

The Firm Balance Sheet Channel of Uncertainty Shocks *

Wentao (Eric) Zhou †

February 25, 2023

Abstract

Following spikes in aggregate uncertainty, firm-level physical capital drops along with large liquidity buildup and deleveraging. Conventional macro-finance models treating corporate cash holding as net debt fail to capture the observed liquidity buildup when reproducing deleveraging, leaving an important adjustment margin unexplained. This paper embeds empirically-consistent corporate cash-holding motives into a workhorse model of borrowing constraints and provides a unified explanation for the observed balance-sheet transmission of uncertainty shocks. In the model, cash buildup allows firms to preserve internal funds for debt repayment and growth opportunities, thereby addressing both the downside risk and the upside potential triggered by higher uncertainty. In a calibrated model consistent with firm-level behavior, (i). uncertainty shocks generate sharp and persistent aggregate output drops that align well with data patterns; (ii). credit interventions, particularly debt relief programs, are powerful in stabilizing uncertainty-driven recessions. In sharp contrast, models failing to account for corporate liquidity choice generate counterfactual output responses to uncertainty shocks and underestimate the stabilizing effects of debt relief. I further show that credit interventions have much larger effects in uncertainty-driven recessions than in TFP-driven recessions, highlighting the nature of the recessions in shaping policy impacts.

JEL Classification: D22, E22, E44, G32

Keywords: Uncertainty, Investment, Cash holding, Corporate Debt

* I am especially grateful to Ken West, Kim Ruhl, Charles Engel, and Oliver Levine for their invaluable advice, patient guidance, and continuous support. I thank Hengjie Ai, Manuel Amador, Louphou Coulibaly, Min Fang, Illenin O. Kondo, Annie Soyeon Lee, Rasmus Lentz, Roman Merga, Yueran Ma, Emi Nakamura, Pablo Ottonello, Cesar Sosa-Padilla, and Chi-Yang Tsou for their great comments and suggestions. I thank seminar participants at the Wisconsin School of Business, The Becker Friedman Institute Macro-Finance Research Program (MFR) Summer Session for Young Scholars (2022), Minnesota/Wisconsin Macro/International Workshop, and UW-Madison Macro Lunch for useful feedback. Donald D. Hester Dissertation Fellowship of the Department of Economics at the University of Wisconsin Madison is greatly acknowledged. All errors are mine.

†The University of Wisconsin-Madison; Email: wzhou92@wisc.edu; Website: wentaozhou.com

1 Introduction

The Great Recession of 2007–2009 witnessed measures of uncertainty spiking to their historical highs. Policymakers and economists have believed the sharp rise in uncertainty to be a key factor contributing to the severity of the Great Recession.¹ Indeed, macroeconomics research in the past decade has shown that elevated aggregate uncertainty not only depresses real economic activities directly but also aggravates recessions indirectly by attenuating the response of the economy to standard stabilization policies.² The adverse effects of high uncertainty have highlighted the importance of understanding (i) how uncertainty shocks transmit to the real economy and (ii) how to stabilize uncertainty-driven recessions.

In the data, firms respond to heightened uncertainty by strongly adjusting their balance sheets. Following spikes in aggregate uncertainty, firm-level physical capital drops along with substantial liquidity buildup and deleveraging.³ In the cross-section, the drop in physical capital and the buildup of liquid assets holding are more pronounced among *ex-ante* more indebted firms. The empirical patterns suggest that firms' elevated liquidity demand plays an important role in shaping firms' responses to uncertainty shocks. However, conventional macro-finance models typically treat corporate cash holding as 'net debt': firms in this class of models either have outstanding debt or save in liquid assets but never both. The simplifying assumption hinders the models' abilities to capture the observed liquidity buildup while reproducing firm deleveraging in response to elevated uncertainty, thereby leaving an important margin of adjustments unexplained.

In this paper, I incorporate firms' portfolio choice between physical capital and liquid assets into a workhorse macro-finance model of borrowing constraints and provide a unified explanation for the observed impact of heightened uncertainty on firms' choices of capital, liquidity, and leverage. The key innovation of the model is its ability to capture empirically-consistent corporate cash-holding motives. In the model, building up liquid assets allows firms to preserve internal funds for future debt repayment and investment opportunities, thereby addressing both the downside risk and the upside potential triggered by higher uncertainty. This rationalizes the observed liquidity buildup alongside corporate deleveraging following uncertainty shocks. I exploit the model framework to decompose the economic forces behind the empirical patterns. I show that a calibrated model reproduces the observed firm responses to uncertainty shocks as well as a wide set of stylized data facts that support the model mechanisms.

Exploiting a calibrated model consistent with firm-level behavior, I show that accounting for corporate liquidity choice is crucial to understanding uncertainty-driven recessions and assessing stabilization policies. (i). Uncertainty shocks in the baseline model generate sharp and persistent drops in aggregate output that align well with data patterns. In contrast, a

¹See, for example, [Blanchard \(2009\)](#) and [Stock and Watson \(2012\)](#). The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) minutes have repeatedly underlined uncertainty as a key factor in every US recession since 2000.

²A large literature has provided ample empirical evidence of the negative impact of heightened uncertainty on real economic activities. Recent literature shows that monetary stimulus are less effective at stimulating output during periods of high uncertainty, for example, [Vavra \(2014\)](#) and [Fang \(2020\)](#). [Bloom et al. \(2018\)](#) also shows that fiscal subsidies that increase the marginal benefit of investment are also less effective during periods of high uncertainty.

³Macroeconomic and finance literature dedicated to understanding how firms respond to an increase in uncertainty and found: a negative investment-uncertainty relationship ([Leahy and Whited \(1996\)](#), [Bloom et al. \(2007\)](#), [Baker et al. \(2016\)](#), [Kim and Kung \(2017\)](#), [Kermani and Ma \(2020\)](#)), a positive liquidity-uncertainty relationship ([Opler et al. \(1999\)](#), [Bates et al. \(2009\)](#), [Gao et al. \(2017\)](#), [Smietanka et al. \(2018\)](#)), a negative leverage-uncertainty relationship ([Rashid \(2013\)](#), [Gilchrist et al. \(2014\)](#), [Arellano et al. \(2019\)](#)).

comparable ‘net debt’ model, in which firms either borrow or save, not only understates aggregate output drops upon impact but also predicts a counterfactual ‘output overshooting’ in the medium run. (ii). Debt relief programs in the baseline model are powerful in stabilizing uncertainty-driven recessions, while models that fail to capture the liquidity buildup substantially underestimate output responses to debt relief programs.

Large-scale fiscal support for the corporate sector during the recent Covid crisis sparked a rapidly growing literature studying the efficacy of credit interventions using quantitative models. Existing work abstracts from the elevated uncertainty during recessions. I further show that credit interventions have much larger effects in uncertainty-driven recessions than in TFP-driven recessions, highlighting the nature of the recessions in shaping policy impacts. These results provide novel insights into policy debates on credit interventions as stabilization tools.

I begin the paper by revisiting empirical evidence on firm-level transmission of uncertainty shocks. Using a panel local projection approach that combines firm-level data with Macro Uncertainty Index by [Jurado et al. \(2015\)](#), I first show that following an increase in the Macroeconomic Uncertainty Index, firm-level physical capital drops, liquid assets holding grows, and the stock of outstanding debt falls. The results are consistent with a large empirical literature that has documented firm-level responses to an increase in uncertainty using different measures of uncertainty, different empirical methods, and different datasets. Further, I find that, in the cross-section, ex-ante more indebted firms experience larger declines in physical capital, accompanied by larger buildups of liquid assets holding. I show that the observed heterogeneous asset choice across differently indebted firms are robust to controlling for potential heterogeneity in investment opportunities and business-cycle sensitivities across differently indebted firms, highlighting the role of balance sheet conditions in shaping firms’ responses to heightened uncertainty. To further confirm the empirical findings, I conduct an event study that follows the uncertainty literature exploiting the 9/11 terrorist attacks as a plausibly exogenous increase in macroeconomic uncertainty (e.g. [Bloom 2009](#); [Kim and Kung 2017](#)). I find that the firm behavior around the 9/11 terrorist attacks accords well with the baseline results.

To understand the economic forces behind the empirical patterns, I incorporate firms’ portfolio choice between physical capital and liquid assets into a workhorse macro-finance model of borrowing constraints with heterogeneous firms. The key innovation of the model is that it embeds two corporate cash holding motives studied in *empirical* corporate finance literature into *structural* models of capital structure choices.⁴ First, firms in the model need to pay an additional financial distress cost when their internal liquidity, operating profits plus liquid assets holding, are insufficient for their maturing debt obligations. This type of costly liquidity short-fall captures real-world difficulties that firms face in dealing with customers, employees, and strategic partners during financial distress and motivate firms to hold liquid assets in preparation for future debt repayment. Second, firms in the model face financing frictions in equity and credit markets, and thus firms hold liquid assets also for future investment opportunities. Specifically, when an investment opportunity is realized, liquid assets holding enables firms to finance investments internally without tapping frictional financial markets. As a result, firms in the model hold liquid assets while having outstanding debt, thereby breaking the strong ‘net debt’ assumption in conventional models.

⁴A large empirical corporate finance literature studies corporate cash-holding motives and finds empirical evidence on the role of liquid assets holding in overcoming both financial distress and financing frictions. Some prominent examples include [Opler et al. \(1999\)](#), [Faulkender and Wang \(2006\)](#), [Bates et al. \(2009\)](#).

To reproduce debt maturity and repayment processes, I follow [Gomes and Schmid \(2021\)](#), and [Chen et al. \(2021\)](#) to model corporate debt as long-term debt that matures randomly with a given probability. The setup keeps the model tractable while capturing realistic features of the debt maturity process: (i). the average maturity of outstanding debt of non-financial firms is around 3-4 years; (ii). firms repay coupon payments before maturity, and principal repayment is only required at maturity. Conventional models typically model corporate debt as one-period debt and thus run the risk of overstating firms' debt burdens every period. Moreover, when firms have pre-existing debt that has not matured yet, new debt issuance incurs transaction costs, which serves as a reduced-form way to capture the financial covenants and seniority rules in real-world debt contracts. The frictions in debt issuance allow the model to generate endogenous borrowing decisions determined by the costs and benefits of issuing debt, not by exogenous limits on leverage ratio often seen in existing models of borrowing constraints.

I estimate the model parameters that govern firms' financial behavior in the model to match firm-level moments on profitability, leverage, debt maturity, liquidity, and equity financing. I then show that a calibrated version of the model replicates a wide set of cross-sectional and dynamic investment and financial behavior found in the data, which are not targeted in the calibration. I highlight four validation exercises. First, I show that the estimated model does a good job of reproducing the observed cross-sectional variation in leverage and liquidity ratios across firms. Second, both in the data and the model, firm indebtedness is positively associated with liquid asset growth and negatively associated with physical capital growth, suggesting the role of firms' debt positions in driving their asset choices. This occurs in the model since more indebted firms save more to reduce their higher likelihood of liquidity shortfalls for future debt repayment. Third, both in the data and the model, firm-level productivity growth is positively correlated with capital investment and debt growth while negatively correlated with liquid assets growth. In the model, firms save in liquid assets and use them as the marginal funding source, which allows them to avoid financing frictions. Lastly, I show that a decrease in debt issuance costs in the model leads to a higher leverage ratio and a lower liquidity ratio. The simulation results echo recent empirical literature that shows the passage of laws that enhance creditor rights is followed not only by an increase in leverage ratio but also by a reduction in liquidity ratio. Intuitively, when firms face less friction in financial markets, the motive to preserve internal funds for future investment opportunities is also mitigated.

Given the model's ability to generate empirically-consistent firm behavior, I then study the transmission of uncertainty shocks in the model. I simulate the perfect foresight transition path of the economy to an uncertainty shock, a mean-preserving spread of firms' productivity shocks. During the transition, firms are more likely to draw high and low idiosyncratic productivity shocks while expected productivity is unchanged. I show that the calibrated model successfully reproduces both average and heterogeneous responses to uncertainty shocks observed in the data.

I exploit the model framework to decompose the underlying economic forces behind the empirical patterns. Two forces are at work. On the one hand, elevated uncertainty implies a higher likelihood of liquidity shortfall due to low productivity draws, motivating firms to deleverage to avoid costly liquid shortfalls. On the other hand, higher uncertainty also implies a larger chance of drawing a good productivity shock, motivating firms to expand in size. Liquid asset holding plays a unique role in this scenario: it allows firms to repay their outstanding debt if firms draw bad productivity. It also enables firms to grab future investment opportunities without assessing frictional financial markets if firms draw good productivity. In the

face of the two forces, firms re-structure their balance sheets by deleveraging and liquidity buildup, diverting firms' internal funds away from capital investment. More indebted firms have more outstanding debt before the shock, thereby trading off more capital investment for liquid assets holding.

I then study the aggregate and policy implications of the novel balance sheet transmission of uncertainty shocks. I show that uncertainty shocks generate sharp and persistent aggregate output drops in the model, consistent with the empirical findings using aggregate-level data. Importantly, I find that credit interventions — akin to those used extensively during the recent Covid crisis— are powerful in stabilizing uncertainty-driven recessions. I highlight two novel insights on policy responses to uncertainty-driven recessions. First, debt relief and cash grant programs that stimulate aggregate output by 0.5% during normal times can drive up aggregate output during uncertainty-driven recessions by 1.5% and 1.0% on impact, respectively. The state-dependent responses to credit interventions come from the direct dampening effects of credit interventions on firms' balance sheet adjustments in response to heightened uncertainty. Second, debt relief is more powerful than cash grants since debt relief programs, by writing-off firms' outstanding debt, not only directly decrease firms' debt burdens but also indirectly reduce firms' cash demand for debt repayment.

To illustrate the importance of accounting for firms' liquidity choices for our understanding of uncertainty-driven recessions and the assessment of stabilization policies, I conduct two counterfactual exercises. First, I show that a comparable 'net debt' model, in which firms either borrow or save, not only understates aggregate output drops upon impact but also predicts a counterfactual 'output overshooting' in the medium run. The intuition is that, when firms cannot hold liquid assets, firms invest in physical capital to generate future internal liquidity through operating profits, thereby mitigating the negative impact of uncertainty shocks on capital investment. Second, I study output responses to credit interventions in a counterfactual simulation where the impact of uncertainty shocks is purely driven by corporate deleveraging. I find that the estimated output response to debt relief is 1.0 % on impact in the counterfactual simulation, in contrast to the 1.5% in the baseline simulation. In other words, without capturing the mitigating effects of debt relief on firms' liquidity buildup, models that only reproduce firm deleveraging following elevated uncertainty underestimate the stabilizing effects of debt relief by more than 30%.

Finally, I study the impact of credit interventions in a recession driven by negative productivity shocks. I find that credit interventions — both debt relief and cash grants programs — have much smaller effects in a TFP-driven recession than in an uncertainty-driven recession. Indeed, the estimated output responses to the interventions are slightly smaller in TFP-driven recessions than in normal times. The intuition for this result is that lower aggregate productivity reduces firms' investment demand and financial needs, thereby mitigating the role of credit interventions in relaxing firms' financial constraints. The differential effects of credit interventions during uncertainty-driven recessions and TFP-driven recessions suggest that the nature of the recessions plays an important role in shaping policy impacts.

1.1 Literature and Contributions

The paper fits into the new research agenda discussed in [Brunnermeier and Krishnamurthy \(2020\)](#), which aims to integrate firm-level corporate financing considerations in quantitative macroeconomic models to study the macroeconomic implications of corporate financial deci-

sions. In particular, this paper joins and contributes to four strands of literature in macroeconomics and finance:

Financial frictions and aggregate shocks. The paper contributes to a large macro-finance literature that studies the role of financial frictions and corporate financial decisions in transmitting and amplifying aggregate shocks. Seminal examples include [Bernanke et al. \(1999\)](#), [Cooley and Quadrini \(2006\)](#), [Khan and Thomas \(2013\)](#), [Gomes et al. \(2016\)](#), [Crouzet et al. \(2016\)](#), [Jungherr and Schott \(2019\)](#), and [Ottonello and Winberry \(2020\)](#). This paper studies the role of corporate financial considerations in transmitting uncertainty shocks. [Gilchrist et al. \(2014\)](#) and [Arellano et al. \(2019\)](#) highlight corporate deleveraging in propagating uncertainty shocks. While like most macro-finance models, they abstract from corporate liquidity choice.⁵ I build a model with joint capital, leverage, and liquidity choice, which generates both deleveraging and liquidity buildup observed in the data. The paper further shows the importance of accounting for corporate cash behavior in understanding the firm-level transmission of uncertainty shocks, the aggregate impact of elevated uncertainty, and the stabilizing effects of credit interventions in an uncertainty-driven recession.

Empirical and theoretical corporate finance. The paper joins and builds on empirical and theoretical corporate finance literature. First, a large empirical corporate finance literature studies corporate cash-holding motives and finds empirical evidence on the role of liquid assets holding in overcoming both financial distress and financing frictions. Some prominent examples include [Opler et al. \(1999\)](#), [Faulkender and Wang \(2006\)](#), [Bates et al. \(2009\)](#). This paper incorporates the two cash-holding motives into a structural model and shows their roles in rationalizing firm responses to uncertainty shocks. Second, the model framework builds upon existing dynamic corporate finance models, for example, [Hennessy and Whited \(2005\)](#), [Titman and Tsyplakov \(2007\)](#), [Gamba and Triantis \(2008\)](#), [Riddick and Whited \(2009\)](#), [Eisfeldt and Muir \(2016\)](#), [Chen et al. \(2021\)](#), [Gomes and Schmid \(2021\)](#) and [Gao et al. \(2021\)](#). I contribute to the literature by showing both empirically and theoretically how indebtedness shapes firms' choices between physical capital and liquid assets, a trade-off faced by firms that have received relatively little attention in the literature so far.

Recessions and Credit interventions. Large-scale fiscal support for the corporate sector during the recent Covid crisis sparked a rapidly growing literature studying the efficacy of credit interventions using quantitative macro models, for example, [Ebsim et al. \(2020\)](#), [Elenev et al. \(2022\)](#), [Crouzet and Tourre \(2021\)](#), and [Guntin \(2022\)](#). Existing work focuses on recessions driven by first-moment shocks, such as a negative productivity shock or a sudden stop in financial markets, and finds that credit interventions have very modest effects in recessions driven by aggregate productivity shocks. This paper instead emphasizes second-moment shocks in recessions and shows that credit interventions are powerful in stabilizing aggregate output drops driven by high uncertainty. This result sheds novel insights on the design of stabilization policies in recessions since heightened uncertainty has been a key feature of U.S. recessions ignored by existing work. Furthermore, I highlight the importance of models used to analyze policy impacts. Models that fail to capture observed liquidity buildup substantially underestimate output responses to debt relief programs.

