

CAPITAL FLOWS AND INCOME INEQUALITY

ZHENG LIU, MARK M. SPIEGEL, AND JINGYI ZHANG

ABSTRACT. We document empirical evidence that surges in capital inflows (outflows) raise (reduce) income inequality. We study the mechanism through which changes in capital flows and capital account policies can influence income distributions in a small open economy model. Our model features heterogeneous agents and financial frictions, with banks intermediating between household savings and entrepreneur investment. Inflow surges disproportionately raise entrepreneur income, exacerbating inequality, while transitory increases in outflows boost the share of household income, alleviating inequality. Under capital-skill complementarity, capital account liberalization that induces net capital inflows raises both the skill wage premium and overall income inequality. These predictions are also in line with our empirical evidence.

Date: February 27, 2023.

Key words and phrases. Capital flows, income distribution, heterogeneous agents, capital-skill complementarity, financial frictions, small open economy.

JEL classification: D63, F32, F38

Liu: Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco; Email: Zheng.Liu@sf.frb.org. Spiegel: Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco; Email: Mark.Spiegel@sf.frb.org. Zhang: School of Economics, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, China; Email: zhang.jingyi@mail.shufe.edu.cn. We are grateful to Jess Benhabib, Anton Korinek, Prakash Loungani, Alessandro Rebucci, Shang-Jin Wei, and seminar participants at CEBRA, the IMF, the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, the SEACEN for helpful comments. We thank Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti and Nan Li for sharing the IMF national assets and liabilities data, updated through 2018. Anton Bobrov and Renuka Diwan provided excellent research assistance. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco or the Federal Reserve System.

I. INTRODUCTION

Surges in capital inflows driven by changes in global economic conditions can have adverse impacts (Ghosh et al., 2014, 2016). In the short run, capital inflows can benefit the destination economy by reducing the cost of financing domestic consumption and investment. Over time, however, capital flow reversals can cause painful sudden stops (Calvo, 1998), elevating the risks of domestic banking crises (Mendoza, 2010; Caballero, 2016). Policymakers have acknowledged the potential adverse effects of excessive capital flows. For example, while the IMF advocated capital account openness, it has become more amenable in recent years to the use of capital account restrictions as a “... part of the policy toolkit to manage inflows” (Ostry et al., 2010).

Capital flows may also influence the distribution of income. For example, de Haan and Sturm (2016) argue that the benefits of inflow surges disproportionately accrue to agents who are more adept at capitalizing on them, exacerbating the skewness of the distribution of income. In contrast, when capital flow reversals occur, the burdens are likely to fall disproportionately on the poor. Similarly, Furceri and Loungani (2018) and Furceri et al. (2019) document evidence that episodes of capital account liberalization are associated with increased inequality .

In this paper, we examine the relations between capital flow surges and income distributions, both empirically and theoretically.

We first document empirical evidence that surges in capital flows have significant impact on income inequality. We use a panel of 119 countries, including both advanced economies (AE) and emerging market economies (EME), during the period from 2001 to 2018. Specifically, we examine the impact of changes in both gross capital flows (inflows and outflows) and net inflows on income inequality measured by year-over-year by changes in the Gini coefficient. To mitigate potentially endogeneity issues, we instrument our capital flow measures using changes in the two-year U.S. Treasury yields interacted with a measure of financial remoteness constructed by Rose and Spiegel (2009) based on the great-circle distance from New York City, the financial center of the United States. A decline in the U.S. Treasury yields, for example, should lead to capital inflows to a small open economy. Since the economy is relatively small, changes in the U.S. Treasury yields should not be exogenous to that economy. The shorter the distance of the economy from New York City, the stronger the responses of capital inflows should be (Rose and Spiegel, 2009). Our evidence suggests that this instrumental variable is valid and the null hypothesis of weak instruments is overwhelmingly rejected in all our empirical specifications.

We estimate that, on average, a one standard deviation increase in capital inflows is associated with a 0.75 percentage point increase in the year-over-year changes in a country's Gini coefficient, while a one standard deviation increase in outflows is associated with a 0.79 percentage point decrease. We also find that a one standard deviation increase in *net* inflows is associated with a 0.39 percentage point increase in the growth rate of a country's Gini coefficient. These numbers are statistically and economically significant. Our results are robust to a wide variety of perturbations in specifications, sample, and estimation methods.

To understand the mechanisms that drive the empirical link between capital flows and income distributions, we construct a small open economy model with heterogeneous agents and financial frictions.

The model features two types of infinitely-lived agents: households and entrepreneurs, with a large number of each type. Competitive firms use capital, skilled labor and unskilled labor to produce a homogeneous consumption good. The production technology features capital-skill complementarity in the spirit of [Krusell et al. \(2000\)](#). Entrepreneurs supply skilled labor to firms. They have access to an investment technology that transforms consumption goods to productive capital. They finance spending from labor income, capital returns, and borrowings from domestic banks and foreign investors. Foreign borrowings require a risk premium that depends on the size of the external debt ([Neumeyer and Perri, 2005](#); [Uribe and Yue, 2006](#)). Households supply unskilled labor to firms. They do not have access to the investment technology. They can save in domestic and foreign banks. Competitive and risk-neutral domestic banks take deposits from the households and extend loans to the entrepreneurs. Financial intermediation costs generate a spread between deposit and lending interest rates, as in [Cúrdia and Woodford \(2016\)](#). The government imposes taxes on both capital inflows and outflows, and rebates the tax revenues to domestic households and entrepreneurs.

In this model environment, changes in capital flows impact on income distributions through changes in capital returns and capital-skill complementarity. We use our model to study the implications of capital flow shocks and capital account policies for the distribution of income between households and entrepreneurs.

The model predicts that a shock that leads to a surge in capital inflows benefits entrepreneurs more than households, and therefore increases income inequality, whereas a shock that leads to an increase in capital outflows would reduce income inequality. Capital flow shocks in our model impact not only on capital income distributions through affecting the relative returns on entrepreneurs' capital investment

vs. households' savings, but also on labor income distributions through capital-skill complementarity.

In our model, a shock that induces capital outflows (e.g., a reduction in the capital outflow tax rate) would raise the households' capital income by boosting the domestic deposit rate. Facing higher funding costs, banks increase the lending rate, depressing investment and output. The contraction in output reduces the marginal product of capital, lowering the entrepreneurs' capital income. Although the decline in investment reduces future capital stocks, mitigating the decline in capital rents, the decline in output under our calibration dominates, leading to persistent declines in capital rents. The fall in capital stocks also reduces the skill wage premium through capital-skill complementarity, lowering the entrepreneurs' share in labor income as well. Thus, the shock that induces capital outflows also reduces income inequality measured by the Gini coefficient.

In contrast, a shock that induces capital inflows (e.g., a reduction in the inflow tax rate) increases income inequality. With increased capital inflows, entrepreneurs rely less on domestic banks for financing investment spending, leading to a decline in the domestic lending rate, reducing the financing costs of investment. This in turn boosts investment and production, raising the levels of labor income for both households and entrepreneurs. Increased investment leads to increases in future capital stocks, raising the skill wage premium through capital-skill complementarity. Thus, the entrepreneurs' share in labor income rises. Meanwhile, the entrepreneurs' share in capital income also rises because the expansion in production raises capital rental income. Overall, the shock that induces a surge in capital inflows also skews the income distribution in favor of entrepreneurs, raising income inequality measured by the Gini. A shock that induces *net* capital inflows (e.g., a decline in the foreign interest rate) would raise income inequality through the same channels.

To evaluate the quantitative importance of the model's mechanism, we simulate the model and run the same regressions using simulated data as we do using actual data. We obtain estimates of the relation between changes in the Gini and capital flows that are very similar—both qualitatively and quantitatively—to those using actual data. This finding suggests that the model's mechanism is empirically plausible and quantitatively important.

II. RELATED LITERATURE

Our paper contributes to the literature on the macroeconomic implications of capital account policies. Capital account restrictions can distort domestic financial markets (Edwards, 1999; Jeanne et al., 2012). They can also distort international trade, effectively mimicking an increase in tariffs (Wei and Zhang, 2007; Costinot et al., 2014) or a devaluation of the real exchange rate, although there is limited evidence that capital controls themselves inhibit growth (Jeanne, 2013). Chang et al. (2015) argue that, following the sharp declines in foreign interest rates during the 2008-09 global financial crisis, China’s costly sterilized intervention program needed to maintain its closed capital account constrained its central bank’s ability to stabilize domestic inflation. By limiting the pressure for capital inflows, capital account restrictions help ease the need for undertaking such costly sterilization activity (Liu and Spiegel, 2015). Davis et al. (2020) show that, in the presence of frictions in foreign bond trading, optimal sterilized foreign exchange interventions are equivalent to optimal time-varying capital flow taxes. Ostry et al. (2010) argue that temporary capital account restrictions can help stabilize large fluctuations in capital inflows. However, the welfare effects of such capital flow taxes depend on whether or not policy commitment is available (Devereux et al., 2018). Properly designed, temporary capital account policies can serve as a useful tool to mitigate the effects of external shocks (Farhi and Werning, 2012; Unsal, 2013; Davis and Presno, 2017). Studies in the development literature suggest that liberalizing capital account can adversely impact an economy with poorly-developed financial markets (Eichengreen et al., 2011; Eichengreen and Leblang, 2003; Ju and Wei, 2010). Some have argued that relaxing capital account restrictions can lead to potential “secondary improvements” or “discipline effects” for domestic institutions stemming from exposures to foreign competition and standards (Kose et al., 2009; Wei and Tytell, 2004).¹

Our work is also related to the theoretical literature on capital account liberalization in the presence of financial frictions. Aoki et al. (2009) study a small open economy model with collateralized debts. They show that liberalizing the capital account is not necessarily beneficial if the domestic financial system is under-developed, because it can reduce long-run total factor productivity (TFP) or lower short-run employment and wages. Liu et al. (2019) examine the optimal capital account liberalization policy in the context of China. They consider a two-sector small open economy model with

¹See Wei (2018), Erten et al. (2019), and Rebucci and Ma (2019) for recent surveys of the literature on capital controls.

financial repression and capital controls over both inflows and outflows. In their model, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are less productive than private firms, but they receive subsidized bank loans under prevailing government policy. Banks finance the subsidies on SOE loans by depressing the deposit interest rates for households and elevating the market loan rates faced by private firms. Capital account liberalization leads to a tradeoff between production allocative efficiency stemming from reallocations between the two sectors and intertemporal allocative efficiency stemming from the households' consumption-savings decisions.

The distributional implications of capital account policies have also been considered by [Bumann and Lensink \(2016\)](#), who examine restrictions on *net* capital flows in a two-period model with heterogeneous agents and financial intermediation. In their model, liberalization of the domestic banking sector through a reduction in reserve requirements raises capital inflows. However, the distributional impacts of this policy change depend on the depth of financial sector development. With low depth, financial deepening effects dominate, and income distribution becomes less skewed. However, with an already-deep financial sector, the reduced costs of intermediation dominate, increasing the skewness of income distribution. In contrast, our analysis considers the implications of liberalization of *gross* capital flows. We show that changes in capital inflows and outflows can have quite different implications for income distributions, and the long-run distributional impact of capital flows is different from the short-run impact. Our analysis thus suggests that adopting distinct inflow and outflow policies can be important for achieving the desired distributional outcomes.

