

Causal Effects of Early Career Sorting on Labor and Marriage Market Choices: A Foundation for Gender Disparities and Norms^{*}

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Abstract:

We study whether and how early labor market choices causally determine longer run career versus family outcomes differentially for men and women. We analyze the physician labor market by exploiting a randomized lottery that determines the sorting of Danish physicians into internships, i.e., their initial labor market positions, where students with worse lottery numbers end up assigned to less desirable local labor markets and entry-level jobs. Using administrative data spanning ten years after physicians' graduations, we find causal effects of early career sorting on a range of life cycle outcomes that cascade from labor market choices, including human capital accumulation and occupational choice, to marriage market choices, including matching and fertility. Notably, the persistent effects are entirely driven by women, whereas men experience only temporary career disruptions from unfavorable early-stage sorting. Investigating sources of this gender divergence, differential baseline preferences over markets or specialties are an unlikely explanation. Instead, evidence points to differential search and mobility in response to the treatment, and to operating roles for employer-side factors, specifically mentorship at the workplace. Our findings have implications for policies aiming at gender equality in outcomes, as they reveal how persistent gaps can arise even in institutionally gender-neutral settings with early-stage equality of opportunity.

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1. Introduction

A long tradition of economic research has documented important gender inequalities in economic life cycle outcomes, including human capital accumulation, field of study, occupational choice, and career trajectories. Recent empirical work has made great strides in understanding the underlying channels of these inequalities, by identifying causal routes by which gender disparities evolve and perpetuate. In parallel, classic labor economics has extensively documented life cycle patterns that strongly suggested the early career stage as an explanation for long run trajectories and gender dynamics, in both the labor market and the marriage market. Hence, early career choices could play a key role in shaping longer run gender inequalities in career and family choices as well as in the tradeoffs across them.

In this paper, we aim to establish whether and how early career choices can causally determine longer run labor market versus marriage market outcomes differentially for males and females. We then investigate potential mechanisms, which are tied to either the supply side or the demand side of the labor market, that could operate asymmetrically across genders and can lend foundation for gender disparities and norms. Estimating these causal relationships is challenging for two main reasons. First, it requires a clean source of idiosyncratic variation that isolates exogenous changes to an individual’s choice set. This type of variation is required for identifying the potential causal effects of making differential choices at the early career, which are an important input in young workers’ optimization problem. Second, such estimation requires detailed long-horizon data on the evolution of a range of life cycle outcomes and choices that are informative about career trajectories and family formation. These data should include labor market information, such as earnings, advanced education, and occupational choice, and family linkages to spouses and children, in order to investigate marriage market outcomes.

We overcome these challenges by studying the labor market for physicians, an important market for highly specialized labor in modern developed economies that has served as a “laboratory” for a range of economic questions.¹ Specifically, we study the allocation of Danish physicians to entry-level labor market positions, which offers several advantages.

First, placement to medical internship—i.e., physicians’ first jobs—is governed in Denmark by a purely randomized lottery that provides a clean source of idiosyncratic variation in entry-level labor market sorting. As we verify, students with the best lottery ranks, who are the ones to choose first, are effectively unrestricted in their choices and are assigned their highest priority options; whereas students with the worst lottery ranks, who are the ones to choose last and well after their choice sets have narrowed, are assigned their lowest priority options. For our main design, we leverage this simple regularity to construct our control group (best lottery ranks) and our treatment group (worst lottery ranks). We show that this generates large exogenous variation so that graduating physicians in the treatment group are much more likely, as compared

¹ Recent work in this setting that is particular to gender includes Sarsons (2019), Zeltzer (2020), and Wasserman (forthcoming).

to the control group, to sort into internships in less desirable local labor markets and positions. These positions offer inferior training and future career opportunities, e.g., in terms of rankings of the educational program, decreased affiliation with teaching hospitals, weaker professional networks, and higher likelihood to locate in rural communities which display more traditional gender norms.

Second, we exploit a novel dataset that combines the formal lottery data we have digitized with a range of administrative datasets on all medical doctors in Denmark. These datasets cover information from medical registries on licenses and specializations, and from the Danish economic registers with information on location, employer-employee linkages, income flows from any reported source, education, and demographics. Importantly, we can link households using spousal and parent-child linkages to investigate family formation and fertility. Together, the data allow us to study a wide range of life cycle choices, in both the labor market and the marriage market, which provides us with the unique advantage to conduct a comprehensive analysis of the broad potential causal effects of early careers and career versus family tradeoffs. The data allow us to track our sample over a long period for up to ten years after the treatment.

Third, our setting also readily lends itself to investigations of mechanisms in support of our main analysis. This is due to the information that maps the lottery ranks to choices, information on students' priority rankings over markets, and restricted data we have obtained from the official government exit surveys in which interns assess their positions on different categories. The setting also conveniently leads to individuals with differential lottery ranks (specifically the "middle" group of intermediate ranks and the treatment group) being treated differentially along the distinct internship dimensions of a position's location and quality. In combination, this allows us to take a deeper look into the multi-dimensional treatment "bundle" and to investigate potential sources of the gender divergence that we uncover.

Overall, we show that early career labor market sorting has far reaching causal effects on life cycle outcomes, from labor market choices of human capital accumulation and occupation to marriage market choices of matching and fertility. While males and females are subject to the same treatment, the persistent longer run effects on all margins are entirely driven by females whereas males experience only transitory career disruptions. The initial labor market sorting and the consequent choices in the decade that follows carry over to explain 10-14 percent of the projected earnings gap across male and female physicians three decades later. We show that the gender divergence in longer run outcomes cannot be explained by differential preferences over entry level labor markets and positions. In contrast, we find that differential search and mobility responses could be at play. Moreover, the evidence points to a role for employers, specifically in terms of how well they place their interns and the mentorship they offer. A key takeaway from our analysis is that persistent gender inequality can still appear even in a context of a highly skilled merit-based profession with institutional early-stage equality of opportunity.

Our analysis is structured as follows. In the main part of the analysis, we investigate the effects of initial sorting on our two categories of longer run outcomes: the labor market outcomes of human capital investment and occupational choice; and the marriage market choices of family formation and fertility.

We find significant impacts on labor market choices. The advanced human capital investment that is most relevant in our setting is obtaining a medical PhD. This choice represents an occupational choice of a research career and provides, as we show, access to economically more favorable and prestigious positions, such as in university hospitals. While we find that males do not have any adverse effects from the treatment, treated females are 25 percent less likely to make this investment (5.4 percentage point decrease on a counterfactual of 21.3). This impact alone can account for one-fifth of the observed gender-biased sorting into scientific careers (as opposed to clinical positions) among physicians in our sample. Furthermore, studying sorting into gender-represented occupations, we find no effect on men, but that treated women are more likely to sort into female-represented medical specialties, which we show to be economically less favorable. To assess the “very” long run implications of these impacts, we use the surrogate index method (Athey et al. 2019) to project future earnings over the course of thirty years from graduation using our long panel of observational (non-experimental) data. This allows us to address the regularity that the returns to major human capital investments could materialize only far in the future (e.g., 15 years after graduation in our medical PhD application). We show that the transitory treatment of variation in individuals’ very first jobs alone can explain about 10-14 percent of the projected long-run gender gap in physician earnings. Finally, we provide investigations to “unpack” the treatment bundle to assess drivers of these effects on labor market outcomes. We find that while there could be some role for the quality of a position, the geography of the healthcare market in which graduates begin their working lives seems to be able to explain the bulk of the effects, and we show that rurality and affiliation with university hospitals are composite location characteristics that can account for the location effects we uncover to a large extent.

The post-graduation and early career stages represent formative years with respect to family formation (Goldin and Katz 2008), and indeed the average age of our population is around 28.5 at the beginning of the quasi-experiment. We therefore investigate the interplay between the labor market and the marriage market by studying how early careers can affect family formation choices in terms of partnership and fertility. To do so, we split our subject pool based on individuals’ partnership status at baseline, since partnered and single graduates enter this stage with a different set of operative family-related margins. Specifically, married individuals enter this phase as a unified household unit whereas single individuals also face the choice of matching in the marriage market (which could be altered by the treatment). Notably, we find significant impacts on fertility choices among the single graduates. With no effects on men, women in the treatment group exhibit an increase of 11.5 percent in their number of children, which is particularly driven by a higher fertility rate with an increase of 7.1 percentage points (pp) in the propensity to have more

than one child (on a counterfactual 45.2 pp). The lack of such an impact on partnered graduates suggests this effect may be less likely due to an underlying shift in household's family preferences, but could rather relate to differential matching in the marriage market among single graduates. Indeed, we find patterns that support this conjecture, with single women in the treatment group ending up in relationships with decreased assortative mating on age and education. We conclude this analysis by directly addressing the career versus family considerations tradeoff: we find that it is indeed the case that the women who exhibit higher fertility simultaneously exhibit decreased investment in their human capital.

In the final part of the paper, we investigate potential mechanisms that can explain the gender divergence. We consider two classes of factors of the labor market: supply side factors that pertain to the employees, and demand side factors that pertain to the employers. On the supply side, we find strong evidence that potential differential preferences across gender, about which there is a heated discussion in the literature as a source of gender inequality, is an unlikely explanation in our setting. Males and females reveal very similar aggregate preferences in their choices over entry-level markets and positions. In contrast, we do find evidence that males engage in actions in response to the lottery that may mitigate the potential adverse effects of unfavorable internship choices, specifically in terms of their search behavior and mobility across markets. On the demand side, we find a potentially important role for the entry-level workplaces, consistent with the hypothesis that graduates of different gender may be differentially treated by the same employers. We find that female interns display a higher "sensitivity" to employer characteristics: they are more likely than male interns to be affected by a workplace's track record of placing students in more competitive subsequent jobs. Moreover, we find strong support for the conjecture that the mentorship offered at the workplace can be an operative channel. We show that the treatment group is much less likely exposed to female role models, either their direct formal mentor or the head of their educational program; and we find that only treated female interns, as opposed to male interns, rank their mentorship experience and quality lower in response to the quasi-experiment.

Our paper makes several contributions. First, classic labor economics research has highlighted the potential importance of early career stages in shaping long run life cycle trajectories. This work has considered the role of search and job mobility, human capital investments, as well as on-the-job learning and skill accumulation (see, e.g., Topel and Ward 1992, and reviews in Weiss 1986 and Rubinstein and Weiss 2006). We contribute to this broad line of research by providing a novel, purely randomized source of idiosyncratic variation for identifying the causal effects of early career choices.² This type of variation

² Related but distinct work had studied aggregate variation, in terms of entering the labor market in a recession, as compared to the idiosyncratic variation that we study here (see von Wachter 2020 for a review). The former identifies the effects of changes to the choice set that come from bad economic times. In comparison, the latter, with variation at the individual level, identifies the causal effect of making different choices within a given distribution of options, i.e., a given choice set. These effects then feed into the individual's optimization problem of early career choices, where a key input in making this choice is the causal effects of different early career options. In that sense our analysis resembles the economics of education literature that uses idiosyncratic exogenous variation (e.g., based on grade cutoffs) to study the returns to different choices of field of study (e.g., Kirkeboen et al. 2016).

can be useful in other important economic questions. For example, with a focus on market design, Arora et al. (2021) concurrently study how shifting the Norwegian system of medical internship allocation from lottery-based to market-based has impacted the quality of employer-employee equilibrium matching, using a metric based on earnings five years out. Our particular analysis and setting offer novel causal evidence on the far reaching, longer run impacts of early career choices on a wide range of economic outcomes. We show how the impacts of initial career sorting cascade from labor market and human capital choices, to marriage market and fertility choices, to the important tradeoffs across them.

Our second key contribution is to the long-standing work on gender inequality in economic outcomes and their underlying sources (see reviews and discussions in, e.g., Bertrand 2011, Goldin 2014, Olivetti and Petrongolo 2016, Blau and Kahn 2017, Lundberg and Stearns 2019).³ We contribute to this literature by revealing a new important route which is inherent in the natural course of the life cycle—i.e., early career choices—that initiates and perpetuates gender inequality and norms in long run economic outcomes. We are able to provide a particular focus on the tension between career and family, which is most important in the study of gender (Goldin and Katz 2008). We are also able to offer insights into the operative mechanisms that could drive the findings of gender asymmetry in the effects of early careers. Lastly, as our analysis reveals that significant gender inequality can emerge in a randomized lottery setup with embedded early-stage equality of opportunity, it has important policy implications. Specifically, policies for outcome-based gender equality cannot merely rely on leveling the starting playing field, but they should also target the way in which opportunities and choices evolve in practice over the formative stage of the early career. Our analysis of mechanisms offers some initial guidance in that direction.

Finally, we speak to the mounting recent evidence that highlights geographic location in determining life cycle outcomes, from education, to economic well-being, to health.⁴ We contribute to this growing work by, first, finding a causal determinant—namely, early career labor market sorting—of the household’s choice of geographic location in the long run (as we find strong lingering effects on location). This choice directly affects the local labor market in which the household operates and the amenities available to the family. Second, our findings identify a pathway by which the location in which individuals operate can shape behavior and welfare. We show that the treatment effects we identify can be attributed to location effects, thereby highlighting the potential causal role of location via geographic sorting in the early career, which in turn affects households’ long run opportunities and economic life trajectories.

³ Recent important studies in this active research on underlying channels investigate the role of job search and labor market preferences, social interactions, personality characteristics, and family obligations. These include, among others, Gneezy et al. (2003), Niederle and Vesterlund (2007), Bertrand et al. (2010), Buser et al. (2014), Azmat et al. (2016), Card et al. (2016), Field et al. (2016), Azmat and Ferrer (2017), Bursztyn et al. (2017), Caliendo et al. (2017), Buser and Yuan (2019), Cai et al. (2019), Cullen and Perez-Truglia (2019), Exley and Kessler (2019), Iriberry and Rey-Biel (2019), Kleven et al. (2019a), Kleven et al. (2019b), Cheng (2020), Porter and Serra (2020), Ginther et al. (2020), Le Barbanchon et al. (2021).

⁴ See, for example, Chetty and Hendren (2018) and Finkelstein et al. (2016) for the U.S., and Damm and Dustmann (2014), Laird and Nielsen (2016), and Eckert et al. (2019) for our context of Denmark.

The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the institutional setting. Section 3 describes the data sources we use and baseline patterns in internship choices. In section 4, we set out our empirical framework. Section 5 describes the nature of the quasi-experimental treatment in terms of the first stage. Section 6 provides the evidence on the longer run causal effects of early career choices and their gender divergence. Section 7 investigates mechanisms underlying this divergence. Section 8 concludes.

2. Institutional Setting

In this section we provide a detailed description of the context of our analysis. We describe the course of post-graduate professional experience and training of Danish physicians, which captures the early stages of their careers, and we elaborate on the process of matching to medical internships in Denmark, which provides the grounds for our causal analysis.

2.1. Physician Training: Broad Overview

The timeline of Danish physicians' training process is generally typical of other OECD countries.⁵ Following medical school, graduating physicians begin the period of their *residency*. Broadly speaking, the residency represents a period of on-the-job training during which physicians make pivotal human capital investments and occupational choices (such as medical specialties) that determine their career paths. The different specific stages of the residency period (illustrated in Appendix A) are as follows.

The initial stage of the residency is the *internship*, which typically lasts one to one and a half years. The internship represents the entry-level labor market for physicians. It stands as physicians' first effective medical experience, and it determines their initial exposure to practical knowledge and career opportunities. The key institutional feature, which we exploit as the basis for our identification, is that a random lottery underlies the placement to internships. We provide more contextual information on the internship and a detailed description of the assignment process in the next subsection.

After they complete their internship, the starting physicians are allowed to practice medicine independently, that is, without the supervision of a senior physician. At that stage, the physicians engage in a process of job search as well as human capital investments (specifically, pursuing a medical PhD) that will determine their later positions and career paths. All positions after the internship period are matched in a standard competitive labor market.

In the immediate stage after the internship, the physicians apply for different *introductory positions*, which typically last one year each. The physicians must complete at least one such position within their future specialty of interest. This would then qualify them to apply for a *main position* within a specific

⁵ For the institutional structure in EU countries, for example, see EU Council Directive 75/363/EEC.

choice of medical specialty. It represents the last stage of the residency, whereby the choice of specialty is typically an absorbing state in relation to the physicians' future careers.

Main positions can be highly competitive and hence physicians' success in this final stage is governed by their choices of investment and training up to that point. Specifically, practical experience from relevant introductory positions and further academic education by obtaining a medical PhD degree are key potential determinants. In the longer run, a PhD degree could further qualify a physician for a broader set of higher-paying competitive positions (as we show later in the data), such as positions at university hospitals and prestigious positions of chief specialists. Upon the completion of the residency, physicians receive their specialty license and continue on to their future careers.