Impact of uncertainty shocks. Finally, this paper contributes to a large literature in macroeconomics and finance that studies the impact of heightened uncertainty on firms' real and fi-

⁵[Alfaro et al. \(2019\)](#) shows that financial frictions amplify the 'real options' effects of uncertainty shocks on capital investment in a model with capital and cash choice. The core mechanism of their model is still the 'real options' effects of uncertainty shocks.

financial decisions. I begin by revisiting three empirical relationships that have been studied in the literature: a negative investment-uncertainty relationship (Leahy and Whited (1996), Bloom et al. (2007), Gulen and Ion (2016), Kim and Kung (2017), Kermani and Ma (2020)), a positive liquidity-uncertainty relationship (Opler et al. (1999), Bates et al. (2009), Gao et al. (2017), Smitanka et al. (2018)), a negative leverage-uncertainty relationship (Rashid (2013), Gilchrist et al. (2014)). This paper adds to the empirical literature by uncovering the role of indebtedness in shaping firms' real and financial responses to uncertainty shocks.

On the theoretical front, this paper develops a quantitative framework that provides a novel and unified explanation for the observed impact of heightened uncertainty on firms' capital, liquidity, and leverage choices, as well as its heterogeneous impact across differently indebted firms. To explain the impact of uncertainty shocks on firm behavior, macroeconomics literature emphasizes the role of non-convex capital adjustment costs in generating the 'real-options' effect of uncertainty shocks, leading to delays on capital investment (see, e.g. Bloom 2009, Bloom et al. 2018, Alfaro et al. 2019). A strand of the theoretical literature also emphasizes the interaction of uncertainty and credit spreads. Gilchrist et al. (2014) and Arellano et al. (2019) study models with defaultable debt and show that uncertainty shocks lead to higher default risk and thus credit spreads, causing firms to cut investment and employees. My mechanism differs significantly by emphasizing firms' liquidity demand in shaping their real and financial responses to uncertainty shocks. I consider my mechanism a third mechanism in the literature, and we differ by explaining different aspects of the data.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides empirical evidence based on panel local projection. Section 3 constructs a quantitative heterogeneous-firm model with financial frictions. Section 4 discusses model calibration. Section 5 presents model mechanics and model validation. Section 6 studies the transmission mechanism of uncertainty shocks in the model. Section 7 examines the policy implications of the model. Section 8 concludes.

2 Empirical Evidence

In this section, I provide empirical evidence on firm-level responses to heightened uncertainty. The empirical analysis highlights two key empirical patterns:

- (1). Spikes in aggregate uncertainty are followed by declines in physical capital, buildups of corporate liquidity, and deleveraging.
- (2). Firm indebtedness predicts heterogeneous asset choices in response to uncertainty shocks. The declines in physical capital and the accumulation of liquid assets holding are much more pronounced among *ex-ante* more indebted firms.

In Section 2.2, I exploit a Jordà (2005)-style local projection approach with firm-quarter data to estimate dynamic firm-level responses to changes in Macro Uncertainty Index by Jurado et al. (2015). In Section 2.3 and 2.4, I show that the baseline results hold both across and within firms and are robust to a wide set of controls and specifications.

2.1 Data

Measure of aggregate uncertainty. I employ the Macro Uncertainty Index developed by Jurado et al. (2015) as the baseline measure of macroeconomic uncertainty faced by U.S. firms,

which captures forecast volatility of major macroeconomic variables implied by a large-scale time-series model. I take the quarterly average of their 1 month-ahead macroeconomic uncertainty index and use it as a proxy for quarterly macroeconomic uncertainty. Uncertainty shocks, or changes in aggregate uncertainty, are measured as the log growth of the index.

Firm-level variables. I draw firm-quarter observations from Compustat Quarterly. Compustat is ideal for this study: First, it contains rich balance sheet information, which allows me to study firms' financial behavior and measure firms' financial positions. Second, it includes detailed information on firms' sales and cash flows. This is important to a study that examines the effects of uncertainty (second-moment) on firm behavior, in which controlling for changes in first-moment variables, i.e. investment opportunities becomes essential. To the best of my knowledge, Compustat is the only U.S. dataset that satisfies these requirements. The sample period is 1990q1 to 2018q4, which avoids changes in accounting rules in the late 1990s and in 2019. Firms in the financial (SIC code 6000-6999), utilities (SIC code 4900-4949), and government-regulated industries (SIC code > 9000) are excluded since the study focuses on non-financial corporate business. The key dependent variables include firm-level growth in physical capital, liquid asset holdings, and total outstanding debt. I also construct widely used firm-level control variables such as Tobin's Q, Sales Growth, Firm Size, Cash Flows, and Debt Maturity. All variables are deflated by the 2012 GDP deflator. Sample selection and variable construction follow standard practices in the literature, which is detailed in Appendix A. Table A1 presents summary statistics of key firm-level variables.

Firm indebtedness. Firm indebtedness is defined as the net leverage of firms, total outstanding debt of firms *minus* their liquid assets holding and then scaled by their total assets. To capture cross-sectional variation in indebtedness in each quarter, I standardize each of the firm-quarter observations of indebtedness for a firm i in quarter t by its industry-level average and standard deviation in quarter t . Therefore, the firm-level indebtedness measure used in the following regressions captures how one firm is more or less indebted than its industry average in each quarter. As documented by Kim and Kung (2017) and Gulen and Ion (2016), the impact of uncertainty varies across industries that feature different levels of capital irreversibility. Since the levels of indebtedness also vary across industries, the heterogeneous effects by differences in indebtedness might be simply driven by firms that operate in certain industries that feature both high indebtedness and high sensitivity to uncertainty shocks. The use of the 'within-industry cross-sectional variation' in indebtedness addresses this concern.

2.2 Firm-Level Responses to Uncertainty Shocks

Baseline local projection. I employ a Panel Local Projection empirical specification to estimate both the average responses to uncertainty shocks across all sample firms, as well as heterogeneous responses across differently indebted firms:

$$\underbrace{\Delta_h \log(y_{i,t+h})}_{\text{Cumulative growth}} = \alpha_{i,h} + \alpha_{fq,h} + \left(\underbrace{\beta_h}_{\text{Average}} + \underbrace{\gamma_h}_{\text{Heterogeneous}} \text{Indebtedness}_{i,t-1} \right) \cdot \underbrace{\Delta \log \sigma_t}_{\text{Uncertainty Shock}} \quad (1)$$

$$+ \eta_h \text{Indebtedness}_{i,t-1} + \Gamma'_h \underbrace{\mathbf{Z}_{i,t-1}}_{\text{Firm controls}} + \sum_{l=0}^4 \Lambda'_{l,h} \underbrace{\mathbf{Y}_{t-l}}_{\text{Macro controls}} + \mu_{i,t+h}$$

$$\forall i, h = 0, 1, 2, 3, \dots, 12$$

where $h \geq 1$ denotes the horizon at which the impact is being estimated, $\Delta_h \log(y_{i,t+h}) = \log(y_{i,t+h}) - \log(y_{i,t})$ is the cumulative growth in firm-level outcomes over horizon h . $\Delta \log \sigma_t$ denotes the growth in the Macro Uncertainty Index in quarter t . The coefficient of interest β_h , therefore, captures average growth in dependent variables across firms at quarter $t+h$ following a change in the Macro Uncertainty Index at quarter t . $\text{Indebtedness}_{i,t}$ measures how many standard deviations of firm i 's net leverage at t is away from its industry average. The industry is defined as 1-digit SIC level. Hence, the coefficient of interest γ_h captures differences in firm growth at quarter $t+h$ among firms with differential indebtedness following a change in Macro Uncertainty Index at quarter t . If firm indebtedness affects how firms react to uncertainty shocks, then γ_h should be statistically significantly different from zero. Firm fixed effects $\alpha_{i,h}$ are included to absorb unobserved permanent differences across firms. Fiscal-quarter dummy $\alpha_{fq,h}$ is included to absorb the impact of differences in fiscal-quarter across firms on firm behavior. I cluster standard errors in two ways to account for correlation within firms and within quarters.

One common concern in estimating the effects of aggregate uncertainty is that changes in firm behavior following a rise in aggregate uncertainty might be driven by changes in other macroeconomic conditions that are correlated with changes in uncertainty. Recent literature has shown that uncertainty is counter-cyclical, and large rises in uncertainty tend to occur in recessions, see e.g. Bloom et al. (2018). To mitigate these concerns, I control both current and lagged macroeconomic variables $\sum_{l=0}^4 \Lambda'_{l,h} \mathbf{Y}_{t-l}$, including real GDP growth rate, inflation rate, real federal funds rate, and credit spreads to absorb the effects of confounding macroeconomic forces on firm behavior. In addition, I include a vector of firm-level variables $\mathbf{Z}_{i,t-1}$ to control for cross-sectional differences in investment opportunities and financial conditions at the firm level: Tobin's Q, Sales Growth, Firm size, Cash Flows, and Debt Maturity, which are widely used in the empirical literature.

Baseline results. Figure 1 plots both average and heterogeneous responses of (a) physical capital, (b) liquid assets holding, and (c) outstanding debt to a one-standard-deviation growth in Macro Uncertainty Index. Figure 1 shows that following a one-standard-deviation growth (4.5 %) in the Macro Uncertainty Index, average firm-level physical capital drops, liquid assets holding grows, and outstanding debt falls. The average responses are statistically significant at the 5% significance level and persist for more than three years with the peak appearing two years after the shock. The estimated average responses echo previous findings in the literature.

I find that variation in *ex-ante* firm indebtedness foreshadows a statistically significant shift in firms' asset choices following heightened uncertainty. Panel (A) and (B) of Figure 1 show that following a one-standard-deviation growth (4.5 %) in the Macro Uncertainty Index, the decline in physical capital is around 0.5% larger and the buildup of liquid assets holding is around 1.5% larger for firms that are one-standard-deviation more indebted than their industry averages. Moreover, Panel (C) of Figure 1 shows that there is no statistically significant difference in debt growth across differently indebted firms. Taken together, instead of cutting more debt, *ex-ante* more indebted firms respond to heightened uncertainty by reallocating more of their assets towards liquidity. A key takeaway of the empirical analysis is that liquidity build-up is a salient feature of firm responses to an elevated uncertainty in the data, while conventional macro-finance models typically abstract from corporate liquidity choice when firms have debt outstanding.

2.3 Heterogeneous Responses by Firm indebtedness

Extended local projection. To mitigate concerns on the differential responses driven by variation in firm indebtedness, I estimate the following specification:

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta_h \log(y_{i,t+h}) = & \alpha_{i,h} + \alpha_{fq,h} + \alpha_{s,t,h} + \underbrace{\gamma_h \text{Indebtedness}_{i,t-1} \cdot \Delta \log \sigma_t + \beta_h \text{Indebtedness}_{i,t-1}}_{\text{Heterogeneous responses}} \\ & + \underbrace{\Psi'_h \mathbf{Z}_{i,t-1} \cdot \Delta \log \sigma_t + \Gamma'_h \mathbf{Z}_{i,t-1}}_{\text{Firm controls}} + \underbrace{\eta_h \text{Indebtedness}_{i,t-1} \cdot \Delta \log GDP_t}_{\text{Cyclical sensitivity}} + \mu_{i,t+h} \end{aligned} \quad (2)$$

$$\forall i, h = 0, 1, 2, 3, \dots, 12$$

where $h \geq 1$ denotes the horizon at which the impact is being estimated, $\frac{1}{h} \Delta_h \log(y_{i,t+h}) = \log\left(\frac{y_{i,t+h}}{y_{i,t}}\right)$ is the average cumulative growth in firm-level outcomes over horizon h . $\Delta \log \sigma_t$ measures log growth in Macro Uncertainty Index at quarter t , and $\Delta \log GDP_t$ measures real GDP growth at quarter t . $\alpha_{i,h}$ indicate firm fixed effects. Fiscal-quarter dummy $\alpha_{fq,h}$ is included to absorb the impact of differences in fiscal-quarter across firms on firm behavior. Since the focus is heterogeneous responses across firms, I include industry-by-quarter fixed effects $\alpha_{s,t,h}$ to absorb differences in how broad industries are exposed to aggregate shocks. The industry is defined at 1-digit SIC level. $\text{Indebtedness}_{i,t-1}$ measures how many standard deviations of firm i 's net leverage at $t - 1$ is away from its industry average at quarter $t - 1$. $\mathbf{Z}_{i,t-1}$ indicates a vector of firm-level control variables. The main coefficients of interest γ_h capture heterogeneous responses to changes in the Macroeconomic Uncertainty Index driven by pre-shock variation in corporate indebtedness across firms.

Regression (2) addresses two major concerns on the heterogeneous responses to uncertainty shocks driven by variation in firm indebtedness. First, Firm indebtedness is endogenous and might vary systematically with other dimensions of firms. For example, more indebted firms might simply have fewer investment opportunities, and thus the heterogeneous responses across differently indebted firms might be driven by cross-sectional variation in investment opportunities. To mitigate this type of concern, I interact $\Delta \log \sigma_t$ with **Firm controls** that have been found to be important drivers of firms' investment and financial behavior: Tobin's Q, Sales Growth, Firm Size, Cash flows, and Debt Maturity. Hence, the extended specification also allows firms' responses to differ along other dimensions of firms. The second type of concern is that more indebted firms might be more sensitive to fluctuations in business cycles, which are negatively correlated with aggregate uncertainty. To mitigate this concern, I include an interaction term $\text{Indebtedness}_{i,t-1} \cdot \Delta \log GDP_t$ to absorb potential heterogeneity in cyclical sensitivity across firms with differential indebtedness.

Figure 2 shows that the baseline results are robust to including heterogeneous responses along other dimensions of firms and heterogeneous cyclical sensitivity across firms. Consistent with the baseline results, the response of capital growth is more negative, and the response of liquid assets growth is more positive for *ex-ante* more indebted firms.

2.4 Additional Empirical Results


I conclude the empirical analysis with additional results and robustness exercises.

Within-firm variation. The baseline results suggest that cross-sectional variation in firm in-

debtiness predicts differential responses to uncertainty shocks. In Appendix B.1, I show that similar patterns emerge when using within-firm variation in indebtedness over time. I compute the deviation of firm's net leverage from its unconditional firm-specific average, and interact it with uncertainty shocks. Figure A1 shows that the responses of physical capital and liquid assets holding to changes in the Macro Uncertainty Index are also stronger when firms are more indebted than their own average levels. These results provide additional evidence on the role of firm indebtedness in shaping firm responses to uncertainty shocks.


Event study: 9/11 terrorist attacks. To further confirm the interpretation of the empirical findings, I conduct an event study that follows the uncertainty literature exploiting 9/11 terrorist attacks as a plausibly exogenous increase in aggregate uncertainty (e.g. Bloom (2009); Kim and Kung (2017)). Appendix B.2 details the empirical design. I find that the firm behavior observed around the 9/11 terrorist attacks accord well with the baseline results. Panel A of Figure A2 shows that the post-9/11 period features statistically significant declines in physical capital and outstanding debt, as well as a large buildup in liquid assets holding on average across firms. Panel B of Figure A2 shows that differences in lagged indebtedness predict differential asset choices in the post-911 period.

FIGURE 1: Baseline Local Projection: Firm-Level Responses to 1 S.D. Growth in Macro Uncertainty Index



Notes: the figure plots both the average and heterogeneous responses of (a) physical capital, (b) liquid assets holding, and (c) outstanding debt to a one-standard-deviation growth in Macro Uncertainty Index by [Jurado et al. \(2015\)](#) at quarter t . The heterogeneous responses are driven by cross-sectional variation in indebtedness at quarter $t - 1$. $\text{Indebtedness}_{i,t-1}$ measures how many standard deviations of firm i 's net leverage at $t - 1$ is away from its industry average at quarter $t - 1$. Point estimates and 95% confidence intervals for β_h and γ_h are plotted. Standard errors are two-way clustered at both firm and time levels. The sample period is from 1990Q1 to 2018Q4.

FIGURE 2: Extended Local Projection: Heterogeneous Responses by Firm indebtedness



12

Notes: this figure plots both the heterogeneous responses of (a) physical capital, (b) liquid assets holding, and (c) outstanding debt to a one-standard-deviation growth in Macro Uncertainty Index by [Jurado et al. \(2015\)](#) at quarter t . The heterogeneous responses are driven by cross-sectional variation in indebtedness at quarter $t - 1$. Indebtedness $_{i,t-1}$ measures how many standard deviations of firm i 's net leverage at $t - 1$ is away from its industry average at quarter $t - 1$. I interact $\Delta \log \sigma_t$ with **Firm controls** that have been found to be important drivers of firms' investment and financial behavior: Tobin's Q, Sales Growth, Firm Size, Cash flows and Debt Maturity. Hence, the extended specification also allows firms' responses to differ along other dimensions of firms. I also include an interaction term $\text{Indebtedness}_{i,t-1} \cdot \Delta \log GDP_t$ to absorb potential heterogeneity in cyclical sensitivity across firms with differential indebtedness. Point estimates and 95% confidence intervals for β_h and γ_h are plotted. Standard errors are two-way clustered at both firm and time levels. The sample period is from 1990Q1 to 2018Q4.

3 Quantitative Model

In this section, I develop a quantitative heterogeneous-firm model in which firms make optimal choices of capital, leverage, and liquidity in the presence of financial market frictions. A calibrated model is able to reproduce a broad set of cross-sectional and dynamic features of corporate investment and financial behavior observed in the data, therefore it is exploited to understand the economic mechanisms that drive the observed firm-level responses to uncertainty shocks. In Sections 3.1 - 3.6, I describe the details of the model.

3.1 Environment

Time is discrete and the horizon is infinite. The economy is populated by a continuum of heterogeneous firms that make optimal investment and financial decisions in the presence of idiosyncratic productivity shocks and financial market frictions. Firms produce a homogeneous good in a competitive market and sell their products at a price of 1. They hire labor in the labor market at a wage rate W determined by labor market clearing.

There is a representative household that has preferences over the final consumption good and supplies labor according to

$$L^s(W) = \psi W^\zeta, \quad (3)$$

where $\psi > 0$ denotes the disutility of working, and $\zeta > 0$ is the labor supply elasticity. There is also a mass of risk-neutral/deep-pocketed financial intermediaries who provide financial services.

I first study a stationary equilibrium in which there is no aggregate shock and all aggregate variables are constant. I then study the perfect foresight transition path in response to unexpected uncertainty shocks. I drop subscripts for a firm i and period t , and adopt the recursive timing convention, except in parts where such choice may jeopardize the clarity of exposition.

3.2 Firm's Setup

Firms are **risk-neutral** and discount the future at an exogenous risk-free interest rate r . Firms have access to the same production and financing technologies. In each period, each firm's risk-neutral manager maximizes the expected present value of dividends to equity holders by choosing capital, cash, and debt.

