

Foreign Demand Shocks to Production Networks: Firm Responses and Worker Impacts*

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Abstract

We quantify and explain the firm responses and worker impacts of foreign demand shocks to domestic production networks. To capture that firms can be indirectly exposed to such shocks by buying from or selling to domestic firms that import or export, we use Belgian data with information on both domestic firm-to-firm sales and foreign trade transactions. Our estimates of firm responses suggest that Belgian firms pass on a large share of a foreign demand shock to their domestic suppliers, face upward-sloping labor supply curves, and have sizable fixed overhead costs in labor. Motivated and guided by these findings, we develop and estimate an equilibrium model that allows us to study how idiosyncratic and aggregate changes in foreign demand propagate through a small open economy and affect firms and workers. Our results suggest that the way the labor market is typically modeled in existing research on foreign demand shocks—with no fixed costs and perfectly elastic labor supply—would grossly understate the decline in real wages due to an increase in foreign tariffs.

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1 Introduction

The increased availability of micro datasets with information on both domestic firm-to-firm sales and foreign trade transactions has expanded the focus of research on international trade to include firms that only trade indirectly by buying from or selling to domestic firms that import or export (see, e.g., Huneus, 2018, Adao et al., 2020, Demir et al., 2021, and Dhyne et al., 2021). An important insight from these data is that smaller and less productive firms often overcome the costs of entering foreign markets by selling to or buying from domestic firms that trade internationally. This finding raises several important questions that we seek to answer in this paper: How do changes in foreign demand transmit from one firm to the next in the domestic production network? How are firms responding to and workers affected by foreign demand shocks to direct exporters and their domestic suppliers? What are the aggregate implications of foreign demand shocks for output, input costs, and real wages?

We study these questions in the context of Belgium, a small open economy. As discussed in Section 2, our analyses employ a panel dataset of Belgian firms and workers, covering the period 2002-2014. This dataset is based on several micro data sources that we have linked. Annual accounts provide data on input factors and output; customs records and intra-EU declarations give information on imports and exports; a value-added tax (VAT) registry provides information on domestic firm-to-firm transactions; and social security records and employer-employee data give information on workers and their earnings, hourly wages, and work hours. Importantly, these data allow us to accurately represent firms' domestic production networks and measure their total import and export. These measures capture that firms may choose to access foreign markets both directly and indirectly by buying from or selling to domestic firms that trade internationally.

In Section 3, we use the panel dataset on firms and workers to develop three sets of empirical facts about the Belgian economy. First, we characterize the relationships in our data between (changes in) firm-level sales, labor costs, and intermediate input purchases. We find that input purchases respond nearly proportionally to changes in sales. In contrast, changes in sales are associated with less than proportionate changes in labor costs. These findings are consistent with firms facing fixed overhead costs in labor inputs, whereas intermediate inputs (such as energy and materials) are predominantly variable costs in production. Second, we build on the analysis of Dhyne et al. (2021) to show that even though direct exporters are rare, a majority of firms are indirectly exporting. This finding points to the importance of incorporating indirect export through the production network to measure firms' ultimate exposure to foreign demand.¹ Third, we show that firms that are more exposed to foreign

¹Dhyne et al. (2021) also demonstrate that what matters for the transmission of foreign demand shocks to a firm's revenue is how much it ultimately sells to foreign markets, not whether these sales are from direct or indirect export.

markets are larger, more productive, and pay higher wages, and that these wage differentials cannot be entirely explained by observed or unobserved differences across workers. This finding suggests it is necessary to depart from the canonical model of a competitive labor market where wages depend only on the marginal product of workers and not the firm for which they work.

