Who is in the Driver's Seat? Markups, Markdowns & Firm Relationships in the Car Industry

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Markups along Value Chains

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If violated: markup estimate = total margin (markup+markdown)

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- Contributions:
 - 1) Markup estimation with profit sharing in input markets
 - 2) Backing out relative bargaining weights from the supply side
 - > 3) Production function estimation controlling for product characteristics & prices

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• Proposed solution: including car characteristics to the estimation procedure

1 Measures for Markups and Markdowns

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- Markdown Manufacturer i:
 - Profit maximizing
 - Input price P_{it}^M
 - Marginal revenue product of material input MRP_{it}^{M}

$$\gamma_{it}^{M} = \frac{MRP_{it}^{M}}{P_{it}^{M}}$$



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- Markups Supplier s:
 - Cost minimizing
 - $\blacktriangleright \quad P_{st} = P_{it}^M$
 - Supplier's marginal cost *MC*_{st}

$$\mu_{st} = \frac{P_{it}^M}{MC_{st}}$$



(1)

(2)

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Graphical Illustration

• (1)=(2) results in the markdown equation:

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- Consists of two parts:
 - Inverse supplier markups
 - Shared margin
- Manufacturers' markups with input distortions:
 - ▶ \rightarrow e.g. Rubens (2023) in Leontief setting

$$\mu_{it} = \frac{P_{it}}{MC_{it}} = \frac{1}{\frac{\alpha_{it}^L}{\theta_{it}^L} + \alpha_{it}^M \gamma_{it}^M}$$

(3)

(4)

Profit Sharing - Industry Background

Calzolari et al. (2022)

• Car production period: 6-7 years with annual/biannual facelifts

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- Two-stage procurement process:



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$$\frac{\frac{MRP_{it}^{u} - P_{it}^{M}}{P_{it}^{M}}}{\frac{P_{it}^{M} - MC_{st}}{P_{it}^{M}}} = \frac{b}{(1-b)}$$
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$$\frac{\frac{MRP_{it}^{m} - P_{it}^{M}}{P_{it}^{m}}}{\frac{P_{it}^{M} - MC_{st}}{P_{it}^{M}}} = \frac{b}{(1-b)}$$
(5)

• Inserting γ_{it}^M and μ_{st} :

$$\frac{\gamma_{it}^M - 1}{1 - \mu_{st}^{-1}} = \frac{b}{(1 - b)} \tag{6}$$

Equations That I Take to the Data:

- Markdowns Manufacturer *i*:
 - α_{st}^z : revenue shares of supplier s with z = (L, M)
 - θ_{st}^L : output elasticity of L supplier s

$$\gamma_{it}^{M} = \mu_{st}^{-1} \frac{MRP_{it}^{M}}{MC_{st}} \propto \mu_{st}^{-1} = \frac{\alpha_{st}^{L}}{\theta_{st}^{L}} + \alpha_{st}^{M}$$

 $\text{Green} \rightarrow \text{From Data}$

 $Blue \rightarrow Estimates$

(7)

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• Total Margin Manufacturer ψ_{it} :

$$\psi_{it} = \frac{1}{\frac{\alpha_{it}^L}{\theta_{it}^L} + \alpha_{it}^M}$$

(7)

(8)

 $\text{Green} \to \text{From Data}$

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• Balance sheet information (sales, wagebill, number of employees etc.) • Statl • Stat2

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- Contracting data between manufacturers and suppliers
 - Level of: supplier/part/model/manufacturer-location >> Stat3

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- Contracting data between manufacturers and suppliers
- Sales-weighted plant-level prices and characteristics of manufacturers (* Stats4) (* Stats4)

Results I:

Stable Car Manufacturers' Margin/Volatile Suppliers' Markups



Results II:

Fluctuating Bargaining Weights of Manufacturers



Results III:

Firm-Level Analysis of Markups and Markdowns

Car Manufacturers' Markdowns:

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- Significantly higher for Mini producers

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Part Suppliers' Markups:

- Highly correlated with:
- Relationship intensity (positively) and
- Size of product portfolio (negatively).