Technology. Each firm combines physical capital k and labor l to produce a homogeneous good y using a decreasing return to scale production technology. Firm production is subject to idiosyncratic productivity shocks z . The production function is as follows:

$$y = z^{1-\nu} k^\alpha l^\nu, \alpha + \nu < 1 \quad (4)$$

α is the value-added share of capital, and ν is the value-added share of labor.

Productivity. Firm-specific productivity shock z_{it} evolves according to

$$\log(z_{i,t+1}) = \mu_t + \rho \log(z_{it}) + \sigma_t \epsilon_{i,t+1} \quad (5)$$

where the innovations $\epsilon_{i,t+1} \sim N(0, 1)$ are independent across firms. μ_t denotes an adjustment to the level of firms' productivity. σ_t denotes the volatility of the innovations.

Equation (5) implies that the level of volatility σ_t today determines the distribution of next-period idiosyncratic productivity $z'(\sigma_t)$. Thus, from the perspective of firms in the model, high volatility σ_t today indicates a more widely spread distribution of tomorrow's idiosyncratic productivity. That is, during a period of high volatility σ_t , firms are more likely to draw both high and low idiosyncratic productivity, a scenario where firms face both higher downside risk (due to a higher probability of bad productivity shock) and larger growth potential (due to higher probability of good productivity shock). As in [Gilchrist et al. \(2014\)](#), the volatility term σ_t is common across firms and thus an increase in σ_t affects all firms and hence captures "uncertainty" shock in the aggregate sense.

Importantly, μ_t is chosen to be $\frac{-\sigma_t^2}{2}$, and consequently the conditional mean of firms' productivity $E[\log(z_{i,t+1}) | \log(z_{i,t}), \sigma_t]$ is not affected by the level of volatility σ_t . In other words, changes in σ_t do not affect the expected aggregate productivity of the economy. Therefore, a change in σ_t is also considered as a "Second-moment Shock" or a "Dispersion Shock". In this paper, I first solve for a stationary equilibrium by fixing σ_t at σ_L to study firms' optimal investment and financial decisions. I then study a perfect foresight transition path in response to unexpected jumps in σ_t , i.e. uncertainty shocks.

Operating profits. Physical capital k is owned by firms and chosen one period before. After the realization of idiosyncratic productivity z each period, firms hire labor from a competitive labor market at a wage rate W to maximize their operating profits. As in [Gilchrist et al. \(2014\)](#) and [Xiao \(2018\)](#), firms also pay operating costs each period. To account for the fact that bigger firms tend to incur larger operating costs, these costs are scaled by firms' existing stock of physical capital. Thus, a firm with physical capital k will pay operating costs $f_o k$.⁶ Firms' per-period operating profits are therefore given by the solution to the following static profit-maximization problem:

$$\begin{aligned}\pi(z, k; W) &= \max_l \{z^{1-\nu} k^{\alpha l^\nu} - f_o k - Wl\} \\ &= (1 - \nu) \left(\frac{\nu}{W}\right)^{\frac{\nu}{1-\nu}} z k^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\nu}} \\ &= z\psi(W)k^\gamma - f_o k\end{aligned}$$

where W denotes the (real) wage and

$$\gamma = \frac{\alpha}{1 - \nu} \quad \text{and} \quad \psi(W) = (1 - \nu) \left(\frac{\nu}{W}\right)^{\frac{\nu}{1-\nu}}$$

This setup ensures that the firm's profit function is linear in its productivity, as in [Gilchrist et al. \(2014\)](#). The detailed solution to the problem is shown in [Appendix C.1](#).

Asset structure. Firms own physical capital, which depreciates at a constant rate $\delta > 0$. Each period firms have an opportunity to choose their next period's capital stock, k' . The law of motion for firms' capital stock is given by

$$k' = (1 - \delta)k + i \tag{6}$$

where i denotes the net capital (dis)investment of firms.

In addition to holding physical capital k , firms can also save in liquid assets c at an exoge-

⁶The operating cost f_o helps to match the average operating profits of firms in the data, which further affects average cash held by firms, as in [Xiao \(2018\)](#).

nous risk-free rate r . I interchangeably refer to liquid assets as “cash” throughout the paper.

Entry and Exit. As in [Khan and Thomas \(2013\)](#), firms are forced to exit the economy after production with a fixed probability π^e . This assumption precludes all firms from overcoming the financial frictions in the steady state of the economy, which leads to an unrealistic and uninteresting firm distribution. The exit shock is i.i.d across firms and time. Equity holders of exiting firms receive the residual firm value, i.e. book value of total assets net of all debt obligations. Exiting firms are then replaced by entrants such that there is always a unit mass of firms. Entrants’ problems are discussed in greater detail in [Section 3.5](#). Firms that survive the exit shocks choose next-period physical capital, cash holding, and outstanding debt and enter the next period with entrants.

3.3 Sources of Funds and Financial frictions

Firms can finance their assets and operation through three different sources of funds: internal liquidity, debt, and outside equity. Firms enter the period with their physical capital k , liquid assets holding c , and outstanding debt b .

Internal liquidity. Each period, after production and tax, the internal liquidity available to the firms includes after-tax operating profits, liquid assets holding, and tax rebates:

$$\underbrace{l(z, k, c, b)}_{\text{Internal liquidity}} = (1 - \tau) \underbrace{\pi(z, k)}_{\text{Operating profits}} + \underbrace{[1 + (1 - \tau)r]c}_{\text{Liquid assets}} + \underbrace{\tau(rb + \delta k)}_{\text{Tax rebates}} \quad (7)$$

where τ denotes the corporate tax rate. Note that interest income rc from corporate cash savings are taxed, and interest expenses rb and depreciation δk are tax-deductible.

Debt financing. Firms in the model take on debt to finance their asset choices or to enjoy the tax shield of debt. Risk-neutral deep-pocket lenders impose a collateral constraint ensuring that the outstanding debt obligation is not larger than the value of the capital stock, and thus debt service only requires a coupon rate equal to the risk-free rate r . Consequently, firms’ choice of next-period debt b' must satisfy the borrowing constraint:

$$\underbrace{(1 + r)b'}_{\text{debt obligation}} \leq \theta \underbrace{(1 - \delta)k'}_{\text{value of physical capital}}, \quad 0 < \theta < 1 \quad (8)$$

where θ denotes the pledgeability of physical capital.

Debt maturity and adjustment. As in [Gomes and Schmid \(2021\)](#) and [Chen et al. \(2021\)](#), corporate debt is modeled as long-term debt that matures randomly with a given probability λ . Specifically, with probability λ , the firm’s outstanding debt matures, and with probability $1 - \lambda$, the firm’s outstanding debt continues, and firms only repay coupon payments. The expected debt maturity is, therefore, $\frac{1}{\lambda}$. This setup keeps the model tractable while allowing the model to generate a more realistic debt maturity process: (i). The average maturity of outstanding debt of non-financial firms is significantly longer than one period. (ii). Firms pay coupon payments before maturity and repay the principal at maturity.

When existing debt matures, firms cannot take on new debt until they have repaid their debt obligations in full,⁷ and importantly, firms are in liquidity shortfalls if internal liquidity is

⁷This timing convention follows [Hennessy and Whited \(2005\)](#), [Titman and Tsyplov \(2007\)](#), [Gamba and Triantis \(2008\)](#), and so on.

insufficient to meet their maturing debt obligations.⁸ The liquidity gap for debt repayment is given by:

$$\underbrace{m}_{\text{Liquidity gap}} = \underbrace{l(z, k, c, b)}_{\text{Internal liquidity}} - \underbrace{(1+r)b}_{\text{Maturing debt obligations}}$$

where $m < 0$ indicates the event of liquidity shortfalls. When liquidity shortfalls arise, a penalty is triggered. Specifically, firms suffer a cash flow penalty proportional to their liquidity gap, as in [Titman and Tsyplakov \(2007\)](#). In these scenarios, firms' cash flows after taking into account costly liquidity shortfalls can be written as:

$$m - s \cdot |m| \cdot \mathbf{1}_{m < 0} \quad (9)$$

where s is the parameter that governs the costs of liquidity shortfalls. Firms can then finance their liquidity shortfalls by disinvestment or new debt/equity issuance.

Prior to debt maturity, indebted firms can adjust their outstanding debt, that is, debt is callable at par.⁹ Firms can lower their debt level without any costs while increasing debt level entails issuance costs proportional to additional debt issued η . The debt adjustment of firms with non-maturing debt can be summarized as follows:

$$\underbrace{R(b, b')}_{\text{Debt adjustment}} = \begin{cases} (1 - \eta)(b' - b) - rb, & \text{if } b' > b \\ b' - (1 + r)b, & \text{if } b' < b \end{cases} \quad (10)$$

The debt issuance costs capture the difficulties of issuing new debt when firms have debt outstanding. For example, debt covenants and seniority rules in debt contracts make new debt issuance especially costly.

Equity financing. Firms' choices of next-period physical capital k' , liquid assets holding c' , and outstanding debt b' , together with their internal liquidity $l(z, k, c, b)$ and undepreciated capital stock $(1 - \delta)k$, determine firms' cash flows to their equity holders d . When $d \geq 0$, it represents dividend payout to the equity holders. When $d < 0$, firms issue new equity. Following [Hennessy and Whited \(2007\)](#) and [Eisfeldt and Muir \(2016\)](#), the equity issuance cost is as follows:

$$\Phi(d) = \mathbf{1}_{d < 0} \cdot \left(\kappa_0 + \frac{\kappa_1}{2} d^2 \right) \quad (11)$$

where κ_0 captures the fixed costs of equity issuance and κ_1 captures the variable costs of equity issuance. The equity issuance costs reflect agency problems in financial markets.

3.4 Timing

The timing of events within each period is as follows:


- (1) Firms enter the period with physical capital k , liquid assets holding c , and outstanding debt b . After observing their idiosyncratic productivity z , firms hire labor to maximize

⁸[Hennessy and Whited \(2005\)](#) abstracts from corporate cash holding, and thus firms are considered in liquidity shortfalls as long as firms' realized operating profits are insufficient to cover their debt burdens. This paper models cash holding explicitly and highlights firms' liquidity management.

⁹Conceptually, debt restructuring, as in [Goldstein et al. \(2001\)](#), requires firms to call back all of their outstanding debt first and then issue new debt at the desired level. Therefore, there is always only one vintage of debt from the firm's most recent restructuring.

their current operating profits. Firms also observe aggregate uncertainty σ_t and thus form beliefs about tomorrow's idiosyncratic productivity.

- (2) After production, exit shocks realize. π^e fraction of firms that are hit by exit shocks exit the economy permanently. $(1 - \pi^e)$ fraction of incumbent firms continue to the next stage.
- (3) With probability λ , firm's outstanding debt b matures. Continuing firms with maturing debt repay their debt first, then choose next-period capital k' /cash c' /new debt b' . Continuing firms with non-maturing debt can choose next-period capital k' , cash c' , and debt $R(b, b')$.
- (4) Potential entrants replace exiting firms and solve entrants' problems. They then enter the next period with continuing firms.



3.5 Firms' Problems

I now characterize firms' problems recursively in detail.

Begin-the-period firm value. Let $V(z, k, c, b)$ represent the expected discounted value of a firm that enters the period with productivity z , physical capital k , liquid assets holding c , and outstanding debt b before it learns whether it will exit and whether its outstanding debt will mature.

$$\underbrace{V(z, k, c, b)}_{\text{Begin-the-period Firm Value}} = \underbrace{\pi^e V^{\text{exit}}(z, k, c, b)}_{\text{Value of Exiting Firms}} + (1 - \pi^e) \underbrace{\left[\lambda V^m(z, k, c, b) + (1 - \lambda) V^n(z, k, c, b) \right]}_{\text{Value of Continuing Firms}} \quad (12)$$

Value of existing firms. Equity holders of exiting firms receive the residual firm value, i.e. book value of total assets net of all debt obligations. Therefore, the value of exiting firm is defined as follows:

$$\underbrace{V^{\text{exit}}(z, k, c, b)}_{\text{Value of Exiting Firms}} = \underbrace{l(z, k, c, b) + (1 - \delta)k}_{\text{Asset value}} - \underbrace{(1 + r)b}_{\text{debt value}} \quad (13)$$

Value of continuing firms w/ maturing debt. Conditional on survival, firms with maturing debt today need to pay off their maturing debt obligations. As discussed in Section 3.3, when

their internal liquidity is insufficient to cover debt repayment, they suffer a reduction in their cash flows. They then choose next period's capital k' , cash c' , and new debt b' to maximize:

$$V^m(z, k, c, b) = \max_{k', c', b'} d - \Phi(d) + \frac{1}{1+r} E_{z'|z} [V(z', k', c', b')] \quad (14)$$

subject to

$$\text{[Liquidity gap]:} \quad m = \underbrace{l(z, k, c, b)}_{\text{Internal liquidity}} - \underbrace{(1+r)b}_{\text{Maturing debt obligations}}$$

$$\text{[Dividend flow]:} \quad d = m - \underbrace{s \cdot |m| \cdot \mathbf{1}_{m < 0}}_{\text{Liquidity shortfalls}} - \underbrace{[k' - (1-\delta)k]}_{\text{Investment}} - \underbrace{c'}_{\text{Cash}} + \underbrace{b'}_{\text{new debt}}$$

$$\text{[Borrowing constraint]:} \quad (1+r)b' \leq \theta(1-\delta)k', 0 < \theta < 1$$

$$\text{[Equity issuance costs]:} \quad \Phi(d) = \mathbf{1}_{d < 0} \cdot \left(\kappa_0 + \frac{\kappa_1}{2} d^2 \right)$$

Value of continuing firms w/ non-maturing debt. Continuing firms with non-maturing debt can choose next-period capital k' , cash c' , and debt $R(b, b')$ to maximize:

$$V^n(z, k, c, b) = \max_{k', c', b'} d - \Phi(d) + \frac{1}{1+r} E_{z'|z} [V(z', k', c', b')] \quad (15)$$

subject to

$$\text{[Dividend flow]:} \quad d = \underbrace{l(z, k, c, b)}_{\text{Internal liquidity}} + \underbrace{R(b, b')}_{\text{Debt adjustment}} - \underbrace{[k' - (1-\delta)k]}_{\text{Investment}} - \underbrace{c'}_{\text{Cash}}$$

$$\text{[Debt adjustment]:} \quad R(b, b') = \begin{cases} (1-\eta)(b' - b) - rb, & \text{if } b' > b \\ b' - (1+r)b, & \text{if } b' < b \end{cases}$$

$$\text{[Borrowing constraint]:} \quad (1+r)b' \leq \theta(1-\delta)k', 0 < \theta < 1$$

$$\text{[Equity issuance costs]:} \quad \Phi(d) = \mathbf{1}_{d < 0} \cdot \left(\kappa_0 + \frac{\kappa_1}{2} d^2 \right)$$

Value of entrants. Every period, entrants will replace exiting firms. Entrants draw an initial realization of the idiosyncratic shock z from the long-run invariant distribution implied by Equation (5), denoted by $\mu^{\text{Entry}}(z)$. They know about their initial asset size n_0 , and initial leverage ratio $\frac{b_0}{n_0}$, and then choose their next period's asset portfolio k' and c' :

$$V^{\text{entry}}(z, n_0, b_0) = \max_{c', k'} \beta E_{z'} [V(z', k', c', b_0)] \quad (16)$$

$$k' + c' = n_0$$

where n_0 and b_0 will be calibrated to match the size of entrants and the average entrant's leverage ratio in the data.

3.6 Equilibrium

Firm distribution. I begin by defining $\mu(z, k, c, b)$ as the cross-sectional distribution of firms over idiosyncratic productivity z , physical capital k , liquid assets holding c , and outstanding

debt b . The evolution of the distribution of firms $\mu_{t+1}(z, k, c, b)$ is given by

$$\begin{aligned} \mu_{t+1}(z', k', c', b') = & \tag{17} \\ (1 - \pi_e) & \left[\int \int_{z'} \underbrace{\lambda \mathbf{1}\{\hat{k}_t^m(z, k, c, b) = k'\} \times \mathbf{1}\{\hat{c}_t^m(z, k, c, b) = c'\} \times \mathbf{1}\{\hat{b}_t^m(z, k, c, b) = b'\}}_{\text{transition of continuing firms with maturing debt}} \right. \\ & + \underbrace{(1 - \lambda) \mathbf{1}\{\hat{k}_t^n(z, k, c, b) = k'\} \times \mathbf{1}\{\hat{c}_t^n(z, k, c, b) = c'\} \times \mathbf{1}\{\hat{b}_t^n(z, k, c, b) = b'\}}_{\text{transition of continuing firms with non-maturing debt}} dF(z'|z) d\mu_t(z, k, c, b) \left. \right] \\ & + \pi_e \left[\int \int_{z'} \underbrace{\mathbf{1}\{\hat{k}_t^o(z, n_0, b_0) = k'\} \times \mathbf{1}\{\hat{c}_t^o(z, n_0, b_0) = c'\} \times \mathbf{1}\{\hat{b}_t^o(z, n_0, b_0) = b_0\}}_{\text{transition of entry firms}} dF(z'|z) d\mu^{Entry}(z) \right] \end{aligned}$$

where $\{\hat{k}^m, \hat{c}^m, \hat{b}^m\}$ denote the policy functions of firms with maturing debt, $\{\hat{k}^n, \hat{c}^n, \hat{b}^n\}$ denote the policy functions of firms with non-maturing debt, and $\{\hat{k}^o, \hat{c}^o, \hat{b}^o\}$ denote the policy functions of entrants.

Aggregation. Given the firm distribution $\mu_t(z, k, c, b)$, I aggregate firm-level variables to aggregate variables. The aggregate output and aggregate labor demand are given by:

$$Y_t = \int y_t(z, k, c, b) d\mu_t(z, k, c, b) \quad \text{and} \quad L_t^d = \int n_t(z, k, c, b) d\mu_t(z, k, c, b)$$

Similarly, other variables can be aggregated, such as aggregate capital stock, liquid assets, and outstanding debt.

Equilibrium definition. A stationary industry equilibrium in this economy consists of (i). aggregate prices: wage W and interest rate r , (ii). firm value functions $\{V, V^m, V^n, V^{entry}, V^{exit}\}$, related firms policy functions, (iii). firm distribution $\mu(z, k, c, b)$, and a measure of entrants $\mu^{entry}(z)$ such that

- (1). Given W and r , $V(z, k, c, b), V^e(z, k, c, b), V^m(z, k, c, b), V^n(z, k, c, b)$ solve the continuing firms' problems (14) - (15) with related policy functions.
- (2). Given $r, \tilde{V}(z, n_0, b_0)$ solve the entrants' problem (16) with related policy functions.
- (3). The labor market clears:

$$L_t^d = \int n_t(z, k, c, b) d\mu_t(z, k, c, b) = L^s(W) = \psi W^\zeta, \forall t$$

- (4). The distribution of firms satisfies (17). In a steady state, the distribution's law of motion is a fixed point.