Motivated and guided by these empirical facts, we next develop, in Section 4, a small open economy model and then analyze the comparative statics properties of the relationships between key variables. One important feature of our model is that we allow for imperfect competition, in the form of monopsonistic competition in the labor market and monopolistic competition in the product market. Another important feature of our model is that we allow the production of goods to depend on both fixed and variable costs of labor and intermediate goods. Fixed labor costs may reflect tasks such as administration, worker management, facility maintenance and any other work that does not translate directly into production and revenue. Examples of fixed intermediate input costs include waste management, accounting services, and electricity payments that occur irrespective of sales.

The model serves three purposes. First, the comparative statics of the model show the elasticities we need to recover to quantify and interpret how firms and workers respond to and are affected by changes in foreign demand. These elasticities include the labor supply elasticity facing the firm as well as the firm's elasticities of labor costs and intermediate input purchases with respect to demand-driven changes in sales. Second, the model helps to make explicit the data, instrument, and assumptions we need to identify and estimate these elasticities. The comparative statics of the model consider a change in the sales of a firm due to an exogenous change in the demand it faces. In the data, however, sales may change for many reasons other than demand, including shifts in input prices, technology, preferences, or amenities. To address this identification challenge, we draw on the work of Hummels et al. (2014) and Dhyne et al. (2021) to construct an instrument that intends to isolate the variation in sales that is induced by a change in foreign demand. We perform a number of robustness checks to examine various threats to the validity of the instrument. Lastly, the model makes it possible to perform counterfactuals to quantify and explain the aggregate welfare implications of changes in foreign demand (or productivity). In this analysis, we consider several counterfactual economies, defined by alternative parameterizations of the model. One of these economies is constructed to mirror the actual Belgian economy. In the other counterfactual economies, we instead assume no fixed costs or perfectly elastic labor supply (or both).

In Section 5, we take the model to the data with the goal of quantifying and explaining the firm responses and worker impacts of changes in firm sales that are induced by changes in foreign demand. To do so, we use the instrumental variables approach described in Section

4 to recover the elasticities defined by the comparative statics of the model. Our estimates of firm responses suggest that Belgian firms pass on a large share of a foreign demand shock to their domestic suppliers, face upward-sloping labor supply curves and, thus, have wage-setting power, and have sizable fixed overhead costs in labor.² To help interpret these estimates and gauge their economic implications, we next perform a simple model-based simulation of the direct and indirect effects of foreign demand shocks to production networks. The first step in the simulation is to use the estimated elasticities to predict the employment and wage responses of a direct exporter to a foreign demand shock. The next step is to simulate the spillover effects of the foreign demand shock to the domestic suppliers of the direct exporters.

We find that, on average, a direct exporter raises employment by 1.4 percent and the wages it pays by 0.4 percent in response to a foreign demand shock that increases the firm’s direct export by 10 percent. This shock cascades through the production network as the direct exporters buy more inputs both directly from their own suppliers and indirectly from the suppliers’ (direct and indirect) suppliers. These indirect demand effects increase, on average, the employment and wages of the direct exporter’s key supplier by 0.3 and 0.08 percent, respectively. In other words, the key supplier experiences one-fifth of the percentage increases in wages and employment of the direct exporter. These indirect demand effects decay quickly with the distance to direct exporters in the supply chain. In fact, the foreign demand shock has little if any impact on the employment and wages of the key supplier’s key supplier. An implication of the direct and indirect effects on wages and employment is that workers in the production network will get surplus or rents due to the foreign demand shock. On average, workers in the directly exporting firms get 75 percent of these rents. The remaining rents are shared among the other workers in the production network, with most of them going to the workers of the direct suppliers.

