
# **Endogenous Production Networks and Non-Linear Monetary Transmission**

Mishel Ghassibe


CREi, UPF & BSE

CEBRA Annual Meeting New York City, July 7th 2023

# Motivation: non-linear monetary transmission to GDP




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



Jordà et al. (2019)

• Tightening in a fully non-linear medium-scale New Keynesian model:



Tenreyro and Thwaites (2016)





Ascari and Haber (2021)

• A novel tractable framework for rationalizing a range of non-linearities in monetary transmission, with the key mechanism supported by new empirical evidence

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**Key novel mechanism**: states of the world with more linkages feature stronger pricing complementarities and stronger real effects of monetary policy

(Productivity  $\uparrow$ , desired markups  $\downarrow$ , money supply  $\uparrow$ )  $\longrightarrow$  Linkages  $\uparrow$ 

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
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  - ▶ Size dependence: large monetary shocks have a disproportionate effect on GDP
- 3 Novel model-free empirical evidence on network responses to shocks

# A TWO-PERIOD SETTING

#### Overview



• K sectors, continuum of firms  $\Phi_k$  in each sector

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- Roundabout Production (for firm j in sector k):

$$Y_k(j) = \psi(S,\Omega) \mathcal{A}_k(S_k) N_k(j)^{1-\sum_{r \in S_k} \omega_{kr}} \prod_{r \in S_k} Z_{kr}(j)^{\omega_{kr}}, \quad \forall k, \forall j \in \Phi_k$$

where  $S_k \subseteq \{1, 2, ..., K\}$  is sector k's choice of suppliers,  $\mathcal{A}_k(.)$  is the technology mapping,  $\omega_{kr} = [\Omega]_{kr}$  are input-output weights,  $N_k(j)$  is labor,  $Z_{kr}(j)$  is intermediates

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• Marginal Cost (conditional on supplier choice):

$$MC_k = \frac{1}{\mathcal{A}_k(S_k)} W^{1 - \sum_{r \in S_k} \omega_{kr}} \prod_{r \in S_k} P_r^{\omega_{kr}}, \quad \forall k, \forall j \in \Phi_k$$

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Optimal Network:

$$S_k^* \in \arg\min_{S_k} MC_k(S, P), \quad \forall k$$

where  $S = [S_1, S_2, ..., S_K]'$  and  $P = [P_1, P_2, ..., P_K]'$ 

• Optimal reset price:

$$\overline{P}_k = (1 + \mu_k) M C_k, \quad (1 + \mu_k) = (1 + \tau_k) \frac{\theta}{\theta - 1}$$

where  $\tau_k$  is tax,  $\theta$  is within-sector elasticity of substitution



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$$\mathcal{U} = \ln C - N, \quad C \equiv \prod_{k=1}^K C_k^{\omega_{ck}}.$$



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• Money supply rule:  $\mathcal{M} = \mathcal{M}_0 \exp(\varepsilon^m)$ 



**BASELINE** (
$$\varepsilon^m = 0$$
)

Consider variations in the baseline pair  $(\mathcal{A},\mathcal{M}_0)$ 

 $\bullet \ \ \text{Two sectors:} \ \omega_{kk}=0, \quad \ \tau_k=-\tfrac{1}{\theta}, \quad \ \theta \to 1^+, \quad \ P_{k,0}=1, \quad \ \forall k=1,2$ 

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	Sector 1	Sector 2
a(.)	$a_1(\varnothing)=1,  a_1(\{2\})=\overline{a}$	$a_2(\varnothing) = 1,  a_2(\{1\}) = \overline{a}$
Ω	$\omega_{12}=\omega_{c1}=0.5$	$\omega_{21}=\omega_{c1}=0.5$
$\alpha$	$lpha_1=0$	$\alpha_2 = 0.5$

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• Marginal costs:  $mc_{k,0} = -a_k(S_{k,0}) + m_0 + \mathbf{1}_{-k \in S_{k,0}} \frac{1}{2} (p_{-k,0} - m_0)$ 

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- Optimal network choice over marginal costs:

# **Recession vs Expansion** (varying $\overline{a}$ )

**Recession**: 
$$\overline{a} = 0$$

**Normal**: 
$$\overline{a} = 0.65$$

Expansion: 
$$\overline{a} = 0.8$$

$$\bigcup_{\alpha_1=0}$$





$$\bigcap_{\alpha_1 = 0} \longrightarrow \bigcap_{\alpha_2 = 0.5}$$

# **Tight vs Loose** initial money (varying $m_0$ )

**Tight money**: 
$$m_0 = 0$$

Normal money:  $m_0 = 4$ 

**Loose money**:  $m_0 = 8$ 







$$\bigcap_{\alpha_1 = 0} \longrightarrow \bigcap_{\alpha_2 = 0.5}$$

# Baseline: density of the network

#### Lemma (Baseline supplier choices)

Suppose the marginal cost is quasi-submodular in  $(S_k, \mathcal{A}_k(S_k))$ ,  $\forall k$ . Consider any two baseline pairs  $(\underline{\mathcal{A}}, \underline{\mathcal{M}}_0)$ ,  $(\overline{\mathcal{A}}, \overline{\mathcal{M}}_0)$  such that either  $\overline{\mathcal{A}} \geq \underline{\mathcal{A}}, \overline{\mathcal{M}}_0 = \underline{\mathcal{M}}_0$  or  $\overline{\mathcal{A}} = \underline{\mathcal{A}}, \overline{\mathcal{M}}_0 \geq \underline{\mathcal{M}}_0$ , then:


$$S_k(\overline{\mathcal{A}}, \overline{\mathcal{M}}_0) \supseteq S_k(\underline{\mathcal{A}}, \underline{\mathcal{M}}_0)$$


for all k = 1, 2, ..., K.


# **MONETARY SHOCKS**

Small Monetary Shocks Endogenous Production Networks and Non-Linear Monetary Transmission

# IRFs to a small monetary expansion across the cycle $\bar{a}$

















#### IRFs to a small monetary expansion across the cycle $\bar{a}$














#### Proposition (Cycle dependence)

For two otherwise identical baselines with  $\overline{A} \geq \underline{A}$ , following a monetary shock  $\varepsilon^m$  that is small with respect to both baselines:  $c_k(\varepsilon^m; \overline{A}) \geq c_k(\varepsilon^m; \underline{A})$ ,  $\forall k$ .

#### IRFs to a small monetary expansion across initial $m_0$









$$\bigcap_{\alpha_1=0}$$







#### IRFs to a small monetary expansion across initial $m_0$












#### Proposition (Path dependence)


For two otherwise identical baselines with  $\overline{\mathcal{M}}_0 \geq \underline{\mathcal{M}}_0$ , following a monetary shock  $\varepsilon^m$  that is small with respect to both baselines:  $c_k(\varepsilon^m; \overline{\mathcal{M}}_0) > c_k(\varepsilon^m; \overline{\mathcal{M}}_0)$ ,  $\forall k$ .

Large Monetary Shocks


#### Large monetary expansions



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
#### Large monetary expansions



#### Proposition (Size dependence)


Starting from network  $S_0$ , a large monetary expansion  $E^+$  has a more than proportional effect on GDP than a small monetary expansion  $\varepsilon^+$ :  $C(E^+)/C(\varepsilon^+) \ge C(E^+;S_0)/C(\varepsilon^+;S_0)$ .

#### Large monetary contractions



#### Large monetary contractions






#### Proposition (Size dependence)

Starting from network  $S_0$ , a large monetary contraction  $E^-$  has a less than proportional effect on GDP than a small monetary contraction  $\varepsilon^-$ :  $C(E^-)/C(\varepsilon^-) \le C(E^-; S_0)/C(\varepsilon^-; S_0)$ .

# EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE

Sectoral Data

#### Cost share of intermediate inputs (BEA, US)



 Use BEA annual sectoral accounts (KLEMS) to construct sectoral measures of intermediates intensity between 1987-2017 for 65 sectors (Summary level):

$$\delta_{kt} = \frac{\text{Expenditure on Intermediates}_{kt}}{\text{Expenditure on Intermediates}_{kt} + \text{Compensation of Employees}_{kt}}$$

which exactly matches to  $\sum_{r \in S_{kr}} \omega_{kr}, \forall k$ , in our theoretical framework

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• Linear local projection:

$$\delta_{k,t+H} = \alpha_{k,H} + \beta_H s_t + \gamma_H x_{k,t-1} + \varepsilon_{k,t+H}$$

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
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Non-linear local projection:


$$\delta_{k,t+H} = \alpha_{k,H} + \beta_H^{lin} s_t + \beta_H^{sign} s_t \times \mathbf{1}\{s_t > 0\} + \beta_H^{size} s_t \times |s_t| + \gamma_H x_{k,t-1} + \varepsilon_{k,t+H},$$

Use Fernald's TFP shocks and Romer-Romer monetary shocks

#### Intermediates intensity response: linear local projection







 Use BEA annual sectoral accounts (KLEMS) to construct sectoral measures of intermediates intensity between 1987-2017 for 65 sectors (Summary level):

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Non-linear local projection:


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
• Use Fernald's TFP shocks and Romer-Romer monetary shocks

#### Productivity shocks: non-linear local projection











Horizon (years)

#### (b) Productivity contractions




(c) p-values for non-linearities



-02


#### Monetary shocks: non-linear local projection






Horizon (years)

#### (b) Monetary contractions



(c) p-values for non-linearities





#### Conclusion

- Develop a sticky-price New Keynesian model with endogenous input-output linkages across sectors, which delivers empirically realistic cyclical variation in production networks
- Results rationalize observed non-linearities associated with monetary transmission: cycle dependence, path dependence and size dependence
- Novel empirical evidence in support of the mechanism

#### Conclusion

- Develop a sticky-price New Keynesian model with endogenous input-output linkages across sectors, which delivers empirically realistic cyclical variation in production networks
- Results rationalize observed non-linearities associated with monetary transmission: cycle dependence, path dependence and size dependence
- · Novel empirical evidence in support of the mechanism
- Future work to develop and enhance the research agenda
  - Formation of input-output linkages across countries, with implications for monetary policy
  - ▶ Impact of uncertainty on linkage formation under forward-looking behaviour
  - Misallocation and inefficient production networks: cross-country differences
  - Government policies to address inefficient networks in a decentralized equilibrium

#### **APPENDIX**

#### Firms: pricing under nominal rigidities

Profit maximization:

$$\max_{P_k^*(j)} \Pi_k(j) = [P_k^*(j)Y_k(j) - (1 + \tau_k)MC_kY_k(j)] \quad \text{s.t.} \quad Y_k(j) = \left(\frac{P_k(j)}{P_k}\right)^{-\theta} Y_k$$

• Optimal reset price:

$$\overline{P}_k = (1 + \mu_k) MC_k, \qquad (1 + \mu_k) = (1 + \tau_k) \frac{\theta}{\theta - 1}, \qquad \forall k, \forall j \in \Phi_k$$

• Calvo lotteries (probability of non-adjustment  $\alpha_k$ ):

$$P_k = \left[\alpha_k P_{k,0}^{1-\theta} + (1-\alpha_k) \left\{ \frac{1+\mu_k}{\mathcal{A}_k(S_k)} W \prod_{r \in S_k} \left(\frac{P_r}{W}\right)^{\omega_{kr}} \right\}^{1-\theta} \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\theta}}, \ \forall k$$

▶ Back

#### Equilibrium

• Flow Utility:  $\mathcal{U} = \log C - N, \quad C \equiv \prod_{k=1}^{K} C_k^{\omega_{ck}}.$ 

• Cash-in-Advance Constraint:  $P^cC = \mathcal{M}$ 

• Money supply rule:  $\mathcal{M} = \mathcal{M}_0 \exp(\varepsilon^m)$ 

• Equilibrium fixed point problem:

$$P_{k} = \left[\alpha_{k} P_{k,0}^{1-\theta} + (1-\alpha_{k}) \left\{ \min_{S_{k}} \frac{1+\mu_{k}}{\mathcal{A}_{k}(S_{k})} \mathcal{M} \prod_{r \in S_{k}} \left( \frac{P_{r}}{\mathcal{M}} \right)^{\omega_{kr}} \right\}^{1-\theta} \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\theta}}, \ \forall k$$

#### Proposition (Equilibrium)

Equilibrium in my economy: (i) exists; (ii) sectoral prices and final consumptions are unique; (iii) supplier choices and remaining quantities are generically unique.