3.7 Optimal Firm Policies

In this subsection, I analyze firms' optimal investment and financial policies in detail, tracing their costs and benefits. For illustration purposes, I assume firms' value functions are differentiable.¹⁰ For simplicity, I set the exogenous exit probability $\pi^e = 0$ in this section. Details on the analytical derivations below can be found in Appendix C.1.

¹⁰Firms' value functions are not everywhere due to equity issuance costs, liquidity shortfalls, and debt issuance costs.

Optimal payout policy. In an economy without equity issuance costs, the marginal value of cash flows to shareholders is always equal to one. On the other hand, the marginal value of firms' cash flows to shareholders might be greater than one in the presence of costly external finance. The first-order condition for dividends reveals the marginal value of firms' cash flows to shareholders in the model :

$$\Lambda(d) = \begin{cases} 1, & \text{if } d \geq 0 \\ 1 + \kappa_1 |d|, & \text{if } d < 0 \end{cases} \quad (18)$$

Formally, the marginal value of firms' cash flows to shareholders equals one when firms payout dividends $d \geq 0$, while it becomes larger than one when firms issue new equity $d < 0$ due to the equity issuance costs. In the model, an additional unit of internal funds might help firms avoid and reduce costly external finance. Thus firms can benefit from liquidity management in anticipation of future funding needs.

Optimal cash policy. Corporate cash holding allows firms to transfer internal resources across time and states where the marginal values of firms' cash flows to shareholders differ. The condition for optimal cash holding is as follows:

$$\underbrace{\Lambda(d) \cdot \mathbf{1}}_{\text{marginal cost of cash}} \geq \frac{1}{1+r} E_{z'|z} \left[\overbrace{\Lambda(d') \quad [1 + (1-\tau)r] \quad (1 + \lambda \cdot s \cdot \mathbf{1}_{m' < 0})}^{\text{marginal benefit of cash}} \right] \quad (19)$$

increase in internal liquidity

The left-hand side of Equation (19) represents the firm's marginal cost of carrying one additional dollar of cash into the subsequent period. When firm payouts dividends, this cost is the marginal value of foregone dividends, which equals one. When firm issues equity, one additional unit of cash saving implies an additional unit of equity issuance, and thus its marginal cost is given by one plus the equity issuance costs. The right-hand side of Equation (19) represents the firm's marginal benefit of holding cash. Carrying one more unit of cash leads to an increase in next-period internal liquidity by $1 + (1 - \tau)r$ and thus increase dividends payout or reduces the amount of costly equity issuance. When a firm faces a liquidity shortfall for debt repayment $m' < 0$, the increased internal liquidity further helps to reduce the amount of liquidity penalty firms need to cover.

Cash holding helps firms to avoid and reduce equity issuance costs in anticipation of both good and bad productivity shocks: (i). when firms are hit by good productivity shocks and thus have high investment needs, cash holding allows firms to fund investment without tapping frictional financial markets. (ii). when firms are hit by bad productivity shocks and thus generate low operating profits, cash holding allows firms to avoid and reduce liquidity shortfalls for debt repayment. These two cash-holding motives are consistent with the empirical patterns documented by a large empirical corporate finance literature.

Optimal investment policy. In the model with financing frictions, liquidity management is intimately intertwined with firms' capital investment decisions. The optimality condition per-

taining to firms' investment policies is given by:

$$\underbrace{\Lambda(d) \cdot 1}_{\text{marginal cost of capital}} = \overbrace{\mu_b \theta (1 - \delta) + \frac{1}{1+r} E_{z'|z} \left[\Lambda(d') \left[\underbrace{\left[(1 - \tau) \frac{\partial \pi(z, k)}{\partial k} + \tau \delta \right]}_{\text{increase in internal liquidity}} (1 + \lambda \cdot s \cdot \mathbf{1}_{m' < 0}) + (1 - \delta) \right] \right]}_{\text{marginal benefit of capital}} \quad (20)$$

The left-hand side of Equation (20) represents the marginal cost of capital investment. Similar to cash saving, investing in one more unit of physical capital today reduces current dividends or increases equity issuance, which is valued at the marginal value of current cash flows to shareholders $\Lambda(d)$. The right-hand side of Equation (20) represents the marginal benefit of capital investment, which has several components. Specifically, investing today builds up collateral and thus relaxes a firm's borrowing constraint (first component), and increases future internal liquidity (second component) and capital stock (third component).

Optimal debt policy. Increasing leverage, on the one hand, allows the firm to improve its current cash flows to shareholders, reflecting either increased dividends or lower equity issuance. On the other hand, it increases the firm's debt service tomorrow, thereby raising the likelihood that it will have to issue costly new shares in the future. The first-order conditions with respect to debt choice b' for firms with maturing and non-maturing debt are as follows:

$$\underbrace{\Lambda(d) \cdot 1 - \mu_b}_{\text{marginal benefit of debt}} = \overbrace{\frac{1}{1+r} E_{z'|z} \left[\Lambda(d') \left[1 + (1 - \tau)r (1 + \lambda \cdot s \cdot \mathbf{1}_{m' < 0}) - (1 - \lambda) \cdot \eta \cdot \mathbf{1}_{b' > b'} \right] \right]}_{\text{marginal cost of debt}} \quad (21)$$

$$\underbrace{\Lambda(d) \cdot (1 - \eta) - \mu_b}_{\text{marginal benefit of debt}} = \overbrace{\frac{1}{1+r} E_{z'|z} \left[\Lambda(d') \left[1 + (1 - \tau)r (1 + \lambda \cdot s \cdot \mathbf{1}_{m' < 0}) - (1 - \lambda) \cdot \eta \cdot \mathbf{1}_{b' > b'} \right] \right]}_{\text{marginal cost of debt}} \quad (22)$$

Equation (21) represents the first-order condition with respect to debt for firms with maturing debt obligations. Equation (22) represents the first-order condition with respect to debt for firms with non-maturing debt. The left-hand side of Equation (21) and Equation (22) is the marginal benefit of one more unit of borrowing today which increases firms' current cash flows to shareholders while reducing firms' future debt capacity. Since firms with non-maturing debt face debt issuance frictions, the proceeds from their debt issuance are reduced by the proportional issuance costs η . The right-hand side of Equation (21) and Equation (22) represent the marginal costs of outstanding debt firms face. Servicing an additional unit of debt tomorrow reduces next-period cash flows to shareholders, especially when a firm's internal liquidity is insufficient to meet its maturing debt obligations.

4 Calibration

This section describes the calibration strategy. The model is calibrated at a quarterly frequency. There are two groups of parameters. The first group consists of externally set parameters, which are either standard parameters in the literature or parameters that have a natural data counterpart. The second group of parameters is calibrated internally to minimize the difference between model-simulated moments and their empirical counterparts. Details on model simulation are described in Appendix C.2.

4.1 Externally Set Parameters

Panel A of Table 1 displays the values for fixed parameters and their sources.

TABLE 1: Externally Set Parameters

Parameter	Description	Value	Source/Targets
(a). Technology			
α	Capital share	0.30	Gilchrist et al. (2014)
χ	Decreasing returns-to-scale	0.85	Gilchrist et al. (2014)
δ	Depreciation rate	0.025	Standard
(b). Productivity			
ρ_z	Persistence	0.90	Foster et al. (2008)
σ_z	Volatility	0.051	Bloom et al. (2018)
(c). Institutions			
r_f	Risk-free interest rate	0.0121	$\beta = 0.988 = 1/(1+r)$
τ	Effective corporate tax rate	0.20	CBO (2017)
π^e	Exogenous exit rate	0.025	Annual exit rate=0.10 (BED)
λ	Debt maturity	0.07	Maturity $\frac{1}{\lambda} = 3.5$ years
θ	Pledgeability	0.71	$P_{95}(Leverage)$

Technology and productivity. Capital share α is set to $\alpha = 0.30$, and capital depreciates at rate $\delta = 0.025$ quarterly. Return-to-scale is set to $\chi = 0.85$. These parameter choices are fairly standard in the literature. As suggested by Foster et al. (2008), the persistence of firm-specific productivity is set to $\rho_z = 0.90$. Following Bloom et al. (2018), I set the low uncertainty state as σ_L as 0.51.

Institutions. Parameters in this group have natural data counterparts, which capture features of the U.S. economy outside the model. The quarterly risk-free interest rate is chosen to be $r = 0.121$, which implies the subjective discount factor $\beta = 0.988$. As reported by Congressional Budget Office in 2017, the marginal effective corporate tax rate is 0.20. Following the survey of Business Employment Dynamics, the quarterly firm exit rate is $\pi^e = 0.025$, which implies an average 10-year corporate duration, in line with Khan and Thomas (2013).

Debt maturity. Expected maturity of debt is set to be 3.5 years, which implies that $\lambda = 0.07$. The average maturity of outstanding debt for samples of U.S. public firms calculated by empirical literature varies from 3 years to 4 years.

Assets pledgeability. I set the assets pledgeability θ to 0.71, which corresponds to the 95th percentile of the leverage distribution calculated using my sample. This parameter value helps the model generate a realistic leverage distribution. The value is slightly lower than the average recovery rate of corporate loans and bonds reported by Moody's Ultimate Recovery Database, 0.75, which is used in Begenau and Salomao (2019).

4.2 Internally Calibrated Parameters.

Panel B of Table 2 displays the values for internally calibrated parameters as well as the calibration targets. I use 8 empirical moments to estimate 7 parameters using Simulated Methods of Moments. This choice produces an overidentified model by one degree of freedom. Appendix C.3 details how the empirical targets are computed from a firm-quarter panel and their model counterparts. I also discuss the empirical targets used in the literature. While

every targeted moment is simultaneously affected by all parameters, in what follows I provide some intuition for their identification. Table 2 displays the values for internally calibrated parameters and shows that the model matches the targeted moments reasonably well.

TABLE 2: Internal Calibrated Parameters and Model Fit

Parameter	Data	Value	Targets	Data	Model
(a). Financial Frictions					
s	Liquidity penalty	0.51	Mean leverage ratio	0.26	0.27
η	Debt issuance costs	0.09	SD leverage ratio	0.15	0.15
			Mean cash-to-asset ratio	0.10	0.10
f_o	Production costs	0.09	Mean operating income-to-assets	0.10	0.11
κ_0	Fixed equity issuance cost	0.02	Fraction of net equity issuer	0.05	0.04
κ_1	Convex equity issuance cost	0.21	Mean equity-issuance-to-assets	0.13	0.14
(b). Firm Life Cycle					
n_0	Entrant' assets	0.34	Entrants' Relative Size	0.23	0.24
b_0	Entrant' debt	0.24	Entrants' Debt/Assets	0.45	0.47

Financial frictions. The first set of parameters governs the financial behaviors of firms, therefore they are calibrated to match key financial ratios. As shown in 3.7, the expected marginal costs of debt is directly affected by liquidity penalty s . Since the costs of liquidity shortfalls grow as liquidity penalty s increases, the average leverage ratio decreases. It also shapes the cross-sectional difference in leverage ratio: when liquidity penalty s is low, all firms, regardless of their productivity, will use debt to take advantage of its tax benefits, implying a small standard deviation of leverage ratio across firms. In the presence of debt issuance frictions, corporate cash is used as the marginal source of funding for firms, therefore, the average cash-to-assets ratio increases in debt issuance costs. I set the operating costs f_o that firms pay after production to reproduce the average EBITDA-to-assets ratio of firms, which is the empirical counterpart of firms' operating profits in the model. Fixed equity issuance cost κ_0 and convex equity issuance cost κ_1 directly affect firms' equity issuance behavior in the model. Fixed equity issuance cost κ_0 is calibrated to reproduce the average fraction of firms that issue (net) equity across quarters. The convex equity issuance cost κ_1 is calibrated to match the average size of equity issuance (equity issuance over total firm assets).

Entrants. Two salient empirical patterns on entrants documented by firm dynamic literature is that entrants are smaller in size than the incumbents while entrants tend to have a higher leverage ratio.¹¹ Therefore, the entrants' size and leverage ratio in the model are calibrated to reproduce these empirical patterns. Specifically, I calibrate entrants' total asset n_0 by targeting an entrant's size of 0.23 relative to the average firm's size in the economy, as in [Begenau and Salomao \(2019\)](#). Entrants' debt b_0 is targeted to match the average firm-level leverage of 0.45 at age 0-2. Note that the model period is one quarter, while the statistics reported in the literature are calculated using annual data. Hence, I aggregate the simulated data to annual frequency appropriately before computing the simulated moments to make sure they are indeed comparable to data moments.

4.3 Relation to Capital Structure Theory

This subsection discusses the implications of the baseline calibration for firms' financing choices in the model. First, the calibrated model features larger frictions in the equity market

¹¹A recent empirical study can be seen in [Kochen \(2022\)](#).

than the credit market as well as tax advantage of debt, and thus firms prioritize debt financing over equity financing. Second, the existence of debt issuance frictions implies that corporate internal liquidity is the cheapest source of funding. As a result, firms in the model hold cash holding for potential future growth opportunities. Taken together, financing behavior in the calibrated model closely follows the *Pecking Order Theory*: when a firm finances an investment opportunity, firms prefer internal financing to external financing. In terms of external financing, firms prefer to use debt over equity.


5 Firm Behavior in Steady State

Before testing the ability of the calibrated model to replicate the observed firm-level transmission of uncertainty shocks, in this section, I show that the steady state of the calibrated model generates salient cross-sectional heterogeneity in firms' balance sheets and dynamic investment, cash, and debt choices consistent with the data, which validates the model. Importantly, the steady-state firm behavior sheds light on how firms behave in the presence of uncertainty and financial market frictions, which helps to understand firms' responses to sudden spikes in uncertainty.

5.1 Cross-Sectional Implications of the Model

Balance-sheet heterogeneity. Figure 3 shows the unconditional distribution of leverage ratio and cash ratio in the model and the data. The calibrated model generates empirically-plausible cross-sectional variation in firm balance sheets, which are not directly targeted in the calibration. In the model, firms experience different paths of productivity realization and debt maturity, and thereby choose different stocks of physical capital, cash holding, and outstanding debt.

FIGURE 3: Non-Targeted Cross-Sectional Moments: Data versus Model



Notes: This figure compares the 5 percentile, 25 percentile, 50 percentile, 75 percentile, and 95 percentile of leverage ratio distribution (panel a) and liquidity ratio distribution (panel b) from Compustat panel and simulated panel.

Life-cycle patterns. Both corporate finance and firm dynamics literature has documented life-cycle patterns of firms' real and financial behavior.

- (i). Empirically, younger firms are smaller, more profitable, and experience larger growth in output.
- (ii). In terms of financial behavior, younger firms tend to have a larger leverage ratio, lower cash ratio, and lower dividend ratio.

As shown in Table 3, the model does a good job of reproducing these empirical patterns. In the model, due to the financing frictions, small entrant firms build up their assets slowly. When firms are young, they are far from their optimal production scales and thus borrow to invest in physical capital. As they approach their optimal scales, they rely less on external financing, save in liquid assets, and pay out dividends. Furthermore, consistent with empirical literature, firm age is important in understanding firm heterogeneity: in the model, firm age can explain around 16% variation in firm size and around 10% variation in profitability, leverage ratio, and cash ratio.

TABLE 3: **Life-Cycle Patterns of Firms in the Model**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Firm Size	Profitability	Output Growth	Leverage ratio	Cash ratio	Dividend ratio
Age	0.0393*** (0.0001)	-0.0041*** (0.0000)	-0.0055*** (0.0000)	-0.0060*** (0.0000)	0.0029*** (0.0000)	0.0074*** (0.0001)
R-Squared	0.161	0.111	0.075	0.124	0.102	0.009

Notes: This table reports the estimated relationship between firm age and firms' real and financial behavior using univariate OLS and simulated panel.

5.2 Dynamic Investment and Financial Behavior

In this subsection, I show that the full-fledged model reproduces non-targeted investment and financial behavior consistent with those observed in the data. I discuss the role of key model ingredients in shaping firm behavior and illustrate how alternative models fail to reproduce salient features of the data.

5.2.1 Firm Behavior and Firm Characteristics

Model-implied policy functions. To understand the key forces that drive firm behavior in the model, I estimate model-implied policy functions using a model-simulated firm panel, which characterizes firms' optimal decisions based on the states of the firms. As in [Bazdresch et al. \(2018\)](#), I transform the actual state and control variables of the model into widely-used variables in the empirical literature, which allows me to directly compare model predictions and observed data patterns. Using both Compustat and model-simulated data, I run the following fixed-effect panel regressions:

$$\Delta \ln y_{i,t+1} = \alpha_i + \alpha_{s,t} + \alpha_{fq,t} + \beta_1 \mathbf{Tobin's\ Q}_{i,t} + \beta_2 \mathbf{Size}_{i,t} + \beta_3 \mathbf{Indebtedness}_{i,t} + \epsilon_{i,t} \quad (23)$$

For Compustat sample, I control for firm fixed effects α_t , fiscal-quarter dummy $\alpha_{fq,t}$, and industry-quarter fixed effects $\alpha_{s,t}$ to absorb permanent heterogeneity across firms, fiscal-quarter effects, and impact of aggregate shocks that do not exist in the stationary equilibrium of the

TABLE 4: Firm Characteristics and Firm Behavior: Data Versus Model

$\Delta \ln y_{i,t+1}$	$\Delta \text{Capital}_{i,t+1}$		$\Delta \text{Cash}_{i,t+1}$		$\Delta \text{Debt}_{i,t+1}$	
	Data	Model	Data	Model	Data	Model
Indebtedness $_{i,t}$	-0.023*** (0.001)	-0.027*** (0.000)	0.122*** (0.003)	0.110*** (0.001)	-0.080*** (0.003)	-0.060*** (0.001)
Tobin's $Q_{i,t}$	0.022*** (0.000)	0.056*** (0.000)	0.038*** (0.001)	0.008*** (0.001)	0.013*** (0.002)	0.033*** (0.000)
Firm Size $_{i,t}$	-0.003*** (0.001)	-0.012*** (0.000)	-0.043*** (0.002)	-0.051*** (0.001)	-0.015*** (0.002)	-0.044*** (0.001)
Firm FE	✓	—	✓	—	✓	—
Sector-Quarter FE	✓	—	✓	—	✓	—
R^2	0.098	0.784	0.055	0.045	0.054	0.144

Notes: This table reports the estimated relationship between firm behavior and firm indebtedness using Compustat data and model-simulated data. *, **, and *** represent results significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.


model. Standard errors are two-way clustered to account for correlation within firms and within quarters in regressions using Compustat data. Table ?? details the construction of the firm characteristics variables. Note that I standardize firm i ' indebtedness $_{i,t}$ (net leverage) using its 1-digit industry average and standard deviation. Table 4 reports the estimated relation between firm characteristics and the firm's capital investment, cash growth, and debt growth.