2.2. Internship: Source of Identifying Variation

The internship following medical school provides our source of exogenous variation in initial job market sorting of physicians. The graduate is assigned to an internship position by being matched with a hospital department, that in practice represents a workplace, which is responsible for facilitating an educational program for the intern. The interns are supervised by formally assigned mentors, which include a senior supervisor and the head of the educational program at the specific workplace.

Training Content. The internship positions aim to provide hands-on work experience and have the physicians accumulate practical knowledge and skills through learning by doing. That is, the purpose of the internship is to bring the theoretical knowledge from medical school into clinical practice by having the intern integrated into the daily work routines of a given hospital department. For the educational programs, legislation defines learning goals under several categories that represent key virtues a physician should possess: medical expertise, communication, health promotion, collaboration, ethics, leadership, and academic merit (National Board of Health 2009). The medical expertise portion is meant to verify that an intern engages in all aspects of medical care, including diagnostics, examinations, implementation of procedures, treatment protocols, medical complications, resuscitation, and treatment of acute and chronic patients. The intern accumulates these professional experiences through treating patients, interacting with their relatives, and working with multiple healthcare professionals. For the intern to complete the program successfully, the supervisors must sign off that the intern meets the expected standards of all the learning goals. By the end of the internship, the interns in turn evaluate the program and their experience via external exit surveys.

In term of its structure, the internship consists of bundles of half-year primary positions at hospitals followed by secondary positions at primary care practices. By construction, internships are tied to geographic regions and their hospitals. Institutionally, the healthcare system in Denmark is organized such that Danish counties (with a total of 16) represent the local healthcare market (which bears similarities to Hospital Referral Regions [HRRs] in the U.S.). We note that spatial variation in entry jobs for physicians

is typical of post-graduate medical training positions in other developed countries, such as the U.S., and is a main dimension by which the training programs are categorized (see, e.g., Brotherton and Etzel 2018).

Internship Assignment. Internship positions are periodically created by the Danish National Health Authority (NHA) to accommodate all graduating students and with respect to national demand for healthcare professionals. Specifically, prior to every graduation round (twice a year), the NHA requires medical schools to report how many students will graduate in that round. The NHA then guarantees to create a number of internship positions of at least at that amount. Finally, the positions are designed to distribute proportionally across the local labor markets (i.e., counties) based on their population share.

The key institutional feature we exploit for identification is that a *randomized lottery* governs the placement to internships. For every graduating cohort, a public notary performs a lottery that allocates a random number to each graduating student, which sets the ordering of the matching process for that cohort. We capture a graduating physician’s relative position in the matching order by mapping a lottery number to its rank relative to the lottery numbers of the graduate’s cohort. We refer to it as the “lottery rank.”⁶

The exact implementation of assignment to internships based on the lottery has somewhat changed over the years, but it has been continuously designed so that a better lottery number (of a lower rank) guarantees a student a more favorable position in the allocation process. We leverage this simple yet powerful feature and pool all graduating cohorts to maximize power. We show in the next section that the patterns of geographic allocation of students to internship remains very similar over time.

To give context, prior to 2008 the NHA first allocated students to counties based on the order of their lottery numbers in the primary stage of the placement process. Having been assigned their lottery numbers, the graduating students then compiled their list of priority over all the Danish counties. Next, they were matched with their highest-ranked county among the counties with remaining open positions when their time in line to make a choice arrived. Later, each county matched its assigned students with the internship positions (across the county’s hospitals) that were created in that round, based on student choices in the order of their initial lottery number. In 2008 when the system was digitized, the process simplified into a single combined step, where interns make a county-hospital choice in the order of their lottery number from the positions available nationally. Across years, each stage of the allocation process followed a serial dictatorship procedure (Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez 1998).

⁶ This normalization permits a comparison between individuals with bad lottery numbers and individuals with good lottery numbers across cohorts of different sizes. Appendix Table E.2 provides estimates that include graduation round fixed effects for robustness.

3. Data and Patterns of Internship Choices

3.1. Data

We combine several administrative data sources, linked by person-level identifiers, with information on all medical doctors in Denmark and their households. We use the *Educational Registers* starting in 1980 to identify all students ever enrolled in a Danish medical school through 2017.

Our analysis population for the quasi-experiment of the lottery is identified using information starting from 2001 on the internship lotteries, which we obtained from the physical archives at the Danish National Health Authority and digitized. We link these records with the following register datasets on the data servers at Statistics Denmark.

The *Danish Authorization Register* provides us with information through 2017 on registrations of medical licenses and specializations, which capture occupational choice in our setting. The economic registers (up to 2019) include administrative information on: geographic location (to 2019), employers and employer-employee linkages at the hospital level (to 2017), income flows from any reported source including earnings, government benefits, and capital income (to 2017), demographics including age and gender (to 2019), and education including information on degrees achieved and high school GPA (to 2017). Notably, we are able to link households using spousal and parent-child linkages (up to 2019) to study matching in the marriage market and fertility choices.

In addition, we obtained confidential information from internship exit surveys, which are processed at restricted research servers at the University of Copenhagen. With permission from the official governmental body, the Regional Councils for Physicians' Post-Graduate Education (De Regionale Råd for Lægers Videreuddannelse), these data were obtained from a private IT company, Dansk Telemedicin A/S, which administers the data on all post-graduate educational positions for physicians in Denmark. From 2008, due to the digitization of the internship selection process, we are able to link the lottery numbers to the exit surveys and the positions at the specific hospital departments. In these surveys, the interning physicians assess their workplace in a series of questions that are clustered into topic-based categories. Besides overall assessment as a category, we will make use of a particular category related to mentorship. We report the various survey questions in Appendix G. These surveys also include details on the interns' supervisors and program chairs, which we use to identify mentors and their gender.

3.2. Patterns of Internship Choices

Location Choices during Internship. The effective choice and assignment patterns of the medical internships display close similarities over the years, which is consistent with students' reluctance to intern in remote and rural areas. To see this, we leverage the fact that the motivation underlying the randomization-based placement process (see Danish Ministry of Health 1989) had been to distribute physicians more

evenly across the different parts of the country, specifically to less desirable rural labor markets, to address physician shortages (which is a broader concern and a common policy target across OECD countries; see, OECD 2012, Ono et al. 2014). Indeed, throughout the years, geographic dispersion and relocation of graduating students have been a key dimension of variation that the lottery has created across the lottery rank distribution. To illustrate this, we calculate for each student the distance between their municipality of residence at the time of the lottery and their municipality of work at the time of the internship, which captures their “relocation distance.” To put it in context, we note that graduating students reside near the major university cities in which medical schools are located in Denmark (Aarhus, Copenhagen, and Odense). Hence, short relocation distances broadly imply staying in the vicinity of the urban labor market where the student was educated, and long relocation distances broadly imply placement in internships that are located in rural areas.

Panel A of Figure 1 plots a graduating student’s relocation distance against the student’s lottery rank, where we split cohorts around 2008 (when the process was digitized). There is a clear gradient such that the relocation distance of those with better lottery numbers (lower ranks) is significantly shorter than for those with worse lottery numbers (higher ranks). This mirrors the underlying motivation for the lottery-based system, as it reveals interns’ distaste for locating in rural labor markets when they get to choose.

The persistence of location preferences over the years, as they are revealed through choices, can be also shown in the following way. Let us characterize the desirability of a labor market (i.e., a county) based on the average lottery rank of the interns who choose to sort into it. This captures the aggregate regularities that a market is revealed as more desirable if it is chosen by individuals with better lottery ranks, and a market is revealed as less desirable if it is chosen by individuals with worse lottery ranks. We use this measure of “market desirability” throughout our analysis that follows. We construct these rankings for both earlier and later cohorts and compare across them in panel A of Appendix Figure C.1. Locations are effectively valued over the years to a similar extent.

Strategic Choice Considerations. It is useful to discuss some potential choice and prioritization considerations that could result from the incentives embedded in the choice processes we described and to investigate how they play out in practice. However, as will become clear in our research design, it is important to note that strategic behavior is not going to affect the validity of our identification of the effects of initial labor market sorting, since it rests solely on reduced form effects of the randomized lottery numbers. Still, describing these aspects is potentially informative for understanding the empirical context and for the interpretation of our findings. We use the information on the full rankings of local labor markets provided by the earlier cohorts in these investigations.

Given the structure of the matching process, individuals’ equilibrium best-response strategy at each stage is to choose the option that maximizes their expected utility payoff, based on their individual

preferences and their expectations over other students' equilibrium play. For the later cohorts, this simply implies choosing their most preferred option among the options that are still available at the time they make their choice. For the earlier cohorts, there are additional potential considerations to take into account. To the extent that differential job aspects within a county play a role in preferences (that is, aspects that go beyond the local labor market and its average internship-related characteristics), the process implies that at the first step of ranking counties some consideration may be given to one's place in line for making a choice. For example, it may be preferable (along some job dimension) to be first in line in a worse labor market than the last in line in a better labor market.

To test this conjecture, we consider the rankings by those with the best lottery numbers as compared to the rankings by those with the worst lottery numbers. As one example, we use graduates with lottery ranks in the highest 30 percent and the lowest 30 percent. To the degree that students view their position in line for making a choice within a market as important—i.e., if dimensions of specific open jobs within a market are deemed relatively important beyond the average characteristics of the labor market itself—we would expect systematic differences in rankings over labor markets across the two groups. If, on the other hand, the choice of local labor market is what dominates students' preferences regarding where to intern—due to the bundle of the entry-level job experience they offer which we describe later—we would expect similarities in their overall rankings. Panel B of Appendix Figure C.1 compares the average rankings of labor markets across the two groups. Each dot represents a local market, and we plot the fitted line as well as the 45-degree line, which is the benchmark under non-differential rankings. We also report the slope of the fitted line, where the benchmark null of non-differential rankings is 1. The figure is consistent with the second hypothesis, i.e., that the choice of labor market itself leads students' rankings in the first step of the allocation process. The average rankings of markets across the two groups line up around the 45-degree line, and we cannot reject the benchmark null of a coefficient of 1. The importance of location in students' preferences and choices is further underscored later when we analyze the quasi-experiment's first stage across lottery rank groups.⁷

4. Empirical Framework

4.1. Verification of Lottery

As the basis for our empirical analysis, we establish the validity of the lottery in terms of random assignment. In Appendix Table B.1, we run specifications that regress the graduating physicians' lottery

⁷ In addition, local labor markets and the average characteristics of the jobs they offer have aspects that people may agree upon ("vertical" quality, e.g., interning in a teaching hospital) and aspects that could be individual specific ("horizontal" quality whose valuation can differ across individuals, e.g., a county's proximity to family). We investigate the degree to which the rankings of the labor markets are agreed upon among the new physicians in Appendix C.1, by comparing the average rankings of labor markets across a random split of our analysis sample, which we find to be similar.

rank on baseline characteristics available in our data. These include gender, age, an indicator for having a registered partner, number of children in the household, and high school GPA rank. Consistent with random assignment, we find that these regressions have no predictive power. This is the case whether we test the significance of the coefficients individually or jointly. In the appendix table we also run the corresponding specifications separately for males and females, with similar conclusions. This sets the grounds for our research design that we turn to now.

4.2. Nature of Assignment to Entry-Level Jobs

To motivate the choice of our research design, we first describe the practical nature of the internship assignment. To do so, we use the information on the binding pre-placement rankings of all local labor markets solicited among the earlier cohorts as part of the allocation process, and we study the mapping between choice rankings and placements as a function of the lottery. Specifically, we plot individuals' pre-placement ranking of the local labor market they were assigned to (where 1 is highest priority) against the percentile rank of their lottery number draw within their graduating cohort.

Panel B of Figure 1 shows a few key patterns in this relationship. First, as expected by design, there is a clear gradient such that graduates with higher lottery ranks (worse numbers) are assigned their lower-ranked priorities. More interesting, however, is the market clearing pattern of the available slots against graduates' preferences. We see that in equilibrium there is a clear non-linearity: there is virtually a flat region in the vicinity of the best lottery ranks and a steep slope at the vicinity of the worst lottery numbers. By the nature of the assignment process, students with the best lottery ranks are effectively unrestricted in their choices. As they are the ones who make the choices first, their highest priority options are still available, and they therefore end up being assigned their first priority. Then, as the lottery rank increases (that is, worse draws), the available choices increasingly narrow. As a result, those with the worst lottery numbers are most restricted in their early career choices, and they therefore end up making choices that are low on their priority list. These patterns guide our choice of research design.

4.3. Research Design

To analyze how early career sorting affects longer run life cycle outcomes, we employ a straightforward design based on the randomized lottery where we compare outcomes of a treatment group to outcomes of a control group. As natural experimental groups, we define the "control" group to be individuals with the best lottery ranks (below a certain lower cutoff rank), as we have seen they are essentially unaffected by the lottery; and we define the "treatment" group to be individuals with the worst lottery ranks (above a certain upper cutoff rank), as we have seen they are the most affected by the lottery.

Our choice of research design that compares outcomes of a treatment group to outcomes of a control group provides a standard and intuitive empirical framework, with treatment effect coefficients that are

economically directly interpretable. In addition, it maximizes the differential treatment intensity across the differentially affected experimental groups since it compares individuals who are most restricted to those who are least restricted in their choices. Finally, it does not impose functional form assumptions on the underlying relationship between outcomes and lottery ranks (specifically, it does not use the common linear specification where linearity seems less appropriate given the patterns in panels A-B of Figure 1). Still, we also run the corresponding specifications that are linear in lottery rank (in Appendix Table E.1).

In constructing our experimental groups, we need to make a choice of upper and lower lottery rank thresholds which we do in the following way. First, to keep the experimental groups balanced with similar size, we use symmetric thresholds from above and below. Second, we pivot the analysis around the 30 percent most treated and least treated, i.e., with cutoff ranks 0.30 and 0.70 (as illustrated by the vertical lines in panels A-B of Figure 1), and we vary this bandwidth from 20 to 40 percent in Appendix Table E.1. This choice trades off increased power from higher treatment intensity with decreased power from reducing sample sizes, which is the reason we investigate a broad range of 20 pp in lottery ranks. For completeness, the appendix table also reports the effects on the “middle” group of graduates with lottery ranks in the intermediate range.

We note that while we discuss our main results as the comparison between the treatment group and the control group, we also leverage comparisons to the middle group. As we will show below, the middle group and the treatment group are differentially affected by the treatment, in terms of the first stage, on distinct dimensions of the treatment that is naturally multi-dimensional. This will give us the opportunity to unpack the treatment bundle.

Estimating Equation. With this design, we identify the causal effects of the internship lottery using the following estimating equation:

$$y_{it} = \sum_{\tau} I_{\tau} \times \alpha_{\tau} + \sum_{\tau} I_{\tau} \times Treat_i \times \beta_{\tau} + \varepsilon_{it}. \quad (1)$$

In this specification, y_{it} is the outcome of interest for individual i at time t ; τ is year relative to lottery; and I_{τ} is a vector of indicators of time relative to the lottery. The variable $Treat_i$ is an indicator for being in the treatment group or in the control group. In our main analysis we focus on the later half of our data horizon (years 6-10) to focus on longer run outcomes and since some key choices emerge several years after graduation (such as advanced education completion which starts materializing after approximately 5 years). We cluster standard errors at the household level.

Our parameters of interest are β_{τ} , which estimate the causal effects of the lottery treatment over a course of ten years. We summarize the average longer run effects over periods 6-10 using the following standard estimating equation:

$$y_{it} = \alpha + \beta \times Treat_i + \varepsilon_{it}, \quad (2)$$

where β captures the average longer run treatment effect.

Analysis Sample. Appendix Table B.2 describes our analysis sample and provides summary statistics for our treatment and control groups. Overall, the two groups together are comprised of 6,076 physicians. Some particular characteristics that would prove useful for later discussions include the average age of our subjects at the time of the lottery, which is about 28.5, and that about half of our subject pool have a partner at the baseline period. Approximately 60 percent are female, with 2,396 males and 3,680 females in our sample. Summary statistics that split the sample by gender are also provided in Appendix Table B.2.

5. Internship Period First Stage

How do the lottery ranks translate to internship characteristics? As a starting point, we characterize the nature of the treatment by investigating the effects of the lottery on the entry-level labor market positions doctors sort into. This serves as the first stage analysis, which sets the basis for interpreting the long run effects of the lottery. As in any natural experiment, it is important to note that this treatment is a “bundle.” It includes aggregate characteristics of the local labor market interns are allocated to and characteristics of the specific internships they are matched with. We now turn to describe these characteristics, and we then discuss how the setting lends itself to exploring the multi-dimensionality of the treatment.

