

# Conservative Holdings, Aggressive Trades: Learning, Equilibrium Flows, and Risk Premia

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# Motivation

Periods of **high uncertainty** are frequently associated with:

- A **flow of risky assets** from institutional to individual investors'
  - ▶ Institutions **sell**/individuals **buy** when uncertainty is high
- An **increase in risk premia**
  - ▶ E.g. FOMC, macro, or earning announcements

# Existing explanations

- **Flows:**

- ▶ **Portfolio constraints, information asymmetry...**
- ▶ **Liquidity provision** by individual investors  
(Barrot, Kaniel, and Sraer, 2016, Glossner, Matos, Ramelli, and Wagner, 2020, Kaniel, Saar, and Titman, 2008, Pástor and Vorsatz, 2020)
- ▶ **“Attention-induced” trading**  
(Barber and Odean, 2008, Frazzini and Lamont, 2007, Hirshleifer, Myers, Myers, and Teoh, 2008, Barber, Huang, Odean, and Schwarz, 2021)

- **Risk premium:**

- ▶ Rational expectations: counter-cyclical **objective** risk premium (habits, long-run risks, disasters,...)  
(survey: Cochrane, 2017)
- ▶ Parameter uncertainty and **learning**: dynamics of **subjective risk premium** (“out-of-sample”)  
(Lewellen and Shanken, 2002, Collin-Dufresne, Johannes, and Lochstoer, 2016b, Nagel and Xu, 2022, ...)

# This paper

- Alternative explanation for **equilibrium** flows **and** risk premia that relies on **two channels**:
  - 1) **Learning** about the underlying parameters of the economy
    - ★ Economy with iid-normal dividend, unknown **mean** and **variance**
  - 2) **Heterogeneity** in agents' **confidence** in parameter estimates
    - ★ **Ambiguity-neutral** vs. **Ambiguity-averse** investors (Knightian uncertainty/robustness)
- **Key** channels to explain the effects of cash flow “surprises” on:
  - ▶ portfolio flows
  - ▶ risk premia

# Main results

- **Equilibrium flows**

- ▶ **Ambiguity-averse**: conservative holdings but aggressive trades after dividend surprises
- ▶ **Ambiguity-neutral**: aggressive holdings but conservative after dividend surprises

- **Equilibrium risk premia**

- ▶ Endogenously time-varying **subjective** risk-premium: increasing following **large dividend surprises**
  - ★ Variance estimate increases after cash flow **surprises**
- ▶ Skewness in **objective** risk premium:
  - ★ Increases more after negative dividend surprises
  - ★ Left-skewed price innovations

- **Methodology**: show how to handle learning about variance in an infinite-horizon OLG economy

- ▶ Bayesian updating with “**truncated**” priors

- **Empirically**: provide support of predictions using institutional investors data

# Outline

- Intuition in a simple **two-period** model
- An **infinite-horizon** overlapping generations (**OLG**) model
  - ▶ (Unknown mean, **known variance**  $\implies$  no portfolio flows)
  - ▶ Unknown mean, **unknown variance**  $\implies$  portfolio flows
- **Empirical** evidence
- Conclusion

## Two-period model – Economy

- **Risky asset** in finite supply: produces perishable dividends  $\tilde{d} \sim \mathcal{N}(\mu, \sigma^2)$ 
  - ▶  $\mu$  **unknown**
  - ▶  $\sigma$  **known**
- **Riskless asset** in infinite supply—exogenous risk-free rate  $r$
- No initial consumption
- At initial date agents have observed a history of  $t$  dividends
  - ▶ time series **average**:  $m$  and **standard error**  $s = \frac{\sigma}{\sqrt{t}}$
- **Two types** of CARA agents with same risk aversion  $\gamma > 0$ 
  - ▶ Type-S: **ambiguity neutral** (Subjective Expected Utility)
  - ▶ Type-A: **ambiguity averse**