Tobin's Q. First, firms in the model differ in their idiosyncratic productivity. All else equal, more productivity firms have higher Tobin's Q. With decreasing-to-return technology, higher productivity also implies a higher optimal scale of production. Therefore, firms with higher Tobin's Q have large investment demand and hence invest and borrow more. The larger growth in debt today means a larger debt burden tomorrow, and thus these firms also save more. The model predicts a positive relationship between Tobin's Q and capital investment, cash growth, and debt growth, consistent with the data pattern shown in Table 4.

Firm Size. Conditional on productivity and outstanding debt, larger firms in the model tend to be closer to their optimal capital level, leading to lower investment demand. The larger size of firms also means larger internal funds and, therefore, smaller demand for external finance. Therefore, larger firms invest and borrow less, and, consequently, save less. Both in the data and the model, conditional on firm indebtedness and Tobin's Q, Firm Size is negatively correlated with growth in capital, cash, and debt.

Indebtedness. In the model, everything else equal, firms with more outstanding debt today are closer to the collateral constraints and have more pre-existing debt burdens compared to their less indebted counterparts. Since liquid assets holding can reduce the likelihood of incurring the liquidity penalty when running out of internal liquidity for maturing debt obligations, more indebted firms, therefore, have larger cash demand for future debt repayment. The smaller borrowing capacity and larger cash demand among more indebted firms lead to lower debt borrowing and higher cash saving today, which results in less capital investment. As shown in Table 4, both in the data and the model, conditional on Firm Size and Tobin's Q, one-standard-deviation higher indebtedness is associated with smaller capital investment,

FIGURE 4: Firm Indebtedness and Firm Behavior: Data versus Model



Notes: This figure plots the estimated relationship between firm behavior and firm indebtedness using Compustat data and model-simulated data, conditional on Tobin's Q and Firm Size.

larger cash growth, and smaller debt growth.

Role of model ingredients. To illustrate the role of model ingredients in driving the impact of firm indebtedness on firms' investment and financial choices, I run the same regressions while using simulated data from alternative models without liquidity penalty ($s = 0$) or debt issuance frictions ($\eta = 0$). Appendix A4 reports the full estimation results. Note that models without liquidity penalty or credit frictions still exhibit the positive effects of Tobin's Q and negative effects of Firm Size on firm behavior, since these effects are mostly driven by productivity heterogeneity and decreasing-to-scale technology. Figure 4 compares the estimated relationship between firm indebtedness and firm behavior using Compustat data and simulated data from different models.

The liquidity penalty has two effects in the full-fledged model. First, it motivates firms to save in liquid assets to avoid liquidity shortfalls for debt repayment, leading to a positive relation between firm indebtedness and liquid assets growth. In a model without liquidity penalty, firms can repay their maturing debt using new debt/disinvestment/new equity without any additional cash flow penalty, which substantially reduces firms' cash demand. More indebted firms in this case borrow less due to their smaller debt capacity and hence have fewer funds for liquid assets holding, resulting in a negative relation between firm indebtedness and liquid assets growth. As shown in Figure 4, in a model without liquidity penalty, indebtedness is negatively associated with liquid assets growth, which is in sharp contrast to the positive association observed in the data and the full-fledged model. Second, as shown in Equation (21) and (22), liquidity penalty increases the expected marginal costs of debt, leading to a much stronger negative relation between firm indebtedness and debt growth in the full-fledged model relative to a model without liquidity penalty. The higher demand for cash and larger costs of debt triggered by liquidity penalty induce less capital investment among firms in the full-fledged model, resulting in a stronger negative relation between firm indebtedness and capital investment, relative to that of a model without liquidity penalty.

In addition to liquidity penalty, firms with non-maturing debt in the full-fledged model also face proportional debt issuance costs that directly reduce the marginal benefits of borrow-

ing. The lower marginal benefits of borrowing make more indebted firms in the full-fledged model borrow, invest, and save less, which on the one hand, amplifies the negative effects of firm indebtedness on capital investment and borrowing, and on the other hand, dampens the positive effects of firm indebtedness on cash saving. As shown in Figure 4, the full-fledged model shows a stronger negative correlation between firm indebtedness and capital investment and debt growth while a weaker positive association between indebtedness and liquid assets growth, relative to a model without debt issuance frictions.

5.2.2 Precautionary Saving for Growth Opportunity

In the presence of uncertainty and financial market frictions, firms save in cash holding for future growth opportunities. The idea is simple: when a good productivity shock realizes, liquid assets holding allows firms to fund capital investment internally and thus avoid incurring the transaction costs associated with new security issuance in the financial market. The precautionary saving behavior of firms has been widely documented in empirical corporate finance literature.¹² In this subsection, I show that the model is able to reproduce these empirical patterns. As will be discussed in Section 6, firms' precautionary saving motives governed by the severity of debt issuance frictions play an important role in shaping firms' responses to uncertainty shocks.

Firm responses to productivity shocks. I examine how firms respond to growth in their firm-level TFP by running the following regression using both Compustat data and simulated data :

$$\Delta \ln y_{i,t+1} = \alpha_i + \alpha_{s,t} + \alpha_{fq,t} + \beta \Delta \ln \text{TFP}_{i,t} + \Gamma' X_{i,t} + \epsilon_{i,t} \quad (24)$$

where $\Delta \ln \text{TFP}_{i,t}$ denotes measured firm-level productivity growth. Appendix A.3 discusses the construction of firm-level productivity using Compustat Quarterly. $X_{i,t}$ denotes a vector of control variables that include Indebtedness, Tobin's Q, and Firm Size. For the Compustat sample, I control for firm fixed effects α_t , fiscal-year dummy $\alpha_{fq,t}$, and industry-year fixed effects $\alpha_{s,t}$ to absorb permanent heterogeneity across firms, fiscal-year effects, and impact of aggregate shocks that do not exist in the stationary equilibrium of the model. Standard errors are two-way clustered to account for correlation within firms and within quarters in regressions using Compustat data.

TABLE 5: Firm Responses to Idiosyncratic Productivity Growth: Data versus Model

$\Delta \ln y_{i,t+1}$:	Data			Model		
	$\Delta \text{Capital}_{i,t+1}$	$\Delta \text{Cash}_{i,t+1}$	$\Delta \text{Debt}_{i,t+1}$	$\Delta \text{Capital}_{i,t+1}$	$\Delta \text{Cash}_{i,t+1}$	$\Delta \text{Debt}_{i,t+1}$
$\Delta \ln \text{TFP}_{i,t}$	0.27*** (0.001)	-0.15*** (0.005)	0.26*** (0.003)	0.849*** (0.002)	-0.955*** (0.021)	0.381*** (0.012)
Firm Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Firm FE	✓	✓	✓	—	—	—
Sector-Quarter FE	✓	✓	✓	—	—	—
R^2	0.176	0.080	0.084	0.896	0.112	0.171

Notes: This table reports estimated firm responses to an idiosyncratic productivity growth using Compustat data and model-simulated data. *, **, and *** represent results significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

¹²Seminal examples include Opler et al. (1999) and Bates et al. (2009), and a recent example can be seen in Gao et al. (2021).

TABLE 6: Firm Responses to Idiosyncratic Productivity Growth: Alternative Models

$\Delta \ln y_{i,t+1}$:	Model w/o liquidity penalty			Model w/o debt issuance frictions		
	$\Delta \text{Capital}_{i,t+1}$	$\Delta \text{Cash}_{i,t+1}$	$\Delta \text{Debt}_{i,t+1}$	$\Delta \text{Capital}_{i,t+1}$	$\Delta \text{Cash}_{i,t+1}$	$\Delta \text{Debt}_{i,t+1}$
$\Delta \ln \text{TFP}_{i,t}$	0.890*** (0.002)	-0.347*** (0.012)	0.538*** (0.004)	0.803*** (0.003)	1.439*** (0.019)	0.859*** (0.008)
Firm Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
R^2	0.903	0.201	0.684	0.857	0.334	0.376

Notes: This table reports estimated firm responses to an idiosyncratic productivity growth using simulated data from alternative models. *, **, and *** represent results significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

Table 5 shows that both in the data and the model, firm-level productivity growth is positively correlated with capital investment and debt growth while negatively correlated with liquid assets growth. Firms in the model save in liquid assets and use them as the marginal funding source, allowing them to save on transaction costs in the financial markets. In contrast, in Table 6, firm-level productivity growth is positively correlated with liquid assets growth in a model without debt issuance frictions. This occurs because firms with larger productivity growth borrow more, and therefore they also save more for future debt repayment.


Debt issuance frictions and financial behavior. Recent empirical literature shows that strengthened creditor rights protection by law leads to a smaller number of restrictive covenants and more favorable contracting terms (e.g. looser covenants) in debt contracts, e.g. Mann (2018) and Ghanbari (2019). Gao et al. (2021) further shows that the passage of the laws that enhance creditor rights is followed by an increase in leverage ratio and a decrease in cash ratio. Motivated by the empirical evidence, I test whether firm responses to a reduction in debt issuance costs are consistent with the data patterns. Note that debt issuance costs in the model serve as a reduced-form way to capture various types of frictions in debt issuance. Specifically, I simulate a Randomized Controlled Trial research design where half of the simulated firms are randomly selected as a treated group. At time 0, treated firms unexpectedly enjoy reduced debt issuance costs ($\eta = 0.5\eta_{\text{baseline}}$) and thereafter. I keep simulated data 3 quarters before and five quarters after the event and then run the following difference-in-difference specification:

$$y_{i,t} = \alpha + \sum_{t \geq -3}^{t \leq 5} \beta_t \text{Treated}_i \times \text{Quarter}_t + \Gamma' X_{i,t} + \epsilon_{i,t} \quad (25)$$

where Treated_i equals one if firm i belongs to the treated group that will face lower debt issuance costs after Quarter 0. Quarter_t denotes the periods before and after the experiment. $X_{i,t}$ denotes a vector of control variables, including Indebtedness, Tobin's Q, and Firm Size.

Figure 5 show that treated firms respond to the reduced debt issuance frictions by increasing leverage ratio and decreasing cash ratio, similar to the empirical patterns documented in Gao et al. (2021). In the model, lower debt issuance costs increase the marginal benefits of debt, motivating firms to borrow more. In the meantime, reduced debt issuance frictions mean that treated firms can cheaply borrow from credit markets when an investment opportunity realizes, thereby reducing firms' precautionary saving motives and generating a cut in cash holding.

FIGURE 5: **Reduced Debt Issuance Frictions and Changes in Financial Policies**



Notes: This table reports estimated firm responses to a reduction in debt issuance costs. Point estimates and 95% confidence level are plotted.

6 The Transmission of Uncertainty Shocks

In this section, I use the calibrated model to understand the transmission mechanism of uncertainty shocks. In Section 6.1, I show that a full-fledged model reproduces firm-level responses to uncertainty shocks consistent with the data. In Section 6.2, I show that alternative models abstracting from key model ingredients emphasized in Section 5.2 fail to reproduce the empirical patterns, which reveals the economic forces that drive the results. Section 5.2 examines the aggregate impact of uncertainty shocks implied by the model.

6.1 Firm-level Responses to Uncertainty Shocks

I study the transmission of uncertainty shocks within the model by estimating firm-level responses to uncertainty shocks using a simulated panel. The economy is initially in a steady state and unexpectedly receives a jump in the cross-sectional dispersion of firm productivity shocks $\sigma_t = \sigma_H$ which reverts to σ_L according to $\sigma_{t+1} = 0.5 \sigma_t$. σ_H is calibrated to induce a 2.5% decrease in aggregate output on impact.¹³ I compute the perfect foresight transition path of the economy as it converges back to a steady state. I simulate a panel of 10,000 firms and estimate the following specification using data from one year before the initial shock to two years after the initial shock:

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta \ln y_{i,t+1} = & \alpha + (\beta + \gamma \text{Indebtedness}_{i,t}) \cdot \Delta \log \sigma_t + \eta \text{Indebtedness}_{i,t} \\ & + \Psi' \mathbf{Z}_{i,t} \cdot \Delta \log \sigma_t + \Gamma' \mathbf{Z}_{i,t} + \mu_{i,t} \end{aligned} \quad (26)$$

where $\Delta \log(\sigma_t)$ measures the log deviation of σ_t from the steady-state level σ_L . A high $\log(\sigma_t)$ implies a more widely spread distribution of next-period idiosyncratic productivity shocks compared to the steady state level. $\text{Indebtedness}_{i,t}$ measures how many standard deviations firm i 's net leverage is away from industry mean. $\mathbf{Z}_{i,t}$ is a vector of the control variable

¹³The choice of 2.5% decrease in aggregate output driven by uncertainty shocks on impact follows Bloom et al. (2018). The persistence of the shock 0.5 is standard in the literature on MIT shocks.

that captures firms' growth opportunity in the context of the model: Tobin's Q and Firm Size. Note that Equation (26) indeed resembles the empirical specification Equation (2), since there is no permanent unobserved heterogeneity across firms, fiscal-quarter differences, and other confounding macro shocks in the model environment.

TABLE 7: **Model-Implied Transmission of Uncertainty Shocks**

$\Delta \ln y_{i,t+1} \times 100 :$	$\Delta \text{Capital}_{i,t+1}$	$\Delta \text{Capital}_{i,t+1}$	$\Delta \text{Cash}_{i,t+1}$	$\Delta \text{Cash}_{i,t+1}$	$\Delta \text{Debt}_{i,t+1}$	$\Delta \text{Debt}_{i,t+1}$
$\Delta \log \sigma_{t+1}$	-0.326*** (0.013)	-0.214*** (0.016)	0.585*** (0.023)	0.753*** (0.026)	-0.491*** (0.060)	-0.193*** (0.069)
$\Delta \log \sigma_{t+1} \times \text{Indebtedness}_{i,t}$		-0.280*** (0.025)		0.257*** (0.039)		0.086 (0.103)
R-Squared	0.796	0.796	0.069	0.069	0.158	0.158
Firm Controls $_{i,t}$	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
$\Delta \log \sigma_{t+1} \times Z_{i,t}$	—	✓	—	✓	—	✓

Notes: This table reports estimated firm responses to uncertainty shocks using simulated data from the full-fledged model. *, **, and *** represent results significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. $\Delta \log(\sigma_t)$ measures the log deviation of σ_t from the steady-state level σ_L . $\text{Indebtedness}_{i,t}$ measures how many standard deviations firm i 's net leverage is away from mean. Firm control variables include $\text{Indebtedness}_{i,t}$ and $Z_{i,t}$. $Z_{i,t}$ includes Tobin's Q and Firm Size, which captures firms' growth opportunity in the context of the model.

Table 7 reports the estimated firm-level responses to uncertainty shocks using simulated data. The full-fledged model does a good job of reproducing the observed firm-level responses to uncertainty shocks in the data: an increase in aggregate uncertainty facing firms is followed by a capital investment drop, liquidity buildup, and deleveraging. In the cross-section, the decline in capital investment and the increase in cash holding are much more pronounced among more indebted firms.

Two forces are at work: on the one hand, an increase in uncertainty implies a higher probability of having a bad productivity shock and thus a higher likelihood of liquidity shortfalls due to lower operating profits. This motivates firms to deleverage to avoid potential liquidity penalties. On the other hand, an increase in uncertainty also implies a larger chance of drawing a good productivity shock and thus a greater growth potential perceived by firms. The growth potential amplifies firms' precautionary saving motives, which counteracts the deleveraging pressure since deleveraging shrinks firms' internal funds. In this case, liquid assets holding plays a unique role in addressing both the downside risk and growth potential triggered by uncertainty shocks: it allows firms to avoid potential liquidity penalty for debt repayment and also enables firms to preserve enough internal funds for growth potential. In the face of the two forces triggered by a higher uncertainty, firms, therefore, re-structure their current balance sheets by deleveraging and accumulating cash holding, both of which divert firms' internal funds away from capital investment. *Ex-ante* more indebted firms choose to accumulate more cash holding since they face a higher likelihood of liquidity shortfalls due to their higher debt burdens.

6.2 Decomposing the Transmission Mechanisms

To better understand each of the two underlying forces at play, I conduct three experiments to explore the transmission of uncertainty shocks in alternative setups. I find that liquidity penalty is the key to generating the negative impact of uncertainty shocks on capital and debt, while frictions in debt issuance are the key to generating the salient liquidity buildup in re-

sponse to uncertainty shocks. Furthermore, the severity of debt issuance frictions shapes how differently indebted firms react to heightened uncertainty.

Model without liquidity penalty. I first shut down the liquidity penalty by setting $s = 0$. In a model without liquidity penalty, firms can repay their maturing debt using new debt/disinvestment/new equity without any additional costs. Consequently, firms have no concern over the elevated likelihood of liquidity shortfalls, that is, the deleveraging pressure is muted. As shown in Panel (A) of Table 8, uncertainty shocks, in this case, have no statistically significant effects on firms' outstanding debt. Since firms do not need to trade off capital investment for cash holding to reduce the likelihood of incurring liquidity penalty, the strong precautionary saving motive triggered by the elevated uncertainty motivates firms to increase both their capital investment and cash holding today in an effort to generate large internal liquidity for future investment. As a result, both capital investment and cash holding rise following uncertainty shocks.¹⁴ To sum up, this model predicts a positive effect of heightened uncertainty on capital investment and an insignificant effect on debt, contradicting the empirical findings.

Model without debt issuance frictions. I shut down the debt issuance frictions by setting $\eta = 0$. In this case, firms can issue debt without any additional costs when a good productivity shock realizes, thereby eliminating firms' precautionary saving motives for growth opportunities. As a result, when uncertainty rises, the firms are only concerned about the larger downside risk caused by an elevated uncertainty, and thus they deleverage to prevent liquidity shortfalls. The decrease in firms' debt obligations also reduces their cash demand for debt repayment, and therefore firms in this model also decrease their cash holding in response to heightened uncertainty. As shown in Panel (B) of Table 8, cash holding drops following uncertainty shocks in this model, contradicting the salient buildup of corporate liquidity observed in the data.

Models with different levels of debt issuance frictions. To further understand how frictions in debt issuance shape firm responses to uncertainty shocks by governing firms' precautionary saving motives, I experiment with two different levels of debt issuance costs relative to the baseline calibration. As shown in Table 9, when debt issuance costs are 50% lower than the baseline level, in response to uncertainty shocks, more indebted firms also deleverage more relative to their less indebted counterparts. This occurs since reduced debt issuance frictions mitigate firms' precautionary saving motive, as discussed in Section ???. Specifically, more indebted firms, in this case, can deleverage first and issue new debt cheaply to fund capital investment if a good productivity shock realizes. By contrast, when debt issuance costs are at the baseline level or 50% higher than the baseline level, issuing new debt is especially costly, and thus more indebted firms choose to hold more cash to reduce their higher likelihood of liquidity shortfalls rather than cut more debt. To sum up, the severity of debt issuance frictions plays a key role in shaping the heterogeneous responses to uncertainty shocks across differently indebted firms.