III. CAPITAL FLOW SURGES AND INCOME DISTRIBUTIONS: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE

This section provides cross-country evidence that surges in capital inflows (outflows) increase (decrease) income inequality.

III.1. Data and methodology. We examine the impact of changes in capital flows on income distributions using an unbalanced panel of 128 advanced and emerging market economies, with annual data from 2001 to 2020. ²

²With our baseline conditioning variables included, the number of countries in our sample falls to 119. Our baseline model includes GDP and population series as conditioning variables. These series are obtained from the Penn-World Tables 10.0, constraining the size of our sample. However, we demonstrate below that our results are robust to dropping these conditioning variables and examining the full 128 country sample.

We measure gross capital inflows by changes in the sum of the net acquisition of financial assets in the financial account in US dollars obtained from the IMF Balance of Payments Statistics (BOPS). Gross capital outflows are measured by changes in the sum of the net incurrence of liabilities in the financial account, also obtained from the BOPS.³ We measure income inequality using the Gini coefficients provided by the Standardized World Income Inequality Database.

Figure 1 displays the scatter plot of average annual growth in the Gini coefficient against net capital inflows between 2001 and 2020 for a cross-section of 79 advanced and emerging economies with a population size of at least 2 million. The correlation between these two averages is positive and statistically significant at a 5% confidence level.⁴ The figure suggests that countries that experienced larger net inflows (e.g., Norway) also experienced increases in income inequality. In contrast, countries that experienced large net capital outflows (e.g., Peru) also experienced declines in income inequality.

Since capital flows are potentially endogenous to domestic economic conditions, we use instrumental-variables (IV) estimation to isolate exogenous movements in capital flows and their implications for income inequality. We consider the countries in our sample to be relatively small, and thus changes in world interest rates represent exogenous shocks. We measure the world interest rate by movements in the two-year U.S. Treasury yields, obtained from FRED of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Unlike the short-term interest rates such as the three-month Treasury bills

³The inflows are the sum of net acquisition of financial assets from direct investment *BFDA_BP6_USD*, net acquisition of financial assets from financial derivatives (other than reserves) and employee stock options, *BFFA_BP6_USD*, net acquisition of financial assets from other investment *BFOA_BP6_USD*, and net acquisition of financial assets from portfolio investment *BFPA_BP6_USD*. The outflows are the sum of net incurrence of liabilities from direct investment *BFDL_BP6_USD*, net incurrence of liabilities from financial derivatives (other than reserves) and employee stock options *BFFL_BP6_USD*, net incurrence of liabilities from debt instruments of financial corporations *BFOLFR_BP6_USD*, and net incurrence of liabilities from portfolio investment *BFPL_BP6_USD*.

⁴We include the 79 economies with at least 10 years of data for income inequality and capital flows between 2001 and 2020. We dropped those small countries with population under 2 million from this figure. We also dropped Mongolia because it had an exceptional experience of capital outflows close to 20% of GDP on average during this period. The correlation patterns in Figure 1 are robust in our full sample with all 128 economies, as we show in our panel exercises reported below.




FIGURE 1. Average annual percentage growth rates in GINI and net capital inflows (as a share of GDP) in a panel of 79 advanced and emerging economies from 2001 to 2020 with a population size above two million. The regression line reports univariate regression. See text for variable definitions and data sources.

rate, the two-year U.S. Treasury yields did not reach the zero lower bound (ZLB) in our sample.⁵

To distinguish the impact of movements in two-year U.S. Treasury yields across countries, we interact the interest rate movements with a measure of financial remoteness, and use this interaction variable (denoted by *INTREMOTE*) as an instrument for capital flows. We follow [Rose and Spiegel \(2009\)](#) and measure financial remoteness by the logarithm of the great-circle distance of a country from New York City,

⁵[Swanson and Williams \(2014\)](#) argue that, during the financial crisis of 2008-2009 when the short-term policy rate reached the ZLB, the Federal Reserve's unconventional policies such as quantitative easing and forward guidance are still effectively transmitted through longer-term (such as the two-year) Treasury yields. In a robustness check, we also use the 1-year or 10-year yields as an alternative for constructing our instrument for capital flows. We have obtained similar results (See online appendix, GIVE ADDRESS HERE).

the financial center of the United States.⁶ A large literature documents that costs of financial intermediation increase with geographic distance, with the distance impacting both investment returns and lending behaviors. Indeed, [Portes and Rey \(2005\)](#) demonstrate that physical distance is a superior predictor of patterns in financial flows than in trade flows associated with the well-known “gravity model”. As a result, some studies have found that financial remoteness is associated with enhanced business cycle volatility [e.g., [Rose and Spiegel \(2009\)](#)] and reduced global monetary policy “discipline” [e.g., [Spiegel \(2009\)](#)].

Because our baseline regression includes both inflows and outflows as independent variables, we include regional dummies as additional instrumental variables identifying countries from from Asia (*ASIA*), Africa (*AFRICA*), or the Western Hemisphere (*WESTHEM*). By including these regional dummies as instruments, we implicitly assume that the regional location of a country affects annual changes in its income distribution only through its impact on capital flows. We report the CLR statistics for weak-instrument robust tests.⁷

Our use of regional fixed effects as instruments precludes the use of country fixed effects in the second stage, so we also introduce a battery of conditioning variables to control for other characteristics that may influence changes in income distribution over the course of our sample in our base specification. The set of conditioning variables includes the [Chinn and Ito \(2008\)](#) measure of capital account openness (*CAOPEN*), the World Bank governance indicator for “control of corruption” (*LOWCORR*), the median age of the population (*AGE*), production-based GDP per capita (*GDPPCAP*), and the population size (*POP*) from the Penn World Tables 9.1. Since the two-year Treasury yields are likely to influence global financial conditions, we also control for time fixed effects in our specifications.

⁶[Rose and Spiegel \(2009\)](#) identify remoteness as the minimum distance of a country to either New York, London, or Tokyo. However, since our interacted variable is the two-year U.S. Treasury yields, remoteness from the United States seems more appropriate for our purposes.

⁷See [Pflueger and Wang \(2015\)](#) for discussions of weak instrument tests in linear IV regressions and [Finlay et al. \(2014\)](#) for Stata implementations of weak-instrument robust tests. We have also calculated robust F statistics for the first-stage weak instrument test. Although such F statistics may have questionable accuracy in regressions with more than one endogenous regressor, they reject the null of weak instruments in our first-stage regressions (see the online appendix ??? for details).

We consider two empirical specifications to study the relation between changes in income inequality and gross and net capital flows. For example, our baseline second-stage specification for gross inflows satisfies

$$GGINI_{i,t} = c + \beta_1 INFLOWS_{i,t} + \beta_2 OUTFLOWS_{i,t} + \beta X_{i,t} + \theta_t + \epsilon_{i,t}, \quad (1)$$

where $GGINI_{i,t}$ denotes the change in country i 's Gini coefficient from year $t - 1$ to year t , $INFLOWS_{i,t}$ and $OUTFLOWS_{i,t}$ denote gross capital inflows and outflows, respectively, as a share of GDP for country i in year t , $X_{i,t}$ denotes the set of conditioning variable discussed above, θ_t represents time fixed effects, and $\epsilon_{i,t}$ represents the regression residual, with standard errors clustered by year.

Similarly, our baseline second-stage specification for *net* capital inflows satisfies

$$GGINI_{i,t} = c + \beta_1 NINFLOWS_{i,t} + \beta X_{i,t} + \theta_t + \epsilon_{i,t}, \quad (2)$$

where $NINFLOWS_{i,t}$ represents net inflows into country i in year t as a share of GDP, calculated as the difference between $INFLOWS_{i,t}$ and $OUTFLOWS_{i,t}$. We use the same set of conditioning variables $X_{i,t}$ as those in the specification (1).

Table 1 displays the summary statistics for the sample used in our baseline regressions. Our sample shows substantial variability in both changes in the GINI coefficient and the measures of capital flows. We therefore consider the sensitivity of our results to winsorizing the data in our robustness checks, discussed below.

TABLE 1. Summary Statistics

Variables	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
<i>GGINI</i>	1626	-0.001	0.007	-0.030	0.039
<i>INFLOWS</i>	1626	0.055	0.163	-0.443	1.989
<i>OUTFLOWS</i>	1626	0.090	0.180	-0.991	2.015
<i>NINFLOWS</i>	1626	-0.035	0.092	-0.832	0.965

Note: Summary statistics of the data sample for the baseline regressions. *GGINI* denotes the annual change in the GINI coefficient, *INFLOWS* denotes gross capital inflows, *OUTFLOWS* denotes gross capital outflows, and *NINFLOWS* denotes net capital inflows (i.e., the difference between *INFLOWS* and *OUTFLOWS*). See the text for detailed descriptions of these variables.

Source: IMF International Balance of Payments Statistics and the Standardized World Income Inequality Database.

Overall, the changes in the GINI coefficient in our sample are modest on average (slightly negative), although the variable *GGINI* displays substantial variability, with a standard deviation about 7 times as large as the mean and it varies in the range

from -3 percent to 4 percent. The capital inflows as a share of GDP in our sample are positive on average (about 5.5 percent) per year. However, there are clearly large surges in both capital inflows and outflows in our data, with flows in some years in our sample exceeding the value of a country's GDP.⁸ Such large surges in capital flows can be particularly true for "risk off" episodes in our sample, including the global financial crisis. We therefore consider the implications of omitting the crisis years from our sample in one of our robustness exercises below.

III.2. Baseline results. Table 2 shows the regression results under our baseline empirical specifications. Our base specification results demonstrate that an increase in gross capital inflows is associated with an increase in income inequality, while an increase in gross outflows is associated with a decrease in income inequality [see Column (1)]. Our estimated coefficient on gross inflows is statistically significant at a 5% confidence level, while that for gross outflows is significant at a 1% confidence level.

Based on the summary statistics in Table 1, the point estimates in Column (1) of Table 2 indicate that a one standard deviation annual increase in inflows is associated on average with a 0.75 percentage point increase in the growth of a country's Gini coefficient in that year, while a one standard deviation increase in outflows is associated with a 0.79 percentage point decrease.⁹ The CLR, AR and Wald statistics all strongly reject the null of weak instruments, with a p-value of less than 1%.