5.1. Tradeoff: Position Quality versus Location

There are two key underlying dimensions that pertain to the internship assignment. The first dimension is location which, as we discussed in the institutional background, comes from the motivation of the lottery-based policy to counteract students’ reluctance to intern in rural areas. We again use our measure of relocation distance which in our context maps to the likelihood of being placed in a less desirable rural labor market. The second dimension is a quality ranking of the specific internship positions as perceived by interns in the exit surveys. We use the ranking of a position’s overall quality, whereby graduates are asked about their overall evaluation of the educational experience in terms of the program’s effort, quality of training, and their own professional development (see Appendix G). In this analysis we use later cohorts from after the digitization of the system for whom we have detailed information available on both dimensions of the internship allocation.

Panels C-F of Figure 1 investigate the relationships of these measures with the lottery. Panels C-D first separately plot averages of these two measures as a function of lottery ranks for each of fifty equal-sized bins. Panel C measures the relocation distance in kilometers from the municipality of residence (at the time of lottery draw) to the municipality of the internship workplace. Panel D measures quality at the hospital department level, i.e., the “workplace,” using the leave-one-out mean of the overall evaluation that we normalize by the standard deviation to create a z-score. Panel E then aggregates this information across

our “control” group, “treatment” group, and “middle” group, and it plots the averages of the two dimensions simultaneously for each experimental group. This figure bears similarities to an “offer curve” if the internship bundle is to be thought of as a consumption bundle: the curve maps individuals’ choice of a multi-dimensional bundle for an increasingly narrow choice set. Corresponding figures for a finer set of groups of lottery ranks are provided in Appendix D.

A clear tradeoff pattern arises in panel E of Figure 1. First, we see that, as expected, the “control” group for whom there are virtually no restrictions, chooses internships that are closest to their medical school’s urban hub *and* are higher ranked in quality. The “treatment” group who is most restricted suffers on both margins, as they end up choosing remaining positions that are *both* in remote locations and are of lower quality. Finally, the “middle” group’s choice contains important revealed preference information. On average, the “middle” group is on par with the “control” group in terms of *distance*, whereas the “middle” group is on par with the “control” group in terms of position *quality*. This illustrates a lexicographic nature of preferences for internship locations among graduates: they are willing to choose the lowest quality positions in return to interning in more desirable geographic locations.

A major useful feature of these patterns is our ability to shed light on the different dimensions of the treatment, which is a common challenge in natural experiments. Intuitively, in studying the longer run causal effects, a comparison between the middle group and the control group would assess the role of position quality (for a given set of geographic markets), and a comparison between the treatment group and the middle group would assess the role of geographic markets (for a given level of position quality). We will break down the causal effects on treatment versus control groups by leveraging the middle group’s choices, to assess the degree to which the two dimensions (location and quality) can explain the results.

While straightforward, it is useful to formalize this intuition so that the conditions under which it could offer a complete decomposition are made explicit. A simple way to think of this setting has the same basic logic as a traditional difference-in-differences setting as follows. Let us split internships dichotomously on the two dimensions we consider (say, based on their mean values), into internships whose quality (q) is high (1) or low (0), and internships whose distance from origin (d) is far (1) or close (0). Assume that a long run outcome y_i is determined by these two dimensions, so that:

$$y_i = \beta^q \times \mathbb{I}(q = 0)_i + \beta^d \times \mathbb{I}(d = 1)_i + \epsilon_{it}.$$

For simplicity, further assume that: for individuals in the *control* group ($i \in C$) we have $q = 1$ and $d = 0$; for individuals in the *middle* group ($i \in M$) we have $q = 0$ and $d = 0$; and for individuals in the *treatment* group ($i \in T$) we have $q = 0$ and $d = 1$ (whereas all of these could be made probabilistic in a straightforward way). This structure assumes: (i) additivity, i.e., that in practice there are no economically meaningful complementarities across the two dimensions; (ii) exclusion, i.e., that in practice the composites quality and distance capture the bulk of the variation relevant for the long run outcomes (or are highly

correlated with it). Under these assumptions, this analysis offers a complete decomposition of the total effect, whereas the decomposition would be only partial if these “identifying” assumptions are meaningfully violated. With this structure, the total effect will be identified by a comparison between the treatment group and the control group: $E(y_i|i \in T) - E(y_i|i \in C) = \beta^q + \beta^d$; the first difference between the middle group and the control group would identify the quality effect: $E(y_i|i \in M) - E(y_i|i \in C) = \beta^q$; and the second difference between the treatment group and the middle group would identify the geographic market effect: $E(y_i|i \in T) - E(y_i|i \in M) = \beta^d$.

Finally, panel F of Figure 1 shows that the tradeoffs are similar across gender since the gender-specific offer curves reveal a similar shape. This implies that potential differences in longer run effects across gender could not be attributed back to differential first stages or how they may have differentially translated on average to the treatment intensities across dimensions.

5.2. What Characterizes Locations?

If geographic locations turn out to matter, it is important to provide a description of their key characteristics in the context of our experiment. To proceed, we turn to our measure of a geographic labor market’s desirability, i.e., the average lottery rank of the interns who choose to sort into it. We then use these rankings to partition the markets into two groups: more desirable and less desirable local labor markets.⁸ Finally, we study correlations of market desirability with characteristics that could capture aspects of the quality of training, nature of exposure to knowledge and experience, and future career opportunities.

A key measure, which speaks directly to the quality of training as well as to future career opportunities through exposure to practical knowledge and professional networks, is the extent of attachment to university (or teaching) hospitals. Notably, we find in panel A of Table 1 (column 1) that being assigned to a less desirable local labor market is associated with 31 pp lower likelihood to intern in a university hospital (on a baseline of 40 pp). Leading university hospitals, which are typically located in local labor markets at the vicinity of larger urban areas, are well known to be the institutions where skill intensive and highly specialized procedures are performed, state of the art technologies are first adopted, and innovative medical research is conducted. By definition, university hospitals aim to educate and provide the highest quality training to new physicians, so whether an internship takes place in such a hospital is relevant for physicians’ early careers through on the job training. Moreover, since key players in the medical field often work and mentor in these hospitals, it stands as a boost to the starting physicians’ exposure to networks and future career opportunities.

We use the administrative patient register data to illustrate these points. Panel B of Table 1 compares university hospitals to non-university hospitals on different dimensions. First, in terms of scale

⁸ This market partition is similar if we split locations based on the average pre-placement rankings of local labor markets using the information on students’ solicited priority lists among earlier cohorts.

and the level of technology, we find that university hospitals offer exposure to more patients and types of procedures as well as to more advanced medical technologies, based on common measures in the literature such as the prevalence of MRI scanners (see, e.g., Bhattacharya et al. 2013). Moreover, as a measure of high-quality training and favorable professional networks, we consider the share of high-seniority colleagues. For each hospital, we look at the share of physicians that already obtained their specialty who hold a medical PhD (out of all physicians that obtained their specialty). The logic behind this measure is that physicians who hold a medical PhD tend to occupy the key positions in the field, and we find that university hospitals rank higher on this dimension as well. Aside from quality of training, this difference can additionally capture variation in the type of role models young physicians are exposed to and mentored by in the internship setting (a point we return to later in Section 7 that investigates mechanisms). Lastly, university hospitals also offer exposure to a broader range of specialized knowledge through the presence of a broader range of medical specialties.

Another important dimension of location, which is again related to the motivation underlying the lottery-based allocation to counteract distaste for rural locations, is the degree to which the lottery affects the probability that a physician interns in a rural community versus an urban community. We follow the formal definitions used by the Danish Economic Councils (2015) that are based on classifications at the level of municipalities (which are sub-divisions of counties). We note that the urban/rural divide is frequently used in the discussion of localities more broadly and in the characterization of healthcare markets and physicians' post-graduate training more specifically.⁹ Panel A of Table 1 (column 2) shows that a locality is 61.5 pp more likely to be rural when it is located in a less desirable local labor market.

Panel C of Table 1 provides a characterization of rural municipalities on several dimensions that relate to demographics, amenities, and features of the healthcare market in which the graduates intern. Rural areas are characterized by populations that are less educated, sicker, and rely more on welfare. These municipalities have worse economic conditions and amenities (in terms of income, home prices, tax revenues, and local recreational expenditure). Finally, with our focus on gender, we look at measures that could capture gender-related norms. In terms of traditional household roles, we find that in rural areas females are much likely to take parental leave with the opposite patterns for males. In terms of local representation, we find that the share of elected officials who are female is lower in rural areas. These are consistent with general priors as they suggest that rural areas may be more gender-stereotypical overall.

We have highlighted two features of the location composite that seem to us to stand out—affiliation with university hospitals and degree of rurality—which we have shown to be strong predictors of some

⁹ For example, this characterization of healthcare markets in the U.S. is structurally embedded in the operation of Medicare and its pricing schemes (see, e.g., Sloan and Edmunds 2012). Additionally, geographic imbalances in the form of physician degree of concentration in rural versus urban areas are a pervasive phenomenon across the developed world, and countries have taken several policy measures that aim to address physician shortages in rural areas (see Simoens and Hurst 2006, OECD 2012, Ono et al. 2014). One example is Medicare's Health Professional Shortage Area (HPSA) Physician Bonus Program in the United States.

entry job dimensions that are important for early career training and opportunities. Of course, other features beyond these two could be a part of the local labor market composite. We later assess the degree to which our characterization of a location’s desirability based on these two features is comprehensive; or, in other words, the degree to which we have “pinned down” the first stage. To do so, we will investigate the extent to which variation in them can explain the longer run treatment effects on labor market outcomes.

5.3. A Bridge from First Stage to Longer Run

As a segue from the first stage treatment to the longer run impacts, we consider the dynamics in household’s geographic sorting, since the internship allocation system is strongly governed by location. The importance of individuals’ choice of geographic location stems from the fact that it can directly affects both the local labor market and the marriage market in which the individual operates. Figure 2 illustrates the dynamic effects of the lottery on the probability of sorting into differentially desirable local labor markets throughout our entire analysis window. It plots the β_τ estimates from equation (1) for periods 0 to 10, along with their 95-percent confidence intervals, where the x-axis denotes the year relative to the lottery.

The early years mechanically capture the first stage effect on the internship placement; particularly year 1 which is the period where the internship placement is in full effect (given the timing of the internship relative to the lottery and the end-of-year timing of data reporting in the registers). We see that receiving the worst lottery ranks leads to a large 18.4 pp increase in the probability of interning in less desirable healthcare labor markets (on a counterfactual of 11.6 pp). Notably, focusing on the longer run, the figure reveals that the lottery has important lingering effects that persist throughout the years. Ten years after the lottery—long after the internship itself—individuals in the treatment group are 6.5 pp more likely to sort into less desirable local labor markets relative to a counterfactual of 16 pp.

We then split the sample by gender. Panel B first shows that both males and females have similar sorting patterns at the internship period, that is, have a similar first stage. This again means that differences across gender in long run effects cannot be traced back to potential differential assignment in the treatment stage. Then, studying the dynamics of geographic sorting, an important asymmetry unfolds: the long run effect is entirely driven by women. While men do not display effects in the long run, women display a 9.8 pp increase in the propensity to sort into less desirable local labor markets on a baseline of 14 pp.

6. Longer Run Effects on Life Cycle Choices by Gender

With this setup, we now turn to our main analysis and investigate how the internship lottery affects life cycle choices up to ten years after the draw differentially for males and females. We divide the longer run analysis into two categories of household decisions: (i) labor market choices: human capital investment and occupational choice; and (ii) marriage market choices: household formation and fertility.

6.1. Labor Market Outcomes: Human Capital Investment and Occupational Choice

Human Capital Investment: Graduate-Level Education. We first study a classic human capital investment of obtaining a medical PhD, which also represents an occupational choice of a research track and scientific career in our setting. This human capital choice stands as an important upward career move, as it provides access to economically more favorable and prestigious positions (Korremann 1994), e.g., in university hospitals. Using the population-level register data, panel A of Figure 3 shows an investment pattern of a classic labor economics shape: it illustrates within our setting the association of obtaining a PhD with early lifetime investments, in terms of foregone income, and with high returns later in the life cycle. We note that this is a lengthy investment in that its net returns manifest only late, a point that will become relevant later.

Panel A of Table 2 studies the likelihood of obtaining a medical PhD and the corresponding sorting into a scientific career track. It provides estimates for β_τ using equation (1), starting from year 6 which is when PhD completion begins to materialize following graduation from medical school. Column 1 provides the estimates for the full sample, and columns 2 and 3 provide estimates for males and females, respectively. The results reveal a clear gender divergence. Males do not have any adverse effects as a result of the treatment. However, females in the treatment group have significantly lower propensity to make this human capital investment. By the end of our analysis period, females' lower investment rate amounts to a large decline of 5.4 pp in obtaining a PhD on a counterfactual of 21.3 pp.

Our findings directly relate to gender-biased sorting into scientific careers, with gender inequality in science being a well-known phenomenon of concern in the developed world (see, e.g., Holman et al. 2018, Huang et al. 2020). In our setting, we calculate among our subject pool that the male-female gap in holding a medical PhD ten years after graduation is 8.24 pp. This implies that the treatment effect increases the gap by 25 percent, and that it can account for 20 percent of the observed gap.¹⁰ Notably, these large effects are attributed to variation in the short internship period alone (out of the lengthy training process of becoming a physician), underscoring just how important experiences at the very early career could be over the course of the life cycle.

As key positions in the medical field are attached to university hospitals and tend to be held by medical PhDs, a related result pertains to physicians' affiliation with university hospitals in the long run as a function of our quasi-experimental variation. Panel B of Figure 3 first illustrates how affiliation with university hospitals in the long run is a strong indicator for economically favorable career trajectories. Panel B of Table 2 then summarizes the results, showing that consistent with our findings so far, there are no

¹⁰ These assessments assume (as we show later) that it is individuals with the worst lottery numbers, i.e., those included in our treatment group, who are adversely affected on this margin. As they compose 30 percent of the sample, our calculations are performed as follows: $0.25 = (5.42 \times 0.3)/(8.24 - 5.42 \times 0.3)$, and $0.20 = (5.42 \times 0.3)/8.24$.

effects on males but there are meaningful adverse effects on females in the treatment group. In the longer run they are 6.5 pp less likely to be affiliated with a university hospital on a counterfactual of 40.5 pp.

Gender-Represented Specialties. We further investigate the differential occupational choice that could reinforce gender norms by studying sorting into gender-represented occupations. We classify medical specialties—which represent “occupations” in our setting—based on the share of females within a specialty relative to their overall proportion. “Female-represented specialties” are defined as specialties with a female share that is higher than this proportion, and “male-represented specialties” are defined as specialties with a female share that is lower than this proportion (see Appendix F for list of specialties and their grouping). These female-represented specialties have been revealed to be perceived by Danish physicians as having more balanced workload, being less competitive, and having more female role models (Korremann 1994). Plotting life cycle income trajectories for the two classes of occupations, panel C of Figure 3 illustrates how female-represented specialties are economically less favorable compared to male-represented specialties.

The quasi-experimental causal effects on this occupational choice are provided in panel B of Table 2. Indeed, we find that females are more likely to sort into their gender-represented specialty, where there is no longer run effect on males. Such occupational sorting shapes physicians’ career trajectories since, as we mentioned earlier, medical specialty choices in the residency stage govern the field of specialty physicians can practice in the long run.

Overall, we have found so far that female physicians in the treatment group, as opposed to males, end up forgoing important human capital investments they would otherwise engage in, and they sort into economically less desirable stereotypical career paths at higher rates than they would otherwise prefer. Together, these findings show that, among the women only, making less preferred early working-life choices results in important career outcomes that place them on disadvantaged paths. Consequently, early career circumstances can preserve and amplify underlying structures of gender bias in the labor market.

Unpacking the Treatment Bundle. Whereas our setting naturally involves a multi-dimensional treatment as in most quasi-experiments, it has the advantage that we can investigate how the treatment may break down. Recall that we can conduct this analysis at two levels: in a first step, we can gauge the extent to which career effects can be attributed to position quality versus position location, by comparing our treatment, middle, and control groups; in a second step, if the evidence points to a meaningful role for location, we can assess the extent to which our characterization of locations can account for the observed effects.