¹⁴Note that the average increase in cash holding across firms, in this case, is completely driven by a decrease in dividend payout due to better growth potential, while in the full-fledged model, cash buildup is also partly driven by capital investment cut for future debt repayment. As shown in Section 5.2, liquidity penalty is the key to generating a trade-off between capital and cash for debt repayment.

TABLE 8: Model-Implied Transmission of Uncertainty Shocks: Alternative Models

$\Delta \log y_{i,t+1} \times 100 :$	(A) Model w/o liquidity penalty			(B) Model w/o debt issuance frictions		
	$\Delta \text{Capital}_{i,t+1}$	$\Delta \text{Cash}_{i,t+1}$	$\Delta \text{Debt}_{i,t+1}$	$\Delta \text{Capital}_{i,t+1}$	$\Delta \text{Cash}_{i,t+1}$	$\Delta \text{Debt}_{i,t+1}$
$\Delta \log \sigma_{t+1}$	0.033** (0.016)	0.239*** (0.008)	-0.018 (0.022)	-0.389*** (0.017)	-2.426*** (0.158)	-5.447*** (0.152)
Firm Controls $_{i,t}$	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
R^2	0.727	0.084	0.589	0.716	0.059	0.086

Notes: This table reports estimated firm responses to uncertainty shocks using simulated data from alternative models. *, **, and *** represent results significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. $\Delta \log(\sigma_t)$ measures the log deviation of σ_t from the steady-state level σ_L . Firm control variables include Indebtedness, Tobin's Q and Firm Size.

TABLE 9: Debt Issuance Frictions and Firm Responses to Uncertainty Shocks

(A) Low Debt Issuance Frictions = $0.5 \cdot \eta_{\text{baseline}}$						
$\Delta \ln y_{i,t+1} \times 100 :$	$\Delta \text{Capital}_{i,t+1}$	$\Delta \text{Capital}_{i,t+1}$	$\Delta \text{Cash}_{i,t+1}$	$\Delta \text{Cash}_{i,t+1}$	$\Delta \text{Debt}_{i,t+1}$	$\Delta \text{Debt}_{i,t+1}$
$\Delta \log \sigma_{t+1}$	-0.294*** (0.014)	-0.205*** (0.028)	0.605*** (0.022)	0.813*** (0.036)	-0.455*** (0.055)	-0.187** (0.094)
$\Delta \log \sigma_{t+1} \times \text{Indebtedness}_{i,t}$		-0.342*** (0.027)		0.201*** (0.035)		-0.213** (0.091)
R-Squared	0.799	0.725	0.115	0.115	0.209	0.182
Firm Controls $_{i,t}$	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
$\Delta \log \sigma_{t+1} \times Z_{i,t}$	—	✓	—	✓	—	✓
(B) High Debt Issuance Frictions = $1.5 \cdot \eta_{\text{baseline}}$						
$\Delta \ln y_{i,t+1} \times 100 :$	$\Delta \text{Capital}_{i,t+1}$	$\Delta \text{Capital}_{i,t+1}$	$\Delta \text{Cash}_{i,t+1}$	$\Delta \text{Cash}_{i,t+1}$	$\Delta \text{Debt}_{i,t+1}$	$\Delta \text{Debt}_{i,t+1}$
$\Delta \log \sigma_{t+1}$	-0.302*** (0.014)	-0.260*** (0.030)	0.412*** (0.023)	0.775*** (0.042)	-0.640*** (0.065)	-0.261** (0.119)
$\Delta \log \sigma_{t+1} \times \text{Indebtedness}_{i,t}$		-0.314*** (0.032)		0.468*** (0.045)		0.209 (0.127)
R-Squared	0.745	0.675	0.100	0.091	0.117	0.102
Firm Controls $_{i,t}$	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
$\Delta \log \sigma_{t+1} \times Z_{i,t}$	—	✓	—	✓	—	✓

Notes: This table reports estimated firm responses to uncertainty shocks using simulated data from the full-fledged model. *, **, and *** represent results significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. $\Delta \log(\sigma_t)$ measures the log deviation of σ_t from the steady-state level σ_L . $\text{Indebtedness}_{i,t}$ measures how many standard deviations firm i 's net leverage is away from mean. Firm control variables include $\text{Indebtedness}_{i,t}$ and $Z_{i,t}$. $Z_{i,t}$ includes Tobin's Q and Firm Size, which captures firms' growth opportunity in the context of the model.

6.3 Aggregate Impact of Uncertainty Shocks


The previous sections showed that the model successfully replicates observed firm-level transmission of uncertainty shocks. A large empirical literature studies the aggregate impact of heightened uncertainty and finds that increased uncertainty is associated with sharp and protracted aggregate output drops. A recent example can be seen in Jurado et al. (2015). In this subsection, I examine the aggregate impact of uncertainty shocks in the model.

Note that conventional macro-finance models typically treat firms' liquid assets holding as 'net debt'. In this class of models, firms either borrow or lend but not both. To illustrate

the importance of modeling firms' cash choice to our understanding of the aggregate impact of heightened uncertainty, I also construct a net-debt model and calibrate it to match the net leverage ratio implied by the baseline model.

Figure 6 plots the output responses to the same uncertainty shock in the baseline model and in the net-debt model. Compared to the baseline model, the net-debt model predicts a smaller drop in aggregate output on impact and an output overshoot in the medium run. In both models, uncertainty shocks drive up firms' demand for internal liquidity, which can be used to either repay outstanding debt or fund future growth opportunities. In the net-debt model, the only way for firms to increase their internal liquidity is to invest in physical capital, which generates operating profits. This motive to generate enough operating profits counteracts the deleveraging pressure caused by uncertainty shocks and thereby generating fewer output drops relative to the baseline model. As high uncertainty winds down, this "over-investment" turns to a higher level of physical capital relative to the steady-state level, generating an overshoot in output in the medium run.¹⁵ By contrast, the baseline model that features endogenous cash choice by firms reproduces the sharp and persistent output drops following uncertainty shocks, consistent with the empirical literature.

FIGURE 6: Output Responses to Uncertainty Shock



Notes: This figure plots the output responses to the same uncertainty shock in the baseline model and in the net-debt model. In the net-debt model, firms can either have outstanding debt or save in liquid assets. The net-debt model is calibrated to match the net leverage ratio implied by the baseline model.

7 Recessions and Credit Interventions

In fear of the potentially devastating impacts of the pandemic, the U.S. provided aggressive fiscal support to the corporate sector during the recent Covid crisis. For example, the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) provided corporate businesses with more than \$800 billion in the form of debt relief and forgivable loans. In addition, research in macroeconomics has long found that standard stabilization policies, such as monetary stimulus, have a smaller impact in recessions than normal times, advocating more fiscal or credit policies to stabilize the economy in recessions (see, e.g., [Tenreyro and Thwaites 2016](#)). Motivated by real-world policy implementation and previous research, this section exploits the quantitative model to

¹⁵In Appendix D.2, I further discuss how frictions in debt issuance shape the output responses to uncertainty shocks in the net-debt models.

understand the stabilizing effects of credit interventions in recessions. The following policy experiments highlight three novel findings, which sheds valuable insights into policy debates on credit interventions as stabilization tools.

- (i). I find that credit interventions — akin to the debt relief and cash grants programs during the recent Covid crisis — are powerful in stabilizing uncertainty-driven recessions. A debt relief program has a larger impact than a cash grants program since it lowers firms' existing debt burdens as well as their cash demand for future debt repayment.
- (ii). I find that the model failing to account for observed liquidity buildup underestimates the impact of the debt relief program by more than 30% relative to the baseline simulation, highlighting the importance of the model used to analyze policy impacts.
- (iii). I find that credit interventions have much smaller effects in TFP-driven recessions than in uncertainty-driven recessions, highlighting the nature of the recessions in shaping policy impacts.

Recessions simulation. The economy is initially in a steady state and unexpectedly receives aggregate shocks to the level of firm productivity or the dispersion of firm productivity. I consider two types of recessions and calibrate each shock to induce a 2.5% drop in aggregate output on impact.

- (i). Uncertainty shocks: all firms suddenly receive a jump in the dispersion of their productivity shocks $\sigma_t = \sigma_H$, which reverts back to σ_L according to $\sigma_{t+1} = 0.5 \sigma_t$. The jump in the dispersion is common across firms, and note that the level of the firm's expected productivity is kept constant.
- (ii). TFP shocks: all firms suddenly know the levels of their future productivity are reduced by $\phi_t\%$, which reverts to zero according to $\phi_{t+1} = 0.5 \phi_t$. The reduction in productivity is common across firms, and the level of the firm's expected productivity is reduced accordingly.

Credit interventions. I focus on two credit interventions we saw in the U.S. and worldwide during the recent COVID crisis. I consider one-time policy interventions in the model simulation, which resembles the implementation of loan programs observed in 2020. As shown in [Cho et al. \(2022\)](#), the distribution of PPP loans is untargeted and prioritizes speedy loan disbursement.

- (i). Debt relief programs: a fraction of each firm's outstanding debt is unexpectedly written off when shocks hit.
- (ii). Cash grant programs: each firm unexpectedly receives a cash grant when shocks hit, which equals a fraction of the steady-state wage bills they pay.

I calibrate the size of each program to generate a 0.5% increase in aggregate output during normal times upon impact. Note that in an economy with financial frictions, credit interventions can stimulate aggregate output even without recessions since they relax firms' financial constraints and thus boost capital investments. Appendix C.3 details the computation of aggregate impulse response functions.

7.1 Credit Interventions in an Uncertainty-driven Recession


Panel (A) and (C) of Figure 7 plot the impact of uncertainty shocks on aggregate output with and without credit interventions. A pure uncertainty shock leads to a 2.5% decrease in aggregate output upon impact. Credit interventions substantially reduce the negative effects of uncertainty shocks: (i). with debt relief programs, aggregate output drops by only 1% following the same uncertainty shock on impact; (ii). with cash grants programs, aggregate output drops by 1.5% following the same uncertainty shock on impact.

State-dependent responses to interventions. To directly see the effects of credit interventions on aggregate output, Panel (B) and (D) of Figure 7 plot the output responses to policy interventions during normal times and periods of high uncertainty, that is, following uncertainty shocks. Two patterns stand out. First, output responses to credit interventions are much larger during periods of high uncertainty than during normal times: the debt relief and cash grants programs that stimulate aggregate output by 0.5% during normal times can drive up aggregate output during uncertainty-driven recessions by 1.5% and 1.0%, respectively. The strong state-dependent responses to credit interventions arise since credit interventions directly mitigate firms' responses to uncertainty shocks. Specifically, debt relief programs, by writing off the outstanding debt of firms, directly lowers firms' deleveraging and cash buildup in response to uncertainty shocks. Cash grants programs, by directly injecting liquidity into firms, satisfy firms' increased liquidity demand. Both of them allow firms to cut less capital investment in response to uncertainty shocks, thereby strongly stabilizing aggregate output drops driven by higher uncertainty.

Stronger effects of debt relief than cash grants. A second notable finding from the quantitative exercise is that the state-dependent effects are more pronounced for debt relief programs: the output response to debt relief following uncertainty shocks is *two times* larger than that during normal times while the output response to cash grants following uncertainty shocks is only *one time* larger than that during normal times. This occurs since debt relief programs alleviate firms' balance sheet adjustments in response to uncertainty shocks in two ways. First, it directly reduces firms' debt burdens, which leaves firms with more internal funds for capital investment. Second, it also indirectly lowers firms' cash demand for debt repayment after debt written-off, thereby freeing up firms' cash holding for more capital investment. The second effect of debt relief programs on firms' cash choice is critical for the strong stabilizing effects of debt relief following uncertainty shocks. In Section 7.2, I show that a counterfactual simulation that fails to capture the observed liquidity buildup underestimates output response to debt relief by more than 30%.

Policy effectiveness. To gauge the effectiveness of credit interventions, I compute the present value of all the output gains using the discount factor and then divide it by the total fiscal cost of the program, which measures the expected output gain per unit of fiscal costs. Figure 8 plots the effectiveness of both programs during normal times and uncertainty-driven recessions. Since output responses increase during periods of high uncertainty, the estimated output gain per dollar rises from 0.74 to 1.13 for debt relief programs. It also goes up from 0.64 to 0.85 for cash grants programs. The debt relief program is more effective since it not only directly reduces firms' debt burdens but also indirectly lowers firms' cash demand, freeing up firms' internal funds for more capital investment, as discussed before. The difference in effectiveness between the two interventions becomes especially pronounced, as output response to debt relief rises substantially following uncertainty shocks.

FIGURE 7: Uncertainty-driven Recessions and Credit Interventions




Notes: Panels (A) and (C) plot the aggregate output responses to an uncertainty shock with and without credit interventions. Panels (B) and (D) plot the aggregate output responses to policy interventions during normal times and periods of high uncertainty. Appendix C.3 details the computation of aggregate impulse response functions.

7.2 Credit Interventions in a Counterfactual Economy

The previous section showed that credit interventions, in particular debt relief programs, are powerful in stabilizing uncertainty-driven recessions. In this section, I show that accounting for the observed liquidity buildup is important in understanding policy effects. As shown in Section 6.2, firms' precautionary saving motives account for the salient liquidity buildup. To eliminate firms' precautionary saving motives, I shut down the debt issuance frictions by setting $\eta = 0$. In this case, firms are only concerned about the larger downside risk caused by elevated uncertainty, thereby simply deleveraging to prevent liquidity shortfalls. The initial jump in uncertainty and the sizes of policy interventions are re-calibrated to ensure compatibility.

A deleveraging-only recession. Figure 9 plots output responses to uncertainty shocks and credit interventions in a deleveraging-only recession driven by elevated uncertainty. The state-dependent effects of debt relief policy are much weaker in this counterfactual simulation without liquidity buildup: estimated output response to the same debt relief program following

FIGURE 8: Policy Effectiveness of Credit Interventions



Notes: This figure plots the effectiveness of credit interventions during normal times and uncertainty-driven recessions. To gauge the effectiveness of credit interventions, I compute the present value of all the output gains using the discount factor and then divide it by the total fiscal cost of the program, which measures the expected output gain per unit of fiscal costs.

uncertainty shocks is around 1.0 % upon impact in contrast to the 1.5% implied by the baseline simulation. In this case, the positive effects of debt relief on output are purely due to the lower debt burdens among firms after debt written-off. The role of debt relief programs in mitigating firms' cash buildup is completely missing in this case, thereby reducing the stabilizing effects of debt relief. The result highlights the importance of accounting for corporate cash choice in understanding the stabilizing effects of debt relief during uncertainty-driven recessions.


7.3 Credit Interventions in TFP-driven Recessions

The unprecedented credit interventions during the recent Covid crisis sparked a rapidly growing literature that evaluates the effects of credit interventions using quantitative models. The previous sections add to the literature by showing the strong effects of credit interventions in stabilizing aggregate output drops driven by an increase in uncertainty, a key feature of U.S. recessions ignored by existing work. In this subsection, I study output responses to credit interventions in a recession driven by negative productivity shocks and find a modest policy impact in TFP-driven recessions. The sharp differential effects during uncertainty-driven recessions and TFP-driven recessions suggest that the nature of the recession plays an important role in shaping policy impacts. This result echoes [Crouzet and Tourre \(2021\)](#), where they find that credit interventions have larger stabilizing effects in a TFP-driven recession accompanied by financial market disruptions.

A TFP-driven recession. Panel (A) and (C) of Figure 10 plot aggregate output responses to negative productivity shocks with and without credit interventions. Panel (B) and (D) of Figure 10 show that output responses to the interventions in TFP-driven recessions turn out to be slightly smaller than those in normal times. The intuition for this result is that lower aggregate productivity reduces firms' investment demand and financial needs, thereby mitigating the role of credit interventions in relaxing firms' financial constraints.¹⁶ This leads to a very limited

¹⁶In Appendix D.3, I show that output responses to credit interventions are slightly larger during booms when investment demand is high and firms have larger financial needs.

FIGURE 9: Credit Interventions in a Counterfactual Economy



Notes: Panels (A) and (C) plot aggregate output responses to uncertainty shocks with and without credit interventions. Panels (B) and (D) plot the output responses to policy interventions during normal times and periods of high uncertainty. Note that in the model without frictions in debt issuance ($\eta = 0$), Appendix C.3 details the computation of aggregate impulse response functions.


effect of credit intervention in TFP-driven recessions, as shown in Panel (A) and (C) of Figure 10. In sharp contrast, credit interventions directly mitigate the balance-sheet transmissions of uncertainty shocks, thereby powerfully stabilizing aggregate output drops in an uncertainty-driven recession.

8 Concluding Remarks

The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) minutes have repeatedly underlined uncertainty as a key factor in every US recession since 2000. Explaining how uncertainty shocks are transmitted to the real economy is crucial to understanding the large contraction in real activities following elevated uncertainty and the design of stabilization policies.

In this paper, I incorporate corporate cash holding motives studied in *empirical* corporate finance literature into a workhorse macro-finance model of corporate borrowing constraints and provide a unified explanation for the observed impact of heightened uncertainty on firms' joint capital, liquidity, and leverage choices. In the model, building up liquid assets allows firms to

FIGURE 10: TFP-driven Recessions and Credit Interventions



Notes: Panels (A) and (C) plot the aggregate output responses to negative productivity shocks with and without credit interventions. Panels (B) and (D) plot the output responses to policy interventions during normal times and periods of low productivity. Appendix C.3 details the computation of aggregate impulse response functions.

preserve internal funds for future debt repayment and investment opportunities, thereby addressing both the downside risk and the upside potential triggered by higher uncertainty. This rationalizes the observed liquidity buildup alongside corporate deleveraging following uncertainty shocks.

In a calibrated model consistent with firm-level behavior, uncertainty shocks lead to sharp and persistent aggregate output drops that align well with data patterns. Credit interventions, particularly debt relief programs, are powerful in stabilizing uncertainty-driven recessions. Accounting for corporate liquidity choice is key to these results. Counterfactual exercises suggest that models failing to capture liquidity buildup generate counterfactual responses of aggregate output to uncertainty shocks and underestimate the impacts of debt relief. These results provide novel insights into the design of stabilization policy in response to large political, military, and public health events that substantially elevate uncertainty about the economic outlook.