## Two-period model – Beliefs

- Type  $S$  subjective distribution of the dividend (“**single-prior**”)

$$\tilde{d} \sim^S \mathcal{N}\left(\mu^S, \sigma^2 \left(\frac{t+1}{t}\right)\right), \text{ where } \mu^S = m$$

- Type  $A$  subjective distribution of the dividend (“**multi-prior**”)

$$\tilde{d} \sim^A \mathcal{N}\left(\mu^A, \sigma^2 \left(\frac{t+1}{t}\right)\right), \text{ where } \mu^A \in \mathcal{P} \equiv [m - \kappa s, m + \kappa s]$$

with  $\kappa > 0$  coefficient of **ambiguity aversion**

- ▶ **Classical statistics**,  $\kappa =$  quantile of a distribution (see, e.g., Bewley, 2011)
- ▶  $\kappa$  captures **heterogeneity** between agents:  $\kappa = 0 \implies A = S$
- ▶ Note: size of set of priors  $\mathcal{P}$  depends on **standard error**  $s$



# Two-period model – Optimal portfolios


- Type-S **portfolio problem**

$$\max_{\theta^S} \mathbb{E} \left[ -\frac{1}{\gamma} e^{-\gamma \widetilde{W}^S} \right], \quad \text{s.t.} \quad \widetilde{W}^S = W^S(1+r) + \theta^S(\tilde{d} - p(1+r))$$

- Type-A **portfolio problem** (Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989))

$$\max_{\theta^A} \min_{\mu^A \in \mathcal{P}} \mathbb{E}^A \left[ -\frac{1}{\gamma} e^{-\gamma \widetilde{W}^A} \right], \quad \text{s.t.} \quad \begin{aligned} \widetilde{W}^A &= W^A(1+r) + \theta^A(\tilde{d} - p(1+r)) \\ \mathcal{P} &= [m - \kappa s, m + \kappa s] \end{aligned}$$

## Two-period model - Demand and Equilibrium



- $p^* < \frac{m-\kappa s}{1+r}$ : both participate
- $p^* > \frac{m-\kappa s}{1+r}$ : A does not participate

## Two-period model – Equilibrium

- **Equilibrium price:**  $p^*$  s.t.  $\theta^A + \theta^S = 1$

$$p^* = \frac{1}{1+r}m - \lambda, \quad \text{with} \quad \lambda = \begin{cases} \frac{\gamma}{2} \left(\frac{t+1}{t}\right) \sigma^2 + \frac{\kappa}{2} \frac{\sigma}{\sqrt{t}} & \text{if } \kappa \leq \kappa^* \text{ (A\&S participate)} \\ \gamma \left(\frac{t+1}{t}\right) \sigma^2 & \text{if } \kappa > \kappa^* \text{ (Only S participates)} \end{cases}$$

- Agent  $A$  participates only if ambiguity aversion  $\kappa$  is **sufficiently low** ( $\kappa \leq \kappa^*$ )
- If agents  $A$  participate, risk premium **linear-quadratic** in  $\sigma$ 
  - ▶ **Ambiguity aversion** has a **first-order effect** on asset prices
  - ▶  $A$  is locally not risk neutral (“First-order risk aversion”)
- $\lambda$  is  $S$ 's **subjective risk premium:**  $\lambda = \mu^S - (1+r)p^*$ ,  $\mu^S = m$

## Two-period model – Equilibrium portfolio holdings


- **Equilibrium risky holdings:** Replace equilibrium  $p^*$  in agents' risky asset demands

$$\theta^A = \frac{1}{2} - \frac{\kappa}{2\gamma} \left( \frac{\sqrt{t}}{t+1} \right) \frac{1}{\sigma}$$
$$\theta^S = \frac{1}{2} + \frac{\kappa}{2\gamma} \left( \frac{\sqrt{t}}{t+1} \right) \frac{1}{\sigma}$$