For the first step, we use equation (2) to provide the following decomposition of the effects we identified. We calculate for each gender: (i) the “full” treatment effect on the treatment group relative to the control group, which we have shown to differ systematically on both quality of the internship position and its geographic location; (ii) the “intermediate” treatment effect on the middle group relative to the

control group, which we have shown to primarily differ on average quality of the internship position (and not on average distance); (iii) the difference between the “full” effect and the “intermediate” effect, which captures the difference between the treatment group and the middle group, whose internships vary by location in terms of average relocation distance (and not by average quality). Finally, we calculate the share of the full treatment effect that could be attributable to location. We use the ratio of (iii) to (i), that is, the share of the difference in treatment effects across the treatment group and the middle group out of the full effect on the treatment group.

These estimates are provided in panel A of Figure 4. Looking across the different outcomes, we find (as evidenced by the effects on the middle group) that there generally appears to be some role for the quality of a position within a set of markets. However, we find (as evidenced by the difference between the effects on the treatment and middle groups) that the geographic labor market in which graduates begin their working lives seems to be able to explain the bulk of the effect. As we have seen so far, males display no long run effects on any of our outcomes. For women, however, the decomposition attributes to location 74 percent of human capital investment, 100 percent of affiliation with university hospitals, and 64 percent of sorting into female-represented specialties (as reported in calculations in the figure).

For the second step, after having found evidence suggesting that location matters, we assess the degree to which our two-dimensional characterization of the internship’s location (based on interning hospital type and degree of rurality) encompass the location composite. In what follows we make use of the “surrogate index” method (Athey et al. 2019). This method has been proposed as a solution to the common challenge in estimating long term impacts of treatments where outcomes of interest are sometimes observed with a very long delay. The idea is to combine several short-term outcomes into the “surrogate index,” which is the predicted value of the long-term outcome given the short-term outcomes (the “surrogates”) based on long-run observational data. Athey et al. (2019) show that the average treatment effect on the surrogate index equals the treatment effect on the long-term outcome. This is the case under the assumption that the long-term outcome is independent of the treatment conditional on the surrogate index, which forms the “surrogacy condition.”¹¹

We follow the implementation in Athey et al. (2019) and estimate the following statistical models. Let y_i represent the long run outcome of interest; let $s_i = (s_{1i}, \dots, s_{mi})$ be the vector of intermediate outcomes; and let w_i be the treatment indicator. To construct the surrogate index estimator, we use data on the control group to run the OLS regression:

¹¹ This method improves on previously suggested methods that use only one surrogate outcome in that it weakens the standard surrogacy condition for a single variable with the notion that there is a greater likelihood that a set of intermediate outcomes could together satisfy the surrogacy condition.

$$y_i = \delta_0 + \sum_{j=1}^m \delta_j \times s_{ji} + \omega_{it}. \quad (3)$$

The surrogate index for the long run outcome is the predicted value from this regression which we denote by \hat{y}_i . We construct this index for each individual in our experimental sample data by calculating: $\hat{y}_i = \hat{\delta}_0 + \sum_{j=1}^m \hat{\delta}_j \times s_{ji}$. The average treatment effect on the long-term outcome is then estimated as the treatment effect of the quasi-experiment on the predicted value of the long-term outcome based on the surrogates. That is, using equation (2), we estimate the average treatment effect, β^S , using the following regression:

$$\hat{y}_i = \alpha^S + \beta^S \times Treat_i + \epsilon_{it}. \quad (4)$$

We bootstrap standard errors to account for estimation error from both stages of the surrogacy analysis.

We first apply the surrogacy index method to assess the extent to which our characterization of locations can account for the effects. To do so, we consider as intermediate outcomes the two dimensions of location we used: an individual's attachment to a university hospital in the internship period and whether the location of the internship is rural. We estimate the effect on long run outcomes based on the surrogacy index from equation (4), β^S , and we compare it to the actual effect on long run outcomes from our estimates from equation (2), β . The ratio β^S/β essentially evaluates the surrogacy condition in this application which, alternatively, gauges the degree to which the intermediate outcomes can explain the actual treatment effect.

Table 3 summarizes the findings. Across the different labor supply outcomes, we find that the predicted treatment effects can account for the majority of the actual treatment effects we find for females. This supports the idea that our characterization of location captures the bulk of the location composite. Interestingly, for males the analysis predicts there should be non-negligible effects whereas in practice we observe none. This suggests that males engage in actions in response to the lottery that mitigate the potential adverse effects of unfavorable internship choices, which will guide us in the investigation of mechanisms that could play a role in the identified gender divergence in treatment effects. A particular route we will consider is search and mobility, which had been suggested in the classic work of Topel and Ward (1992).

Predicted Earnings Gap. We conclude this subsection on labor market outcomes by discussing implications for earnings. In our context, while we have data on a long horizon of ten years, we could expect the effects on the career-defining labor market choices that we studied to translate into effects on earnings only later. This is because the returns to major human capital investments may materialize only in the very long run. In that sense, earnings could be insufficient for studying individuals' relative position in the labor market in the analysis of early careers within the potentially lengthy period of human capital investments (what is commonly known as the "life-cycle bias," see Black and Devereux 2011). For example, we saw that the returns to a medical PhD materialize on average as late as 15 years after graduation (see Figure 3).

In fact, panel B of Table 2 displays no treatment effects on earnings in our analysis horizon, so that focusing on earnings would have missed the significant career effects that we have uncovered.

Instead, we again take advantage of the surrogate index method. As we have discussed above, this is the exact scenario for which this tool has been developed; that is, for outcomes of interest (here earnings in the long run) that are observed with a very long delay. In the first step of estimating the “surrogate index” we include as surrogates all our labor market outcomes and we use observational data on Danish physicians over three decades. Specifically, we include as intermediaries the year-ten position of the physician in the following outcomes: holding a PhD, having specialized in a female-represented specialty, affiliation with a university hospital, and whether they reside in a less desirable location. We also include indicators for number of children, since we find significant treatment effects on fertility in subsection 6.2. We then study the average treatment effect on the surrogate index for earnings predictions over the course of 30 years.

Panel B of Figure 4 summarizes the results. It displays, for different time horizons, the predicted effects on earnings for males and females as well as the predicted gender earnings gap. The baseline gender gap grows over time, as is typical in developed countries contexts (see, e.g., Bertrand et al. 2010). As expected, there are no predicted long run effects on earnings for males, reflecting the fact they displayed no effects on the entire array of labor market outcomes we studied. In clear contrast, we find a widening effect for females. As there is no effect for males, this pattern of effect on females that grows over time translates to a growing gender gap in earnings that is attributable to the lottery. Interestingly, our transitory treatment of variation in individuals’ very first jobs alone can explain about 10-14 percent of the predicted long run gender gap in physician earnings 21-30 years after graduating from medical school.

6.2. Family Formation: Marriage and Fertility

The post-graduation and early career stages represent formative years with respect to family formation (see Goldin and Katz 2008 for a related discussion). In terms of age, recall that in our setting the average age of graduates at the beginning of our quasi-experiment is 28.5. Hence, family-related choices and career-related choices naturally intertwine. In this section, we investigate the interplay between the labor market and the marriage market, by studying how early career choices can affect family formation choices in terms of partnership and fertility. Literature has shown that a key aspect in the analysis of gender is that labor market and family considerations could interact differentially for males and females (e.g., Goldin and Katz 2008, Bertrand et al. 2010, Kleven et al. 2019b), which can potentially translate to gender differences from early career choices in the interaction between the labor market and the marriage market.

In the analysis that follows, we split our sample into two groups (that are similar in size in our context) based on individuals’ partnership status at the baseline pre-period: individuals who were partnered pre-lottery (i.e., had a partner listed in the demographic registers) and individuals who were not partnered pre-lottery. Conceptually, the two subsamples differ with respect to the household decisions they face at

the beginning of their careers. Partnered individuals enter the planning period as a joint unit of two partners who make family planning choices. In comparison, single individuals additionally face a household formation choice through matching in the marriage market. Since their relevant potential partner pool can be altered by the quasi-experiment with its effects on graduates' local environment and the set of people they may interact with (e.g., through changes to their workplaces and geography), we may expect implications for the matches formed by singles. We now turn to study whether and how household related outcomes are affected by the internship lottery.

Partnership and Fertility. We begin by analyzing the sample of individuals who were single in the pre-period. For these individuals, partnership and fertility could both be important operative margins. Panels A-D of Table 4 (columns 1-3) summarize the effects on these outcomes. First, studying the probability of having a partner, we find no detectable effects. That is, for both genders, there is no difference between the treatment and control groups in the probability of having a partner in the longer run.

However, interesting patterns arise when we move on to studying fertility choices. We begin by looking at the longer run impact of the lottery on an individual's number of children. Whereas there are no effects on men, women in treatment group exhibit an increase of 11.5 percent ($=0.1422/1.2374$) in the number of children in their families as a result of the internship placement variation. We then disentangle this result by studying the probability of having one child or more (i.e., becoming a parent) and the probability of having more than one child (i.e., higher fertility). The results suggest that the treatment effect is concentrated on higher number of children: women in the treatment group are 7.1 pp more likely to have more than one child as compared to women in the control group, which amounts to an effect of 16 percent.

In contrast, columns 4-6 in panels A-D of Table 4 show there are no such effects on individuals who were partnered in the pre-period. The lack of an impact on partnered individuals could suggest that the fertility effects on singles may be less likely driven by an underlying shift in a household's family preferences due to a labor market shock. Rather, the fertility effects could be related to differential matching in the marriage market among the singles, which we investigate next.

Marriage Market Matching. We test the hypothesis of potential effects on matching patterns among single physicians by constructing measures of matching likelihoods based on a set of observables for the pool of their potential partners. The idea is that systematic differences for a given set of observables would be consistent with differential matching as reflected by selection on observables.

The details of our analysis are as follows. We first take from the general population an approximate pool of individuals who could be potential partners for the subjects of our quasi-experiment. We select this pool based on gender, age, and age gap across spouses. Specifically, for our single female physicians we take the pool of all males of ages 30-50, and for our single male physicians we take the pool of all females of ages 25-45. We then predict, using lottery years 6-10, the match probability for each person i in the

partner pool of marrying a person in our subject pool. We split the single subject pool on two dimensions: whether the physician belongs to the treatment group or the control group (indexed by $l \in \{t, c\}$), and whether the physician is male or female (indexed by $n \in \{m, f\}$). We then let $D_{i(l,n)}$ denote an indicator for i marrying a physician from group (l, n) , and we estimate a set of logistic regressions:

$$\Pr(D_{i(l,n)} = 1|X_i) = F(\beta_{(l,n)}X_i),$$

where $F(z) = \exp(z)/[1 + \exp(z)]$. In the observables vector, X_i , we include a third-order polynomial in age and whether the potential partner also holds a medical degree, and we additionally include year fixed effects. Finally, we calculate treatment/control ratios of the predictions $\Pr(D_{i(t,n)} = 1|X_i)/\Pr(D_{i(c,n)} = 1|X_i)$ for male/female subjects ($n \in \{m, f\}$). If we find that these ratios meaningfully deviate from 1, this evidence of selection on observables would imply differential matching across experimental groups; that is, it would provide evidence that the quasi-experiment has an effect on matching in the marriage market.

Panel A of Table 5 reports these ratios. For males, though highly precise due to the large potential partner pool, this ratio is economically very close to 1. It suggests no meaningful effects on males' marriage patterns, in line with their null effects on the number of children. However, consistent with the matching hypothesis we conjectured, we find a large deviation from 1 for our female subjects on the order of 25 percent. To investigate the direction in which the marriage patterns change due to the treatment, we analyze as outcomes the characteristics of the actual partners with whom our single subjects match. In panel B of Table 5 we find evidence of decreased assortative mating, whereby single women in the treatment group find partners with larger age gaps and who are less likely to hold a medical degree.¹²

Family vs. Career Tradeoff. The literature has underscored that family responsibilities could hinder females' advancement in the labor market. Our identified differential effects on fertility by gender suggest that the interaction between family and career considerations is a potential explanation for the long run impacts we have uncovered. That is, our findings are consistent with the notion that women, unlike men, may crowd out long run career goals by becoming more oriented toward the family when faced with adverse labor market events at the beginning of their working life. Such patterns are also consistent with the regularity that the locations which treatment group physicians sort into display traditional gendered norms to a larger extent as we have seen earlier (in panel C of Table 1). To test whether this tradeoff could play a role in practice, we ask: is it the case that the women who have more children *also* invest less in human capital? Panel E of Table 4 finds evidence that supports this view, showing that single women in the treatment group exhibit an increase in the joint probability of not earning a PhD *and* having more than one child on the order of 7 pp.

¹² The analysis in panel B is descriptive and aims to characterize the causal effect we found on matching. It is endogenous since it includes only individuals who become partnered, though we found no differential partnership rate across the experimental groups.

The findings in this subsection of effects on family formation and fertility provide novel evidence on the far reaching impact of early career choices, as they extend to an important aspect of the life cycle that is not immediately linked to the labor market. Moreover, they reveal how, in the long run, perturbations that are local to the early career may alter women’s trajectories from career-enhancing choices to family-oriented considerations while not altering men’s longer run choices.

7. Mechanisms: What Can Explain the Gender Divergence?

We have found significant causal impacts on females’ long run labor market choices of human capital investment and career track and the marriage market choices of family formation and fertility, in a direction that preserves and amplifies underlying structures of gender bias in the labor market. Our analysis cleanly identifies a specific source of variation: individuals’ very initial labor market sorting. It serves as a clean real-life laboratory that provides proof of concept for the far reaching impacts of early career choices and how they initiate significant divergence in long run economic outcomes across males and females. In this section, we support our main analysis with a characterization of the nature of the identified effects. Specifically, our setting and data further allow us to investigate leading competing explanations for the potential sources of the gender divergence we have uncovered.

We divide our candidate mechanisms into two classes of factors of the labor market: supply side factors that pertain to the employees, and demand side factors that pertain to the employers.

7.1. Supply Side Factors (Employee)

Preferences over Entry-Level Positions. There is an important discussion in the gender literature about whether gender differences in economic choices, such as college majors and occupations, stem from diverging preferences or other factors such as diverging opportunities (see, e.g., Bertrand 2020). Our application allows us to test this hypothesis in the context of physicians’ ex-ante preferences over entry-level local labor markets and internship specializations (or “occupations”).

We proceed in two steps. First, we utilize our measure for market desirability that reveals students’ location preferences through their lottery-based choices. We construct these market rankings based on the average lottery rank of the interns who choose to sort into it, separately for males and females, and we compare across them. Panel A of Figure 5 illustrates the results. Each dot represents a local labor market, where the x-axis denotes male rankings and the y-axis denotes female rankings. We plot the fitted line and report its slope, where the benchmark of non-differential ranking by gender is 1 (that is, the 45-degree line). Overall, the estimation is notably close to the benchmark case under the null that males and females have

similar average priorities over the entry-level markets.¹³ Hence, differential preferences over entry-level market locations are an unlikely explanation in our setting for the diverging long run effects across gender. Second, we investigate graduates' occupational preferences in their entry-level jobs. We base our analysis on revealed preferences for specialty choices in internships. Within the primary positions at hospitals, interns can broadly choose between internal medicine and surgery; and within the secondary positions in primary care, interns can choose between general medicine and psychiatry. For each gender, we split the sample by deciles according to lottery ranks. Then, for each of the two types of positions, we calculate over deciles the gender-specific cumulative probability of making a particular choice of specialty against the other. We then plot in panels B and C of Figure 5 the gender-specific CDFs against one another, where again the 45-degree line serves as a benchmark when preferences of specialties are similar across gender. We do not find systematic differences across gender in these choices as well. Put together, the evidence strongly suggests that ex-ante preferences over entry-level positions are not driving our results. Of course, it is still possible that preferences change ex-post differentially across gender in response to the treatment.

Search Behavior and Mobility. Earlier (in Section 6.1) we have seen evidence suggesting that males may engage in actions in response to the lottery that mitigate the potential adverse effects of unfavorable internship choices. We are particularly interested in testing the conjecture that males and females may display different search behavior in the labor market in response to initial placement. One recently studied margin in the context of differential search behavior by gender is commuting distance (Le Barbanchon et al. 2021). In panel A of Table 6 (columns 1-4) we analyze the effect of the lottery on commuting distance, measured either in kilometers or using an indicator for commuting more or less than the commuting distance mean. The evidence shows that, in contrast to females, males in the treatment group are more likely to commute further. This is consistent with the notion that differential willingness to commute could help mitigate adverse effects on males via differential responses to the treatment. Another margin to investigate in relation to search, in light of our analysis of family formation that found effects on matching patterns, is differential internal migration across labor markets. To this end, we consider the sample of pre-lottery singles who face the decision of forming a new household, and we study the physician's propensity to reside in the pre-lottery location of their new spouse. In panel A of Table 6 (columns 5-6) we find that households of male physicians show a decreased propensity to reside in the spouse's original location, so that men are more likely to migrate their households across labor markets. Overall, the evidence suggests that differential search behavior in response to the quasi-experiment could be at play.