References

- Ivan Alfaro, Nicholas Bloom, and Xiaoji Lin. The finance uncertainty multiplier. Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research, 2019.
- Cristina Arellano, Yan Bai, and Patrick J Kehoe. Financial frictions and fluctuations in volatility. *Journal of Political Economy*, 127(5):2049–2103, 2019.
- Scott R Baker, Nicholas Bloom, and Steven J Davis. Measuring economic policy uncertainty. *The quarterly journal of economics*, 131(4):1593–1636, 2016.
- Thomas W Bates, Kathleen M Kahle, and René M Stulz. Why do us firms hold so much more cash than they used to? *The journal of finance*, 64(5):1985–2021, 2009.
- Santiago Bzdresch, R Jay Kahn, and Toni M Whited. Estimating and testing dynamic corporate finance models. *The Review of Financial Studies*, 31(1):322–361, 2018.
- Juliane Begenau and Juliana Salomao. Firm financing over the business cycle. *The Review of Financial Studies*, 32(4):1235–1274, 2019.
- Ben S Bernanke, Mark Gertler, and Simon Gilchrist. The financial accelerator in a quantitative business cycle framework. *Handbook of macroeconomics*, 1:1341–1393, 1999.
- Olivier J Blanchard. *The crisis: basic mechanisms and appropriate policies*. Number 9-80. International Monetary Fund, 2009.
- Nicholas Bloom. The impact of uncertainty shocks. *econometrica*, 77(3):623–685, 2009.
- Nicholas Bloom, Max Floetotto, Nir Jaimovich, Itay Saporta-Eksten, and Stephen J Terry. Really uncertain business cycles. *Econometrica*, 86(3):1031–1065, 2018.
- Nick Bloom, Stephen Bond, and John Van Reenen. Uncertainty and investment dynamics. *The review of economic studies*, 74(2):391–415, 2007.
- Markus Brunnermeier and Arvind Krishnamurthy. The macroeconomics of corporate debt. *The Review of Corporate Finance Studies*, 9(3):656–665, 2020.
- Hui Chen, Yu Xu, and Jun Yang. Systematic risk, debt maturity, and the term structure of credit spreads. *Journal of financial economics*, 139(3):770–799, 2021.
- David Cho, Leland D Crane, Mita Goldar, Byron Lutz, Joshua Montes, William B Peterman, David Ratner, Daniel Villar, Ahu Yildirmaz, et al. The 800 billion paycheck protection program: where did the money go and why did it go there? *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 36(2):55–80, 2022.
- Thomas F Cooley and Vincenzo Quadrini. Monetary policy and the financial decisions of firms. *Economic Theory*, 27:243–270, 2006.
- Nicolas Crouzet and Fabrice Tourre. Can the cure kill the patient? corporate credit interventions and debt overhang. *Corporate credit interventions and debt overhang (June 1, 2021)*, 2021.
- Nicolas Crouzet et al. Default, debt maturity, and investment dynamics. In *2016 Meeting Papers*, Society for Economic Dynamics, volume 533, 2016.
- Mahdi Ebsim, Miguel Faria-e Castro, and Julian Kozlowski. Credit and liquidity policies during large crises. *FRB St. Louis Working Paper*, (2020-35), 2020.

- Andrea L Eisefeldt and Tyler Muir. Aggregate external financing and savings waves. *Journal of Monetary Economics*, 84:116–133, 2016.
- Vadim Elenev, Tim Landvoigt, and Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh. Can the covid bailouts save the economy? *Economic Policy*, 37(110):277–330, 2022.
- Min Fang. Lumpy investment, fluctuations in volatility, and monetary policy. *Fluctuations in Volatility, and Monetary Policy (February 14, 2020)*, 2020.
- Michael Faulkender and Rong Wang. Corporate financial policy and the value of cash. *The journal of finance*, 61(4):1957–1990, 2006.
- Lucia Foster, John Haltiwanger, and Chad Syverson. Reallocation, firm turnover, and efficiency: Selection on productivity or profitability? *American Economic Review*, 98(1):394–425, 2008.
- Andrea Gamba and Alexander Triantis. The value of financial flexibility. *The journal of finance*, 63(5):2263–2296, 2008.
- Janet Gao, Yaniv Grinstein, and Wenyu Wang. Cash holdings, precautionary motives, and systematic uncertainty. *Precautionary Motives, and Systematic Uncertainty (June 21, 2017)*, 2017.
- Xiaodan Gao, Toni M Whited, and Na Zhang. Corporate money demand. *The Review of Financial Studies*, 34(4):1834–1866, 2021.
- Negar Ghanbari. Do creditor rights affect financial contracts? evidence from the anti-recharacterization statute. *Evidence from the Anti-Recharacterization Statute (November 5, 2019)*, 2019.
- Simon Gilchrist, Jae W Sim, and Egon Zakrajsek. Uncertainty, financial frictions, and investment dynamics. Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research, 2014.
- Robert Goldstein, Nengjiu Ju, and Hayne Leland. An ebit-based model of dynamic capital structure. *The Journal of Business*, 74(4):483–512, 2001.
- Joao F Gomes and Lukas Schmid. Equilibrium asset pricing with leverage and default. *The Journal of Finance*, 76(2):977–1018, 2021.
- João Gomes, Urban Jermann, and Lukas Schmid. Sticky leverage. *American Economic Review*, 106(12):3800–3828, December 2016.
- Huseyin Gulen and Mihai Ion. Policy uncertainty and corporate investment. *The Review of Financial Studies*, 29(3):523–564, 2016.
- Rafael Guntin. Firms’ rollover risk and macroeconomic dynamics. 2022.
- Christopher A Hennessy and Toni M Whited. Debt dynamics. *The journal of finance*, 60(3): 1129–1165, 2005.
- Christopher A Hennessy and Toni M Whited. How costly is external financing? evidence from a structural estimation. *The Journal of Finance*, 62(4):1705–1745, 2007.
- Òscar Jordà. Estimation and inference of impulse responses by local projections. *American economic review*, 95(1):161–182, 2005.

- Joachim Jungherr and Immo Schott. Slow debt, deep recessions. Technical report, Working paper, 2019.
- Kyle Jurado, Sydney C Ludvigson, and Serena Ng. Measuring uncertainty. *American Economic Review*, 105(3):1177–1216, 2015.
- Amir Kermani and Yueran Ma. Asset specificity of non-financial firms. Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research, 2020.
- Aubhik Khan and Julia K Thomas. Credit shocks and aggregate fluctuations in an economy with production heterogeneity. *Journal of Political Economy*, 121(6):1055–1107, 2013.
- Hyunseob Kim and Howard Kung. The asset redeployability channel: How uncertainty affects corporate investment. *The Review of Financial Studies*, 30(1):245–280, 2017.
- Federico Kochen. Finance over the life cycle of firms. Technical report, Mimeo. New York University, 2022.
- Gary Koop, M Hashem Pesaran, and Simon M Potter. Impulse response analysis in nonlinear multivariate models. *Journal of econometrics*, 74(1):119–147, 1996.
- John V Leahy and Toni M Whited. The effect of uncertainty on investment: Some stylized facts. *Journal of Money, Credit and Banking*, 28(1):64–83, 1996.
- William Mann. Creditor rights and innovation: Evidence from patent collateral. *Journal of Financial Economics*, 130(1):25–47, 2018.
- Tim Opler, Lee Pinkowitz, René Stulz, and Rohan Williamson. The determinants and implications of corporate cash holdings. *Journal of financial economics*, 52(1):3–46, 1999.
- Pablo Ottonello and Thomas Winberry. Financial heterogeneity and the investment channel of monetary policy. *Econometrica*, 88(6):2473–2502, 2020.
- Abdul Rashid. Risks and financing decisions in the energy sector: An empirical investigation using firm-level data. *Energy Policy*, 59:792–799, 2013.
- Leigh A Riddick and Toni M Whited. The corporate propensity to save. *The Journal of Finance*, 64(4):1729–1766, 2009.
- Pawel Smietanka, Nicholas Bloom, and Paul Mizen. Business investment, cash holding and uncertainty since the great financial crisis. 2018.
- James H Stock and Mark W Watson. Disentangling the channels of the 2007-2009 recession. Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research, 2012.
- Silvana Tenreyro and Gregory Thwaites. Pushing on a string: Us monetary policy is less powerful in recessions. *American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics*, 8(4):43–74, 2016.
- Sheridan Titman and Sergey Tsyplakov. A dynamic model of optimal capital structure. *Review of Finance*, 11(3):401–451, 2007.
- Joseph Vavra. Inflation dynamics and time-varying volatility: New evidence and an ss interpretation. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 129(1):215–258, 2014.
- Jasmine Xiao. Borrowing to save and investment dynamics. *Unpublished manuscript*, 2018.

Appendix

Table of Contents

A Data Appendix	45
A.1 Macro Time Series Data	45
A.2 Firm-level Data	45
A.3 Measured Firm-level Productivity	47
B Additional Empirical Results	48
B.1 Within-firm Variation in Indebtedness	48
B.2 Event Study: 9/11 Terrorist Attacks	48
C Model Appendix	50
C.1 Model Details	50
C.2 Model Computation	52
C.3 Model Simulation	53
D Additional Model Results	54
D.1 Firm Behavior and Firm Characteristics	54
D.2 Net-Debt Models	55
D.3 TFP-driven Booms and Credit Interventions	56

A Data Appendix

A.1 Macro Time Series Data

For the macro data, I use data from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (FRED) for the United States.

Definition	Code	Unit
GDP	GDP	Billions of Dollars
GDP Deflator	GDPDEF	Index 2012=100
Effective Federal Funds Rate	FEDFUNDS	Percentage
Credit Spread	BAA10Y	Percentage

The aggregate variables used in the panel local projection include Real GDP Growth measured as the log growth of real GDP, Inflation Rate measured as the log difference in GDP deflator, Real Federal Funds Rate measured as the difference between Effective Federal Funds Rate and Inflation Rate, and Credit Spread.

A.2 Firm-level Data

This subsection describes the firm-level variables used in the empirical analysis of the paper, based on quarterly Compustat data. The variable definition and sample selection follow standard practices in the literature, for example, [Kim and Kung \(2017\)](#), and [Ottonello and Winberry \(2020\)](#).

Variable Construction: All variables are deflated by the 2012 GDP deflator.

1. *Capital Investment*: defined as $\Delta \log(k_{i,t+1})$, where $k_{i,t+1}$ denotes the capital stock of firm i at the end of period t . For each firm, we set the first value of $k_{i,t+1}$ to be the level of Gross Plant, Property, and Equipment $PPEGTQ$ in the first period in which this variable is reported in Compustat. From this period onwards, I compute the evolution of $k_{i,t+1}$ using the changes of Net Plant, Property, and Equipment $PPENTQ$, which is a measure of net investment with significantly more observations than $PPEGTQ$.
2. *Leverage Ratio*: measured as Total Debt divided by Total Assets ATQ , with Total Debt computed as the sum of Debt in Current Liabilities and Total Long-Term Debt ($DLCQ + DLTTQ$).
3. *Cash Ratio*: measured as the ratio of Cash and Short-term Investments $CHEQ$ to Total Assets ATQ .
4. *Net Leverage*: measured as the ratio of Total Debt minus Cash and Short-term Investments $CHEQ$ to Total Assets ATQ .
5. *Firm Size*: measured as the log of Total Assets ATQ .
6. *Tobin's Q*: is defined as follows:

$$\text{Tobin's } Q = \frac{ATQ + CSHOQ \times PRCCQ - CEQQ}{ATQ}$$

where $CSHOQ$ is the number of Common Shares Outstanding, $PRCCQ$ is the Share Price (Close), $CEQQ$ is Common/Ordinary Equity - Total, and ATQ is Total Assets.

7. *Real Sales Growth*: measured as the year-on-year growth in quarterly sales $SALEQ$.
8. *Cash Flows*: measured as the sum of Income before Extraordinary Items IBQ and Depreciation and Amortization DPQ divided by lagged Total Assets ATQ .
9. *Debt Maturity*: measured as $(1 - \text{Debt Maturing within a Year } DD1) / \text{Debt in Current Liabilities and Total Long-Term Debt } (DLCQ + DLTTQ)$.
10. *(Net) Equity Issuance*: measured as $(SSTKQ - PRSTKCQ)$, where $SSTKQ$ is the quarterly Sale of Common and Preferred Stock, constructed based on the Compustat reported Year-to-date Sale of Common and Preferred Stock $SSTKY$; $PRSTKCQ$ is the quarterly Purchase of Common and Preferred Stock, constructed based on the Compustat reported Year-to-date Purchase of Common and Preferred Stock $PRSTKCY$. I normalize these quarterly net issuances by lagged Total Assets ATQ , as in [Hennessy and Whited \(2007\)](#).

Panel Local Projection: The sample covers the period from 1990Q1 to 2018Q4 at a quarterly frequency.

1. I exclude firms in finance (SIC codes 6000-6999), utility (SIC codes 4900-4949), and government-related sectors (SIC codes 9000-9999).
2. I exclude firms that are not incorporated in the United States.
3. I exclude firm-quarter observations with negative values for non-negative accounting items.
4. I exclude firm-observations with net property, plant, and equipment of less than \$1M and total assets of less than \$3M. This eliminates extremely small firms that might be very sensitive to aggregate shocks. These only account for less than 1% of total firm-quarter observations.
5. I include firm-quarter observations from firms that are observed for at least 20 quarters during the sample period (a reasonably long time dimension is required for firm-level fixed effects and within the estimator).
6. I winsorize observations of all variables at the top and bottom 1% of the distribution to exclude extreme observations, e.g., those driven by mergers and acquisitions.

APPENDIX TABLE A1: Summary Statistics of Key Firm-level Variables

	Mean	S.D.	P25	P50	P75
$\Delta \log(Capital_{i,t})$	0.01	0.10	-0.02	-0.00	0.03
$\Delta \log(Cash_{i,t})$	0.02	0.69	-0.24	-0.00	0.24
$\Delta \log(Debt_{i,t})$	0.01	0.35	-0.06	-0.00	0.05
$\Delta_8 \log(Capital_{i,t+8})$	0.08	0.45	-0.13	0.04	0.27
$\Delta_8 \log(Cash_{i,t+8})$	0.12	1.15	-0.47	0.09	0.66
$\Delta_8 \log(Debt_{i,t+8})$	0.13	1.06	-0.26	0.03	0.48
Tobin's Q	1.81	1.29	1.08	1.42	2.04
Firm Size	6.12	2.11	4.55	6.12	7.60
Sales Growth	0.02	0.24	-0.06	0.02	0.10
Cash flows	0.01	0.05	0.01	0.02	0.03

Notes: this table presents summary statistics of key firm-level variables. The sample period is 1990q1 to 2018q4. All variables are winsorized at the 1% level to eliminate outliers.

A.3 Measured Firm-level Productivity

I assume that the production function at the firm level is Cobb-Douglas and allow the parameters of the production function to be industry-specific:

$$y_{i,j,t} = z_{i,j,t} k_{i,j,t}^\alpha n_{i,j,t}^\nu$$

Since data on employment is not available in the Compustat Quarterly, I rewrite the production function based on the optimal static choice of labor in the model:

$$y_{i,j,t} = z_{i,j,t} \psi(W_t) k_{i,j,t}^\gamma$$

where $y_{i,j,t}$ is sales, $z_{i,j,t}$ is firm-level productivity, $\psi(W_t)$ is a time-specific term related to equilibrium wage, and $k_{i,j,t}$ is capital stock.

Within each 1-digit SIC industry, I then estimate firm-level productivity as the residual of the following equation:

$$\ln(y_{i,t}) = \alpha_i + \alpha_t + \alpha_k \ln(k_{i,t-1}) + v_{i,t}$$

where $y_{i,t}$ is firm sales in quarter t , $k_{i,t-1}$ is the firm's physical capital stock at the beginning of period t , α_i is a firm fixed effect, and α_t is a time fixed effect.

$\hat{v}_{i,t}$ therefore denotes the estimated log productivity $\ln(z_{i,t})$ of firm i in quarter t . The year-on-year firm-level productivity growth used in the regressions is then $\Delta \ln TFP_{i,t} = \ln(z_{i,t}) - \ln(z_{i,t-4})$.

B Additional Empirical Results

B.1 Within-firm Variation in Indebtedness


I examine whether within-firm variation in firm indebtedness predicts heterogeneous responses to uncertainty shocks by estimating the following specification:

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta_h \log(y_{i,t+h}) = & \alpha_{i,h} + \alpha_{fq,h} + \alpha_{s,t,h} + \underbrace{\gamma_h (D_{i,t-1} - \bar{D}_i)}_{\text{Heterogeneous responses}} \cdot \Delta \log \sigma_t + \beta_h (D_{i,t-1} - \bar{D}_i) \\ & + \Psi'_h (\mathbf{Z}_{i,t-1} - \bar{\mathbf{Z}}_i) \cdot \Delta \log \sigma_t + \Gamma'_h (\mathbf{Z}_{i,t-1} - \bar{\mathbf{Z}}_i) + \eta_h (D_{i,t-1} - \bar{D}_i) \cdot \Delta \log GDP_t + \mu_{i,t+h} \end{aligned} \quad (27)$$

$$\forall i, h = 0, 1, 2, 3, \dots, 12$$

The Equation 27 differs from Equation 2 by using within-firm variation in firm characteristics. Specifically, $(D_{i,t-1} - \bar{D}_i)$ is the deviation of firm i 's net leverage from its unconditional firm-specific average, and $\mathbf{Z}_{i,t-1}$ is a vector of control variables all in deviation from their respective firm-specific averages. Figure A1 shows that the responses of physical capital and liquid assets holding to changes in the Macro Uncertainty Index are also stronger when firms are more indebted than their own average levels. These results provide additional evidence of the role of firm indebtedness in shaping firm responses to uncertainty shocks.

APPENDIX FIGURE A1: **Heterogeneous Responses by Within-firm Variation in Indebtedness**



Notes: the figure plots both the average and heterogeneous responses of (a) physical capital, (b) liquid assets holding, and (c) outstanding debt to a one-standard-deviation growth in Macro Uncertainty Index by [Jurado et al. \(2015\)](#) at quarter t . The heterogeneous responses are driven by cross-sectional variation and within-firm variation in indebtedness at quarter $t - 1$. Point estimates and 95% confidence intervals for β_h and γ_h are plotted. Standard errors are two-way clustered at both firm and time levels. The sample period is from 1990Q1 to 2018Q4.

B.2 Event Study: 9/11 Terrorist Attacks

As in [Kim and Kung \(2017\)](#), I exploit the 9/11 terrorist attacks as an event study to study changes in firm behavior before and after large uncertainty events.

Using the 9/11 terrorist attacks to study the effects of heightened aggregate uncertainty on firm behavior has several advantages: First, the terrorists' attacks on U.S. soil in September 2001 were exogenous to the U.S. economy and struck as a total surprise. Second, the event induces a significant increase in economic uncertainty. For example, Macro Uncertainty Index by [Jurado et al. \(2015\)](#) increases by 5.5%, the largest single-quarter change before the Great Recession. The jump in the VIX index in September 2001 is more than 1.65 standard deviation above the mean, as shown in [Bloom et al. \(2018\)](#). The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC)

also stated in October 2001 that “the events of September 11 produced a marked increase in uncertainty”. Third, compared with other events that result in a rise in the uncertainty of a similar magnitude, this political event appears to be relatively unconfounded by changes in other macroeconomic factors. For example, the 2007-2009 financial crisis is a period with both high macroeconomic uncertainty and financial sector disruption, therefore, it is hard to disentangle what factors drive the changes in firm behavior.

