,668	62,668

** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Effect of Grant Eligibility on All Fields: Rescaled

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Figure: Effect of Grants vs. Loans: Coeff. rescaled by Baseline Enrollment



Financial Aid and STEM Subfields

Table: Results for STEM subfields: Engineering and Natural Sciences

	Engineering (=1)		Natural Sciences (=1)	
RD Estimate	0.022** (0.009)	0.021* (0.011)	0.005** (0.002)	0.006* (0.003)
Baseline Mean	0.234	0.238	0.021	0.021
Bandwidth	43.3	25	49.9	25
Effective N	59,634	34,875	67,788	34,875


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Ingreso Promedio	Tramos de Ingreso	Evolución Ingreso	Empleabilidad	Evolución Empleabilidad	Titulados	Matrícula y Retención	Establecimiento de Origen
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







Matemáticas y/o Estadísticas

Ingresos brutos mensuales (en pesos a septiembre de 2021)

[Más Información](#)

Number of Programs as a function of PSU

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Increase Risk Taking and Graduation

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Table: Effect of Grants vs. Loans on Graduation Conditional on Enrollment

	Graduated in...		Years to Completion in...			
	Any (1)	STEM (2)	Any (3)	Any (4)	STEM (5)	STEM (6)
RD Estimate	0.008 (0.010)	-0.004 (0.013)	0.071** (0.035)	0.040 (0.026)	0.152** (0.068)	0.075 (0.057)
Baseline Mean	0.607	0.464	5.823	5.823	5.623	5.623
Bandwidth	63	79	38	47	62	67
Effective N	62,061	24,961	24,358	29,736	9,503	10,247
# Semester Req.			No	Yes	No	Yes

Note: * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.