**₩** Back

#### Small shock $\varepsilon^m \neq 0$ across baselines

#### Proposition

Let  $c_k(A, \mathcal{M}_0) \equiv \ln C_k(A, \mathcal{M}) - \ln C_k(A, \mathcal{M}_0), \forall k$ . Consider any two baseline pairs  $(\underline{A}, \underline{\mathcal{M}}_0), (\overline{A}, \overline{\mathcal{M}}_0)$ , and  $\varepsilon^m > 0$  which is small, and  $P_{k,0} = (1 + \mu_k)g(\mathcal{M}_0)MC_k(A, \mathcal{M}_0)$ :

$$\mathbb{C}(\overline{\mathcal{A}},\overline{\mathcal{M}}_0) - \mathbb{C}(\underline{\mathcal{A}},\underline{\mathcal{M}}_0) = \left[\mathcal{L}(\overline{\mathcal{A}},\overline{\mathcal{M}}_0) - \mathcal{L}(\underline{\mathcal{A}},\underline{\mathcal{M}}_0)\right]\mathcal{E}^m$$

where  ${\tt c}=[c_1,c_2,...,c_K]'$ ,  ${\cal E}^m=[{\it e}^m,{\it e}^m,...,{\it e}^m]'$  and  ${\cal L}$  is a Leontief inverse given by:

$$\mathcal{L}(\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{M}_0) = [I - (I - A)\Gamma(\mathcal{M}_0)\Omega(\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{M}_0)]^{-1}[I - (I - A)\Gamma(\mathcal{M}_0)]$$

where 
$$A = diag(\alpha_1, ..., \alpha_K)$$
,  $\Gamma(\mathcal{M}_0) = diag(\gamma_1(\mathcal{M}_0), ..., \gamma_K(\mathcal{M}_0))$ ,  $\gamma_k = \frac{1}{\alpha_k (g(\mathcal{M}_0))^{1-\theta} + 1 - \alpha_k}$  and  $[\Omega(\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{M}_0)]_{kr} = \omega_{kr}$  if  $r \in S_k$  and 0 otherwise.

### INFINITE-HORIZON MODEL

#### Pricing in the infinite-horizon model

• Assume "finite-horizon" Calvo (1983) pricing

#### Assumption (Nominal rigidities)

There exists a finite, deterministic cut-off time period T>1, such that for  $1 \le t \le (T-1)$  each firm has a sector-specific probability of price adjustment  $\alpha_k \in (0,1)$  and prices are fully flexible for  $t \ge T$ 

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- Two-period model mimicked by T=2
- Conditional on the path of supplier choices, sector-level solutions can be obtained by backward induction

## Optimal networks in the infinite-horizon model • Firms can re-optimize their supplier choices in every time period

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- Firms can re-optimize their supplier choices in every time period
- Consider productivity mapping from Acemoglu and Azar (2020), augmented with an aggregate productivity term

#### Assumption (Productivity mapping)

For every sector k = 1, 2, ..., K the productivity mapping  $A_{kt}(S_{kt})$  takes the following form:

$$\mathcal{A}_{kt}(S_{kt}) = \mathcal{Z}_t B_0 \prod_{r \in S_{kt}} B_{kr},$$

where  $\mathcal{Z}_t$  is agg. productivity which follows an AR(1) process in logs:  $\ln \mathcal{Z}_t = \rho_z \ln \mathcal{Z}_{t-1} + \zeta_t$ , and  $B_0$ ,  $\{B_{kr}\}_{kr}$  are parameters.