¹³ We reach a similar conclusion if we instead use the information we have for the earlier cohorts about students' binding pre-placement rankings of all local labor markets as reported in their priority lists (see panel D of Appendix Figure C.1).

7.2. Demand Side Factors (Employer)

“Excess Sensitivity” to Employers. On the employer side, we begin with a general investigation of the potential role for employers. The motivation for this investigation is the hypothesis that being differentially treated by the same entry-level employers (given there is a similar first stage across gender) could alter the career course of graduates differentially for males and females. We address this by asking: do employers’ “outcome-based” characteristics translate into employees’ future outcomes differentially by gender? For this purpose, we analyze whether men and women display differential sensitivity in terms of their own subsequent placement (which is market based), when they are exposed due to the lottery to internship employers who do better or worse in placing their interns in subsequent positions.

The specific way in which we do this is by identifying hospital departments as employers and linking interns within an employer to the interns’ next employer. A key dimension of the next position for which we have consistent information that can be linked across hospital departments (as internship employers), interns, and their employers in the subsequent stage is whether the next position is held at a university hospital. For each intern of a given gender, we calculate the leave-out-mean of how well their internship employer places its similar-gender interns in a university hospital later on. We refer to this measure as “employer intensity.” Finally, we study interns’ sensitivity to employer intensity by gender, by regressing one’s own probability to be employed at a university hospital in their next position on the intensity of their internship employer. The benchmark for the slope of full pass-through is 1.

Panel B of Table 6 reports the results. We first show, as before, that males and females are similarly affected in the first stage, in terms of how the quasi-experiment leads them to intern for employers who are “worse” in future placements. In contrast, we find that women’s outcomes display a higher sensitivity than men’s outcomes—by 30 percent more—to their employer’s placement quality. The patterns combined—of similar exposure but differential sensitivity—suggest that the gender divergence could be linked to being differentially treated by the “market” and how its characteristics ultimately translate to outcomes. It sheds light on how opportunities play out in practice and can shape into gender differentials in performance.

Mentorship. Lastly, having found that employer characteristics can matter, we turn to investigate the potential role of a particular workplace characteristic, that is, the mentorship it provides. This is in light of the important literature that has suggested same-gender role models and mentors as a mechanism for gender inequalities in field of study and occupational choice.¹⁴ Even more, this work has found strong influences of the gender of role models or mentors on females, with little to no impact on males. With this work in mind, we investigate whether variation from the treatment in terms of exposure to role models could provide an explanation in our setting.

¹⁴ See, for example, Bettinger and Long (2005), Carrell et al. (2010), Blau et al. (2010), Dennehy and Dasgupta (2017), Kofoed and McGovney (2019), Porter and Serra (2020), and Ginther et al. (2020).

To do so, we use information from the exit surveys of the later cohorts in our sample (after the system was digitized) for whom we have exact linkages, with full names, between interns, their formally assigned mentor, and the head of the education program at the hospital department they intern. The names allow us to impute (with error) the gender of the mentor and of the head of the education program (see details in Appendix G).

Panel C of Table 6 (columns 1-4) clearly shows that the quasi-experiment leads to a large decline in exposure to female role models, as captured by a decreased probability of having been assigned a female formal mentor or program chair in the internship period. Moreover, we further take advantage of the internship exit surveys to study how interns translate this variation into their perceived experience of the mentorship. The exit surveys have a dedicated section for interns to evaluate their mentor, in terms of the training plan, provision of feedback, and advising on professional and career development (see Appendix G). In line with the mentorship hypothesis, we find that females in the treatment group rate this aspect of the internship lower, whereas there is no detectable effect on males (see columns 5-6 in panel C of Table 6). These patterns are consistent with the literature which have found significant effects of mentors' gender on females, with little to no effect on males. Overall, the evidence is in line with the notion that variation in mentorship could be a driving mechanism of the divergence in long run effects we have identified.

8. Conclusion

Using a randomized lottery that determines Danish physicians' entry-level placements, we identify significant impacts of early labor market sorting on longer run career and family choices. These far reaching effects encompass human capital investment, occupational choice, family formation, and fertility. We find that the long run effects are entirely driven by females, thereby providing evidence of a novel route that initiates and perpetuates gender inequality and gender-biased labor market norms, specifically those that pertain to career versus family tradeoffs. The evidence suggests that preferences over entry-level choices cannot explain this gender divergence. In contrast, we find support for differential search behavior, and we also find evidence for a role for workplaces and the mentoring they offer as potential operative mechanisms.


Our analysis highlights how persistent gender inequality can arise even in an institutionally equitable setting. As such, our findings imply that policies that aim to achieve outcome-based gender equality cannot only rely on leveling the starting playing field. Rather, such policies should target the ways in which these opportunities play out in practice and shape into gender-differential choices over the course of the formative years of early careers. For example, are women deterred by adverse events such that they give up on career goals and shift to more family-centered lives, whereas men do not let such events alter their planned course? If so, more targeted mentoring, as one example, may allow enhancing the career success of women, as suggested by some recent important studies that provide encouraging evidence.

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
Figure 1: Patterns of Internship Choices and the First Stage



Notes: These figures study the nature of placement to internships. In panel A, we calculate for each student the distance (in kilometers) between their municipality of residence at the time of the lottery and their municipality of the internship, which captures their “relocation distance.” This figure plots a graduating student’s relocation distance against the student’s lottery rank, where we split cohorts around year 2008 when the process was digitized. Internship location is based on the physician’s workplace in period 1 as reported in annual employment registers as of the month of November. In panel B, we use the rankings of all local labor markets that had been solicited among the earlier cohorts as part of the allocation process. We plot individuals’ pre-placement ranking of the local labor market they were assigned to (where 1 is highest priority) against the percentile rank of their lottery number draw (within their graduating cohort). Panels C-F investigate the relationship between relocation distance and internship quality against lottery ranks using information from after the system was digitized where data on both dimensions is linked to interns. Panel C measures the relocation distance using more precise information on the internship location that is reported directly for later cohorts. Panel D measures quality at the hospital department level, using the leave-one-out mean of the overall evaluation normalized by the standard deviation of this measure (to create a z-score). Panel E aggregates the information from panels C and D across our “control” group, “treatment” group, and “middle” group, and it plots the averages of the two dimensions simultaneously for each group. Panel F replicates panel E split by gender. Panels E and F also display the corresponding 95-percent confidence intervals.


Figure 2: Dynamics of Geographic Sorting

A. Effects on Overall Sample




B. Effects by Gender

Males




Females




Notes: This figure plots the dynamic effects of the lottery on the probability of sorting into less desirable local labor markets. We plot the β_τ estimates from equation (1) for periods 0 to 10, along with their 95-percent confidence intervals, where the x-axis denotes the year relative to the lottery. As illustrated in the figure, the early years (0-1) mechanically capture the first stage effect on the internship position, and the later years (6-10) capture the longer run impact on households' geographic location decisions. Panel A includes the overall sample, and panel B splits the sample by gender.

Figure 3: Life Cycle Income Trajectories


A. Medical PhD



B. Affiliation with University Hospitals




C. Gender-Represented Specialties




Notes: These figures plot income paths by years since graduation for the sample of all Danish physicians. Shaded areas represent 95-percent confidence intervals. We use a comprehensive measure of income from any source, including pre-tax earnings, capital income, government transfers, and self-employment business revenues.

Figure 4: Labor Market Outcomes

A. Unpacking the Treatment Bundle



B. Predicted Long Run Treatment Effects on Earnings




<i>Years since graduation</i>		<i>11-15</i>	<i>16-20</i>	<i>21-25</i>	<i>26-30</i>
Predicted Effect	Males	1,742	1,004	-13	-1,739
	Females	-3,837	-10,415	-21,597	-22,265
Predicted gender gap		-93,259	-119,519	-151,317	-219,266


Notes: This figure investigates the longer run effects on labor market outcomes. Panel A unpacks the overall treatment effect by providing the treatment effect on the “treatment” group (as compared to the “control” group) and the treatment effect on the “middle” group (as compared to the “control” group). These are estimated using a modification to equation (2), where we also include the middle group of the internship lottery and add an indicator for belonging to that group. The corresponding regression estimates are presented in Appendix Table E.1 (column 3). For each of the studied outcomes we also provide a calculation of the share of the difference in treatment effects across the treatment group and the middle group out of the full effect on the treatment group. Panel B plots the estimates of the surrogate index predictions of the effects on long run earnings. It is constructed in two steps. In the first step we use the entire sample of physicians from 1980-2016, and regress (separately for males and females) earnings in years 11-15, 16-20, 21-25, and 26-30 after completing medical school on characteristics of the physicians ten years after medical school. These characteristics include indicators of the individual’s values ten years after graduation for the following outcomes: having a medical PhD, employment at a university hospital, having a gender represented specialty, residing in a less desirable location, having no children, having one child, and having three children or more (where the omitted category is having two children). We use these regressions to construct the surrogate index for each person, that is, the predicted value for earnings in the long run. In the second step, we use the predicted values from the first step to estimate the effects on the surrogate index using the experimental sample. The estimates and their 95-percent confidence intervals are plotted in the graph. Standard errors are bootstrapped to account for estimation error from the two steps of the surrogacy analysis. The corresponding point estimates for the predicted effects are reported in the table below the figure, including the predicted gender gap in earnings.

Figure 5: Preferences over Local Labor Markets and Medical Specialties by Gender


A. Location Preferences



B. Hospitals: Internal Medicine vs. Surgery



C. Primary care: General Medicine vs. Psychiatry



Notes: This figure compares male and female graduates' revealed preferences over entry-level local labor markets and internship specialties. Panel A investigates preferences over local labor markets. We use our measure for market desirability that reveals students' preferences through their lottery-based choices. We construct these market rankings based on the average lottery rank of the interns who choose to sort into it, separately for males and females, and compare across them. Each dot represents a local labor market, where the x-axis denotes male rankings and the y-axis denotes female rankings. We plot the fitted line, as well as the 45-degree line which is the benchmark under non-differential rankings by gender, and we also report the slope of the fitted line where the benchmark of non-differential ranking is 1. Panels B-C investigate preferences over internship specialties. Within the primary positions at hospitals, interns can choose between internal medicine and surgery; and within the secondary positions in primary care, interns can choose between general medicine and psychiatry. For each gender, we split the sample by deciles according to lottery ranks. Then, for each of the two types of positions, we calculate over deciles the gender-specific cumulative probability of making a particular choice of specialty against the other. We plot the gender-specific CDFs against one another, where again the 45-degree line serves as a benchmark when preferences of specialties are similar across gender. We also plot the fitted line along with confidence intervals and report its slope.

Table 1: Characterization of Locations*A. Characteristics of Less Desirable Labor Markets*

	University Hospital (1)	Rural Location (2)
Less Desirable Labor Market	-0.3064*** (0.0796)	0.6153*** (0.1451)
Constant	0.4034*** (0.0581)	0.0130 (0.1059)
Counties	15	15

B. Characteristics of University Hospitals

		Non-University	University	Difference	p-value
Scale	Unique Patients	42,403	86,437	44,034***	<0.0001
	Admissions	82,741	160,380	77,639***	<0.0001
	Procedures	28,947	64,450	35,503***	0.0001
Technology	Unique Procedures	816	1,485	669***	<0.0001
	CT Scanner (probability)	0.75	0.98	0.23***	0.0002
	CT Scans	12,839	41,472	28,633**	0.0202
	MRI Scanner (probability)	0.58	0.98	0.41***	<0.0001
Human Capital	MRI Scans	6,380	24,678	18,298***	0.0018
	Medical Specialties	9.9	16.5	6.6***	<0.0001
	Specialists with PhD (share)	0.069	0.156	0.087***	<0.0001

C. Characteristics of Rural Locations

		Urban	Rural	Difference	p-value
Demographics	Population density (capita per sq km)	1,681	83	-1,598***	0.0045
	Population size (capita)	165,284	53,849	-111,435***	0.0027
	College degree (% , ages 25-64)	32.8	20.3	-12.5***	<0.0001
	DI recipients (% , ages 17-64/66)	5.9	8.4	2.5***	<0.0001
	Annual income (DKK, ages 25-59)	396,200	349,271	-46,929***	<0.0001
Health and Healthcare	Primary care expenditure per capita (DKK)	450	617	167***	<0.0001
	Hospital visits per capita	0.84	0.97	0.13***	<0.0001
	Daily smokers, %	16.3	18.7	2.4***	<0.0001
Amenities and Norms	Home prices per square meter (DKK)	15,674	7,484	-8,190***	<0.0001
	Revenue from income tax per capita (DKK)	39,352	36,087	-3,265***	0.0041
	Places in daycare (% , ages 0-2)	40.0	22.7	-17.4***	<0.0001
	Expenditure on culture, sports, and leisure (per capita)	1,693	1,477	-216***	0.0019
	Women elected officials (%)	34.2	27.8	-6.3***	0.0003
	Parental leave, males (z-score)	0.023	-0.066	-0.089***	0.0003
	Parental leave, females (z-score)	-0.017	0.054	0.071***	<0.0001

Notes: Panel A characterizes the degree to which the desirability of local labor markets (counties) is predictive of the probability of interning in a university hospital or in a rural municipality. We run regressions at the county level, where the available data collapses two counties within the capital of Copenhagen into one. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Panel B provides characteristics of hospitals (with a of 51 nationally) split by whether they are non-university or university hospitals. We use data from the national patient register, the registries for income and education, and the authorization register. Panel C provides characteristics of rural versus urban municipalities, where the classification follows the formal definitions used by the Danish Economic Councils (2015). Data are from: “Municipal Key Figures,” Ministry of Interior Affairs and Housing (“Kommunale Nøgletal,” Indenrigs- og boligministeriet); “Housing Market Statistics,” Finance Denmark (“Boligmarkedsstatistikken,” Finans Danmark); “National Goals,” Ministry of Health (“Nationale mål,” Sundhedsministeriet); and the absence, income, population, education, national health insurance, and national patient registers. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Table 2: Labor Market Outcomes

A. Dynamics in Human Capital Investment

		<i>Obtaining a Medical PhD</i>		
		All	Males	Females
		(1)	(2)	(3)
Treatment Effect at t				
	6	-0.0052 (0.0072)	0.0053 (0.0146)	-0.0125* (0.0067)
	7	-0.0102 (0.0099)	0.0171 (0.0186)	-0.0295*** (0.0105)
	8	-0.0168 (0.0127)	0.0040 (0.0223)	-0.0330** (0.0146)
	9	-0.0214 (0.0148)	0.0094 (0.0251)	-0.0444** (0.0178)
	10	-0.0275 (0.0171)	0.0055 (0.0282)	-0.0542*** (0.0209)
Counterfactual at $t = 10$		0.2364	0.2697	0.2131
Average Treatment Effect		-0.0147 (0.0096)	0.0093 (0.0177)	-0.0325*** (0.0104)
Constant		0.1359*** (0.0069)	0.1711*** (0.0124)	0.1121*** (0.0080)
Individuals		3,857	1,551	2,306

B. Longer Run Effects

	<i>Affiliation with University Hospitals</i>		<i>Gender-Represented Specialties</i>		<i>Earnings</i>	
	Males	Females	Males	Females	Males	Females
Average Treatment Effect	-0.0063 (0.0190)	-0.0577*** (0.0155)	0.0065 (0.0092)	0.0282*** (0.0079)	11,750 (9,110)	1,135 (5,802)
Constant	0.4627*** (0.0134)	0.4448*** (0.0111)	0.0706*** (0.0063)	0.0743*** (0.0050)	664,811*** (6,355)	543,388*** (3,969)
Individuals	1,830	2,771	1,706	2,544	1,674	2,521
Treatment at $t=10$	0.0026 (0.0277)	-0.0647*** (0.0226)	0.0090 (0.0238)	0.0578*** (0.0224)	15,538 (15,668)	8,666 (10,742)
Constant	0.4052*** (0.0198)	0.4050*** (0.0162)	0.1931*** (0.0169)	0.2459*** (0.0153)	747,040*** (11,378)	600,326*** (7,054)
Individuals	1,262	1,824	1,123	1,586	1,024	1,528

