Greed? Profits, Inflation, and Aggregate Demand

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August 2023

EEA-ESEM 2023, Barcelona

Preliminary, comments welcome (2nd presentation)

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Greed: Inflation and Inequality

- return of inflation: "greed", profits (markups), "sellers' inflation"
- intimately related to distributional considerations
 - benefit the "rich", hurt poor twice (also erodes wages)
- "demand" component: inflation beyond cost increase
 - aggregate-demand amplification of recession
- ► = comovement of: inflation, profits, aggregate demand
- policy speeches: Lagarde, Schnabel; President Biden, IRA anniversary: "one reason we've seen inflation fall by two thirds without losing jobs is corporate profits are coming back down to earth."

The Economist

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Are greedy corporations causing inflation?

That is the popular narrative. Yet there is reason to doubt it



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Apr 30th 2023 | SAN FRANCISCO



Economic policy

The Guardian view on corporate greed: it's causing inflation *Editorial*

Sun 12 Mar 2023 18.25 GMT

- Share

Unite's claim that firms are profiteering on the back of a crisis hitting workers is hard to dismiss



Literature

- ► sticky wages and profits in (RA-)NK transmission
 - Christiano Eichenbaum Evans 1997, 2005; markups: Nekarda Ramey; Burstein Carvalho Grassi
 - Erceg Henderson Levin, Schmitt-Grohe Uribe, Galí
 - Bilbiie Melitz 2020 (without and with *free* entry)
- TANK flex-wage: Galí Lopez-Salido Vallés 2007, Bilbiie 2008, Bilbiie 2020, Debortoli Galí 2018
 - sticky-wage extensions of Bilbiie 2008: Colciago 2011, Furlanetto 2011, Ascari Colciago Rossi 2017; Diz Giarda Romero 2023
- HANK sticky-wage role for transmission:
 - Broer Harbo-Hansen Krusell Oberg; Hagedorn Manovskii Mitman; Auclert Bardoczy Rognlie; Auclert Rognlie Straub; Alves Kaplan Moll Violante; Bilbiie Känzig Surico

► "sellers' inflation": Lerner; Weber and Wasner

Starting Point

- ► standard sticky-price (RA-)NK model implies the opposite
- ► profits *negatively* related to demand → **Deflation**!

$$\pi_t = -\psi_p d_t$$

- *novel* analytical condition for demand-procyclical, inflationary profits:
- sticky-enough nominal wages



Christiano Eichenbaum Evans JPE 2005

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Supply Shocks?

- profits *supply*-procyclical even w/ sticky P only, no puzzle
 - TFP $\downarrow \longrightarrow mc \uparrow \longrightarrow d \downarrow$ in a "recession" $(y \downarrow)$
- ► However:
- 1. still puzzling π : TFP $\downarrow \longrightarrow \pi \uparrow$ negative comovement (d, π)

-> positive (d, π) correlation needs to be driven by something else (focus on *demand shocks*)

2. separate issue: supply shocks \rightarrow recession \equiv negative output **gap**

-> to fix, endogenous entry-exit, Bilbiie Melitz 2020

RANK Baseline: Sticky Prices & Wages

- DRS $c_t = y_t = (1 \alpha) n_t$, gross markup post-subsidy \mathcal{M}
- Given Aggregate Demand e.g fixed real rate $\rightarrow c_t = E_t c_{t+1} \sigma r_t$
- ► Loglinearized profits and marginal cost (= -markup):

$$d_t = y_t - \frac{1-\alpha}{\mathcal{M}} (w_t + n_t) = \left(1 - \frac{1}{\mathcal{M}}\right) c_t - \frac{1-\alpha}{\mathcal{M}} w_t$$
$$mc_t = -\mu_t = w_t + \frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha} c_t.$$

• Static Phillips curve wlog (Bilbiie 2017, 2019, etc.)

$$\pi_t = \psi_p m c_t = \psi_p \left(w_t + rac{lpha}{1-lpha} c_t
ight)$$
 $\pi_t^w = w_t - w_{t-1} + \pi_t = \psi_w \left(\sigma^{-1} c_t + \varphi n_t - w_t
ight)$

► Combine → Profits' dynamics:

Sticky Wages and Profits' Cyclicality in RANK

$$d_t = rac{\mathcal{M}-1+\Omega}{\mathcal{M}}c_t - rac{1-lpha}{\mathcal{M}}\Theta w_{t-1}$$