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• Delivers marginal cost cost function in logs:  $-z_t - b_0 + w_t + \sum_{r \in S_{tr}} [\omega_{kr}(p_{rt} - w_t) - b_{kr}]$ 

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- Delivers marginal cost cost function in logs:  $-z_t b_0 + w_t + \sum_{r \in S_{t+}} [\omega_{kr}(p_{rt} w_t) b_{kr}]$
- Simple rule for choosing supplier: sector *k* should be from sector *r* if and only if:

$$\omega_{kr}(p_{rt} - w_t) < b_{kr}$$

• Start from a guess for sectoral prices, supplier choices and allocations; let  $\mathcal{X}_t^-$ ,  $\mathcal{X}_t$  and  $\mathcal{X}_t^+$  be, respectively, the full set of past, present and future variables at t

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## Numerical Algorithm: NK model with endogenous networks

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  - (iv) Repeat (i)-(iii) until convergence within the time period;
  - (v) If t > 1, decrease t by one and go back to (i). Otherwise, compare  $\{\{P_{kt}^0\}_{k=1}^K\}_{t=1}^{T-1}$  with  $\{\{P_{kt}\}_{k=1}^K\}_{t=1}^{T-1}$ ; if they are equal, stop the algorithm; if they are not equal, set  $P_{kt} = P_{kt}^0, \forall k, 1 \le t \le T-1$ , set t = T-1 and return to (i).

• Need to make an assumption about the path of money supply:

## Assumption (Money supply)

For a given initial money supply  $\mathcal{M}_0$ , the money supply in  $t \geq 1$  takes the following form:

$$\Delta \ln \mathcal{M}_t = \rho_m \Delta \ln \mathcal{M}_{t-1} + \varepsilon_t^m.$$

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  - Aggregate parameters:  $\beta=0.99, \theta=6, \rho_a=0.86, \rho_m=0.80, T=50$  and  $\mathcal{Z}_0=1$

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
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  - ightharpoonup Sector-specific Calvo parameters ( $\alpha_k$ ): one minus frequency of price adjustment from Pasten et al. (2020)
  - Sector-specific taxes  $(\tau_k)$ : match sectoral markups from De Loecker et al. (2020)
  - Input-output shares ( $\omega_{kr}$ ): take observed shares from the 2007 BEA Input-Output tables, impute unobserved ones following Acemoglu and Azar (2020)
  - Productivity mapping parameters ( $B_0$ ,  $B_{kr}$ ): estimated to ensure the steady-state of my model under  $\overline{\mathcal{M}_t = \mathcal{Z}_t = 1}$ ,  $\forall t$ , simultaneously matches observed input-output linkages an real GDP in 2007


Baselines with Different Productivity Paths and Money Supplies

# Baselines with different aggregate productivity paths

(a) Average number of suppliers




(b) Average intermediates intensity




**▶** Back

# Baselines with different initial money supplies

(a) Average number of suppliers



(b) Average intermediates intensity




**→** Back


Small Monetary Shocks Endogenous Production Networks and Non-Linear Monetary Transmission

## Small monetary expansions across productivity baselines

(a) IRFs of GDP under expansion and recession




(b) Peaks of IRFs across productivities




## Small monetary expansions across initial money supply

(a) IRFs of GDP under tight and loose money




(b) Peaks of IRFs across money supplies




Large Monetary Shocks

## Large monetary expansions and contractions





### (b) Large monetary contractions



Firm-level Data

# Cyclical fluctuations in the number of suppliers

- Measure the number of suppliers at firm level, using data on "in-degree" computed by Atalay et al.
   (2011) for US publicly listed firms available in Compustat
- Linear local projection:


$$indeg_{k,t+H} = \alpha_{k,H} + \beta_H s_t + \gamma_H x_{k,t-1} + \varepsilon_{k,t+H}$$

• Non-linear local projection:


$$\textit{indeg}_{j,t+H} = \alpha_{j,H} + \beta_H^{\textit{lin}} s_t + \beta_H^{\textit{sign}} s_t \times \mathbf{1} \{ s_t > 0 \} + \beta_H^{\textit{size}} s_t \times |s_t| + \gamma_H x_{j,t-1} + \varepsilon_{j,t+H},$$

• Use Fernald's TFP shocks and Romer-Romer monetary shocks


# Number of suppliers response: linear local projection




## Productivity shocks: non-linear local projection




## (b) Productivity contractions







### (c) p-values for non-linearities




# Monetary shocks: non-linear local projection



### (b) Monetary contractions



### (c) p-values for non-linearities





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
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
## Productivity shocks: non-linear local projection






Horizon (years)

### (b) Productivity contractions




(c) p-values for non-linearities






4

# Monetary shocks: non-linear local projection



### (b) Monetary contractions



### (c) p-values for non-linearities