- An **increasing** dividend **volatility**  $\sigma$  leads to:
  - ▶ an **increase** in  $\theta^A$  (“aggressive  $A$  trades”)
  - ▶ a **decline** in  $\theta^S$  (“conservative  $S$  trades”)

**Note:** equilibrium portfolio weights  $\theta$ s **independent** of beliefs about **dividend mean**  $\mu$

# Equilibrium Portfolios



- Ambiguity-averse equilibrium holdings  $\theta^A$  **increase** with dividend volatility
- Ambiguity-neutral equilibrium holdings  $\theta^S$  **decrease** with dividend volatility

# Intuition

- Because of ambiguity aversion  $A$  holds **less** risky asset than  $S$ 
  - ▶  $A$  has more **marginal “risk capacity”** than  $S$
  - ▶  $A$ 's risky-asset demand shows **less risk sensitivity**
- Following an increase in variance:
  - ▶  $A$  requires **less** return compensation than  $S$  to keep the same portfolio
  - ▶ As a “response to an increase” in volatility (*handwaving* argument, more rigorous later)
  - ▶  $\Rightarrow A$  **buys** and  $S$  **sells** risky asset ▶ Intuition
- Ambiguity aversion ( $A$  agents) implies
  - ▶ “conservative” holdings:  $\theta^A < \theta^S$  **BUT**
  - ▶ “aggressive” trades:  $\Delta\theta^A > 0$ ,  $\Delta\theta^S < 0$
- **Caveat:** comparative statics w.r.t.  $\sigma \neq$  portfolio flows!

# An Overlapping-Generations (OLG) model

- **Infinite horizon.** Two types of agents:
  - ▶ **Ambiguity averse:**  $A$
  - ▶ **Ambiguity neutral** (subjective expected utility):  $S$
- Agents live for **two periods** with **overlapping generations**, CARA utility.
- Risky and risk-free assets. No first-period consumption.
- iid dividend process  $d_t \sim \mathcal{N}(\mu, \sigma^2)$ :
  - ▶  $\mu, \sigma$  **constant** but **unknown**
- Portfolios of generation- $t$ :  $\theta_t^i, i = A, S$
- Inter-generational **flows**

$$\Delta\theta_t^i = \theta_t^i - \theta_{t-1}^i, \quad i = A, S$$

## Why learning about volatility?

- For **tractability**, literature focused mainly on uncertainty about mean, not variance
  - ▶ High-frequency observations  $\implies$  variance estimated precisely (Merton 1980)
- Learning about variance relevant if information arrives in “**chunks**”, e.g., FOMC announcements
- Weitzman (2007, AER): “for asset pricing implications [...] the most critical issue involved in Bayesian learning [...] is the unknown variance”
  - ▶ Fat tails of predictive distribution can reverse macro-finance puzzles (risk premium, riskfree, volatility)



# Why not stochastic volatility?

- Starkly different implication for equilibrium flows.
- **Stochastic and observable volatility**
  - ▶ any new dividend observation **reduces** the standard error of the mean and hence its confidence interval
- **Unobservable volatility and learning**
  - ▶ a change in the estimated variance implies a change in the **perceived** information quality of *all* historically observed dividends
  - ▶ any new dividend observation can both **increase** or **decrease** the standard error of the mean



# Two issues

1) OLG with **unknown variance**  $\implies$  subjective  $d_{t+1}$  is Student-t (fat tails!)

▶  $\mathbb{E}_t[u(d_{t+1})] = \mathbb{E}_t\left[-\frac{1}{\gamma}e^{-\gamma d_{t+1}}\right]$  **does not exist!!** (see Geweke, 2001)

▶ Solution: Assume  $\sigma \in [\underline{\sigma}, \bar{\sigma}]$ , precision  $\phi = 1/\sigma^2$  is **truncated Gamma**

★ Bakshi and Skoulakis (2010) provide Bayesian updating theory that preserves **conjugacy**





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

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## Two issues (cont.)