Column (2) in Table 2 reports the regression results in the specification for net private inflows. The estimation results show that an increase in net private inflows is associated with increased income inequality, again with statistical significance at a 1% confidence level. Our point estimate indicates that a one standard deviation increase in net private inflows is associated with a 0.39 percentage point increase in the growth of country's Gini coefficient in that year. As in the case for the gross flow

⁸Note that while our measures of gross inflows and outflows are positive on average, we also observe large negative movements in these flows. Essentially, our measurement considers changes in private asset holdings as outflows, and changes in liability holdings as inflows. As such, for example, a large principal payment on debt issuance would be considered a negative movement in inflows, and could result in a negative value for overall annual inflows. As these transactions are often lumpy, it is not surprising that the absolute values of negative values for inflows can exceed GDP for some observations.

⁹To get these numbers, we multiply the standard deviation of the private capital inflows (0.163) or outflows (0.180) by the point estimates of the coefficient on these two variables in the baseline regression (0.046 and -0.044, respectively), and scale the results by 100 to obtain the percentage point changes in the growth rate of the Gini coefficient.

TABLE 2. Baseline Regression Results

Dependent variable:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>GINI</i>						
<i>INFLOWS</i>	0.046** (0.018)		0.124*** (0.028)		0.115*** (0.025)	
<i>OUTFLOWS</i>	-0.044*** (0.012)		-0.088*** (0.018)		-0.093*** (0.029)	
<i>NINFLOWS</i>		0.042*** (0.009)		0.071*** (0.015)		0.098*** (0.032)
<i>AGE</i>	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)				
<i>CAOPEN</i>	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)				
<i>INFCONT</i>			0.006*** (0.001)	0.004*** (0.001)		
<i>OUTCONT</i>			-0.004*** (0.001)	-0.004*** (0.001)		
<i>LOWCORR</i>	0.000 (0.000)	0.001** (0.000)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.001*** (0.000)		
<i>GDPPCAP</i>	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)		
<i>POP</i>	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)		
<i>Constant</i>	-0.003** (0.001)	-0.003** (0.001)	-0.002 (0.001)	0.001 (0.000)	0.002** (0.001)	0.003*** (0.001)
Observations	1626	1626	1102	1102	1787	1787
CLR	14.06 [0.005]	14.05 [0.005]	15.85 [0.003]	15.69 [0.003]	15.91 [0.003]	15.38 [0.003]
AR	15.11 [0.005]	15.11 [0.005]	16.01 [0.003]	16.01 [0.003]	16.45 [0.003]	16.45 [0.003]
Wald	28.37 [0.000]	22.08 [0.000]	24.11 [0.000]	21.51 [0.000]	31.82 [0.000]	9.47 [0.002]

Dependent variable: Growth in GINI coefficient of income inequality. Two-stage least squares estimation with *INTREMOTE* and regional dummies as instruments for *INFLOWS*, *OUTFLOWS*, *NINFLOWS*. Year fixed effects are included in all specifications. See the text for variable definitions. For models (1), (2), we use the base sample with the conditioning variables, including the Chinn-Ito (2008) measure of capital account openness, *CAOPEN*. For models (3), and (4), we substitute the Fernández, et al (2016) individual indices for controls on capital inflows and outflows, *INFCONT* and *OUTCONT*. Models (5) and (6) drop the conditioning variables, and thus expand the sample size. Standard errors clustered by year are shown in parentheses. P-values are reported for CLR, AR, and Wald tests of weak instruments. Statistical significance levels are indicated by the asterisks: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, and * $p < 0.10$.

regression in Column (1), the CLR, AR, and Wald statistics continue to reject the null of weak instruments.

Columns (3) and (4) in Table 2 substitute the Fernández et al. (2016) indices which separately represent controls on inflows and outflows for the Chinn-Ito index of overall capital account openness. This alternative measure reduces our coverage and the size of our sample, but the qualitative results remain the same. As in our base regression, we obtain statistically significant positive and negative coefficients for the impact on growth in income inequality from capital inflows and outflows respectively. Our coefficient point estimates are also larger in absolute value, about twice as large for outflows and close to three times the size for inflows. We also obtain a larger point estimate for net capital flows. The results for all the common conditioning variables are also comparable, leaving us to conclude that our results are largely robust to either form of conditioning for capital account restrictions. As before, the CLR, AR and Wald diagnostics all strongly reject the null of weak instruments with a p-value of less than 1%.

To demonstrate that our baseline estimation results are not driven by the second-stage conditioning variables, we drop the conditioning variables from our second-stage regressions and run our full 128 country sample in columns (5) and (6) in Table 2. These results are also qualitatively similar, as increases in gross (or net) private capital inflows continue to raise inequality, while increases in gross outflows continue to reduce it. These effects are statistically significant at the 1% level, and the magnitudes are roughly double those obtained in the baseline specifications.¹⁰

III.3. Robustness. We have conducted a battery of further robustness checks. To conserve space, we present those results in an online Appendix [GIVE ADDRESS HERE](#).

We first consider a variety of alternative specifications. These include dropping the conditional variables, as we do in columns (5) and (6) of Table 2, but restricting our sample to those in our base specification. We then consider a number of alternative specifications with additional conditioning variables added one at a time, including average years of schooling, the World Governance Indicators (WGI) for voice and accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, and rule of law; bank lending rates, our remoteness measure, the share of self-employment in

¹⁰Moreover, as we demonstrate below in our robustness exercises, running the regression with conditioning variables removed and the baseline sample (with 119 countries) yields similar results.

the population, and individual country dummies. We also consider alternative measures of our *INTREMOTE* variable with 1 and 10-year US treasury rates substituted for our base 2-year measure. We consider both substituting these alternative measures for our base measure and adding them to the base measure one at a time.

Our results are robust to almost all of these alternative specifications as the estimated coefficients on the variables of interest continue to enter with their predicted signs and similar levels of statistical significance. One exception is the case for capital outflows in the model with the average years of schooling variable added.¹¹ We also find that with the WGI Rule of law indicator or the remoteness variable added the *INFLOWS* variable continues to enter with the same sign, but insignificantly, while the *OUTFLOWS* and *NINFLOWS* variables continue to enter significantly with their expected signs at standard confidence levels.

We also examine the robustness of our results to a variety of changes in sample. We drop the extreme observations with very large or very small private inflows and outflows one at a time, with the outliers defined as the observations more than three standard deviations from the sample mean. We also drop the observations with exceptionally unequal or exceptionally equal income distributions, and those with exceptionally remote or proximate countries, again one at a time with the outliers defined as the realizations more than three standard deviations from the sample mean. We also drop the observations coinciding with the 2008 and 2009 global financial crisis. For all of these perturbations, we re-estimate our base specification and cluster the standard errors by year. Our estimation results are robust to all of these perturbations. The estimated coefficients on the variables of interest all enter with the predicted signs and with strong statistical significance.

Finally, we examine the robustness of our results to changes in estimation methods. First, to demonstrate that our baseline estimation results are not driven by outliers in the data, we winsorize the sample at the 1% level. Next, we re-estimate our baseline specification with White's heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, and then with regular standard errors. All of the specifications continue to enter with

¹¹The issue with the years of schooling variable appears to be its impact on our sample, rather than the inclusion of the education variable. When we include the education variable, the sample is reduced from 1,626 to 1,390 observations. To confirm this conjecture, we reestimated our baseline specification without the education variable, but with this smaller sample. With this sample, all three variables of interest lose their statistical significance. These results are available on request from the authors.

statistical significance and with point estimates similar to what we obtain under the base specification.

Overall, the empirical results provide robust evidence that capital inflows, both gross and net, are associated with short-run increases in income inequality, whereas capital outflows are associated with short-run declines in inequality.

IV. THE MODEL

To understand the empirical link between capital flows and income inequality, we construct a small open economy model with two types of infinitely-lived agents, entrepreneurs and households, with a continuum of each type. We normalize the population size to one and assume that the share of households is $\theta \in (0, 1)$. There is a homogeneous consumption good produced by competitive firms using capital and labor supplied by the two types of agents. Entrepreneurs supply skilled labor to firms and accumulate capital. They finance the acquisition of capital through labor income and borrowings from domestic banks and foreign investors. Households supply unskilled labor to firms, although they do not have access to capital investment technology. Households can save in domestic and foreign banks. We allow for endogenous variations in the discount factors of each type of agents to ensure the model to be stationary.

Domestic banks operate in a perfectly competitive market, taking as given the market interest rates on deposits and loans. Banks face financial intermediation costs, which give rise to a credit spread, driving a wedge between the deposit and lending interest rates. The government implements capital account restrictions by taxing earnings on both capital inflows and outflows.

IV.1. Households. The representative household has the utility function

$$U_{ht} = \mathbb{E} \sum_{s=0}^{\infty} \beta_{h,t+s} \ln(c_{h,t+s}), \quad (3)$$

where \mathbb{E} is an expectation operator, c_{ht} denotes consumption in period t , and β_{ht} denotes a time-varying subject discount factor. To ensure stationarity of the small open economy model, we follow the approach of [Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe \(2003\)](#) by assuming that the discount factor is endogenous and depends on average household consumption $\bar{c}_{h,t}$. Specifically, the discount factor is given by

$$\beta_{h,t+1} = \beta_{ht} \gamma (1 + \bar{c}_{ht})^{-\chi}, \quad (4)$$

where $\gamma > 0$ is a scale parameter and $\chi > 0$ measures the elasticity of the discount factor with respect to average household consumption.¹²

In each period t , the household chooses consumption (c_{ht}), domestic bank deposits (d_t), and foreign bank deposits (b_{ft}^d) to maximize the utility function (3), subject to Eq. (4) and the sequence of budget constraints

$$c_{ht} + d_t + b_{ft}^d = w_{ht}h_{ht} + R_{t-1}d_{t-1} + (1 - \tau_{dt})R_{t-1}^*b_{f,t-1}^d + t_{ht}. \quad (5)$$

where h_{ht} denotes the household's endowment of low-skill labor, which is inelastically supplied to firms at the competitive wage rate w_{ht} for low-skill workers; R_t denotes the domestic deposit interest rate; R_t^* denotes the world risk-free interest rate; τ_{dt} denotes the tax rate on earnings from foreign assets (i.e., a capital outflow tax); and t_{ht} denotes lump-sum transfers from the government and dividend income from domestic banks.

The household's optimizing decisions imply the Euler equations

$$1 = E_t \gamma (1 + \bar{c}_{h,t})^{-\chi} R_t \frac{c_{ht}}{c_{h,t+1}}, \quad (6)$$

$$1 = E_t \gamma (1 + \bar{c}_{h,t})^{-\chi} (1 - \tau_d) R_t^* \frac{c_{ht}}{c_{h,t+1}}, \quad (7)$$

which in turn imply the no-arbitrage condition

$$R_t = (1 - \tau_{dt})R_t^*. \quad (8)$$

A positive tax rate τ_{dt} represents capital outflow controls and it drives a wedge between the domestic deposit rate and the world interest rate.

