### Lowering Barriers to Remote Education: Experimental Impacts on Parental Responses and Learning

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#### Motivation: Understand barriers to parental educational investments

- Parental time and economic investments affect children's human capital development (Becker and Tomes, 1976; Cunha et al., 2006; Todd and Wolpin, 2007)
  - Barriers prevent investment optimization, educational interventions attempt to relieve different constraints
- Parents serve as intermediaries between policy and children's learning, re-optimize in response to policy changes (Das et al., 2013)
- Inequality in parental inputs lead to disparities in investments  $\rightarrow$  can exacerbate educational inequality (Blanden et al., 2022)

# Research question: How do parents adjust their investments in response to reduced barriers to remote education?

- How do parental responses differ by socioeconomic status?
- How do these policies affect persistent learning?

#### Our study: RCT in Bangladesh during Covid-19 school closures

- 7,576 households of secondary school students across
   Bangladesh with smartphone access
- Three interventions (4–8 weeks) relieving different barriers to educational services take-up
- Two phone surveys to measure responses while the interventions were ongoing and persistence afterward



(1) Information and reminders about the internet learning platform



#### **10-minute school**

Free app/website with videos and adaptive quizzing



(1) Information and reminders about the internet learning platform

(2) Information + Data subsidy



**Data subsidy** 1-month 10GB data package (untied)

Sangsad TV

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(3) Individual teacher support



Teacher outreach Weekly check-in calls from teacher

gsad TV 🔵 ( 🕨 Full randomizatior

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#### September-October 2020: Recruitment and baseline survey

Project timeline

March 2021: Parental survey while ongoing interventions, 68% response rate

- Parental time and economic investment in children's education
- Student learning activities, use of learning resources, time use (parent-reported)

June 2021: Survey 1-2 months after interventions end, 65% response rate

- Parental survey (same modules)
- Child survey: Learning assessment, engagement and aspirations

- Two-thirds have TV with cable/satellite
- Wide distribution of parental education
- High rates of school work, private tutoring

Sample balance

	Mean	Std.Dev.	Obs	
Number of children	1.93	0.99	9027	
Number of children grades 6-10	1.30	0.54	8908	
HH has TV with cable/satellite	0.65	0.48	9038	
Respondent is mother	0.50	0.50	9044	
Respondent is father	0.50	0.50	9044	
Mother completed primary	0.38	0.48	8227	
Mother completed secondary	0.20	0.40	8227	
Mother completed post-secondary	0.19	0.40	8227	
Father completed primary	0.27	0.45	8397	
Father completed secondary	0.18	0.38	8397	
Father completed post-secondary	0.27	0.45	8397	
Days of school work, last week	5.73	2.20	8758	
Weekly days of school work, April 2020	5.63	1.85	8397	
Received private tutoring since closures	0.59	0.49	8807	
Child did work for pay, past 30 days	0.03	0.17	8802	

### **Empirical specification**

$$\begin{split} y_{hc} &= \alpha + \underbrace{\beta_1 AppInfo_h + \beta_2 GenInfo_h}_{\text{Information Only}} \\ &+ \underbrace{\beta_3 SubsidyAppInfo_h + \beta_4 SubsidyGenInfo_h}_{\text{Information + Data Subsidy}} + \underbrace{\beta_5 TeacherGenInfo_h}_{\text{Teacher support}} \\ &+ \sum_{i=6}^{9} \beta_j InteracTreat_{i,h} + X'_{hc}\gamma + f_s + g_w + h_j + \epsilon_{hc} \end{split}$$

 $y_{hc}$  measured at household-child level. Includes pre-specified covariates ( $X_{hc}$ ), FE (stratification-cell,  $f_s$ ; survey-week,  $g_w$ ; enumerator,  $h_i$ )

Full interactions to avoid bias (Muralidharan et al., 2021) Report Anderson sharpened q-values for key outcomes.

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#### Differential use of tech learning resources hints to existing constraints



#### Parental time and monetary investment are (weakly) positively correlated



### Extensive margin shift of use of specific learning resources

# 1. Only app info alongside subsidy increases its usage

- Info alone not sufficient
- App + subsidy  $\uparrow$  1.8pp app use
  - ▶ 36% increase (low baseline)
  - ↑ only among high-SES HHs (4.1pp vs 0pp)



### Extensive margin shift of use of specific learning resources

1. Only app info alongside subsidy increases its usage

#### 2. App info alone reduces use of tech

- App info ↓ 0.051-SD in tech-learning resources use
- Other interventions do not affect net tech usage
- Intensive margin results similar



#### Extensive margin shift of use of specific learning resources

- 1. Only app info alongside subsidy increases its usage
- 2. App info alone reduces use of tech
- 3. Teacher support decreases the use of non-tech resources
  - $\downarrow$  0.1-SD non-tech resource use