2) **OLG with constant parameters**  $(\mu, \sigma) \implies$  learning eventually irrelevant


- ▶ **Perpetual learning** is relevant when there is “**leakage**” in **information transfer** from generation  $t$  to generation  $t + 1$
- ▶ Model **information leakage** as **shocks** that “**blur**” **priors** on  $\mu$  and  $\sigma$
- ▶ Similar to “**fading memory**” (Nagel and Xu, 2021) or “**age-related experiential learning**” (Malmendier and Nagel, 2016, Collin-Dufresne, Johannes, and Lochstoer, 2016a, Ehling, Graniero, and Heyerdahl-Larsen, 2018, Malmendier, Pouzo, and Vanasco, 2020)

## Two issues (cont.)


### 2) OLG with constant parameters $(\mu, \sigma) \implies$ learning eventually irrelevant

- ▶ **Perpetual learning** is relevant when there is “leakage” in **information transfer** from generation  $t$  to generation  $t + 1$
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### $\implies$ OLG with **unknown variance** and **perpetual learning**





# OLG with unknown variance and perpetual learning: Equilibrium portfolios and risk premia



- As in the two-pd model, an **increase** in  $\hat{\sigma} \equiv \sqrt{b_t/\bar{n}}$  leads to:
  - ▶ an **increase** in  $\theta_t^A$  ("aggressive A trades") and a **decrease** in  $\theta_t^S$
  - ▶ an **increase** in risk premium


# Equilibrium portfolios and dividend surprises



- Dividend **surprise**:  $e_{t+1}^i = d_{t+1} - \mu_t^i$ . **Deviation** from **subjective mean** belief
- Equilibrium flows large positive and negative surprises  $\implies$  A buys and S sells the risky asset



# Equilibrium portfolio flows and risk premia vs. dividend surprises



- Large surprises  $\implies$  A buys ( $\Delta\theta_t^A > 0$ )
- Large surprises  $\implies$  high risk premium  $\Lambda_t$  (right axis)

## Return predictability

- **Objective** risk premium. Using the equilibrium price  $p_t = \frac{1}{r}m_t - \Lambda(b_t)$ , we have

$$\Lambda_t^{\text{obj}} \equiv \frac{\mu}{r} - p_t = \begin{cases} \frac{1}{r}(\mu - m_t) + \Lambda(t), & \text{if **known** variance} \\ \frac{1}{r}(\mu - m_t) + \Lambda(b_t), & \text{if **unknown** variance} \end{cases}$$

$b_t$ : measure of **variance**

- $\mu - m_t$  detectable **ex-post** but not exploitable **ex-ante** (Lewellen and Shanken, 2002)
- **Subjective** risk premium  $\Lambda(b_t)$  **not countercyclical**, **increases** with estimated **volatility** (Nagel and Xu, 2022)
- **Skewness**: asymmetry of  $\Lambda_t^{\text{obj}}$  response to news shocks:
  - ▶ Bad news  $\implies$  High  $b_t$  and low  $m_t \implies$  **amplification** effect on  $\Lambda_t^{\text{obj}}$
  - ▶ Good news  $\implies$  High  $b_t$  and high  $m_t \implies$  **dampening** effect on  $\Lambda_t^{\text{obj}}$

# Empirical analysis (in progress...)

Two key challenges:

- 1) How to **map** agents in the model to observable market participants?
  - ▶ **Individual** more averse to uncertainty than **institutions** (Li, Tiwari, and Tong, 2017)
  - ▶ Ambiguity aversion influenced by perceived **competence** (Heath and Tversky, 1991, Fox and Tversky, 1995)
  - ▶  $\Rightarrow$  Type-A  $\approx$  **retail** investors, Type-S  $\approx$  **institutional** investors
- 2) How to measure uncertainty/surprises?
  - ▶ Use large market return realizations ( $\Delta p_t$ ) as **proxy** for increase in uncertainty ( $e_t$ )