Profits' cyclicality determinant:

$$\Omega \equiv \left[\psi_{p}\alpha-\psi_{w}\left(\sigma^{-1}\left(1-\alpha\right)+\varphi\right)\right]\Theta$$

• Endogenous *persistence* $\Theta \equiv (1 + \psi_p + \psi_w)^{-1}$ iff both P & W sticky

• **Proposition**: Profits procyclical wrt demand $\frac{\partial d_t}{\partial c_t} > 0$ iff:

$$\mathcal{M} - 1 + \Omega > 0
ightarrow rac{\psi_w \left[\left(1 - lpha
ight) \sigma^{-1} + arphi
ight] - lpha \psi_p}{1 + \psi_p + \psi_w} < \mathcal{M} - 1$$

- two contradicting forces, procyclical if wage-stickiness-induced procyclicality dominates
 - ► see Cantore et al 2021 for an earlier related result on the labor share (=) (=) (=) ()

W & *P* stickiness for *procyclical profits* (yellow) $\alpha = .33 \ \varphi = 1 \ \sigma = 1 \ M = 1.3$



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Inflation Dynamics: PC with Profits

• Assume *wlog* optimal subsidy $\mathcal{M} = 1 \rightarrow \Omega = cyclicality$

$$d_t = \Omega c_t + \Theta d_{t-1}$$

• Modified PC ($\Omega \in [0, \alpha]$ restriction)

$$\pi_t = \psi_p \frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha} c_t - \psi_p \frac{1}{1-\alpha} d_t$$

Note: endogenous persistence

$$\pi_{t} = \Theta \pi_{t-1} + \frac{\psi_{p}}{1-\alpha} \left(\alpha - \Omega\right) c_{t} - \alpha \frac{\psi_{p}}{1-\alpha} \Theta c_{t-1}$$

- Different AD models $\rightarrow c_t \rightarrow$ inflation; **RANK useful benchmark**!
- ► How to get an inflation surge + profits increase + AD expansion
- First: amplified aggregate demand? (inflation later)

Profits, Inequality, and AD

- ▶ simplest TANK (Bilbiie 2008): $\lambda \in (0, 1)$ *H* hand-to-mouth
- ▶ rest savers *S*; All work for a union, sticky wages (Ascari et al, 2017)
- *H* may get some profits per-capita $\eta \in \left[0, \frac{1}{\lambda}\right]$, e.g. redistribution
- η < 1: profits skewed to *S*, own/price shares (natural assumption)
- Loglinearized model (SS with equal consumption):

$$c_t^H = (1 - \alpha) (w_t + n_t) + \eta d_t$$

$$c_t^S = E_t c_{t+1}^S - \sigma r_t$$

$$c_t = \lambda c_t^H + (1 - \lambda) c_t^S$$

Consumption Inequality: Sufficient Statistic

• Define consumption inequality $\gamma_t^C \equiv c_t^S - c_t^H$, rewrite

$$c_t^S = c_t + \lambda \gamma_t^C$$

AggregateD Euler

$$c_{t} = E_{t}c_{t+1} - \lambda \left(\gamma_{t}^{C} - E_{t}\gamma_{t+1}^{C}\right) - \sigma r_{t}$$

• Amplification iff consumption inequality is countercyclical

$$\frac{\partial \gamma_t^C}{\partial c_t} < 0$$

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Consumption Inequality: Sufficient Statistic

• Consumption inequality as a function of profits:

$$\gamma_t^{\rm C} = rac{1-\eta}{1-\lambda} d_t
ightarrow$$

$$c_t = E_t c_{t+1} - \lambda \frac{1-\eta}{1-\lambda} \left(d_t - E_t d_{t+1} \right) - \sigma r_t$$

- Amplification if either
- 1. profits countercyclical and go to *S* (η < 1) **or**
- 2. profits procyclical but go to *H*.