Relating to the Bigger Picture

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 - Car manufacturers' total margin stayed constant
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 - Dispersed markdowns within car manufacturer groups
 - \rightarrow bargaining weights vary with major crises
 - Suppliers' markups correlate with product portfolio and relationship intensity
- Margin distribution along value chain could paint a different picture of market power than markups only

Thank You

Intuition - Graphical Illustration



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Balance Sheet Data

Revenue & Expenditure Shares

→ Back

	rev_M	exp_M	rev_L	exp_L
2002	0.776	0.866	0.073	0.084
2003	0.760	0.862	0.071	0.076
2004	0.773	0.886	0.061	0.070
2005	0.783	0.881	0.069	0.075
2006	0.804	0.891	0.069	0.073
2007	0.806	0.901	0.064	0.071
2008	0.804	0.899	0.064	0.071
2009	0.765	0.882	0.073	0.077
2010	0.801	0.886	0.070	0.075
2011	0.814	0.904	0.061	0.066
2012	0.801	0.896	0.069	0.074
2013	0.796	0.886	0.070	0.076
2014	0.814	0.902	0.067	0.073
2015	0.834	0.914	0.061	0.066
2016	0.827	0.914	0.062	0.067
2017	0.816	0.920	0.058	0.064
2018	0.843	0.922	0.054	0.058
2019	0.835	0.927	0.051	0.054

	rev_M	exp_M	rev_L	exp_L
2002	0.868	0.557	0.059	0.036
2003	0.862	0.563	0.067	0.036
2004	0.788	0.582	0.094	0.066
2005	0.853	0.592	0.061	0.043
2006	0.879	0.590	0.051	0.033
2007	0.863	0.601	0.068	0.045
2008	0.807	0.613	0.084	0.061
2009	0.829	0.593	0.091	0.053
2010	0.809	0.600	0.106	0.069
2011	0.878	0.619	0.066	0.040
2012	0.856	0.615	0.073	0.059
2013	0.902	0.608	0.055	0.032
2014	0.778	0.612	0.143	0.072
2015	0.869	0.602	0.083	0.050
2016	0.885	0.602	0.045	0.034
2017	0.820	0.603	0.101	0.045
2018	0.800	0.624	0.072	0.045

Suppliers

Balance Sheet Data

Summary Statistics

→ Intro

	Capital	Revenue	Materials	Wages	Employees
2002	10490	38341	23140	1231	270
2003	10090	46477	24531	1379	260
2004	10856	23098	14156	1314	294
2005	10028	16196	8317	1384	264
2006	9021	22461	13348	1257	253
2007	8404	30526	21038	1236	264
2008	8374	27445	18996	1516	270
2009	7951	24137	16481	2453	225
2010	8176	26431	17903	1929	250
2011	8762	38655	30152	1960	254
2012	9600	29158	20234	2322	250
2013	9754	54782	36810	2588	272
2014	10153	40159	27818	3134	275
2015	11145	67476	45095	3016	281
2016	10848	49691	31973	2496	279
2017	11326	51563	33760	2387	320
2018	9152	47780	39134	2563	319

Monetary Values in Thousands

Manufacturers

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Monetary Values in Thousands

Suppliers

Contracting Data

➡ Back

	mean	p25	p50	p75	Ν
Observations per Supplier - Overall:					
Contracts	462.89	102	284	638	18160
Manufacturer Plants	65.76	33	77	95	18160
Car Models	105.09	44	115	159	18160
Products (wide categories)	3.82	3	4	5	18160
Products (narrow categories)	13.90	5	12	21	18160
Observations Manufacturers - Overall:					
Contracts	360.44	223	294	532	7091
Supplier Groups	97.80	72	86	138	7091
Car Models	2.79	2	3	4	7091
Contracts Suppliers - Manufacturers from Dataset:					
Contracts	155.12	34	115	210	5077
Manufacturer Plants	21.22	13	25	30	5077
Car Models	34.11	20	39	49	5077
Products (wide categories)	3.51	2	4	5	5077
Products (narrow categories)	10.87	5	10	16	5077
Contracts Manufacturers - Suppliers from Dataset:					
Contracts	258.05	145	223	359	5077
Supplier Groups	58.06	41	54	77	5077
Car Models	2.78	2	3	4	5077

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Data - Characteristics and Prices

Summary Statistics



	mean	p25	p50	p75	count
Horsepower	82.97	61.14	85.36	98.39	480
Cylinder	1618.80	1332.45	1604.11	1823.17	480
Length	423.86	398.06	426.18	449.59	480
Width	175.28	169.69	176.35	181.06	480
Height	150.52	145.33	148.55	152.97	480
Liter	5.41	4.69	5.33	6.03	480
Price	22244.11	14245.66	21394.96	28754.42	480

Characteristics and Prices

Correlations

➡ Back

1								
Horsepower -	1.000	0.848	0.796	0.851	0.367	0.373	0.961	_
Cylinder –	0.848	1.000	0.745	0.736	0.471	0.658	0.845	
Length -	0.796	0.745	1.000	0.879	0.187	0.329	0.801	
Width -	0.851	0.736	0.879	1.000	0.357	0.273	0.835	
Height -	0.367	0.471	0.187	0.357	1.000	0.447	0.334	
Liter –	0.373	0.658	0.329	0.273	0.447	1.000	0.342	
Price -	0.961	0.845	0.801	0.835	0.334	0.342	1.000	
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