IV.2. Entrepreneurs. The representative entrepreneur has the utility function

$$U_{et} = E \sum_{s=0}^{\infty} \beta_{e,t+s} \ln(c_{e,t+s}), \quad (9)$$

where c_{et} denotes the entrepreneur's consumption in period t and β_{et} denotes the entrepreneur's time-varying discount factor. Similar to that for the household, we assume that the entrepreneur's discount factor is a function of average entrepreneur consumption \bar{c}_{et} and it is given by

$$\beta_{e,t+1} = \beta_{et} \gamma (1 + \bar{c}_{et})^{-\chi}. \quad (10)$$

¹²This type of preferences originally introduced by [Uzawa \(1968\)](#) has been widely used in the small open economy literature. Examples include [Mendoza \(1991\)](#), [Uribe \(1997\)](#), [Schmitt-Grohe \(1998\)](#), [Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe \(2003\)](#), and [Ju et al. \(2021\)](#).

The entrepreneur has access to an investment technology that transforms final consumption goods into productive capital. The capital stock (k_t) held by the entrepreneur evolves according to the law of motion

$$k_t = (1 - \delta)k_{t-1} + \left[1 - \frac{\Omega_k}{2} \left(\frac{i_t}{i_{t-1}} - 1\right)^2\right] i_t. \quad (11)$$

where i_t denotes the flow of investment, $\delta \in [0, 1]$ denotes the capital depreciation rate, and the term in the squared brackets shows the quadratic investment adjustment cost function, the size of which is governed by the parameter Ω_k .

The entrepreneur is endowed with h_{et} units of skilled labor, which is inelastically supplied to firms at the competitive wage rate w_{et} . The entrepreneur rents the available capital stock at the beginning of period t (k_{t-1}) to firms at the competitive rental rate r_t^k . The entrepreneur uses the labor income, capital rental income, along with loans b_{et} and transfer payments t_{et} to finance consumption, investment, and repayments of loans at the loan interest rate R_{lt} . Thus, the entrepreneur faces the sequence of budget constraints

$$c_{et} + i_t + R_{l,t-1}b_{e,t-1} = w_{et}h_{et} + r_t^k k_{t-1} + b_{et} + t_{et}. \quad (12)$$

The entrepreneur chooses consumption c_{et} , borrowing b_{et} , and investment i_t to maximize the utility function (9) subject to Eq. (10), (11), and (12). The entrepreneur's optimizing decisions imply the following Euler equations

$$1 = E_t \gamma (1 + \bar{c}_{e,t})^{-\chi} R_{lt} \frac{c_{e,t}}{c_{e,t+1}}, \quad (13)$$

$$q_t^k = E_t \gamma (1 + \bar{c}_{e,t})^{-\chi} [q_{t+1}^k (1 - \delta) + r_{t+1}^k] \frac{c_{e,t}}{c_{e,t+1}}, \quad (14)$$

$$1 = q_t^k \left[1 - \frac{\Omega_k}{2} \left(\frac{i_t}{i_{t-1}} - 1\right)^2 - \Omega_k \left(\frac{i_t}{i_{t-1}} - 1\right) \frac{i_t}{i_{t-1}}\right] + E_t \gamma (1 + \bar{c}_{e,t})^{-\chi} \frac{c_{e,t}}{c_{e,t+1}} q_{t+1}^k \Omega_k \left(\frac{i_{t+1}}{i_t} - 1\right) \left(\frac{i_{t+1}}{i_t}\right)^2. \quad (15)$$

where q_t^k denotes the Tobin's q , defined as the ratio the marginal value of capital (i.e., the Lagrangian multiplier for Eq. (11)) to the marginal utility of income (i.e., the Lagrangian multiplier for the budget constraint (12)).

The aggregate capital stock K_t and investment I_t are then given by

$$K_t \equiv (1 - \theta)k_t, \quad I_t \equiv (1 - \theta)i_t. \quad (16)$$

IV.3. **Firms.** There is a continuum of identical and competitive firms with measure one. The representative firm produces a homogeneous good Y_t using capital K_{t-1} , low-skill labor H_{ht} and high-skill labor H_{et} . Following [Krusell et al. \(2000\)](#), we introduce capital-skill complementarity using a nested CES production function

$$Y_t = \left[(\alpha_u)^{\frac{1}{\sigma}} (H_{ht})^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} + (1 - \alpha_u)^{\frac{1}{\sigma}} (V_t)^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \right]^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}}, \quad (17)$$

where

$$V_t = \left[(\alpha_k)^{\frac{1}{\rho}} (K_{t-1})^{\frac{\rho-1}{\rho}} + (1 - \alpha_k)^{\frac{1}{\rho}} (H_{et})^{\frac{\rho-1}{\rho}} \right]^{\frac{\rho}{\rho-1}}. \quad (18)$$

Here, the parameters $\alpha_u \in (0, 1)$ and $\alpha_k \in (0, 1)$ govern the relative importance of low-skill labor and capital inputs in production. The parameter $\rho > 0$ denotes the elasticity of substitution between capital and high-skill labor and the parameter $\sigma > 0$ denotes the elasticity of substitution between the capital-skill composite (V_t) and low-skill labor.

Cost-minimizing implies the conditional factor demand functions

$$w_{ht} H_{ht}^{\frac{1}{\sigma}} = (\alpha_u Y_t)^{\frac{1}{\sigma}}, \quad (19)$$

$$w_{et} H_{et}^{\frac{1}{\rho}} = ((1 - \alpha_u) Y_t)^{\frac{1}{\sigma}} (1 - \alpha_k)^{\frac{1}{\rho}} V_t^{\frac{\sigma-\rho}{\sigma\rho}}, \quad (20)$$

and

$$r_t^k K_{t-1}^{\frac{1}{\rho}} = ((1 - \alpha_u) Y_t)^{\frac{1}{\sigma}} (\alpha_k)^{\frac{1}{\rho}} V_t^{\frac{\sigma-\rho}{\sigma\rho}}. \quad (21)$$

The skill premium, measured by the ratio of the skilled wage and unskilled wage, is given by

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{w_{et}}{w_{ht}} &= \left(\frac{1 - \alpha_u}{\alpha_u} \right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma}} \frac{H_{ht}^{\frac{1}{\sigma}}}{H_{et}^{\frac{1}{\rho}}} (1 - \alpha_k)^{\frac{1}{\rho}} V_t^{\frac{\sigma-\rho}{\sigma\rho}} \\ &= \left(\frac{1 - \alpha_u}{\alpha_u} \right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma}} \frac{H_{ht}^{\frac{1}{\sigma}}}{H_{et}^{\frac{1}{\rho}}} (1 - \alpha_k)^{\frac{1}{\rho}} \left[(\alpha_k)^{\frac{1}{\rho}} (K_{t-1})^{\frac{\rho-1}{\rho}} + (1 - \alpha_k)^{\frac{1}{\rho}} (H_{et})^{\frac{\rho-1}{\rho}} \right]^{\frac{\sigma-\rho}{\sigma(\rho-1)}}. \end{aligned}$$

If $\sigma > \rho$, the production function features capital-skill complementarity. In this case, an increase in the capital stock raises the marginal product of high-skill labor more than the marginal product of low-skill labor. For any given labor supply, an increase in the capital stock raises the skill premium, as in [Krusell et al. \(2000\)](#).¹³

¹³For simplicity, we follow [Krusell et al. \(2000\)](#) and abstract from the general equilibrium effect from endogenous skill accumulation. See [He and Liu \(2008\)](#) for a general equilibrium model with capital-skill complementarity and endogenous skill accumulation decisions.

IV.4. Banks. There is a continuum of competitive banks with measure one. The representative bank takes deposits D_t from households at the deposit interest rate R_t and lends to entrepreneurs at the lending interest rate R_{lt} , where $D_t \equiv \theta d_t$ denotes the aggregate deposits held by the households.

Following [Cúrdia and Woodford \(2016\)](#), we assume that financial intermediation is costly. In the process of originating B_t units of loans, the bank needs to spend real resources $\Xi\left(\frac{B_t}{Y_t}\right) Y_t$ (in units of final output). The function $\Xi\left(\frac{B_t}{Y_t}\right)$ takes the form

$$\Xi\left(\frac{B_t}{Y_t}\right) = \xi \left(\frac{B_t}{Y_t}\right)^\eta, \quad (22)$$

where the elasticity parameter $\eta > 1$, implying that the intermediation cost function $\Xi(\cdot)$ is strictly increasing and strictly convex. The convexity of $\Xi(\cdot)$ reflects diseconomies of scale in the enforcement of loan contracts.

Taking the interest rates and aggregate output as given, the representative bank chooses deposits D_t and loans B_t to maximize profits

$$\Pi_t^b \equiv D_t - B_t - \Xi\left(\frac{B_t}{Y_t}\right) Y_t, \quad (23)$$

subject to the flow-of-funds constraint

$$R_{lt} B_t = R_t D_t. \quad (24)$$

At the end of the period, the bank distributes all excess funds received from depositors that are not lent out or used to cover the intermediation costs to its shareholders (i.e., the households) in the form of dividend payments.

The optimizing credit supply decision implies that

$$R_{lt} = R_t \left[1 + \Xi' \left(\frac{B_t}{Y_t} \right) \right]. \quad (25)$$

Thus, financial intermediation costs drive a wedge between the loan rate and the deposit rate, with the wedge (or credit spread) given by the term $\Xi' \left(\frac{B_t}{Y_t} \right)$.¹⁴ The convexity of the $\Xi(\cdot)$ function implies that credit spread increases with the loan-to-output ratio $\frac{B_t}{Y_t}$.

IV.5. Foreign investors. Foreign investors lend to domestic entrepreneurs at the market loan rate R_{lt} , subject to a capital inflow tax of $\tau_{l,t}$.¹⁵ The after-tax return for

¹⁴This time-varying interest rate wedge captures the severity of credit frictions faced by domestic banks. As we show in the quantitative analysis, the time-varying interest rate wedge plays an important role in the transmission of capital inflow shocks to real activity and income distributions.

¹⁵Since the domestic deposit interest rate lies below the market loan rate (see Eq. (25)), foreign investors have no incentive to deposit funds in domestic banks.

foreign investors is thus $(1 - \tau_{lt})R_{lt}$. External debt also requires a risk premium (Liu et al., 2019).

Under these assumptions, no arbitrage implies that

$$(1 - \tau_{l,t})R_{lt} = R_t^* \Phi \left(\frac{B_{ft}^l}{Y_t} \right). \quad (26)$$

where B_{ft}^l denotes the amount of foreign investment and $\Phi \left(\frac{B_{ft}^l}{Y_t} \right)$ denotes the risk premium, which depends on the amount of external debt relative to aggregate output.

We assume that the risk premium function is given by

$$\Phi \left(\frac{B_{ft}^l}{Y_t} \right) = \exp \left[\Phi_b \left(\frac{B_{ft}^l}{Y_t} - \kappa_f \right) \right], \quad (27)$$

where $\kappa_f \geq 0$ denotes the desired ratio of external debt to aggregate output and the parameter $\Phi_b > 0$ measures the sensitivity of the risk premium to changes in external debts.

The dependence of the risk premium on the relative size of external debts implies an externality, as individual firms take interest rates (inclusive of the risk premium) as given. The presence of the risk premium, along with capital inflow taxes, drives a wedge between domestic loan interest rate and the world interest rate.

