

The impacts of studying abroad: Evidence from a government-sponsored scholarship program in Brazil

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
The Science Without Borders program

- Created by the Brazilian Ministry of Education in July 2011
 - **Goal:** Send students for 6-12 months exchange period.
- **Focus on undergraduates**, which accounted for 79% (73,353) of the scholarships between 2011 and 2016.
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- **Benefits:** monthly stipend, airfare, housing allowance, health insurance, installation aid, and aid for educational materials.
- **Very high costs:** US\$ 2.72 billion (BRL 15 billion in 2022) EU spent EU 14bi on ERASMUS between 14-20.
 - **5x the average expenditure necessary to maintain a student in a public university during one year** in Brazil. Same cost of a school meal program that attends 39 million of children.

Figure: Number of government-sponsored undergraduate scholarships per year in Brazil



Source: De Negri, 2022.

Paper in a nutshell

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
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- **Main results:** Negative impacts on post-graduation enrollment. No effects on the probability of having a formal job and entrepreneurship.
- **Mechanism:** ↑ delayed graduation and (potential) brain drain

Empirical Strategy: Data

We build a novel data set comprising public and non public registries. We merged the data sets using probabilistic linkages using the Brazilian social security number (e.g., ***-123-456-**) and complete names.

- Non public:
 - **CSF candidates registry:** applicants x approved. Provided by CNPQ and CAPES.
 - **University records:** entrance exam score, enrollment year, major provided by each university
 - **Formal Labor Market (RAIS):** painel data with employment status and wages.
- Public:
 - **Post graduation:** enrollment in a graduate program in Brazil.
 - **Formal entrepreneurship:** firm registry as a partner.
- Add non-public: detailed students history at UFBA.

Sample distribution



Program selection and IV

Program selection:

- 1) CSF launch the call (e.g. UK, March 2013)
- 2) Students apply at their home university
- 3) Each university sends a shortlist to CNPQ and CAPES
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Problem: We have information on 13 out of 60 universities, and CNPQ and CAPES did not provide the ENEM score of the last approved candidate in some calls.

Empirical Strategy:

$$Y_{i,c} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Approved}_{i,c} + \beta_2 \text{Entrance_Exam}_{i,c} + \beta_3 \text{Male}_i + \beta_4 \text{Dup_Major}_i + \alpha_s + \pi_u + \theta_m + \mu_y + \psi_d + \varepsilon_{i,c} \quad (1)$$

- $Y_{i,c}$ is one of the outcomes
- $\text{Approved}_{i,c}$ is a dummy if the student received the scholarship.
- $\text{Entrance_Exam}_{i,c}$ is the vestibular score
- α_s , π_u , θ_m , μ_y and ψ_d are cohort, university, major, call's year, and destination country fixed effect
 - In the appendix, we show results using a (major-university-call's year) fixed effect. Results do not change
- Standard errors clustered at the call level

Program selection and IV

- We created a measure of each program call competitiveness:
 - Discounted call approval rate: share of approved per-call excluding the candidates from the 13 universities in the sample.
 - Intuition: more students from other university approved in a given call, less competitive is the call
 - More competitive a call is, the less likely it is for a given applicant from one of the thirteen universities in the sample to receive a scholarship scholarship.


Important: candidates did not know the number of slots available and if there would be new calls for the same destination country

Exclusion Restriction

Table: The effect of CSF on pre-treatment covariates using UFBA data

| | Age | Metropolitan Region of Salvador | Mother or father with a college degree | Single | Financially dependent Financially dependent | Attended vocational track in high school |
|---------------|------------------|------------------------------------|---|-------------------|--|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| Approved | 0.181 [0.532] | 0.067 [0.114] | 0.020 [0.092] | -0.085 [0.083] | 0.019 [0.072] | 0.007 [0.0445] |
| Mean dep. var | 18.92 | 0.626 | 0.198 | 0.847 | 0.545 | 0.072 |
| Obs | 1,566 | 1,566 | 1,566 | 1,566 | 1,566 | 1,566 |
| No. clusters | 80 | 80 | 80 | 80 | 80 | 80 |