To examine the average changes in firm behavior across firms around the 9/11 terrorist attacks, I estimate a simple fixed effects regression:

$$\log(y_{i,t}) = \alpha_i + \alpha_{fq} + \sum_t \beta_t \text{Quarter}_t + \epsilon_{i,t} \quad (28)$$

$$\forall t \in \{2001q1, \dots, 2002q2\} \setminus \{2000q4\}$$

To explore how the impact of firm indebtedness on firm behavior varies over the event window, I estimate the following regression:

$$\log(y_{it}) = \alpha_i + \alpha_{s,t} + \alpha_{fq} + \sum_t \gamma_t \text{Indebtednes}_{i,t-1} \cdot \text{Quarter}_t + \beta \text{Indebtednes}_{i,t-1} \quad (29)$$

$$+ \Gamma' \mathbf{X}_{i,t-1} + \sum_t \Lambda'_t \mathbf{X}_{i,t-1} \cdot \text{Quarter}_t + \epsilon_{i,t}$$

$$\forall t \in \{2001q1, \dots, 2002q2\} \setminus \{2000q4\}$$


where Quarter_t is a quarter dummy for the time period from 2000q4 to 2002q2, with 2000q4 taken as the omitted category. α_i indicates firm fixed effects that absorb permanent differences in the levels of dependent variables across firms. Fiscal-quarter dummy α_{fq} is included to absorb the impact of the difference in fiscal-quarter across firms on firm behavior. $\alpha_{s,t}$ represents the industry-by-quarter fixed effects that absorb differences in how broad industries are exposed to aggregate shocks. The industry is defined as 1-digit SIC level. $\text{Indebtednes}_{i,t-1}$ measures how many standard deviations away firm i 's net leverage is from its industry average in quarter $t-1$. As discussed earlier, differences in indebtedness might correlate with other factors that affect firm behavior. I control for a vector of widely used control variables $\mathbf{X}_{i,t-1}$ that include Tobin's Q, Sales growth, and Cash flows, and allow their effects on firm behavior also vary over time by interacting these variables with a quarter dummy. Standard errors are clustered by both firm and quarter. Since the goal is to capture within-firm changes in firm behavior before and after the event, firms that enter and exit the sample during the event window are excluded. Finally, β_t capture 'within-firm' changes in firm behavior over time relative to the base period 2000q4. γ_t captures the time-varying relation between indebtedness and changes in dependent variables over the event window.

Panel A of Figure A2 plots the estimated average firm-level growth in physical capital, liquid assets holding, and outstanding debt from 2000q4 to 2002q2, along with a 95% confidence interval. The Post-9/11 period features statistically significant declines in physical capital and outstanding debt, while a large buildup in liquid assets holding across firms. The average dynamics following the 9/11 terrorist attacks are consistent with the baseline results.


Panel B of Figure A2 plots the estimated time-varying relation between firm indebtedness and firm-level changes in (a) physical capital, (b) liquid assets holding, and (c) outstanding debt from 2000q4 to 2002q2, along with 95% confidence interval. Notably, after the third quarter of 2001, higher indebtedness at $t-1$ foreshadow statistically significant a larger decline in physical capital and a larger growth in liquid assets holdings. Moreover, differences in lagged

APPENDIX FIGURE A2: Firm Behavior around 9/11 Terrorist Attacks

Panel A. Average Firm Growth in Capital, Cash, and Debt



Panel B. Time-Varying Effects of Firm Indebtedness on Firm Choices of Capital, Cash, and Debt



Notes: Panel A reports estimated average firm-level growth in (a) physical capital, (b) liquid assets holding, and (c) outstanding debt from 2000q4 to 2002q2, along with 95% confidence interval. Panel B reports estimated time-varying relation between firm indebtedness and firm-level changes in (a) physical capital, (b) liquid assets holding, and (c) outstanding debt from 2000q4 to 2002q2, along with a 95% confidence interval.

indebtedness do not predict differences in debt growth across differently indebted firms after the event. Taken together, during periods of high uncertainty, high indebtedness is mainly associated with a larger shift in firms' asset choice, consistent with the more direct evidence based on local projection discussed in Section 2.2.

C Model Appendix

C.1 Model Details

Static Labor Choice and Operating Profits. Given productivity z , capital stock k , and Wage W , firms solve the following static profit-maximization problem:

$$\pi(z, k; W) = \max_n \{ z^{1-\nu} k^\alpha n^\nu - f_o k - Wn \}$$

Optimal labor choice is given by

$$n^*(z, k; W) = \left(\frac{\nu}{W} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\nu}} z k^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\nu}}$$

Therefore, the production of the firm is given by

$$y^*(z, k; W) = \left(\frac{\nu}{W} \right)^{\frac{\nu}{1-\nu}} z k^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\nu}}$$

Operating profits is given by

$$\begin{aligned} \pi(z, k; W) &= (1 - \nu) \left(\frac{\nu}{W} \right)^{\frac{\nu}{1-\nu}} z k^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\nu}} \\ &= z \psi(W) k^\gamma - f_o k \end{aligned}$$

where W denotes the (real) wage and

$$\gamma = \frac{\alpha}{1 - \nu} \quad \text{and} \quad \psi(W) = (1 - \nu) \left(\frac{\nu}{W} \right)^{\frac{\nu}{1-\nu}}$$

α is the value-added share of capital, and ν is the value-added share of labor. This set-up ensures that the firm's profit function is linear in its productivity, as in [Gilchrist et al. \(2014\)](#).

Optimality Conditions First-order condition with respect to dividends is as follows:

$$\Lambda(d) = \begin{cases} 1, & \text{if } d \geq 0 \\ 1 + \kappa_1 |d|, & \text{if } d < 0 \end{cases} \quad (30)$$

Step 1: using the envelop theorem, I obtain the marginal value of cash, capital, and debt for firms with non-maturing debt:

$$\frac{\partial V^m(z, k, c, b)}{\partial c} = \Lambda(d) \left[1 + (1 - \tau)r(1 + s \cdot \mathbf{1}_{m < 0}) \right] \quad (31)$$

$$\frac{\partial V^m(z, k, c, b)}{\partial k} = \Lambda(d) \left[\left[(1 - \tau) \frac{\partial \pi(z, k)}{\partial k} + \tau \delta \right] (1 + s \cdot \mathbf{1}_{m < 0}) + (1 - \delta) \right] \quad (32)$$

$$\frac{\partial V^m(z, k, c, b)}{\partial b} = -\Lambda(d) \left[1 + (1 - \tau)r(1 + s \cdot \mathbf{1}_{m < 0}) \right] \quad (33)$$

Step 2: using the envelop theorem, I obtain the marginal value of cash, capital and debt for firms with non-maturing debt:

$$\frac{\partial V^n(z, k, c, b)}{\partial c} = \Lambda(d) [1 + (1 - \tau)r] \quad (34)$$

$$\frac{\partial V^n(z, k, c, b)}{\partial k} = \Lambda(d) \left[(1 - \tau) \frac{\partial \pi(z, k)}{\partial k} + \tau \delta + (1 - \delta) \right] \quad (35)$$

$$\frac{\partial V^n(z, k, c, b)}{\partial b} = -\Lambda(d) \left[1 + (1 - \tau)r - \eta \cdot \mathbf{1}_{b' > b} \right] \quad (36)$$

Step 3: first-order conditions with respect to cash choice c' and capital choice k' are the same

for firms with maturing and non-maturing debt:

$$FOC[c'] : \Lambda(d) \cdot \mathbf{1} \geq \frac{1}{1+r} E_{z'|z} \left[\lambda \frac{\partial V^m(z', k', c', b')}{\partial c'} + (1-\lambda) \frac{\partial V^n(z', k', c', b')}{\partial c'} \right] \quad (37)$$

$$FOC[k'] : \Lambda(d) \cdot \mathbf{1} = \frac{\mu_b \theta (1-\delta)}{1+r} + \frac{1}{1+r} E_{z'|z} \left[\lambda \frac{\partial V^m(z', k', c', b')}{\partial k'} + (1-\lambda) \frac{\partial V^n(z', k', c', b')}{\partial k'} \right] \quad (38)$$

Step 4: first-order conditions with respect to debt choice b' for firms with maturing debt:

$$FOC[b'] : \Lambda(d) \cdot \mathbf{1} - \mu_b = \frac{1}{1+r} E_{z'|z} \left[\lambda \frac{\partial V^m(z', k', c', b')}{\partial k'} + (1-\lambda) \frac{\partial V^n(z', k', c', b')}{\partial k'} \right] \quad (39)$$

$$FOC[b'] : \Lambda(d) \cdot (1-\eta) - \mu_b = \frac{1}{1+r} E_{z'|z} \left[\lambda \frac{\partial V^m(z', k', c', b')}{\partial k'} + (1-\lambda) \frac{\partial V^n(z', k', c', b')}{\partial k'} \right] \quad (40)$$

Step 5: plugging the envelope conditions (B2)-(B7) into the first-order conditions (B8)-(B11), I obtain Euler equations (19)-(22) for cash, capital, and debt in the main text.

C.2 Model Computation

Stationary Equilibrium. I first assume the economy is at steady-state with normal volatility. In the stationary equilibrium, there is no aggregate shock, so $r = 1/\beta - 1$ and I solve for equilibrium wage to clear the labor market. The algorithm is as follows:

Step 1: Guess an equilibrium wage W^{old} .

Step 2: Solve the firm's problem using Value Function Iteration.

Step 3: Using the policy functions and distributions, compute aggregate quantities.

Step 4: Using the labor market clearing condition, compute the *Excessive Demand* $\epsilon = L^s - L^d$ by taking the difference between labor demand and labor supply. *STOP* if $\max |\epsilon| < 10^{-5}$.

Step 5: Update the wage with a given weight and return to Step 2.

Transition Dynamics. The key assumption of the transition dynamics is that after a sufficiently long time, the economy will converge back to its original stationary equilibrium after any temporary and unexpected (MIT) shocks. The solution algorithm here is outlined as follows:

Step 1: Fix a sufficient long transition period $t = 1$ to $t = T$ (say 200), at which point we assume the economy has reached steady state.

Step 2: Generate an initial jump in volatility σ_t and assume the shock follows $\sigma_{t+1} = \rho \sigma_t$ with $\rho = 0.5$.

Step 3: Guess a time-series of aggregate prices $\{W_t\}$ of length T.

Step 4: Backward Induction: solve the value functions (and policy functions) backwards from $t = T - 1, \dots, 1$ setting value functions at time T as the steady-state value functions. This yields value functions and policy functions along the transition path from $t = 1$ to $t = T - 1$.

Step 5: Forward Simulation: starting from the steady state distribution, simulate the distribution forward from $t = 1, \dots, T$ using the policy functions and idiosyncratic productivity Markov transition matrix. This yields firm distributions along the transition path from $t = 1$ to $t = T - 1$.

Step 6: Using the policy functions and distributions, compute aggregate quantities.

Step 7: Using the labor market clearing condition, compute the *Excessive Demand* $\epsilon_t = L_t^s - L_t^d$ by taking the difference between labor demand and labor supply.

Step 8: STOP if $\max |\epsilon_t| < 10^{-5}$.

Step 9: Update $(\{W_t\}_{t=1}^T)^{New} = v\epsilon_t + (1 - v)(\{W_t\}_{t=1}^T)^{Old}$, and GO TO step 4. v is chose to be 0.5.

C.3 Model Simulation

I simulate this economy for 200 quarters until they converge to the steady-state distribution. Then I keep simulating this economy for an additional 300 quarters which is used for the calculation of moments. Finally, I keep simulating the economy starting from the quarter 500 forwards with the transitional policy functions and aggregate prices until the economy converges back to the steady state at the quarter 700.

Simulated Methods of Moments The SMM proceeds as follows: The simulated data vector $y_i(\beta)$ depends on a vector of structural parameter β . The goal is to estimate β by matching a set of simulated moments, denoted as $h(y_i(\beta))$, with the set of actual data moments $h(x_i)$, where x_i is an i.i.d. data vector. Define

$$g_n(\beta) = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n \left[h(x_i) - h(y_i(\beta)) \right]$$

The simulated moment estimator of β is then defined as the solution to the minimization of

$$\hat{\beta} = \arg \min_{\beta} g_n(\beta)' W g_n(\beta)$$

The optimal parameter estimate β is obtained by searching over the parameter space using the simulated annealing algorithm.

Mapping Model to Data. Table below details the mapping between model variables to Compustat Variables.

Aggregate Impulse Response Functions. I compute perfect-foresight transition path following unexpected uncertainty shocks or both unexpected uncertainty shocks and policy interventions. Following [Koop et al. \(1996\)](#), aggregate impulse response functions are computed using "Simulation Differencing":

$$\hat{X}_t^{shock} = 100 \log \left(\frac{X_t^{shock}}{X_t^{no shock}} \right) \quad \hat{X}_t^{shock, policy} = 100 \log \left(\frac{X_t^{shock, policy}}{X_t^{no shock}} \right)$$

where \hat{X}_t^{shock} denotes the aggregate impact of uncertainty shocks. $\hat{X}_t^{shock, policy}$ denotes the aggregate impact of uncertainty shocks with policy interventions. To evaluate whether the effectiveness of the credit policies differs during normal times and periods of high uncertainty,

APPENDIX TABLE A2: Mapping Model to Data

Variable	Data	Construction	Model
Tobin's Q	(ATQ + PRCCQ × CSHOQ - CEQQ) / ATQ		$\frac{V_{t-1}(z,k,c,b)}{k+c}$
Firm Size	log(ATQ)		$\log(k+c)$
Leverage ratio	(DLTTQ+DLCQ)/ATQ		$\frac{b}{k+c}$
Net leverage ratio	(DLTTQ+DLCQ-CHEQ)/ATQ		$\frac{b-c}{k+c}$
Cash ratio	CHEQ/ATQ		$\frac{c}{k+c}$
Dividends ratio	DVY/ATQ		$\frac{d}{k+c}$
Equity-issuance-to-assets	(SSTKY - PRSTKY) / ATQ		$\frac{e}{k+c}$

Notes: Variables ending in Y in Compustat are stated as year-to-date. I convert them into quarterly frequency by subtracting the past quarter from the current observation for all but the rest quarter of the firm.

I compute the effects of policies as follows:

$$\hat{X}_t^{policy} = 100 \log \left(\frac{X_t^{policy}}{X_t^{no\ shock}} \right) \quad \hat{X}_t^{policy, shock} = 100 \log \left(\frac{X_t^{shock, policy}}{X_t^{shock}} \right)$$

where \hat{X}_t^{shock} denotes the aggregate effects of policy interventions during normal times, \hat{X}_t^{shock} denotes the aggregate effects of policy interventions with uncertainty shocks.

D Additional Model Results

D.1 Firm Behavior and Firm Characteristics

APPENDIX TABLE A3: Firm Behavior and Firm Characteristics: Alternative Models

$\Delta \ln y_{i,t+1}$:	Model w/o liquidity penalty		
	$\Delta \text{Capital}_{i,t+1}$	$\Delta \text{Cash}_{i,t+1}$	$\Delta \text{Debt}_{i,t+1}$
Indebtedness_{i,t}	-0.002*** (0.000)	-0.022*** (0.000)	-0.014*** (0.000)
Tobin's $Q_{i,t}$	0.022*** (0.000)	0.018*** (0.000)	0.023*** (0.000)
Size _{i,t}	-0.079*** (0.000)	-0.087*** (0.001)	-0.070*** (0.000)
R-Squared	0.726	0.116	0.594

Notes: The table reports the estimated relationship between firm behavior and firm characteristics using simulated data from alternative models. *, **, and *** represent results significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

APPENDIX TABLE A4: Firm Behavior and Firm Characteristics: Alternative Models


$\Delta \ln y_{i,t+1}$:	Model w/o debt issuance frictions		
	$\Delta \text{Capital}_{i,t+1}$	$\Delta \text{Cash}_{i,t+1}$	$\Delta \text{Debt}_{i,t+1}$
Indebtedness $_{i,t}$	-0.006*** (0.000)	0.173*** (0.001)	-0.015*** (0.000)
Tobin's $Q_{i,t}$	0.052*** (0.000)	0.026*** (0.000)	0.036*** (0.000)
Size $_{i,t}$	-0.024*** (0.000)	-0.040*** (0.002)	-0.033*** (0.001)
R-Squared	0.754	0.123	0.279

Notes: The table reports the estimated relationship between firm behavior and firm characteristics using simulated data from alternative models. *, **, and *** represent results significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

D.2 Net-Debt Models

As in the baseline model, frictions in debt issuance also govern firms' liquidity demand in response to uncertainty shocks in the net-debt models. Figure A3 plots output responses to the same uncertainty shocks in the net-debt model with different levels of debt issuance cost η when $\eta = 0$, firms' precautionary saving motives are muted. As in the baseline model with $\eta = 0$, the drops in aggregate output in this model are purely driven by firm deleveraging in response to uncertainty shocks. When $\eta > 0$, firms have incentives to generate internal liquidity through capital investment, which counteracts the deleveraging pressure caused by uncertainty shocks and thereby generates smaller output drops. I calibrate $\eta = \eta^*$ to match the net leverage ratio as in the baseline model, the net-debt model predicts an overshoot in output in the medium run. When $\eta = 0.5\eta^*$, firms' precautionary saving motives are weaker, and thus the output overshoot is less pronounced. However, this calibration also predicts a higher leverage ratio and a lower cash ratio relative to the baseline model.

APPENDIX FIGURE A3: Output Responses to Uncertainty Shocks




Notes: Figure A3 plots output responses to the same uncertainty shocks in the net-debt model with different levels of debt issuance cost η .

D.3 TFP-driven Booms and Credit Interventions

The estimated output responses to credit interventions in TFP-driven booms are slightly larger than in normal times. This occurs because positive productivity shocks increase firms' investment demand and financial needs, thereby amplifying the role of credit interventions in relaxing firms' financial constraints. This is in contrast to the weaker effects of credit interventions during TFP-driven recessions, where investment demand becomes lower than the steady-state level. However, the stimulating effects of credit intervention during TFP-driven booms are still much smaller than their stabilizing effects in uncertainty-driven recessions.

APPENDIX FIGURE A4: TFP-driven Booms and Credit Interventions



Notes: Panels (A) and (C) plot aggregate output responses to positive productivity shocks with and without credit interventions. Panels (B) and (D) plot the output responses to policy interventions during normal functions and periods of high productivity. Appendix C.3 details the computation of aggregate impulse response functions.