IV.6. Market clearing and equilibrium. In equilibrium, final goods market clearing implies that the trade surplus (i.e., net exports) is given by

$$NX_t = Y_t - \theta c_{ht} - (1 - \theta)c_{et} - I_t - \Xi \left(\frac{B_t}{Y_t} \right) Y_t. \quad (28)$$

The loan market clearing condition is given by

$$B_t + B_{ft}^l = (1 - \theta)b_{et}. \quad (29)$$

We assume that individual labor supplies of both the households and entrepreneurs are inelastic and normalized to one ($h_{ht} \equiv 1, h_{et} \equiv 1$). Then, labor market clearing implies that

$$H_{ht} = \theta h_{ht} = \theta, \quad H_{et} = (1 - \theta)h_{et} = 1 - \theta. \quad (30)$$

In each period, the government collects capital control taxes and transfers these taxes to the households and the entrepreneurs. Banks distribute profits to the households and the entrepreneurs, who are their share holders. Both the capital flow taxes and bank profits are equally distributed to the households and the entrepreneurs as lump sum transfers. Specifically, the per-capita transfers are given by

$$t_{ht} = t_{et} = \tau_{d,t-1} R_{t-1}^* B_{f,t-1}^d + \tau_{l,t-1} R_{l,t-1} B_{f,t-1}^l + \Pi_t^b. \quad (31)$$

Summing up all sectors' budget constraints, we obtain the balance of payments condition

$$NX_t + (R_{t-1}^* - 1)B_{f,t-1}^d - (R_{l,t-1} - 1)B_{f,t-1}^l = (B_{ft}^d - B_{ft}^l) - (B_{f,t-1}^d - B_{f,t-1}^l). \quad (32)$$

where $B_{f,t}^d \equiv \theta b_{f,t}^d$ denotes the aggregate holdings of foreign assets by the households. The left-hand side of the equation is the current account balance, including net exports and net capital income received by the small open economy. The right-hand side is the financial account balance, measured by net capital outflows.

IV.7. Income distributions. Each household's capital income includes interest earnings from domestic deposits and foreign asset holdings. It is given by

$$w_{ht}^c = (R_{t-1} - 1)d_{t-1} + [(1 - \tau_{d,t-1})R_{t-1}^* - 1]B_{f,t-1}^d. \quad (33)$$

Each entrepreneur's capital income consists of returns on capital net of interest payments on debt. It is given by

$$w_{et}^c = r_t^k k_{t-1} - (R_{l,t-1} - 1)b_{e,t-1}. \quad (34)$$

The per-capita labor incomes for the household and the entrepreneur are given by

$$w_{ht}^l = w_{ht}, \quad w_{et}^l = w_{et}, \quad (35)$$

We use the Gini coefficient to measure the economy's overall income inequality. Since there are two types of agents, the Gini coefficient is defined by

$$\begin{aligned} Gini_t &= \frac{\theta(1 - \theta)|(w_{et}^c + w_{et}^l) - (w_{ht}^c + w_{ht}^l)|}{\theta(w_{ht}^c + w_{ht}^l) + (1 - \theta)(w_{et}^c + w_{et}^l)} \\ &= \left| \theta - \frac{\theta(w_{ht}^c + w_{ht}^l)}{\theta(w_{ht}^c + w_{ht}^l) + (1 - \theta)(w_{et}^c + w_{et}^l)} \right|. \end{aligned} \quad (36)$$

If the per-capita income of the entrepreneur ($w_{et}^c + w_{et}^l$) exceeds that of the household ($w_{ht}^c + w_{ht}^l$), then the Gini coefficient defined here would be measured by the difference between the population share of the entrepreneurs ($1 - \theta$) and the income share of the entrepreneurs. A decline in the entrepreneur's share in total income would lower the Gini coefficient and thus reduce income inequality.

IV.8. The shocks. There are three types of shocks in the model, including the world interest rate shock, the capital inflow tax shock, and the capital outflow tax shock. We assume that the world risk-free interest rate R_t^* follows the stationary stochastic process

$$\ln R_t^* = (1 - \rho_r) \ln R^* + \rho_r \ln R_{t-1}^* + \epsilon_{rt}, \quad (37)$$

where R^* denotes the steady-state value of the world risk-free interest rate, $\rho_r \in (-1, 1)$ is a persistence parameter, and the term ϵ_{rt} is an i.i.d. innovation drawn from a log-normal distribution $N(0, \sigma_r)$.

Since capital account policies are usually long-term policies in reality, we assume that the capital inflow taxes τ_{lt} and outflow taxes τ_{dt} both follow a random walk process such that

$$\tau_{lt} = \tau_{l,t-1} + \epsilon_{lt}, \quad \tau_{dt} = \tau_{d,t-1} + \epsilon_{dt} \quad (38)$$

where ϵ_{lt} and ϵ_{dt} are i.i.d. innovations drawn from a log-normal distribution with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of σ_l and σ_d , respectively.

V. CALIBRATION

We calibrate most of the model parameters to match moments in the [World Bank data](#) over the period from 2001 to 2020 for the set of countries in the sample for our empirical analysis. The calibrated values of the parameters are summarized in [Table 3](#).

A period in our model corresponds to 1 years. We set the discount factor parameters $\gamma = 1.12$ and $\chi = 0.10$ to match the average private consumption-to-output ratio of 67% and the average annual domestic credit spread of 7% in the World Bank data for our country sample. We set $\theta = 0.55$ such that the population share of the entrepreneur is $1 - \theta = 0.45$, consistent with the average share of self employment in our country sample.

For the parameters in the production function, we set the elasticity of substitution between capital and unskilled labor to $\sigma = 2.94$ and the elasticity of substitution between capital and skilled labor to $\rho = 0.96$ based on the estimates of [Duffy et al. \(2004\)](#) using a panel of 73 economies. We calibrate the relative weight of capital input in production to $\alpha_k = 0.75$, implying a labor income share of 0.4, consistent with the average labor income share estimated by [Karabarbounis and Neiman \(2014\)](#). Our calibrated parameter $\alpha_u = 0.86$ implies a skill premium of about 1.5, which lies within the range of the cross-country skill premium estimated by [Papageorgiou and Chmelarova \(2005\)](#).¹⁶

For the parameters associated with financial frictions, we set $\xi = 0.07$, implying a steady-state domestic credit to output ratio of $\frac{B}{Y} = 0.5$, in line with the average

¹⁶[Papageorgiou and Chmelarova \(2005\)](#) estimated the country-specific skill premium for 46 developed and developing countries. These cross-country estimates range from 1.1 in Italy to 3.2 in Jamaica with a median value of 1.5.

credit-to-output ratio in our country sample.¹⁷ We set $\eta = 1.31$ such that a 1 percent increase in the volume of domestic bank credit raises the domestic credit spread by 0.02 percentage points, consistent with the estimates by López-Espinosa et al. (2011) using bank-level data in 15 developed and emerging economies.¹⁸

For the parameters in the capital accumulation equation, we calibrate the investment adjustment cost parameter to $\Omega_k = 1$, which lies in the range of empirical estimates (Liu et al., 2011). We calibrate the capital depreciation rate to $\delta = 0.1$, such that the stock of capital depreciates at a rate of 10 percent per year.

For the parameters in the external debt risk premium function, we set the sensitivity parameter to $\Phi_b = 0.06$, consistent with the estimates obtained by Dell’Erba et al. (2013) using data on sovereign spreads and external debt in advanced and emerging market countries. We set the desired external debt-to-output ratio to $\kappa_f = 0.4$, in line with the 2002 “sustainability framework” of the IMF, which notes that 40% is the suggested ratio of external debt to annual output that should not be breached on a long-term basis.¹⁹

For the parameters in the exogenous shocks, we set the steady-state values of capital control taxes to $\tau_d = 3.54\%$ and $\tau_l = 2.53\%$, implying that $\frac{B_f^d}{Y} = 0.65$ and $\frac{B_f^l}{Y} = 0.5$ in the steady state. These two steady state values are consistent, respectively, with the average ratios of foreign assets and external debts to aggregate output in our country sample. We set the standard deviations of the capital control tax shocks to $\sigma_d = 0.005$ and $\sigma_l = 0.004$ to match, respectively, the volatilities of capital outflows and inflows as shares of aggregate output (i.e., the variables *OUTFLOWS* and *INFLOWS* in our empirical analysis). We set the average world risk-free rate to $R^* = 1.05$. We use the annual data on U.S. one-year *ex ante* real Treasury rates estimated by the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland for the period from 2000 to 2020 to calibrate the world interest rate shock parameters and obtain $\rho_r = 0.6$ and $\sigma_r = 0.015$.

¹⁷The domestic credit-to-output ratio varies widely across countries. The World Bank data shows that the domestic credit to private sector as a share of GDP per annum ranges from 25% in Mexico, to 50% in Brazil and 60% in Belgium, and to over 120% in Canada and South Africa.

¹⁸This elasticity of credit spread to bank credit in our model is given by $\frac{d \ln(R_t/R)}{d \ln(B)} = \frac{\xi \eta (\eta - 1) B^{\eta - 1}}{1 + \xi \eta B^{\eta - 1}} = \frac{(\eta - 1)(R_t/R - 1)}{R_t/R}$.

¹⁹International Monetary Fund, 2002, “Assessing Sustainability,” SM/02/06.

TABLE 3. Calibration

Parameter	Description	Parameter Value	Target Variable	Target Value	Source
γ	Scale of discount factor	1.12	Consumption/output ratio	0.67	World Bank data
χ	Elasticity par of discount factor	0.1	Domestic credit spread	0.07	World Bank data
θ	Population share of households	0.55	Share of self-employed workers	0.45	World Bank data
α_k	Capital weight	0.75	Ave. labor income share	0.4	Karabournis and Neiman (2014)
α_u	low-skill labor weight	0.86	Skill wage premium	1.5	Papageorgiou and Chmelarova (2005)
σ	Substitution elasticity between capital and low-skill labor	2.94			Duffy et al. (2004)
ρ	Substitution elasticity between capital and high-skill labor	0.96			Duffy et al. (2004)
ξ	Scale of intermediation cost	0.07	Domestic bank credit to output ratio	0.5	World Bank data
η	Elasticity of intermediation cost	1.31	Sensitivity of interest rate margin to bank assets	0.02	López-Espinosa et al. (2011)
Ω_k	Investment adjustment cost	1			Liu et al. (2011)
δ	Capital depreciation rate	0.1			
Φ_b	Elasticity of external debt risk premium	0.06			Dell'Erba et al. (2013)
κ_f	Desired external debt/output ratio	0.4			IMF(2002)
τ_d	Tax rate on foreign asset	3.54%	Foreign asset to output ratio B_f^d/Y	0.65	World Bank data
τ_l	Tax rate on foreign debt	2.53%	External debt to output ratio B_f^l/Y	0.5	World Bank data
σ_d	Standard deviation of outflow tax shock	0.005	Std of outflow/GDP ratio	0.18	IMF BOPS data
σ_l	Standard deviation of inflow tax shock	0.004	Std of inflow/GDP ratio	0.16	IMF BOPS data
r^*	World interest rate	1.05			
ρ_r	Persistence of world interest rate	0.6			Real yields of one-year U.S. Treasuries
σ_r	Volatility of world interest rate	0.015			Real yields of one-year U.S. Treasuries

Note: The final column ("Source") shows the source of the target value or the parameter value if the target value is left blank. The source is labeled as "World Bank data" if we obtain the target value by calculating the historical average of the target variable using World Bank data from 2001 to 2020 for the country sample covered in our empirical analysis.