Difference between call-date and scholarship start and end



Effects of Science Without Borders on post-graduation

Table: Effects on postgraduate education enrollment

| | +1 year | +2 years | +3 years | +4 years | +5 years | +6 years | +7 years | Pooled +1 to +3 years | Pooled +4 to +7 years | Pooled +8 to +9 years |
|---------------|---------------------|----------------------|----------------------|--------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) |
| Approved | -0.028** [0.013] | -0.085*** [0.024] | -0.118*** [0.036] | -0.075* [0.038] | -0.033 [0.031] | -0.006 [0.024] | -0.029 [0.028] | -0.125*** [0.036] | -0.065** [0.030] | -0.026 [0.027] |
| Mean dep. var | 0.02 | 0.07 | 0.14 | 0.20 | 0.21 | 0.20 | 0.19 | 0.14 | 0.29 | 0.20 |
| Obs | 14,271 | 14,271 | 14,271 | 14,271 | 14,271 | 14,271 | 14,271 | 14,271 | 14,271 | 14,271 |
| No. clusters | 97 | 97 | 97 | 97 | 97 | 97 | 97 | 97 | 97 | 71 |

Effects of Science without Borders on having a formal job

Table: Effects on having a formal job

| | +1 year | +2 years | +3 years | +4 years | +5 years | +6 years | +7 years | Pooled +1 to +3 years | Pooled +4 to +7 years | Pooled +8 to +9 years |
|--|----------|-----------|----------|-----------|----------|-----------|----------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) |
| Panel A. Only contracts started after the call's year | | | | | | | | | | |
| Approved | -0.023** | -0.053*** | -0.038* | -0.060*** | 0.009 | -0.093*** | -0.042 | -0.058*** | -0.072** | -0.031 |
| | [0.009] | [0.017] | [0.021] | [0.019] | [0.022] | [0.025] | [0.027] | [0.020] | [0.032] | [0.024] |
| Mean dep. var | 0.03 | 0.07 | 0.11 | 0.12 | 0.15 | 0.19 | 0.26 | 0.13 | 0.37 | 0.32 |
| Obs | 14,271 | 14,271 | 14,271 | 14,271 | 14,271 | 14,271 | 14,271 | 14,271 | 14,271 | 14,271 |
| No. clusters | 97 | 97 | 97 | 97 | 97 | 97 | 97 | 97 | 97 | 71 |
| Panel B. All contracts independently of when they started | | | | | | | | | | |
| Approved | -0.031** | -0.055*** | -0.039* | -0.060*** | 0.004 | -0.093*** | -0.038 | -0.065*** | -0.076** | -0.032 |
| | [0.013] | [0.017] | [0.022] | [0.022] | [0.023] | [0.026] | [0.026] | [0.022] | [0.033] | [0.023] |
| Mean dep. var | 0.05 | 0.08 | 0.12 | 0.12 | 0.15 | 0.20 | 0.27 | 0.14 | 0.38 | 0.33 |
| Obs | 14,271 | 14,271 | 14,271 | 14,271 | 14,271 | 14,271 | 14,271 | 14,271 | 14,271 | 14,271 |
| No. clusters | 97 | 97 | 97 | 97 | 97 | 97 | 97 | 97 | 97 | 71 |

Effects of Science without Borders on entrepreneurship

Table: Effects on being a firm owner or partner

| | +1 year | +2 years | +3 years | +4 years | +5 years | +6 years | +7 years | Pooled +1 to +3 years | Pooled +4 to +7 years | Pooled +8 to +9 years |
|--|-------------------|----------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|------------------|--------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) |
| Panel A. Only firms started up after the call's year | | | | | | | | | | |
| Approved | -0.007 [0.007] | -0.020*** [0.006] | -0.013 [0.011] | -0.014 [0.014] | -0.021 [0.015] | 0.014 [0.015] | -0.025* [0.014] | -0.042*** [0.016] | -0.047* [0.027] | -0.033** [0.016] |
| Mean dep. var | 0.01 | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.04 | 0.05 | 0.05 | 0.05 | 0.05 | 0.17 | 0.08 |
| Obs | 14,271 | 14,271 | 14,271 | 14,271 | 14,271 | 14,271 | 14,271 | 14,271 | 14,271 | 14,271 |
| No. clusters | 97 | 97 | 97 | 97 | 97 | 97 | 97 | 97 | 97 | 71 |
| Panel B. All firms independently of when they started | | | | | | | | | | |
| Approved | -0.007 [0.007] | -0.020*** [0.006] | -0.013 [0.011] | -0.014 [0.014] | -0.021 [0.015] | 0.014 [0.015] | -0.025* [0.014] | -0.042*** [0.016] | -0.047* [0.027] | -0.033** [0.016] |
| Mean dep. var | 0.01 | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.04 | 0.05 | 0.05 | 0.05 | 0.05 | 0.17 | 0.08 |
| Obs | 14,271 | 14,271 | 14,271 | 14,271 | 14,271 | 14,271 | 14,271 | 14,271 | 14,271 | 14,271 |
| No. clusters | 97 | 97 | 97 | 97 | 97 | 97 | 97 | 97 | 97 | 71 |