# Data and methodology

## ● Holdings:

- ▶ **Aggregate** level and flow data on corporate equity holdings of **households** and **financial sector**: 1952.Q1–2020.Q4 (Federal Reserve of St. Louis, FRED)
- ▶ **Institutional** holdings of U.S. **firms**: 2000.Q1–2020.Q1 (Thomson Reuters OP Global Ownership database + Compustat-CapitalIQ)
  - ★ 13F reporting institutions, mutual, pension and insurance funds: 274,697 firm-quarter observations

## ● Returns:

- ▶ CRSP return data of all NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ firms, 1965.01–2020.12

## ● Surprises in firms' future profitability:



- ▶ Deviation from standardized market returns over a rolling 20-quarter window (Mkt return from Kenneth French's data library)

## ● Subjective risk premium, conditional on surprises

- ▶ **Aggregate**. Households and financials holdings return in excess of the 3-month risk-free rate (FRED)
- ▶ **Cross sectional**. Fama-MacBeth regression using stock return data (CRSP)

# Evidence – institutional investors portfolio flows


- Institutional investors **reduce** risky holdings after extreme surprises



- **“Surprise”**: standardized market return     $\Delta\theta_t^S$ : change in risky asset holding of institutions

# Evidence – subjective risk premium

- Large **surprises** (positive and negative) imply a **high** subjective **risk premium**



## New dataset / New revision

- **EUR STOXX 50 futures** transactions on Eurex
- January 2002 to December 2020
- **824 million trades** at a frequency of **milliseconds**
- Three trader types: **Agency traders, proprietary traders, market makers**
- Argue that **agency traders** (trading for clients) are **less ambiguity averse** than proprietary traders and market makers
  - ▶ **Desire** for **robustness** as a reaction of market makers' **inventory risk**, Routledge and Zin (2009), Easley and O'Hara (2010) and Zhou (2021)
  - ▶ **Proprietary traders** and **market makers** do **less informed** trades, Menkveld and Saru (2023)
- **Confirm** our **model predictions** regarding flows and risk premia

# Conclusions


- Develop a **general equilibrium asset pricing model** with
  - ▶ **learning** about the **moments** of the endowment process
  - ▶ **heterogeneous confidence** in parameter estimates
- **Learning** about **variance** (not just the mean)
  - ▶ key to understanding risk-premia and portfolio flows around dividend “surprises”
- Can **explain** features of both **asset prices** and **flows**
  - ▶ **Individuals** hold **conservative portfolios** but **buy** in response to **positive and negative surprises**
  - ▶ Endogenously time-varying risk premium
- **Verify** these predictions **empirically**
- Understanding the dynamics of flows in **inelastic** markets (“demand-based asset pricing”)



# Additional Slides


## Intuition—Type- $S$ agents' iso-portfolios

- **Iso-portfolios:** pairs  $(\sigma, \lambda)$  s.t.  $S$ 's portfolio  $\theta^S$  is constant




- Agents  $S$  are “locally risk neutral” (second-order risk aversion) [▶ Back](#)

## Intuition—Type-A agents' iso-portfolios




- If  $\lambda < \kappa\sigma/\sqrt{t} \Rightarrow$  **no participation**
- Agents A are “locally risk averse” (first-order risk aversion) [▶ Back](#)

# Intuition—Market clearing, $\theta^A + \theta^S = 1$



- A iso-lines always **flatter** than  $S$  at equilibrium ( $\theta^A + \theta^S = 1$ ) [▶ Back](#)
  - ▶ Agents  $A$  require a **smaller compensation** for bearing **extra risk** than  $S$

# Intuition–Equilibrium Risk Premium



- Ambiguity averse agents **increase**  $\theta^A$  as  $\sigma$  increases [▶ Back](#)
  - ▶ A (S) iso-lines always intersect  $\lambda$  from above (below)

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