VI. QUANTITATIVE EXERCISES

We now examine the model's transmission mechanism based on impulse response functions from the calibrated model. We also assess the quantitative importance of our model's mechanism for explaining the observed link between capital flows and income inequality.

VI.1. Impulse responses to a world interest rate shock. To help understand the economic mechanism in our model, we solve the model based on the calibrated parameters and plot the impulse responses of a few key variables to an exogenous shock to the world interest rate. We focus on world interest rate shocks because these shocks are more important for generating fluctuations in income inequality than the two types of capital flow shocks. Under our calibration, the world interest rate shock accounts for over 80% of the variance of the growth rate of the Gini coefficient ($GGINI_t$).

Figure 2 displays the impulse responses to a transitory increase in the world interest rate. The shock raises the return on foreign deposits, leading to increases in capital outflows and in the households' holdings of foreign assets. Since the shock raises the funding costs for foreign investors, it leads to a decline in capital inflows, reducing the entrepreneurs' holdings of foreign debt. Net capital inflows and net foreign asset holdings rise unambiguously.

With less capital inflows, entrepreneurs have to rely more on domestic bank loans for funding. Banks now face increased funding costs and also increased loan demand. They pass through a part of the increase in funding costs to entrepreneurs by raising the domestic lending interest rate. Credit spread falls, however, because the capital outflows reduce the available loanable funds for domestic banks. The increase in the lending rate depresses domestic investment and production. As a consequence, both the household and the entrepreneur experience a fall in their labor income. However, the household's share in labor income rises because a lower level of capital stock reduces the skill wage premium through capital-skill complementarity.

The rise in the world interest rate also raises the households' share in capital income. The shock pushes up the domestic deposit rate through the no-arbitrage condition, raising households' capital income. The shock also reduces the entrepreneurs' capital income, because the contraction in production reduces the marginal product of capital (i.e., the capital rents). The decline in investment reduces capital stock in future periods, and all else being equal, it raises the capital rents. However, under our calibration, the decline in output lowers the marginal product of capital and its negative

effect on capital rents dominates the positive effect from a lower capital stock. Thus, the entrepreneurs' capital income share declines persistently.

The increase in the households' share in both labor income and capital income reduces the Gini coefficient, because under our calibration, households' income is lower than entrepreneurs' income in the steady state. Although the world interest rate shock is transitory, it reduces income inequality measured by the Gini coefficient persistently.

VI.2. Effects of changes in capital account policies. In our model, changes in capital account policies can also impact on income inequality. To explore these impacts, we examine the impulse responses following a permanent cut in the tax rates on capital flows. Figure 2 shows the impulse responses to a permanent cut in capital outflow taxes (black solid line) and in capital inflow taxes (blue dashed line).

Following a permanent cut in the capital outflow tax rate (τ_{dt}), the after-tax return on foreign deposits rises, encouraging capital outflows and reducing the funds available for domestic bank lending. It also raises the domestic deposit rate and the households' capital income. Facing higher funding costs, banks increase the lending rate, depressing investment and output. Since capital outflows imply a decline in domestic loanable funds, credit spread falls, cushioning the contractionary effects of the increase in the domestic lending rate. The increase in the lending rate also induces capital inflows, partly offsetting the declines in production and investment. Still, the fall in aggregate output reduces capital rents and therefore reduces the entrepreneur's capital income.

Through capital-skill complementarity, the decline in capital stock reduces the skill wage premium, raising the households' share in labor income. Consequently, although the permanent outflow tax cut leads to declines in both aggregate investment and output, it improves income equality (i.e., it reduces the Gini coefficient) by raising the households' share of in both capital income and labor income.

Following a permanent cut in the capital inflow tax rate (τ_{lt}), the after-tax funding cost from foreign investors declines, raising entrepreneurs' demand for foreign funds and inducing capital inflows. Competition from foreign investors crowds out domestic bank loans, lowering the credit spread and the domestic lending rate. The increases in capital inflows, along with the declines in the domestic lending rate, stimulate investment and production, raising the labor income for both households and entrepreneurs. Through capital-skill complementarity, the increases in investment and therefore in capital stock boosts the skill wage premium and the entrepreneurs' share in labor




FIGURE 2. Impulse responses to a one-standard-deviation increase in world interest rate ($\epsilon_{rt} = 0.01$). The units of the vertical axes are percent deviations from the steady state levels for all variables, except that the units for household (HH) share of labor income, HH share of capital income, and Gini are percentage-point deviations from the steady state.

income. Meanwhile, the entrepreneur's share in capital income also rises because the expansion in production raises capital rental income. Consequently, the inflow tax leads to expansions in both aggregate investment and output, although it worsens the overall income equality. Under our calibration, however, the effects of an inflow tax cut on the Gini coefficient is small relative to that of an outflow tax cut.




FIGURE 3. Impulse responses to permanent cuts in the capital flow taxes. Black solid lines: one-standard-deviation cut in the capital outflow tax ($\tau_{d,t}$); blue dashed lines: one-standard-deviation cut in the capital inflow tax ($\tau_{l,t}$). The units of the vertical axes are percent deviations from the steady state levels for all variables, except that the units for household (HH) share of labor income, HH share of capital income and Gini are percentage-point deviations from the steady state..

VI.3. Regressions from simulated model vs. data. We now compare our model's predicted relation between capital flows and income inequality with those in the actual data. In particular, we use simulated data from our calibrated model and run the same regressions that we use in our empirical analysis in Section III.

For the model-based regressions, we consider the regression specifications

$$GGINI_t = c + \beta_1 INFLOWS_t + \beta_2 OUTFLOWS_{i,t} + \epsilon_t, \quad (39)$$

and

$$GGINI_t = c + \gamma_1 NINFLOWS_t + u_t, \quad (40)$$

where the terms ϵ_t and u_t denote the regression residuals. These regressions are analogous to Eq. (1) and (2) used for our empirical analysis.

The measures of income inequality and capital flows are calculated using simulated data, with the same definitions as those used in our empirical analysis. Specifically, we define

$$GGINI_t = \frac{Gini_t}{Gini_{t-1}} - 1, \quad (41)$$

$$INFLOWS_t = \frac{B_{ft}^l - (1 - \tau_l)R_{l,t-1}B_{f,t-1}^l}{Y_t}, \quad (42)$$

$$OUTFLOWS_t = \frac{B_{ft}^d - (1 - \tau_d)R_{d,t-1}^*B_{f,t-1}^d}{Y_t}, \quad (43)$$

$$NINFLOWS_t = INFLOWS_t - OUTFLOWS_t. \quad (44)$$

Since we have a single country in the model instead of a panel of countries, these model-based regressions could be interpreted as a reduced-form way of capturing the effects of changes in capital flows on changes in income inequality through the lens of the model.

In generating simulated data, we turn on all three types of shocks, including the world interest rate shock and the two capital flow tax shocks. We simulate the model for 2760 periods and discard the first 200 periods to avoid dependence on initial conditions. This leave us with 2560 observations for our regressions, which could be interpreted as a simulation for 128 economies with 20 periods (years), as in the sample for our empirical analysis. The key parameters of interests are the coefficients on capital inflows (β_1), capital outflows (β_2), and net inflows (γ_1).

Table 4 shows the estimated parameters from the regressions using the model-based simulated data (Columns (1) and (2)). For comparison, Columns (3) and (4) of the table display the estimates for the corresponding set of parameters using the actual data (reported in the first two columns in Table 2).

The estimated relations between capital flows and income inequality using model-based simulated data are similar to those using the actual data, both qualitatively and quantitatively. In the regression with both gross inflows and gross outflows (Column

(1)), the estimated coefficients β_1 and β_2 using the simulated data are of the same sign as and similar magnitude to those estimated from the actual data. Specifically, the estimated coefficient on gross inflows is positive and statistically significant at the 1 percent level, although it is slightly smaller than that in the data (0.033 vs. 0.046). The estimated coefficient on gross outflows is negative and also significant at the 1 percent level, with a magnitude close to that in the data (-0.041 vs. -0.044). In the regression with net inflows (Column (2)), the estimated coefficient γ_1 is significantly positive and close to that in the data (0.038 vs. 0.042).

Overall, the model-predicted relations between capital flows and income inequality are in line with our estimates using the panel of advanced and emerging economies. In both the model and the data, an increase in capital inflows (gross or net) raises income inequality and an increase in capital outflows reduces inequality.

TABLE 4. Capital flows and changes in inequality: model-simulated data vs. actual data

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Constant	-0.006** (0.003)	-0.004*** (0.002)	-0.003** (0.001)	-0.003** (0.001)
Inflows	0.033*** (0.009)		0.046** (0.018)	
Outflows	-0.041*** (0.007)		-0.044*** (0.012)	
Net inflows		0.038*** (0.006)		0.042*** (0.009)

Note: Column (1) and (2) report the estimates from the simulated data from the calibrated model. Column (3) and (4) show the estimates from actual data reported in the first two columns in Table 2. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Statistical significance levels indicated by asterisks: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, and * $p < 0.10$.

VII. CONCLUSION

We present robust empirical evidence that short-run movements in capital flows have significant impact on income distribution. In particular, using an instrumental variables approach and a panel of advanced and emerging economies, we show that

income inequality (measured by the Gini coefficient) rises with private capital inflows and falls with outflows. These effects are statistically significant and economically important.

We build a small open economy model with heterogeneous agents and financial frictions to illustrate the mechanism that might drive the empirical connections between capital flows and income inequality. Our model predicts that a shock that leads to short-run surges in capital inflows (for example, a decline in the world interest rate) would boost domestic production and investment, increasing entrepreneur capital income. Through capital-skill complementarity, inflow surges also increase the entrepreneur labor income share. Overall, an increase in capital inflows skews the income distribution in favor of the entrepreneurs and against the households, raising income inequality. Through a similar channel, the model also predicts that a shock that leads to an short-run increase in capital outflows would reduce income inequality, consistent with our empirical evidence. The model-predicted relations between capital flows and income inequality are in line with the empirical evidence, both qualitatively and quantitatively.