Table: Effects on graduation, on-time graduation, and the main outcomes for candidates enrolled at UFBA

| | Graduation | On-time graduation | Postgrad. +1 to +3 | Postgrad. +4 to +7 | Formal emp. +1 to +3 | Formal emp. +4 to +7 | Firm owner +1 to +3 | Firm owner +4 to +7 |
|------------------------------|------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|----------------------|----------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
| Panel A. Second stage | | | | | | | | |
| Approved | 0.185* | -0.231*** | -0.018 | -0.017 | -0.132*** | -0.208** | -0.061 | 0.079 |
| | [0.104] | [0.051] | [0.054] | [0.066] | [0.041] | [0.102] | [0.042] | [0.092] |
| Mean dep. var | 0.79 | 0.18 | 0.08 | 0.22 | 0.11 | 0.34 | 0.07 | 0.21 |
| Obs | 2,044 | 2,040 | 2,044 | 2,044 | 2,044 | 2,044 | 2,044 | 2,044 |
| No. clusters | 85 | 85 | 85 | 85 | 85 | 85 | 85 | 85 |
| Panel B. First stage | | | | | | | | |
| Ratio | 1.051*** | 1.055*** | 1.051*** | 1.051*** | 1.051*** | 1.072*** | 1.072*** | 1.072*** |
| | [0.157] | [0.159] | [0.157] | [0.157] | [0.157] | [0.152] | [0.152] | [0.152] |
| F-stat of Instrument | 44.54 | 43.98 | 44.54 | 44.54 | 44.54 | 49.85 | 49.85 | 50.85 |

Attrition: Effects of Science Without Borders on being found in any of the data sets

Table: Effects on the probability of finding the candidate in any outcome data set

| | +1 year | +2 years | +3 years | +4 years | +5 years | +6 years | +7 years | +8 years |
|-----------------------|---------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|-------------------|--------------------|--------------------|------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
| Approved | -0.043** [0.017] | -0.137*** [0.024] | -0.143*** [0.034] | -0.114*** [0.041] | -0.031 [0.035] | -0.062* [0.033] | -0.057* [0.031] | -0.03 [0.057] |
| Mean control dep. var | 0.05 | 0.14 | 0.24 | 0.31 | 0.36 | 0.39 | 0.44 | 0.42 |
| Obs | 14,271 | 14,271 | 14,271 | 14,271 | 14,271 | 14,271 | 10,881 | 4807 |
| No. clusters | 97 | 97 | 97 | 97 | 97 | 97 | 71 | 30 |

Mechanism: Brain drain

- We found 73% of the approved candidates in the (outcome) data. More specifically, we were not able to find 25% of the non-approved candidates and 29% of the approved candidates.
- Where are the other 27%?

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 - NEET (18-25 years): 35.9%
 - Finishing undergrad
 - Moved to another country!

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 - NEET (18-25 years): 35.9%
 - Finishing undergrad
 - Moved to another country! **However, there are mobility constraints:**
 - Brazilians do not have work permit in Europe, U.S. or Australia
 - Brazilians need to pay higher fees for post-grad than European and U.S. citizens
 - No students loans programs

Discussion

- The program did not achieve the main results in the short and medium term
 - Program implementation and design are controversial
 - Long-term effects may differ
- Delayed graduation seems to be an important mechanism, at least for UFBA.
- We are not able to identify many impacts: cultural capital, perceptions about other cultures and the world, political views, etc.
 - Spillovers/peer effects may also be important

Thank you!