Notes: This table reports effects of early career choices on labor market outcomes. Panel A studies the dynamics in human capital investment using as an outcome an indicator for the completion of medical PhD. It provides estimates for β_t using equation (1), starting from year 6 which is when PhD completion begins to materialize following graduation from medical school. Counterfactuals are calculated as averages of the control group's outcomes. Column 1 provides the estimates for the full sample, and columns 2 and 3 provide estimates for males and females, respectively. Panel B studies the long run effects of the lottery on different labor market outcomes. Estimates are based on equation (2), where for the average treatment effects we include years 6-10 after graduation. We study as outcomes the probability of being affiliated with a university hospital, the probability of sorting into gender-represented specialties, and earnings which are winsorized at their 99th percentile. Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level are reported in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Table 3: Labor Market Outcomes—Unpacking the Treatment Bundle

	Males			Females		
	Earnings Projection (1)	Predicted Effect (2)	Actual Effect (3)	Earnings Projection (4)	Predicted Effect (5)	Actual Effect (6)
<i>A. Medical PhD</i>						
University	0.0711*** (0.0247)			0.0386** (0.0164)		
Hospital (t=1)						
Rural (t=1)	-0.0496 (0.0482)			-0.0549** (0.0220)		
Treatment		-0.0317*** (0.0053)	0.0093 (0.0177)		-0.0215*** (0.0038)	-0.0325*** (0.0104)
Constant	0.1348*** (0.0171)	0.1711*** (0.0068)	0.1711*** (0.0124)	0.0931*** (0.0124)	0.1121*** (0.0047)	0.1121*** (0.0080)
Observations	3,104	6,337	6,337	4,569	9,157	9,157
Individuals	765	1,551	1,551	1,145	2,306	2,306
F-statistic	5.36			8.80		
p-value	0.0049			0.0002		
<i>B. University Hospital</i>						
University	0.0559** (0.0278)			0.1026*** (0.0228)		
Hospital (t=1)						
Rural (t=1)	-0.1115 (0.0684)			-0.1819*** (0.0424)		
Treatment		-0.0321*** (0.0067)	-0.0063 (0.0190)		-0.0591*** (0.0031)	-0.0577*** (0.0155)
Constant	0.4359*** (0.0219)	0.4627*** (0.0070)	0.4627*** (0.0134)	0.3957*** (0.0182)	0.4448*** (0.0021)	0.4448*** (0.0111)
Observations	3,834	7,752	7,752	5,726	11,510	11,510
Individuals	915	1,830	1,830	1,373	2,771	2,771
F-statistic	4.23			26.01		
p-value	0.0148			0.0000		
<i>C. Gender-Represented Specialty</i>						
University	-0.0066 (0.0133)			-0.0332*** (0.0103)		
Hospital (t=1)						
Rural (t=1)	-0.0053 (0.0329)			0.0856*** (0.0253)		
Treatment		0.0019 (0.0036)	0.0065 (0.0092)		0.0221*** (0.0014)	0.0282*** (0.0079)
Constant	0.0745*** (0.0104)	0.0706*** (0.0043)	0.0706*** (0.0063)	0.0884*** (0.0086)	0.0743*** (0.0009)	0.0743*** (0.0050)
Observations	3,468	7,045	7,045	5,142	10,325	10,325
Individuals	846	1,706	1,706	1,263	2,544	2,544
F-statistic	0.12			13.52		
p-value	0.8829			0.0000		

Notes: This table provides surrogate index analyses for our labor market outcomes, separately for males and females, to unpack the multi-dimensional quasi-experiment. Within each gender, the first column regresses the outcome of interest on indicators of interning at a university hospital and in a rural location. We estimate this relationship using the sample of unconstrained interns from our control group. We use these regressions to construct the predicted value of the outcome, that is the “surrogate index.” The second column within each gender then regresses the surrogate index on the treatment status using our subject pool, to provide the predicted treatment effect of the internship lottery. In this estimation, standard errors are bootstrapped to account for the estimation error from the two steps of the surrogacy analysis. For comparison, the third column for each gender reports the actual treatment effect of the internship lottery. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Table 4: Family Formation Outcomes

	Single			Partnered		
	All (1)	Males (2)	Females (3)	All (4)	Males (5)	Females (6)
<i>A. Partnership</i>						
Average Treatment Effect	0.0070 (0.0168)	-0.0025 (0.0242)	0.0142 (0.0231)	0.0008 (0.0097)	0.0153 (0.0145)	-0.0078 (0.0129)
Constant	0.7760*** (0.0118)	0.8003*** (0.0168)	0.7576*** (0.0163)	0.9226*** (0.0072)	0.9244*** (0.0114)	0.9215*** (0.0093)
Individuals	2,144	917	1,227	2,312	840	1,472
<i>B. Number of Children</i>						
Average Treatment Effect	0.0807* (0.0415)	-0.0001 (0.0630)	0.1422*** (0.0549)	-0.0231 (0.0376)	-0.0376 (0.0642)	-0.0142 (0.0464)
Constant	1.2077*** (0.0293)	1.1685*** (0.0449)	1.2374*** (0.0387)	2.0962*** (0.0273)	2.0891*** (0.0492)	2.1001*** (0.0324)
Individuals	2,148	919	1,229	2,317	844	1,473
<i>C. One Child or More</i>						
Average Treatment Effect	0.0351* (0.0187)	0.0202 (0.0289)	0.0464* (0.0244)	0.0038 (0.0101)	0.0221 (0.0172)	-0.0068 (0.0126)
Constant	0.6791*** (0.0135)	0.6567*** (0.0208)	0.6961*** (0.0177)	0.9256*** (0.0074)	0.9138*** (0.0133)	0.9322*** (0.0088)
Individuals	2,148	919	1,229	2,317	844	1,473
<i>D. More than One Child</i>						
Average Treatment Effect	0.0331* (0.0194)	-0.0165 (0.0290)	0.0709*** (0.0260)	-0.0089 (0.0151)	0.0093 (0.0254)	-0.0190 (0.0189)
Constant	0.4411*** (0.0138)	0.4262*** (0.0206)	0.4524*** (0.0185)	0.8109*** (0.0108)	0.7869*** (0.0188)	0.8244*** (0.0131)
Individuals	2,148	919	1,229	2,317	844	1,473
<i>E. Family vs. Career Tradeoff: No PhD and More than One Child among Singles</i>						
		All (1)	Males (2)	Females (3)		
Average Treatment Effect		0.0361* (0.0211)	-0.0058 (0.0308)	0.0702** (0.0285)		
Constant		0.3740*** (0.0149)	0.3298*** (0.0221)	0.4087*** (0.0200)		
Individuals		1,788	775	1,013		

Notes: This table studies the long run effects of the lottery on family formation choices based on equation (2). Panels A-D split the sample by whether individuals were single or partnered in the pre-period and study the probability of becoming partnered, the number of children, the probability of having one child or more, and the probability of having more than one child, respectively. To reduce potential measurement error in the partnership outcome, we make the adjustment that, if an individual has a missing value for the partner's identification number in a given period but the two individuals are reported as partners in the adjacent periods, we assign them as partners in that period as well. Panel E tests the family versus career tradeoff by studying among singles, for whom we find effects on fertility, the joint probability of not earning a PhD and having more than one child. The number of observations is lower since information on family linkages spans to 2019 whereas information on education spans to 2017. Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level are reported in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Table 5: Marriage Market Matching*A. Matching Predictions*

	Female Physicians Male Population Treat vs. Control	Male Physicians Female Population Treat vs. Control
Ratio	1.25*** (0.0002)	1.03*** (0.0001)
Observations	8,880,950	8,348,438

Panel B: Partnership Characteristics

	All	Males	Females
<i>Age Gap of Husband relative to Wife</i>			
Average Treatment Effect	0.2830 (0.2016)	-0.1673 (0.2478)	0.6175** (0.2638)
Constant	0.1536 (0.1386)	-1.5456*** (0.1743)	1.5100*** (0.1847)
Individuals	1,788	777	1,011
<i>Assortative Matching: Medical Degree</i>			
Average Treatment Effect	-0.0337 (0.0250)	-0.0012 (0.0395)	-0.0619** (0.0314)
Constant	0.2942*** (0.0181)	0.3483*** (0.0279)	0.2502*** (0.0234)
Individuals	1,490	659	831

Notes: This table studies marriage market matching of individuals who were single at the baseline period. Panel A studies the potential effects on matching patterns among single physicians by constructing measures of matching likelihoods based on a set of observables for the pool of their potential partners. We first take from the general population an approximate pool of individuals, who could be potential partners for the subjects of our quasi-experiment. For our single female physicians we take the pool of all males of ages 30-50, and for our single male physicians we take the pool of all females of ages 25-45. We then predict using lottery years 6-10 the match probability for each person in the partner pool of marrying a person in our subject pool. We use logistic regressions where we include as controls a third-order polynomial in age, whether the potential partner also holds a medical degree, as well as year fixed effects. We calculate treatment/control ratios of the predictions for male/female subjects which we report in the table. Panel B analyzes as outcomes the characteristics of the actual partners with whom our single subjects match using equation (2), and it includes only observations with non-missing partners in a given period. Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level are reported in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Table 6: Mechanisms*A. Search Behavior and Household Mobility*

	<i>Propensity to Commute</i>				<i>Propensity to Migrate: Probability of Living at New Spouse's Original Location</i>	
	Distance (Kilometers)		Above Mean Distance		Males	Females
	Males (1)	Females (2)	Males (3)	Females (4)	(5)	(6)
Treatment Effect	2.4103** (1.0333)	-0.6892 (0.8115)	0.0289** (0.0140)	0.0001 (0.0122)	-0.0641** (0.0304)	-0.0128 (0.0266)
Constant	26.6494*** (0.5314)	26.6904*** (0.4932)	0.3060*** (0.0075)	0.3115*** (0.0066)	0.4671*** (0.0216)	0.4400*** (0.0187)
Individuals	2,797	4,228	2,797	4,228	959	1,277

B. Excess Sensitivity to Employers

	<i>Degree of Exposure to Employer Intensity</i>		<i>Sensitivity to Employer Intensity</i>		
	Males (1)	Females (2)	Employer Gender-Specific Placement Constant	Males (3)	Females (4)
	Treatment Effect	-0.1673*** (0.0081)	-0.1445*** (0.0057)	0.4391*** (0.0526)	0.5834*** (0.0408)
Constant	0.4709*** (0.0056)	0.4461*** (0.0041)	0.2099*** (0.0226)	0.1550*** (0.0168)	
Individuals	1,779	3,097	2,484	4,260	

C. Mentorship: Exposure to Female Mentors and Evaluations


	<i>Probability of Female Mentor</i>		<i>Probability of Female Head of Educational Program</i>		<i>Evaluation of Mentorship</i>	
	Males (1)	Females (2)	Males (3)	Females (4)	Males (5)	Females (6)
	Treatment Effect	-0.1017*** (0.0286)	-0.1189*** (0.0219)	-0.1043*** (0.0281)	-0.0828*** (0.0216)	-0.1509 (0.1019)
Constant	0.4376*** (0.0188)	0.4976*** (0.0154)	0.4090*** (0.0185)	0.4262*** (0.0152)	7.0663*** (0.0672)	7.1574*** (0.0566)
Individuals	1,177	2,016	1,177	2,016	1,177	2,016
SD					1.75	1.68
Effect/SD					-0.09	-0.25

Notes: This table investigates explanations for the potential sources of the gender divergence we have uncovered. Panel A studies search behavior in responses to the treatment. The propensity to commute measures the distance between home municipalities and workplace municipalities in periods 6-10, and "Above Mean Distance" is an indicator of whether the commuting distance is above the mean in periods 6-10. The propensity to migrate is estimated on the sample of pre-period singles in periods 6-10. We study the physician's propensity to reside in the pre-lottery location of their new spouse. Panel B studies sensitivity to employers by gender. Employer intensity is defined as a leave-one-out mean of the hospital departments' propensity to place their interns in a university hospital in their subsequent position. We provide estimates for interns' exposure to the intensity of departments, and we then provide estimates for the interns' sensitivity to the intensity of their departments. Panel C investigates whether differential exposure to role models during the internship could provide an explanation for the gender differences in long run treatment effects using the internship exit surveys. We study the probability of being assigned a female mentor, the probability that the head of the educational program is female, and the interns' evaluation of the mentorship they have received. Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level are reported in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Appendix

Appendix A: Danish Physicians' Post-Graduate Training

Appendix Figure A.1: Timeline



Notes: This figure summarizes the timeline of Danish physicians' training, which captures the early stages of their career.

Appendix B: Lottery Verification and Summary Statistics

Appendix Table B.1: Verification of Lottery

	Overall Sample (1)	Males (2)	Females (3)
Gender	0.0074 (0.0060)		
Age	0.0004 (0.0013)	-0.0008 (0.0020)	0.0014 (0.0018)
Partnered	0.0086 (0.0063)	0.0084 (0.0100)	0.0089 (0.0081)
Number of Children	-0.0030 (0.0058)	-0.0039 (0.0099)	-0.0033 (0.0073)
GPA Rank	0.0048 (0.0104)	0.0025 (0.0162)	0.0068 (0.0136)
Observations	10,017	3,939	6,078
R-Squared	0.0004	0.0003	0.0003
<i>F</i> -Statistic	0.74	0.25	0.48
<i>p</i> -Value	0.5959	0.9082	0.7507

Notes: This table tests the validity of the lottery in terms of random assignment. We run specifications that regress the graduating physicians' lottery rank on baseline characteristics available in our data. These include gender, age, an indicator for having a registered partner, number of children in the household, and high school GPA rank. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses, and we also report the *p*-value of the *F*-test for the joint predictive power of the specifications we run. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Appendix Table B.2: Analysis Sample Summary Statistics

	Control (1)	Treatment (2)	Difference (3)	<i>p</i> -value (4)
<i>A. Overall Sample</i>				
Female	0.5999	0.6114	-0.0115	0.3576
Partnered	0.4964	0.5079	-0.0115	0.3700
Age	28.5096	28.5206	-0.0111	0.8606
GPA Rank	0.5021	0.5047	-0.0026	0.7246
Number of Children	0.2669	0.2644	0.0025	0.8694
Number of Individuals	3,024	3,052		
<i>B. Males</i>				
Partnered	0.4636	0.4696	-0.0060	0.7681
Age	28.6455	28.5995	0.0460	0.6665
GPA Rank	0.5052	0.4986	0.0066	0.5871
Number of Children	0.2280	0.2184	0.0096	0.6654
Number of Individuals	1,210	1,186		
<i>C. Females</i>				
Partnered	0.5182	0.5322	-0.0140	0.3964
Age	28.4190	28.4705	-0.0516	0.5047
GPA Rank	0.5000	0.5085	-0.0086	0.3652
Number of Children	0.2928	0.2935	-0.0008	0.9682
Number of Individuals	1,814	1,866		


Notes: This table provides summary statistics for the analysis sample in the year prior to the internship lottery. Panel A provides statistics for the entire sample, and panels B and C split the sample by gender. Characteristics include gender, age, an indicator for having a registered partner, number of children in the household, and high school GPA rank. Column 1 displays means for our control group, and column 2 displays means for our treatment group. Column 3 provides the differences between column 1 and column 2. Column 4 reports the *p*-values of the test statistics (*t*-statistics for continuous variables and *z*-statistics for binary variables) of the differences in column 3.

Appendix C: Labor Market Rankings

Appendix C.1: Labor Market Rankings for Random Sample Split

Local labor markets and the average characteristics of the jobs they offer have aspects that people may agree upon (“vertical” quality, e.g., interning in a teaching hospital) and aspects that could be individual specific (“horizontal” quality whose valuation can differ across individuals, e.g., a county’s proximity to family). To investigate the degree to which the rankings of the labor markets are agreed upon among the new physicians (as compared to diverging across them due to individual specific preferences), we compare the rankings of labor markets across a random split of our analysis sample. If students tend to agree on the value of characteristics of labor markets, we would expect the overall average rankings of the two random subsamples to align on the 45-degree line; and if preferences are completely idiosyncratic (an extreme case), there should be no systematic relationship across the two groups’ rankings. Panel C of Appendix Figure C.1 shows that the average rankings of the local labor markets across the two groups line up around the 45-degree line, and we cannot reject the benchmark null of a coefficient of 1 which represents ranking comparability. We note that while this finding suggests there is a degree of general agreement over labor market rankings across students, it does not mean there are no components of idiosyncratic preferences (over “horizontal” quality). In fact, the observation that the two groups’ rankings do not perfectly align on the 45-degree is in itself an indication of the natural presence of individual specific considerations.