REFERENCES

- Aoki, Kosuke, Gianluca Benigno, and Nobuhiro Kiyotaki**, “Adjusting to Capital Account Liberalization,” June 2009. Mimeo, London School of Economics and Princeton University.
- Bumann, Silke and Robert Lensink**, “Capital Account Liberalization and Income Inequality,” *Journal of International Money and Finance*, 2016, *61*, 143–162.
- Caballero, Julian**, “Do Surges in International Capital Inflows Influence the Likelihood of Banking Crises?,” *Economic Journal*, 2016, *126* (591), 281–316.
- Calvo, Guillermo A.**, “Capital Flows and Capital-Market Crises The Simple Economics of Sudden Stops,” *Journal of Applied Economics*, 1998, *1* (1), 35–54.
- Chang, Chun, Zheng Liu, and Mark M Spiegel**, “Capital Controls and Optimal Chinese Monetary Policy,” *Journal of Monetary Economics*, 2015, *74*, 1–15.
- Chinn, Menzie D. and Hiro Ito**, “A New Measure of Financial Openness,” *Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis*, 2008, *10* (3), 309–322.
- Costinot, A., G. Lorenzoni, and I. Werning**, “A Theory of Capital Controls as Dynamic Terms of Trade Manipulation,” *Journal of Political Economy*, 2014, *122*, 77–128.
- Cúrdia, Vasco and Michael Woodford**, “Credit Frictions and Optimal Monetary Policy,” *Journal of Monetary Economics*, 2016, *84*, 30–65.
- Davis, J. Scott and Ignacio Presno**, “Capital controls and monetary policy autonomy in a small open economy,” *Journal of Monetary Economics*, 2017, *85* (C), 114–130.
- , **Ippei Fujiwara, Kevin X.D. Huang, and Jiao Wang**, “Foreign exchange reserves as a tool for capital account management,” *Journal of Monetary Economics*, 2020, (*forthcoming*).
- de Haan, Jacob and Jan-Egbert Sturm**, “Finance and income inequality A review and new evidence,” September 2016. ETH Zurich Research Collection.
- Dell’Erba, Salvatore, Ricardo Hausmann, and Ugo Panizza**, “Debt levels, debt composition, and sovereign spreads in emerging and advanced economies,” *Oxford Review of Economic Policy*, AUTUMN 2013, *29* (3), 518–547.
- Devereux, Michael B., Eric R. Young, and Changhua Yu**, “Capital controls and monetary policy in sudden-stop economies,” *Journal of Monetary Economics*, 2018, (*in press*).
- Duffy, John, Chris Papageorgiou, and Fidel Perez-Sebastian**, “Capital-Skill Complementarity? Evidence from a Panel of Countries,” *The Review of Economics*

- and Statistics*, February 2004, 86 (1), 327–344.
- Edwards, Sebastian**, “How Effective are Capital Controls?,” *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 1999, 13 (4), 65–84.
- Eichengreen, B., R. Gullapalli, and U. Panizza**, “Capital Account Liberalization, Financial Development and Industry Growth: A Synthetic View,” *Journal of International Money and Finance*, 2011, 30, 1090–1106.
- Eichengreen, Barry and David Leblang**, “Capital Account Liberalization and Growth: Was Mr. Mahathir Right?,” *The International Journal of Finance and Economics*, 2003, 8 (3), 205–224.
- Erten, Bilge, Anton Korinek, and José Antonio Ocampo**, “Capital Controls: Theory and Evidence,” *Journal of Economic Literature*, 2019, (*forthcoming*).
- Farhi, Emmanuel and Ivan Werning**, “Dealing with the Trilemma: Optimal Capital Controls with Fixed Exchange Rates,” June 2012. NBER Working Paper No. 18199.
- Fernández, Andrés, Michael W. Klein, Alessandro Rebucci, Martin Schindler, and Martín Uribe**, “Capital Control Measures: A New Dataset,” *IMF Economic Review*, 2016, 64, 548–574.
- Finlay, Keith, Leandro Magnusson, and Mark E Schaffer**, “WEAKIV10: Stata module to perform weak-instrument-robust tests and confidence intervals for instrumental-variable (IV) estimation of linear, probit and tobit models,” 2014. Statistical Software Components S457684, Department of Economics, Boston College.
- Furceri, Davide and Prakash Loungani**, “The distributional effects of capital account liberalization,” *Journal of Development Economics*, 2018, 130, 127–144.
- , ———, and **Jonathan D. Ostry**, “The Aggregate and Distributional Effects of Financial Globalization: Evidence from Macro and Sectoral Data,” *Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking*, 2019, 51 (1), 163–198.
- Ghosh, Atish R., Jonathan D. Ostry, and Mahvash S. Qureshi**, “When Do Capital Inflow Surges End in Tears?,” *American Economic Review Papers & Proceedings*, 2016, 106 (5), 581–585.
- , **Mahvash S. Qureshi, Jun Il Kim, and Juan Zaldueño**, “Surges,” *Journal of International Economics*, 2014, 92, 266–285.
- He, Hui and Zheng Liu**, “Investment-Specific Technological Change, Skill Accumulation, and Wage Inequality,” *Review of Economic Dynamics*, 2008, 11, 314–334.
- Jeanne, Olivier**, “Capital Account Policies and the Real Exchange Rate,” in Francesco Giavazzi and Kenneth D. West, eds., *NBER International Seminar on*

- Macroeconomics 2012*, Vol. 9, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2013, pp. 7–42.
- , **Arvind Subramanian**, and **John Williamson**, *Who needs to open the capital account?*, Washington, D.C.: Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2012.
- Ju, Jiandong and Shang-Jin Wei**, “Domestic institutions and the bypass effect of financial globalization,” *American Economic Journal: Policy*, 2010, 2 (4), 173–204.
- , **Kang Shi**, and **Shang-Jin Wei**, “Trade reforms and current account imbalances,” *Journal of International Economics*, 2021, 131 (C).
- Karabarbounis, Loukas and Brent Neiman**, “The Global Decline of the Labor Share,” *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 2014, 129 (1), 61–103.
- Kose, Ayhan, Eswar Prasad, Kenneth Rogoff, and Shang-Jin Wei**, “Financial Globalization: A Reappraisal,” *International Monetary Fund Economic Review*, 2009, 56 (1), 8–62.
- Krusell, Per, Lee E. Ohanian, José-Víctor Ríos-Rull, and Giovanni L. Violante**, “Capital-skill Complementarity and Inequality: A Macroeconomic Analysis,” *Econometrica*, 2000, 68 (5), 1029–1053.
- Liu, Zheng and Mark M. Spiegel**, “Optimal Monetary Policy and Capital Account Restrictions in a Small Open Economy,” *IMF Economic Review*, 2015, 63 (2), 298–324.
- , **Daniel F. Waggoner**, and **Tao Zha**, “Sources of macroeconomic fluctuations: A regime-switching DSGE approach,” *Quantitative Economics*, July 2011, 2 (2), 251–301.
- , **Mark M. Spiegel**, and **Jingyi Zhang**, “Optimal Capital Account Liberalization in China,” May 2019. Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Working Paper 2018-10.
- López-Espinosa, Germán, Antonio Moreno, and Fernando Pérez de Gracia**, “Banks’ Net Interest Margin in the 2000s: A Macro-Accounting international perspective,” *Journal of International Money and Finance*, October 2011, 30 (6), 1214–1233.
- Mendoza, Enrique G.**, “Real Business Cycles in a Small Open Economy,” *American Economic Review*, September 1991, 81 (4), 797–818.
- Mendoza, Enrique G.**, “Sudden Stops, Financial Crises, and Leverage,” *American Economic Review*, 2010, 100, 1941–1966.
- Neumeayer, Pablo A. and Fabrizio Perri**, “Business cycles in emerging economies:

- the role of interest rates,” *Journal of Monetary Economics*, March 2005, *52* (2), 345–380.
- Ostry, Jonathan D., Atish R. Ghosh, Karl Habermeier, Marcos Chamon, Mahvash S. Qureshi, and Dennis B.S. Reinhart**, “Capital Inflows: The Role of Controls,” February 2010. IMF Staff Position Note No. 10/04.
- Papageorgiou, Chris and Viera Chmelarova**, “Nonlinearities in Capital–Skill Complementarity,” *Journal of Economic Growth*, January 2005, *10* (1), 55–86.
- Pflueger, Carolin E. and Su Wang**, “A robust test for weak instruments in Stata,” *Stata Journal*, 2015, *15* (1), 216–225.
- Portes, Richard and H el ene Rey**, “The determinants of cross-border equity flows,” *Journal of International Economics*, 2005, *65*, 269–296.
- Rebucci, Alessandro and Chang Ma**, “Capital Controls: A Survey of the New Literature,” December 2019. NBER Working Paper No. 26558.
- Rose, Andrew K. and Mark M. Spiegel**, “International Financial Remoteness and Macroeconomic Volatility,” *Journal of Development Economics*, 2009, *89* (2), 250–257.
- Schmitt-Grohe, Stephanie**, “The international transmission of economic fluctuations: Effects of U.S. business cycles on the Canadian economy,” *Journal of International Economics*, April 1998, *44* (2), 257–287.
- _____ **and Martin Uribe**, “Closing small open economy models,” *Journal of International Economics*, October 2003, *61* (1), 163–185.
- Spiegel, Mark M.**, “Financial Globalization and Monetary Policy Discipline: A Survey with New Evidence from Financial Remoteness,” *International Monetary Fund Staff Papers*, 2009, *56*, 198–221.
- Swanson, Eric T. and John C. Williams**, “Measuring the Effect of the Zero Lower Bound on Medium- and Longer-Term Interest Rates,” *American Economic Review*, October 2014, *104* (10), 3154–85.
- Unsal, D. Filiz**, “Capital Flows and Financial Stability: Monetary Policy and Macroeconomic Responses,” *International Journal of Central Banking*, 2013, *9*, 233–285.
- Uribe, Martin**, “Exchange-rate-based inflation stabilization: The initial real effects of credible plans,” *Journal of Monetary Economics*, July 1997, *39* (2), 197–221.
- _____ **and Vivian Z. Yue**, “Country spreads and emerging countries: Who drives whom?,” *Journal of International Economics*, June 2006, *69* (1), 6–36.
- Uzawa, Hirofumi**, “Time preference, the consumption function, and optimum asset holdings,” in “Value, Capital and Growth: Papers in Honor of Sir John Hicks,”

Edinburgh: The University of Edinburgh Press, 1968, chapter 3, pp. 485–504.

Wei, Shang-Jin, “Managing Financial Globalization: Insights from the Recent Literature,” February 2018. NBER Working Paper No. 24330.

_____ **and Irina Tytell**, “Does Financial Globalization Induce Better Macroeconomic Policies?,” IMF Working Papers 04/84, International Monetary Fund May 2004.

_____ **and Zhiwei Zhang**, “Collateral Damage: Capital Controls and International Trade,” *Journal of International Money and Finance*, 2007, 26 (5), 841–863.

APPENDIX A. ONLINE APPENDIX (NOT FOR PUBLICATION)

This online appendix presents some robustness checks on the baseline empirical results and provides detailed proofs to the propositions in the text.