# 1. Interventions affect parental educational investments

- App + subsidy ↑ 5.0pp private tutor (7%)
- Teacher support \$\\$ likelihood of receiving private tutoring



1. Interventions affect parental educational investments

# 2. Data subsidy and info. attenuate parental responses

- App only 
   <sup>1</sup>9% weekly tutoring expenses
- Subsidy mutes response
- No impact of teaching
- Wealthier HH increase tutoring only with info, poor HH with info + data



1. Interventions affect parental educational investments

2. Data subsidy and info. attenuate parental responses

# 3. When tutoring increases, parental hours fall

 Mostly driven by ↓22% of poor parents' time



- Phone-based assessment: 8/student aligned w/ grade-specific curriculum
  - ▶ Grade-specific base set of 4 questions (2020 grade level or lower)
  - Additional 4 higher/lower level questions
  - Substantial overlap across questionnaires, bank of 19
- Measures of student math knowledge
  - ▶ Unadjusted score: Standardized sum of 4 base questions
  - ▶ IRT: 2 parameter logistic model across all questions to estimate latent score

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### Suggestive impacts of interventions on student math knowledge

- App information  $\uparrow$  0.11 SD
  - ↑ only among high-SES HHs (.205 vs. 0.001 s.d)
  - ► → SES differences in ↑ tutoring: Intensity or quality, additional barriers, different starting points?
- Data subsidy and info. no effect
- Teacher support no effect
- $\rightarrow$  Tutoring seem to cause  $\uparrow$  , not app



#### **Conclusions and policy implications**

1. Offering an educational service may lead to parents reoptimizing their educational investments even without adoption

- May act as a signal or nudge, and still have lasting effects on achievement
- Taking parental responses into account is key for results interpretation

#### 2. Parents respond to policies by moving time and monetary investments

• Understanding private tutoring options, complementarity with other resources, and SES heterogeneities is key in certain contexts

#### 3. Policies aimed at $\downarrow$ barriers may exacerbate educational inequalities

• Light-touch interventions  $\uparrow$  learning of households with resources to respond to them

### References

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  V. Sundararaman (2013). School Inputs, Household Substitution, and Test
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Todd, P. E. and K. I. Wolpin (2007). The Production of Cognitive Achievement in Children: Home, School, and Racial Test Score Gaps. *Journal of Human Capital 1*(1), 91–136. Add'l arm: General info about educational TV platform

• Test whether salience of education drives information impacts



#### Sangsad TV

Government-broadcast recorded TV lessons (also available online)







N = 7,576

	Inform	nation	
None	General	Adaptive	General + Adaptive
25%	18.75%	12.5%	12.5%

				Adaptive
No data	25%	18.75%	12.5%	12.5%
No data	1894	1423	947	947
Data		<b>6.25%</b> 471	<b>12.5%</b> 947	<b>12.5%</b> 947

**Teacher support** 

~44% within cells

#### Sample largely balanced across key covariates

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	All	Control	App info	Data + App info.	Teacher	Joint tests, all, p-va
HH size	1.92	1.91	1.96	1.90	1.92	0.845
	(0.99)	(0.99)	(1.00)	(1.00)	(1.02)	
Num. secondary children	1.30	1.27	1.32**	1.29	1.30	0.469
	(0.53)	(0.50)	(0.55)	(0.53)	(0.59)	
Has cable/satellite TV	0.65	0.65	0.63	0.65	0.66	0.260
	(0.48)	(0.48)	(0.48)	(0.48)	(0.47)	
Mother present	0.49	0.50	0.48	0.51	0.49	0.790
	(0.50)	(0.50)	(0.50)	(0.50)	(0.50)	
Mother income	4864	4550	4492	5921*	3394	0.000***
	(25390)	(24830)	(23506)	(28666)	(21705)	
Father income	51555	51415	52910	51328	50834	0.726
	(134271)	(134679)	(138072)	(132713)	(130614)	
School days/week, curr.	5.70	5.76	5.67	5.71	5.64	0.917
	(2.23)	(2.17)	(2.26)	(2.21)	(2.29)	
School days/week, Apr. 20	5.37	5.38	5.37	5.37	5.43	0.923
	(2.16)	(2.18)	(2.14)	(2.16)	(2.12)	
Has private tutor	0.59	0.58	0.60	0.59	0.60	0.818
	(0.49)	(0.49)	(0.49)	(0.49)	(0.49)	
Working for pay	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.622
	(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.17)	(0.16)	(0.15)	
Number of students	8771	2175	2219	2189	954	
Number of households	7576	1894	1891	1897	828	
Joint test, p-val			0.079*	0.612	0.465	

No evidence of differential attrition by treatment arm in March 2021 (p = 0.15), no difference relative to control group of key arms in June 2021, but reject overall equality (p = 0.061).