Appendix Figure C.1: Labor Market Rankings



Notes: This figure makes several comparisons of the effective rankings of local labor markets. In panels A-C, location-based preferences, as revealed through choices, are constructed such that we characterize the desirability of a labor market (i.e., a county) based on the average lottery rank of the interns who choose to sort into it. Panel A compares the average rankings across earlier cohorts and later cohorts. Panel B compares the average rankings across those with the best lottery numbers (the bottom 30 percent) and those with the worst lottery numbers (the top 30 percent). Panel C compares the average rankings of labor markets across a random split of our analysis sample. Panel D compares females' and males' priority rankings over entry-level local labor markets using a different measure (where the counterpart that uses the same measure as in panels A-C appears in panel A of Figure 5). We use here the information we have for earlier cohorts about students' binding pre-placement rankings of all local labor markets as reported in priority lists. We assign to each local labor market its average priority by gender, and we then compare these priority rankings across males and females. In all panels, each dot represents a local labor market. We plot the fitted line, as well as the 45-degree line which is the benchmark under non-differential rankings by gender. We also report the slope of the fitted line, where the benchmark of non-differential ranking is 1.

Appendix D: Internship Period First Stage

Appendix Figure D.1: Distance vs. Quality Tradeoff



Notes: This figure replicates panels E-F of Figure 1, but where we group subjects into ten equal-sized bins based on their lottery ranks. Each dot represents a decile (whose number is displayed in the figure), and it plots the average values within that decile for the internship characteristics of relocation distance (on the x-axis) and a z-score of quality (on y-axis), along with their corresponding 95-percent confidence intervals.

Appendix E: Alternative Specifications

Appendix Table E.1: Research Design—Alternative Specifications

A. Sorting into Less Desirable Local Labor Markets

All

	Percentile						
	20 (1)	25 (2)	30 (3)	35 (4)	40 (5)	Tercile (6)	Linear (7)
Treat	0.0527*** (0.0149)	0.0586*** (0.0135)	0.0538*** (0.0122)	0.0469*** (0.0114)	0.0476*** (0.0106)	0.0507*** (0.0117)	0.0773*** (0.0164)
Middle	0.0180 (0.0117)	0.0076 (0.0112)	0.0181 (0.0111)	0.0120 (0.0115)	0.0165 (0.0128)	0.0130 (0.0112)	
Constant	0.1710*** (0.0100)	0.1737*** (0.0090)	0.1689*** (0.0082)	0.1723*** (0.0077)	0.1699*** (0.0071)	0.1711*** (0.0079)	0.1536*** (0.0091)
Individuals, incl. middle	7,037	7,037	7,037	7,037	7,037	7,037	7,037
Individuals, excl. middle	2,852	3,557	4,250	4,941	5,642	4,668	

Males

	Percentile						
	20 (1)	25 (2)	30 (3)	35 (4)	40 (5)	Tercile (6)	Linear (7)
Treat	0.0107 (0.0229)	0.0104 (0.0209)	0.0152 (0.0191)	0.0190 (0.0179)	0.0236 (0.0167)	0.0021 (0.0181)	0.0290 (0.0257)
Middle	0.0221 (0.0188)	-0.0009 (0.0182)	0.0069 (0.0180)	0.0049 (0.0184)	0.0104 (0.0205)	0.0164 (0.0185)	
Constant	0.1805*** (0.0160)	0.1934*** (0.0147)	0.1883*** (0.0134)	0.1876*** (0.0125)	0.1841*** (0.0115)	0.1926*** (0.0162)	0.1811*** (0.0146)
Individuals, incl. middle	2,798	2,798	2,798	2,798	2,798	2,798	2,798
Individuals, excl. middle	1,138	1,436	1,706	1,948	2,230	1,842	

Females

	Percentile						
	20 (1)	25 (2)	30 (3)	35 (4)	40 (5)	Tercile (6)	Linear (7)
Treat	0.0812*** (0.0196)	0.0918*** (0.0176)	0.0802*** (0.0159)	0.0653*** (0.0147)	0.0634*** (0.0136)	0.0734*** (0.0151)	0.1096*** (0.0213)
Middle	0.0155 (0.0149)	0.0137 (0.0141)	0.0259* (0.0140)	0.0165 (0.0147)	0.0203 (0.0164)	0.0200 (0.0143)	
Constant	0.1645*** (0.0127)	0.1602*** (0.0113)	0.1558*** (0.0103)	0.1623*** (0.0097)	0.1606*** (0.0090)	0.1590*** (0.0099)	0.1352*** (0.0116)
Individuals, incl. middle	4,239	4,239	4,239	4,239	4,239	4,239	4,239
Individuals, excl. middle	1,714	2,121	2,544	2,993	3,412	2,826	

B. Human Capital Investment—Medical PhD

All

	Percentile						
	20 (1)	25 (2)	30 (3)	35 (4)	40 (5)	Tercile (6)	Linear (7)
Treat	-0.0222*	-0.0186*	-0.0147	-0.0083	-0.0043	-0.0142	-0.0183
	(0.0117)	(0.0103)	(0.0096)	(0.0089)	(0.0083)	(0.0092)	(0.0127)
Middle	-0.0077	0.0021	-0.0038	-0.0006	0.0013	-0.0042	
	(0.0099)	(0.0093)	(0.0091)	(0.0093)	(0.0104)	(0.0092)	
Constant	0.1390***	0.1337***	0.1359***	0.1331***	0.1314***	0.1361***	0.1391***
	(0.0086)	(0.0075)	(0.0069)	(0.0064)	(0.0059)	(0.0066)	(0.0075)
Individuals, incl. middle	6,386	6,386	6,386	6,386	6,386	6,386	6,386
Individuals, excl. middle	2,588	3,224	3,857	4,482	5,124	4,322	

Males

	Percentile						
	20 (1)	25 (2)	30 (3)	35 (4)	40 (5)	Tercile (6)	Linear (7)
Treat	-0.0021	0.0105	0.0093	0.0174	0.0177	0.0136	0.0115
	(0.0219)	(0.0191)	(0.0177)	(0.0166)	(0.0153)	(0.0170)	(0.0236)
Middle	-0.0094	0.0125	0.0049	0.0034	0.0129	0.0052	
	(0.0179)	(0.0166)	(0.0165)	(0.0168)	(0.0189)	(0.0166)	
Constant	0.1819***	0.1670***	0.1711***	0.1687***	0.1661***	0.1695***	0.1701***
	(0.0155)	(0.0134)	(0.0124)	(0.0114)	(0.0106)	(0.0118)	(0.0136)
Individuals, incl. middle	2,538	2,538	2,538	2,538	2,538	2,538	2,538
Individuals, excl. middle	1,040	1,304	1,551	1,770	2,027	1,674	

Females

	Percentile						
	20 (1)	25 (2)	30 (3)	35 (4)	40 (5)	Tercile (6)	Linear (7)
Treat	-0.0361***	-0.0397***	-0.0325***	-0.0262***	-0.0195**	-0.0335***	-0.0390***
	(0.0123)	(0.0110)	(0.0104)	(0.0097)	(0.0091)	(0.0100)	(0.0136)
Middle	-0.0056	-0.0035	-0.0085	-0.0046	-0.0077	-0.0112	
	(0.0111)	(0.0106)	(0.0104)	(0.0106)	(0.0117)	(0.0105)	
Constant	0.1095***	0.1106***	0.1121***	0.1095***	0.1083***	0.1139***	0.1185***
	(0.0096)	(0.0087)	(0.0080)	(0.0073)	(0.0067)	(0.0077)	(0.0084)
Individuals, incl. middle	3,848	3,848	3,848	3,848	3,848	3,848	3,848
Individuals, excl. middle	1,548	1,920	2,306	2,712	3,097	2,558	

C. Labor Market Position—University Hospital

All

	Percentile						
	20 (1)	25 (2)	30 (3)	35 (4)	40 (5)	Tercile (6)	Linear (7)
Treat	-0.0328** (0.0147)	-0.0396*** (0.0131)	-0.0369*** (0.0121)	-0.0381*** (0.0112)	-0.0343*** (0.0104)	-0.0392*** (0.0115)	-0.0551*** (0.0161)
Middle	-0.0083 (0.0120)	-0.0004 (0.0114)	-0.0037 (0.0113)	0.0010 (0.0116)	-0.0049 (0.0129)	0.0006 (0.0114)	
Constant	0.4509*** (0.0104)	0.4496*** (0.0093)	0.4520*** (0.0085)	0.4524*** (0.0079)	0.4542*** (0.0074)	0.4522*** (0.0082)	0.4669*** (0.0093)
Individuals, incl. middle	7,616	7,616	7,616	7,616	7,616	7,616	7,616
Individuals, excl. middle	3,085	3,850	4,601	5,346	6,107	5,054	

Males

	Percentile						
	20 (1)	25 (2)	30 (3)	35 (4)	40 (5)	Tercile (6)	Linear (7)
Treat	-0.0130 (0.0234)	-0.0028 (0.0207)	-0.0063 (0.0190)	-0.0104 (0.0177)	-0.0135 (0.0166)	-0.0127 (0.0183)	-0.0237 (0.0256)
Middle	-0.0273 (0.0190)	-0.0082 (0.0181)	-0.0092 (0.0180)	-0.0084 (0.0186)	-0.0155 (0.0206)	-0.0144 (0.0182)	
Constant	0.4760*** (0.0164)	0.4618*** (0.0146)	0.4627*** (0.0134)	0.4633*** (0.0125)	0.4657*** (0.0117)	0.4663*** (0.0129)	0.4690*** (0.0148)
Individuals, incl. middle	3,017	3,017	3,017	3,017	3,017	3,017	3,017
Individuals, excl. middle	1,223	1,540	1,830	2,090	2,401	1,979	

Females

	Percentile						
	20 (1)	25 (2)	30 (3)	35 (4)	40 (5)	Tercile (6)	Linear (7)
Treat	-0.0459** (0.0188)	-0.0646*** (0.0169)	-0.0577*** (0.0155)	-0.0562*** (0.0143)	-0.0480*** (0.0134)	-0.0565*** (0.0148)	-0.0758*** (0.0206)
Middle	0.0046 (0.0155)	0.0050 (0.0148)	0.0001 (0.0145)	0.0071 (0.0149)	0.0021 (0.0165)	0.0105 (0.0147)	
Constant	0.4340*** (0.0134)	0.4413*** (0.0121)	0.4448*** (0.0111)	0.4453*** (0.0103)	0.4466*** (0.0096)	0.4429*** (0.0106)	0.4655*** (0.0120)
Individuals, incl. middle	4,599	4,599	4,599	4,599	4,599	4,599	4,599
Individuals, excl. middle	1,862	2,310	2,771	3,256	3,706	3,075	

D. Occupational Choice—Gender-Represented Specialty

All

	Percentile						
	20 (1)	25 (2)	30 (3)	35 (4)	40 (5)	Tercile (6)	Linear (7)
Treat	0.0224*** (0.0072)	0.0222*** (0.0066)	0.0193*** (0.0060)	0.0182*** (0.0055)	0.0172*** (0.0052)	0.0198*** (0.0057)	0.0274*** (0.0080)
Middle	0.0149*** (0.0055)	0.0073 (0.0053)	0.0075 (0.0053)	0.0064 (0.0055)	0.0074 (0.0061)	0.0078 (0.0054)	
Constant	0.0682*** (0.0046)	0.0724*** (0.0042)	0.0728*** (0.0039)	0.0733*** (0.0036)	0.0732*** (0.0034)	0.0724*** (0.0037)	0.0679*** (0.0043)
Individuals, incl. middle	7,037	7,037	7,037	7,037	7,037	7,037	7,037
Individuals, excl. middle	2,852	3,557	4,250	4,941	5,642	4,668	

Males

	Percentile						
	20 (1)	25 (2)	30 (3)	35 (4)	40 (5)	Tercile (6)	Linear (7)
Treat	0.0093 (0.0106)	0.0059 (0.0098)	0.0031 (0.0086)	0.0117 (0.0086)	0.0102 (0.0080)	0.0099 (0.0088)	0.0103 (0.0121)
Middle	0.0193** (0.0087)	0.0085 (0.0086)	0.0065 (0.0092)	0.0084 (0.0089)	0.0080 (0.0099)	0.0080 (0.0087)	
Constant	0.0606*** (0.0072)	0.0682*** (0.0068)	0.0706*** (0.0063)	0.0672*** (0.0058)	0.0682*** (0.0055)	0.0679*** (0.0059)	0.0687*** (0.0069)
Individuals, incl. middle	2,798	2,798	2,798	2,798	2,798	2,798	2,798
Individuals, excl. middle	1,138	1,436	1,706	1,948	2,230	1,842	

Females

	Percentile						
	20 (1)	25 (2)	30 (3)	35 (4)	40 (5)	Tercile (6)	Linear (7)
Treat	0.0312*** (0.0097)	0.0336*** (0.0088)	0.0282*** (0.0079)	0.0226*** (0.0072)	0.0219*** (0.0067)	0.0264*** (0.0075)	0.0388*** (0.0105)
Middle	0.0119* (0.0071)	0.0064 (0.0067)	0.0102 (0.0067)	0.0052 (0.0070)	0.0071 (0.0078)	0.0078 (0.0068)	
Constant	0.0734*** (0.0060)	0.0752*** (0.0054)	0.0743*** (0.0050)	0.0773*** (0.0046)	0.0766*** (0.0043)	0.0754*** (0.0047)	0.0673*** (0.0056)
Individuals, incl. middle	4,239	4,239	4,239	4,239	4,239	4,239	4,239
Individuals, excl. middle	1,714	2,121	2,544	2,993	3,412	2,826	

E. Probability of Having a Partner among Pre-Lottery Singles

All

	Percentile						
	20 (1)	25 (2)	30 (3)	35 (4)	40 (5)	Tercile (6)	Linear (7)
Treat	0.0112 (0.0203)	0.0140 (0.0183)	0.0070 (0.0168)	0.0046 (0.0157)	0.0019 (0.0146)	-0.0012 (0.0163)	0.0018 (0.0223)
Middle	0.0007 (0.0167)	0.0031 (0.0160)	-0.0006 (0.0158)	0.0135 (0.0162)	0.0010 (0.0179)	0.0128 (0.0158)	
Constant	0.7751*** (0.0144)	0.7728*** (0.0130)	0.7760*** (0.0118)	0.7721*** (0.0110)	0.7769*** (0.0103)	0.7738*** (0.0113)	0.7769*** (0.0128)
Individuals, incl. middle	3,574	3,574	3,574	3,574	3,574	3,574	3,574
Individuals, excl. middle	1,469	1,814	2,144	2,481	2,858	2,337	

Males

	Percentile						
	20 (1)	25 (2)	30 (3)	35 (4)	40 (5)	Tercile (6)	Linear (7)
Treat	0.0033 (0.0301)	0.0105 (0.0265)	-0.0025 (0.0242)	-0.0143 (0.0229)	-0.0140 (0.0215)	-0.0148 (0.0236)	-0.0172 (0.0330)
Middle	-0.0147 (0.0245)	-0.0120 (0.0235)	-0.0240 (0.0234)	-0.0221 (0.0243)	-0.0191 (0.0275)	-0.0140 (0.0236)	
Constant	0.7983*** (0.0209)	0.7933*** (0.0186)	0.8003*** (0.0168)	0.8019*** (0.0157)	0.7995*** (0.0148)	0.7999*** (0.0162)	0.7989*** (0.0187)
Individuals, incl. middle	1,505	1,505	1,505	1,505	1,505	1,505	1,505
Individuals, excl. middle	608	774	917	1,047	1,216	991	

Females

	Percentile						
	20 (1)	25 (2)	30 (3)	35 (4)	40 (5)	Tercile (6)	Linear (7)
Treat	0.0172 (0.0274)	0.0165 (0.0251)	0.0142 (0.0231)	0.0183 (0.0215)	0.0139 (0.0199)	0.0088 (0.0222)	0.0160 (0.0301)
Middle	0.0121 (0.0227)	0.0148 (0.0218)	0.0172 (0.0213)	0.0394* (0.0216)	0.0162 (0.0236)	0.0326 (0.0213)	
Constant	0.7581*** (0.0196)	0.7572*** (0.0179)	0.7576*** (0.0163)	0.7503*** (0.0152)	0.7599*** (0.0141)	0.7545*** (0.0156)	0.7608*** (0.0174)
Individuals, incl. middle	2,069	2,069	2,069	2,069	2,069	2,069	2,069
Individuals, excl. middle	861	1,040	1,227	1,434	1,642	1,346	