A.1. Robustness checks for Empirics. Our baseline results are robust to a battery of alternative empirical specifications, samples, and estimation methods. Tables [A.1](#) and [A.2](#) summarize the estimated coefficients on private capital inflows, outflows, and net inflows under 10 alternative specifications. Table [A.3](#) summarizes the estimation results in a variety of subsamples and under alternative methods of estimation and standard error calculations.

TABLE A.1. Alternative Specifications

Model	(1) INFLOWS	(2) OUTFLOWS	(3) NINFLOWS
(1) No cond. vars. w/ orig. Sample	0.059*** (0.020)	-0.040** (0.020)	0.055*** (0.020)
(2) Add education	-0.015 (0.019)	0.019 (0.012)	-0.022** (0.010)
(3) Add voice and accountability	0.039** (0.017)	-0.038*** (0.012)	0.038*** (0.008)
(4) Add political stability	0.048*** (0.018)	-0.046*** (0.012)	0.044*** (0.009)
(5) Add Gov. effectiveness	0.044*** (0.017)	-0.042*** (0.011)	0.041*** (0.009)
(6) Add reg. quality	0.047*** (0.018)	-0.044*** (0.012)	0.042*** (0.009)
(7) Add rule of law	0.011 (0.013)	-0.017* (0.010)	0.022*** (0.007)
(8) Add lending	0.073*** (0.020)	-0.052*** (0.013)	0.031*** (0.010)

Standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Dependent variable: Growth in GINI coefficient of income inequality. Two-stage least squares estimation with INTREMOTE and regional dummies as instruments for INFLOWS, OUTFLOWS, NINFLOWS. Year fixed effects are included in all specifications. See the text for base specification and variable definitions. Columns (1) and (2) report results from base specification with indicated perturbation for coefficients on INFLOWS and OUTFLOWS. Column (3) reports estimated coefficient for separate regression with net inflows (NINFLOWS). Row (1) removes conditioning variables with base sample. Row (2) adds average years of schooling. Rows (3) through (7) add World Governance Indicators as indicated. Row (8) adds bank lending rates. Full regression results are available on request.

TABLE A.2. Alternative Specifications (cont.)

Model	(1) INFLOWS	(2) OUTFLOWS	(3) NINFLOWS
(1) Add remoteness	0.021 (0.018)	-0.037** (0.016)	0.050*** (0.013)
(2) Add self employment	0.049** (0.020)	-0.042*** (0.013)	0.036*** (0.009)
(3) Add country dummies	0.010*** (0.002)	-0.011*** (0.002)	0.010*** (0.002)
(4) Sub. 10YR US Treasury	0.046*** (0.017)	-0.044*** (0.013)	0.043*** (0.010)
(5) Sub. 1YR US Treasury	0.047*** (0.017)	-0.044*** (0.012)	0.036*** (0.011)
(6) Add 10YR US Treasury	0.046** (0.018)	-0.044*** (0.012)	0.042*** (0.009)
(7) Add 1YR US Treasury	0.039** (0.017)	-0.037*** (0.013)	0.036*** (0.011)

Standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Dependent variable: Growth in GINI coefficient of income inequality. Two-stage least squares estimation with INTREMOTE and regional dummies as instruments for INFLOWS, OUTFLOWS, NINFLOWS. Year fixed effects are included in all specifications. See the text for base specification and variable definitions. Columns (1) and (2) report results from base specification with indicated perturbation for coefficients on INFLOWS and OUTFLOWS. Column (3) reports estimated coefficient for separate regression with net inflows (NINFLOWS). Row (1) adds remoteness measure. Row (2) adds share of self-employment. Row (3) adds country dummies. Rows (4) and (5) substitute 10 and 1 year US treasury rates respectively in interactive INTREMOTE variable. Rows (6) and (7) add interactive INTREMOTE variables with 10 and 1 year treasury rates to base specification. Full regression results are available on request.

TABLE A.3. Alternative samples and estimation methods

Model	(1) INFLOWS	(2) OUTFLOWS	(3) NINFLOWS
(1) Drop Large Inflows	0.036* (0.021)	-0.044*** (0.010)	0.043*** (0.010)
(2) Drop Small Inflows	0.046** (0.018)	-0.044*** (0.012)	0.042*** (0.009)
(3) Drop Large Outflows	0.040* (0.020)	-0.046*** (0.009)	0.045*** (0.010)
(4) Drop Small Outflows	0.033* (0.019)	-0.033** (0.014)	0.033*** (0.010)
(5) Drop High GINI	0.044** (0.018)	-0.041*** (0.012)	0.039*** (0.009)
(6) Drop Low GINI	0.051*** (0.019)	-0.049*** (0.013)	0.046*** (0.010)
(7) Drop Most Remote	0.046** (0.018)	-0.044*** (0.012)	0.042*** (0.009)
(8) Drop Least Remote	0.046** (0.018)	-0.044*** (0.012)	0.042*** (0.009)
(9) Drop Crisis Years	0.039** (0.015)	-0.040*** (0.012)	0.040*** (0.010)
(10) Winsorize 1%	0.038** (0.017)	-0.039*** (0.011)	0.045*** (0.011)
(11) Robust SEs	0.046*** (0.015)	-0.044*** (0.012)	0.042*** (0.011)
(12) Standard SEs	0.046** (0.018)	-0.044*** (0.015)	0.042*** (0.009)

Standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Dependent variable: Growth in GINI coefficient of income inequality. Two-stage least squares estimation with INTREMOTE and regional dummies as instruments for INFLOWS, OUTFLOWS, NINFLOWS. Year fixed effects are included in all specifications. See the text for base specification and variable definitions. Columns (1) and (2) report results from base specification with indicated perturbation for coefficients on INFLOWS and OUTFLOWS. Column (3) reports estimated coefficient for separate regression with net inflows (NINFLOWS). Rows (1) and (2) drop observations with large and small (> 3 standard deviations from sample mean) inflows respectively. Rows (3) and (4) drop observations with large and small outflows respectively. Rows (5) and (6) drop observations with high and low GINI coefficient values respectively. Rows (7) and (8) drop observations with most and least remote countries respectively. Row (9) drops observations from 2008 and 2009. Full results available on request.

APPENDIX B. FOR RESPONSE TO REVIEWERS

TABLE A.4. Regression results for alternative treasury maturities

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Dep. var.: <i>GINI</i>	10yr	10yr	1yr	1yr	10 yr added	10yr added	1yr added	1yr added
<i>INFLOWS</i>	0.046*** (0.017)		0.047*** (0.017)		0.046** (0.018)		0.039** (0.017)	
<i>OUTFLOWS</i>	-0.044*** (0.013)		-0.044*** (0.012)		-0.044*** (0.012)		-0.037*** (0.013)	
<i>NINFLOWS</i>		0.043*** (0.010)		0.036*** (0.011)		0.042*** (0.009)		0.036*** (0.011)
<i>EDUC</i>								
<i>AGE</i>	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)
<i>CAOPEN</i>	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)
<i>LOWCORR</i>	0.000 (0.000)	0.001** (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.001** (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.001** (0.000)	0.001 (0.000)	0.001** (0.000)
<i>GDPPCAP</i>	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)
<i>POP</i>	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)
<i>Constant</i>	-0.003** (0.001)	-0.003** (0.001)	-0.003** (0.001)	-0.004*** (0.001)	-0.003** (0.001)	-0.003** (0.001)	-0.004*** (0.001)	-0.004*** (0.001)
Observations	1626	1626	1626	1626	1626	1626	1626	1626

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

*Two-stage least squares estimation with INTREMOTE and regional dummies as instruments for INFLOWS, OUTFLOWS, NINFLOWS unless otherwise indicated. Year fixed effects are included in all specifications. See the text for the variable definitions. Models (1) and (2) substitute 10-year US treasury rate for 2-year in calculation of INTREMOTE instrument. Models (3) and (4) substitute 1-year rate. Models (5) and (6) add 10-year treasury version of INTREMOTE as additional instrumental variable. Models (7) and (8) add 1-year treasury version of INTREMOTE as additional instrumental variable. Standard errors clustered by year shown in parentheses. Statistical significance levels are indicated by the asterisks: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, and * $p < 0.10$.*

TABLE A.5. Regression results with education added

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Dependent variable: <i>GINI</i>						
<i>INFLOWS</i>	0.046** (0.018)		-0.015 (0.019)		-0.009 (0.018)	
<i>OUTFLOWS</i>	-0.044*** (0.012)		0.019 (0.012)		0.006 (0.012)	
<i>NINFLOWS</i>		0.042*** (0.009)		-0.022** (0.010)		-0.004 (0.009)
<i>EDUC</i>			-0.001*** (0.000)	-0.001*** (0.000)		
<i>AGE</i>	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)
<i>CAOPEN</i>	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)
<i>LOWCORR</i>	0.000 (0.000)	0.001** (0.000)	0.001* (0.001)	0.001*** (0.000)	0.001* (0.001)	0.001*** (0.000)
<i>GDPPCAP</i>	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000* (0.000)	-0.000* (0.000)
<i>POP</i>	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)
<i>Constant</i>	-0.003** (0.001)	-0.003** (0.001)	-0.005*** (0.002)	-0.004*** (0.001)	-0.005*** (0.001)	-0.005*** (0.001)
Observations	1626	1626	1390	1390	1390	1390

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

*Two-stage least squares estimation with INTREMOTE and regional dummies as instruments for INFLOWS, OUTFLOWS, NINFLOWS. Year fixed effects are included in all specifications. See the text for the variable definitions. For models (1), (2), we use the base sample with the conditioning variables, including the Chinn-Ito (2008) measure of capital account openness, CAOPEN. For models (3), and (4), we substitute the Fernández, et al (2016) individual indices for controls on capital inflows and outflows, INFCONT and OUTCONT. Models (5) and (6) drop the conditioning variables, and thus expand the sample size. Standard errors clustered by year shown in parentheses. Statistical significance levels are indicated by the asterisks: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, and * $p < 0.10$.*

TABLE A.6. Regression results with reserve flows added

Dependent variable:	(1)	(2)
<i>GGINI</i>		
<i>INFLOWS</i>	0.018 (0.016)	
<i>OUTFLOWS</i>	-0.001 (0.009)	
<i>NINFLOWS</i>		0.003 (0.010)
<i>CAOPEN</i>	-0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.001)
<i>LOWCORR</i>	0.001* (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)
<i>GDPPCAP</i>	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
<i>POP</i>	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)
<i>Constant</i>	-0.002* (0.001)	-0.001*** (0.000)
Observations	1626	1626

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

*Two-stage least squares estimation with INTREMOTE and regional dummies as instruments for INFLOWS, OUTFLOWS, NINFLOWS. Year fixed effects are included in all specifications. See the text for the variable definitions. Models (1) and (2) repeat base specification gross and net capital flows respectively with changes in government reserves added to OUTFLOWS variable, and subtracted from NINFLOWS variable. Standard errors clustered by year shown in parentheses. Statistical significance levels are indicated by the asterisks: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, and * $p < 0.10$.*