Consumption Amplification

► Solution:

$$c_{t} = \frac{1-\lambda}{1-\lambda\left(1-\left(1-\eta\right)\Omega\right)}\sigma E_{t}\sum_{j=0}^{\infty}\left(-r_{t+j}\right) - \frac{\lambda\left(1-\eta\right)}{1-\lambda\left(1-\left(1-\eta\right)\Omega\right)}\Theta d_{t-1}$$

Key: interaction of profits' *distribution* and *cyclicality* (wage vs price stickiness)

A Conundrum

Profits	<i>Distribution</i> (skewed towards):	
Cyclicality	Asset-holders $\eta < 1$	Hand-to-mouth $\eta > 1$
Procyclical $\Omega > 0$ Counter- $\Omega < 0$	dampen amplify	amplify dampen

 Procyclical profits + concentrated stockholding (profits go to low-MPC) + amplification through heterogeneity

Understanding TA/HA Literature Findings

- ► Add sticky W to sticky P→ dampening;
 - ► Intuition: contains $w \uparrow$, d less countercyclical (Ascari et al 2017; Bilbiie Kanzig Surico 2022)
- flex-P fixed-W $\Omega = \alpha > 0 \rightarrow$ dampening! (in benchmark $\eta < 1$)
 - akin to case in several papers by Auclert et al ($\alpha = 0 \rightarrow$ proportional incomes)

- NB: amplification in Broer et al from $\Omega > 0 \& \eta > 1$
- Parameterized example; $\lambda = .27$; $i_t = \phi \pi_t + \varepsilon_t$, $\phi = 1.5$

AD amplification? TANK (dash) vs RANK (solid); 1% interest cut



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Quantitative (Ir)relevance

- Calibrated example almost neutral. Intuition: "aggregate MPC"
 - ▶ $\psi_w = .052 < \psi_p = 1.85$ (CEE): $1 (1 \eta) \Omega = 0.819 \rightarrow$ dampen by 0.937
- Small "victory": Procyclical profits -> inflationary demand shocks
- BUT: Silly model of profits (no role other than income transfer) + too large (determinant) role of profit redistribution

Profits as Investment Payoff

- Consumption inequality still sufficient statistic for AD amplification
- But inequality now has a richer set of determinants

$$rac{C}{Y}c_{t}^{H}=\left(1-lpha
ight)\left(w_{t}+n_{t}
ight)+\eta d_{t}^{A}$$

$$\frac{C}{Y}c_t^S + \frac{1}{1-\lambda}\frac{I}{Y}i_t = (1-\alpha)\left(w_t + n_t\right) + \alpha\frac{1}{1-\lambda}\left(r_t^K + k_t\right) + \frac{1-\eta\lambda}{1-\lambda}d_t^A$$

• Accounting profits(-ish), as in CEE:

$$d_t^A = \alpha^{-1} d_t + \left(r_t^K + k_t \right)$$

• **Proposition**: *C* amplification if investment procyclical enough

$$\frac{\partial \gamma_t^C}{\partial c_t} < 0 \Leftrightarrow \frac{\partial i_t}{\partial c_t} > (1 - \eta) \left(1 + \frac{r}{\delta}\right) \frac{\partial d_t^A}{\partial c_t}$$

Generically satisfied even with procyclical profits

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C amplification via *I*: TANK (dash) vs RANK (solid); 1% interest cut



And Inflation (and Greed)?

- ► No inflation amplification through AD and profits ↑ -> no "Greed"
- ► Recall

$$\pi_t = \psi_p \frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha} c_t - \psi_p \frac{1}{1-\alpha} d_t$$

• With capital:

$$\pi_t = \psi_p \frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha} y_t - \psi_p \frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha} d_t^A$$

- Sticky P: direct effect ψ_p less inflation; indirect effect more AD expansion->more inflation
 - ► Related (but different): Hagedorn Mitman "Nominal demand" feedback AD-PC
- Can get π amplification through AD but requires *countercyclical* profits $\Omega < 0$

π amplification? TANK (dash) vs RANK (solid); 1% interest cut; $\psi_p = .05 < \psi_w = 1.05$



Greed? Profits, Inflation and AD All UP?

- 1. Procyclical & inflationary profits: analytical condition, sticky enough wages
- 2. <u>Conundrum</u> for HA models: procyclical profits going to asset $\overrightarrow{owners} \rightarrow \overrightarrow{dampening}$ through heterogeneity
- 3. Way out: Capital, cyclical enough investment \rightarrow *AD* amplification with procylical profits (profits' *redistribution* becomes a side show)
- 4. But: no inflation amplification, counteracting forces
- →no "greed story" = higher inflation & (*caused by*?) higher demand expansion & increasing profits