F. Probability of Having More than One Child among Pre-Lottery Singles

All

	Percentile					Tercile (6)	Linear (7)
	20 (1)	25 (2)	30 (3)	35 (4)	40 (5)		
Treat	0.0415* (0.0235)	0.0383* (0.0212)	0.0331* (0.0194)	0.0174 (0.0181)	0.0122 (0.0168)	0.0234 (0.0186)	0.0310 (0.0258)
Middle	0.0155 (0.0193)	0.0212 (0.0184)	0.0229 (0.0181)	0.0263 (0.0186)	0.0138 (0.0205)	0.0198 (0.0183)	
Constant	0.4425*** (0.0166)	0.4400*** (0.0150)	0.4411*** (0.0138)	0.4461*** (0.0128)	0.4526*** (0.0119)	0.4457*** (0.0132)	0.4447*** (0.0149)
Individuals, incl. middle	3,581	3,581	3,581	3,581	3,581	3,581	3,581
Individuals, excl. middle	1,471	1,816	2,148	2,486	2,864	2,341	

Males

	Percentile					Tercile (6)	Linear (7)
	20 (1)	25 (2)	30 (3)	35 (4)	40 (5)		
Treat	0.0086 (0.0357)	-0.0050 (0.0318)	-0.0165 (0.0290)	-0.0298 (0.0272)	-0.0373 (0.0253)	-0.0250 (0.0279)	-0.0328 (0.0388)
Middle	-0.0102 (0.0291)	-0.0070 (0.0279)	-0.0000 (0.0276)	0.0048 (0.0285)	0.0033 (0.0318)	0.0047 (0.0280)	
Constant	0.4254*** (0.0251)	0.4259*** (0.0226)	0.4262*** (0.0206)	0.4302*** (0.0195)	0.4356*** (0.0182)	0.4278*** (0.0199)	0.4375*** (0.0227)
Individuals, incl. middle	1,508	1,508	1,508	1,508	1,508	1,508	1,508
Individuals, excl. middle	609	775	919	1,050	1,219	993	

Females

	Percentile					Tercile (6)	Linear (7)
	20 (1)	25 (2)	30 (3)	35 (4)	40 (5)		
Treat	0.0648** (0.0311)	0.0711** (0.0282)	0.0709*** (0.0260)	0.0529** (0.0239)	0.0488** (0.0223)	0.0597** (0.0248)	0.0783** (0.0343)
Middle	0.0342 (0.0256)	0.0404* (0.0245)	0.0376 (0.0240)	0.0412* (0.0245)	0.0193 (0.0268)	0.0297 (0.0242)	
Constant	0.4551*** (0.0222)	0.4506*** (0.0201)	0.4524*** (0.0185)	0.4579*** (0.0169)	0.4653*** (0.0158)	0.4590*** (0.0175)	0.4496*** (0.0198)
Individuals, incl. middle	2,073	2,073	2,073	2,073	2,073	2,073	2,073
Individuals, excl. middle	862	1,041	1,229	1,436	1,645	1,348	

Notes: These tables investigate the robustness of our design by studying the effects on our main outcomes when we vary the percentiles that define the treatment and control groups. Columns 1-5 report estimates for long run effects based on specification (2) for thresholds that vary in 5 percentage-point increments, where column 3 corresponds to our main specification. Column 6 also reports estimates where treatment, control, and middle groups are split at the 33rd and 67th percentiles (as a potentially natural benchmark). Column 7 estimates a version of specification (2) that is linear in lottery rank. The two bottom rows in each estimation report sample sizes, depending on whether the estimation includes or excludes the middle group. Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level are reported in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Appendix Table E.2: Effects of Early Career Choices on Longer Run Outcomes—
Graduation Round Fixed Effects

A. Sorting into Less Desirable Local Labor Markets

	All (1)	Males (2)	Females (3)
Treat	0.0538*** (0.0122)	0.0139 (0.0190)	0.0801*** (0.0159)
Constant	0.1689*** (0.0081)	0.1890*** (0.0133)	0.1558*** (0.0102)
Individuals	4,250	1,706	2,544

B. Medical PhD

	All (1)	Males (2)	Females (3)
Treat	-0.0143 (0.0096)	0.0101 (0.0177)	-0.0312*** (0.0103)
Constant	0.1357*** (0.0069)	0.1706*** (0.0124)	0.1114*** (0.0079)
Individuals	3,857	1,551	2,306

C. University Hospital

	All (1)	Males (2)	Females (3)
Treat	-0.0392*** (0.0113)	-0.0147 (0.0180)	-0.0549*** (0.0145)
Constant	0.4531*** (0.0079)	0.4669*** (0.0128)	0.4434*** (0.0101)
Individuals	4,601	1,830	2,771

D. Gender-Represented Specialty

	All (1)	Males (2)	Females (3)
Treat	0.0190*** (0.0059)	0.0062 (0.0092)	0.0264*** (0.0077)
Constant	0.0730*** (0.0039)	0.0708*** (0.0063)	0.0752*** (0.0049)
Individuals	4,250	1,706	2,544

E. Probability of Having a Partner among Pre-Lottery Singles

	All (1)	Males (2)	Females (3)
Treat	0.0068 (0.0167)	-0.0105 (0.0236)	0.0158 (0.0229)
Constant	0.7761*** (0.0117)	0.8043*** (0.0162)	0.7568*** (0.0162)
Individuals	2,144	917	1,227

F. Probability of Having More than One Child among Pre-Lottery Singles

	All (1)	Males (2)	Females (3)
Treat	0.0321* (0.0193)	-0.0244 (0.0288)	0.0708*** (0.0257)
Constant	0.4416*** (0.0136)	0.4302*** (0.0202)	0.4524*** (0.0183)
Individuals	2,148	919	1,229

Notes: These tables investigate the robustness of the results for our main long run outcomes to the inclusion of graduation round fixed effects based on specification (2). Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level are reported in parentheses. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Appendix F: Specialty Grouping

Appendix Table F.1

Specialty	Specialty Group
<i>Panel A: Male-Represented</i>	
Thorax Surgery	Surgery
Orthopedic Surgery	Surgery
General Surgery	Surgery
Neurosurgery	Surgery
Internal Medicine	Internal medicine
Clinical Biochemistry	Transverse specialties
Otorhinolaryngology	Surgery
Internal Medicine: Cardiology	Internal medicine
Ophthalmology	Surgery
Vascular Surgery	Surgery
Anesthesiology	Transverse specialties
Internal Medicine: Gastroenterology and Hepatology	Internal medicine
Urology	Surgery
<i>Panel B: Female-Represented</i>	
Internal Medicine: Hematology	Internal medicine
Clinical Microbiology	Transverse specialties
Neuro Medicine	Other
Clinical Immunology	Transverse specialties
Clinical Physiology and Nuclear Medicine	Transverse specialties
Occupational Medicine	Other
General Medicine	General medicine
Internal Medicine: Rheumatology	Internal medicine
Internal Medicine: Pulmonary Diseases	Internal medicine
Radiology	Transverse specialties
Internal Medicine: Endocrinology	Internal medicine
Plastic Surgery	Surgery
Psychiatry	Psychiatry
Internal Medicine: Nephrology	Internal medicine
Dermato-Venerology	Other
Clinical Pharmacology	Transverse specialties
Internal Medicine: Infectious Diseases	Internal medicine
Gynecology and Obstetrics	Surgery
Pathological Anatomy and Cytology	Transverse specialties
Public Medicine	Other
Pediatrics	Other
Clinical Oncology	Other
Internal Medicine: Geriatrics	Internal medicine
Forensic medicine	Other
Clinical Genetics	Transverse specialties
Child and Youth Psychiatry	Psychiatry

Notes: This table classifies medical specialties by gender representativeness based on the share of females within a specialty relative to their overall proportion. “Female-represented specialties” are specialties with a female share that is higher than this proportion, and “male-represented specialties” are specialties with a female share that is lower than this proportion.

Appendix G: Exit Surveys

This appendix provides background information on the exit surveys.

The questions in the surveys are grouped into seven overall categories. The survey questions changed in 2016, but the seven categories remained similar. The average responses for each of the seven categories for each hospital department are reported on the public website www.evaluer.dk, and they are available to students' use to obtain information on the quality of their future workplaces.

Appendix Tables G.1 and G.2 show the groupings of the individual questions from the old and new questionnaires into the overall seven categories. The individual questions are provided in Appendix Tables G.3-G.6 in Danish (original) and English (translated). To provide numerical scoring of a department, interns also report the names of their supervisors: the assigned mentor and the head of the educational program. We use these names to deduct the gender of the supervisors. To do so, we construct an algorithm based on first names, which works as follows. We construct a gender probability using the first name of all doctors in the authorization register, which includes their names and gender. A first name is defined as "male" if more than 70 percent of the individuals with the given first name are males, and accordingly a first name is defined as "female" if less than 30 percent of the individuals with the given first name are males. We extract the first name of the supervisors from the exit surveys and match their first name to the gender proxy constructed from the authorization register.

Appendix Table G.1: Evaluation Categories in Evaluations until 2015

Group	English (translated)	Danish (original)	Questions
1	Introduction	Introduktion	1-2
2	Supervision	Uddannelsesprogram	3-6
3	Daily guidance	Vejleder (Praksistutor)	7-11
4	Work organization	Arbejdstilrettelæggelse	12-17
5	Education	Øvrige forhold	18-22
6	Education	Samlet vurdering	23
7	Overall Assessment	Samlet vurdering	24

Notes: The evaluation scales range from 1 to 9. The individual questions are reported in Appendix Tables G.3 and G.4.

Appendix Table G.2: Evaluation Categories in Evaluations from 2016

Group	English (translated)	Danish (original)	Questions
1	Introduction	Introduktion	1-3
2	Supervision	Uddannelsesvejledning	1-7
3	Daily guidance	Daglig vejledning	8-13
4	Work organization	Arbejdstilrettelæggelse	12-17
5	Education	Konference/undervisning	18-20
6	Work climate	Arbejdsclima	21-24
7	Overall Assessment	Øvrige	25-26

Notes: The evaluation scales range from 1 to 6. The individual questions are reported in Appendix Tables G.5 and G.6.

Appendix Table G.3: Questions in Evaluations until 2015, Danish

1	Hvordan vurderer du kvaliteten af introduktionen på uddannelsesstedet?
2	Fulgte du introduktionsprogrammet?
3	Hvordan vurderer du kvaliteten af uddannelsesprogrammet?
4	Svarer indholdet til målbeskrivelsens krav?
5	Svarede uddannelsesforløbet til uddannelsesprogrammet?
6	Har du indfriet checklistens delpunkter?
7	Hvordan var kvaliteten af vejlederens indsats i forhold til din uddannelse?
8	Anvendtes samtaleindholdet (og uddannelsesplanen) i praksis?
9	Hvordan var graden af supervision?
10	Var vejlederen tilstede i tilstrækkeligt omfang?
11	Anviste vejlederen dig uddannelsesrelevante arbejdsområder?
12	Hvordan vurderer du graden af selvstændighed i det kliniske arbejde?
13	Hvordan vurderer du arbejdsbyrden?
14	Var arbejdet tilrettelagt med rimeligt hensyntagen til uddannelsen?
15	Hvordan var vagthypigheden i forhold til vagtens uddannelsesværdi?
16	Hvordan vurderer du uddannelsesværdien af vagtarbejdet?
17	Hvordan vurderer du uddannelsesværdien af dagarbejdet?
18	Deltog du i forskning/kvalitetsudviklingsarbejde?
19	Deltog du i administrativt arbejde?
20	Deltog du i afdelingens formaliserede undervisning?
21	Underviste du selv?
22	Hvordan vurderer du afdelingens uddannelsesmiljø/prioritering?
23	Hvordan vurderer du uddannelsesstedets samlede uddannelsesindsats?
24	Hvordan vurderer du dit samlede uddannelsesudbytte under ansættelsen?
Text	Vejleder
Text	Uddannelsesansvarlig

Appendix Table G.4: Questions in Evaluations until 2015, English

1	How do you assess the quality of the introduction at the place of education?
2	Did you follow the introductory program?
3	How do you rate the quality of the training program?
4	Does the content correspond to the requirements of the goal description?
5	Did the training course correspond to the training program?
6	Have you met the checklist sub-items?
7	How was the quality of the supervisor's efforts in relation to your education?
8	Was the interview content (and the training plan) used in practice?
9	How was the degree of supervision?
10	Was the supervisor present to a sufficient extent?
11	Did the supervisor instruct you in training-relevant work areas?
12	How do you assess the degree of independence in the clinical work?
13	How do you assess the workload?
14	Was the work organized with reasonable consideration for the education?
15	How was the shift frequency in relation to the shift's educational value?
16	How do you assess the educational value of the shift work?
17	How do you assess the educational value of day work?
18	Did you participate in research/quality development work?
19	Did you participate in administrative work?
20	Did you participate in the department's formalized teaching?
21	Did you teach yourself?
22	How do you assess the department's educational environment/priorities?
23	How do you assess the educational institution's overall educational efforts?
24	How do you assess your overall educational output during employment?
Text	Mentor
Text	Head of Educational Program

Appendix Table G.5: Questions in Evaluations from 2016, Danish

1	Uddannelsesstedet og jeg har afstemt forventninger til uddannelseselementet ved introduktionen.
2	Jeg blev introduceret til de opgaver, jeg skulle varetage.
3	Min hovedvejleder og jeg samarbejdede om at udarbejde min individuelle uddannelsesplan.
4	Mit behov for uddannelsesvejledning er blevet opfyldt.
5	De planlagte kompetencevurderinger er blevet gennemført.
6	Kompetencevurderinger er blevet efterfulgt af feedback.
7	Jeg er blevet tilbudt karrierevejledning svarende til mit behov.
8	Jeg har fået feedback i forhold til min evne til at samarbejde med sundhedsprofessionelle.
9	Jeg har fået feedback i forhold til min evne til at agere professionelt.
10	Jeg har fået feedback i forhold til min evne til at kommunikere.
11	Jeg har fået mulighed for at udvikle mig som leder/administrator og organisator.
12	Jeg har fået supervision svarende til mit behov i det daglige arbejde.
13	De daglige læringsmuligheder er blevet udnyttet.
14	De daglige vejledere har været til at få fat på, når jeg havde behov for det.
15	Arbejdstilrettelæggelsen har tilgodeset, at jeg også har varetaget opgaver, der er relevante for, at jeg har kunnet opnå kompetencerne som angivet i uddannelsesprogrammet.
16	I arbejdstilrettelæggelsen er det blevet prioriteret, at der har været progression i min kompetenceudvikling.
17	I arbejdstilrettelæggelsen er vejledersamtaler blevet prioriteret.
18	Jeg har fået mulighed for at udvikle mig som underviser.
19	Jeg har haft mulighed for at deltage i uddannelsesstedets undervisningstilbud.
20	Jeg har haft udbytte af uddannelsesstedets konferencer.
21	Jeg har oplevet, at der er en gensidigt respektfuld omgangstone på uddannelsesstedet.
22	Jeg har været tryk ved at stille spørgsmål til kollegaer.
23	Jeg har kunnet diskutere svære problemstillinger med mine kollegaer.
24	Jeg har oplevet, at jeg har arbejdet som del af et arbejdsfællesskab.
25	Samlet set har uddannelsesstedets indsats været tilfredsstillende.
26	Mit samlede uddannelsesmæssige udbytte har været tilfredsstillende.
Text	Vejleder
Text	Uddannelsesansvarlig

Appendix Table G.6: Questions in Evaluations from 2016, English

1	The place of education and I have reconciled expectations of the educational element at the time of the introduction.
2	I was introduced to the tasks I had to undertake.
3	My main supervisor and I collaborated on preparing my individual education plan.
4	My need for educational guidance has been met.
5	The planned competency assessments have been carried out.
6	Competence assessments have been followed by feedback.
7	I have been offered career guidance according to my needs.
8	I have received feedback regarding my ability to collaborate with health professionals.
9	I have received feedback in relation to my ability to act professionally.
10	I have received feedback in relation to my ability to communicate.
11	I have had the opportunity to develop as a leader / administrator and organizer.
12	I have received supervision according to my needs in the daily work.
13	The daily learning opportunities have been utilized.
14	The daily tutors have been available when I needed it.
15	The work organization has taken into account that I have also handled tasks that are relevant for me to have been able to achieve the competencies as stated in the training program.
16	In the work organization, it has been prioritized that there has been progression in my competence development.
17	In the work organization, supervisor feedback has been prioritized.
18	I have had the opportunity to develop as a teacher.
19	I have had the opportunity to participate in the educational offer of the educational institution.
20	I have benefited from the conferences of the educational institution.
21	I have experienced that there is a mutually respectful tone of voice at the place of education.
22	I have been comfortable asking questions to colleagues.
23	I have been able to discuss difficult issues with my colleagues.
24	I have experienced that I have worked as part of a working community.
25	Overall, the educational institution's efforts have been satisfactory.
26	My overall educational output has been satisfactory.
Text	Mentor
Text	Head of Educational Program