The simulation results in Section 5 point to the importance of production networks, upward-sloping labor supply curves, and fixed overhead costs to accurately predict how firms respond to and workers are affected by foreign demand shocks. However, this simulation relies on several simplifying assumptions. In particular, it considers a demand shock to a single of exporter, and it abstracts from general equilibrium effects and the need to adjust aggregate imports if aggregate exports fall. In Section 6, we relax these assumptions and analyze the aggregate effects of a five percent increase in foreign tariffs on all Belgian exports. Our results suggest that the increase in foreign tariffs produces a substantial 5.7 percent fall in the average real wage. By comparison, the reduction in real wages would be predicted to be as low as 3.3 percent if we assume the economy had no fixed costs and perfectly elastic labor

²Our estimates of fixed overhead costs—that we infer from firm responses to demand shocks—are broadly comparable to the findings of De Loecker et al. (2020) based on accounting data for publicly listed US firms.

supply. Thus, we conclude that the way in which the labor market is typically modeled in existing research on foreign demand shocks—with no fixed costs and perfectly elastic labor supply—may grossly understate the decline in real wages due to an increase in foreign tariffs.

The Lerner Symmetry Theorem is useful to explain these results. It establishes the equivalence between any intervention that increases the cost of import and export by the same amount. Thus, the five percent increase in foreign tariffs is equivalent to a five percent increase in tax on imports. An increase in the cost of imports has a larger impact on the firms' total variable costs, and, in turn, on output and real wages, if the economy has sizable fixed overhead costs in labor while imported inputs are predominately variable costs. Furthermore, in an economy in which the firms face upward-sloping labor supply curves, they pay lower wages than they otherwise would by hiring fewer workers, which effectively amplifies the share of labor costs that is fixed.

Our paper contributes to several areas of economics. Our first contribution is to the literature that analyzes how foreign demand shocks affect labor market outcomes. A large literature uses worker data at the firm or regional level to analyze the labor market effects of foreign demand shocks (see, e.g., Autor et al., 2013, Autor et al., 2014, Kovak, 2013, Dix-Carneiro, 2014, Dix-Carneiro and Kovak, 2017, Pierce and Schott, 2016, Traiberman, 2019, Kim and Vogel, 2020, 2021, Felix, 2021, Galle et al., 2022, and Costinot et al., 2022). Our paper joins a small set of papers that combine information on firm-to-firm transactions with micro data on firms and workers. Demir et al. (2021) document positive assortative matching between buyers and suppliers in terms of wages paid to workers. They analyze how this positive assortative matching affects the wage responses of exporters and their suppliers to a foreign demand shock. Adao et al. (2020) study the impact of trade on inequality in a framework with perfect competition, and Alfaro-Urena et al. (2019) estimate the effects of foreign multinationals on workers. Huneus et al. (2021) estimate that supply shocks transmitted through the production network can account for around 20 percent of the earnings volatility of Chilean workers.³ All these studies analyze data on firm-to-firm transactions in developing countries.⁴ To our knowledge, the country we study, Belgium, is currently the only developed country with such data. Another key difference between our study and prior work is that our analysis allows for imperfect competition in the labor market and distinguishes between fixed and variable costs in production. We find this distinction to be empirically important, as it materially affects the conclusions from both partial and general equilibrium analyses of the labor market effects of foreign demand shocks.

³In other work based on data with firm-to-firm transactions, Huneus (2018) studies the pass-through of foreign shocks to Chilean firms during the Great Recession.

⁴A large literature in development economics studies the role of intermediaries in trade. See, for example, the works by Atkin and Donaldson (2015), Chatterjee (2019), Dhingra and Tenreyro (2020), Bergquist and Dinerstein (2020), Grant and Startz (2020), and Zavala (2021).

Our paper also contributes to the literature on general equilibrium effects in production networks. Baqaee and Farhi (2022) analyze the general equilibrium effects of trade shocks, and Bigio and La’O (2020), Baqaee and Farhi (2019a), and Baqaee and Farhi (2019b) analyze the transmission of shocks in closed economies with and without distortions. Baqaee and Farhi (2020) illustrate how free entry affects the long-run effects of shocks, vom Lehn and Winberry (2021) document the role of the investment network for sectoral comovement along the business cycle, and Atalay (2017) quantifies the importance of sectoral shocks along the business cycle.⁵ To our knowledge, our study is the first to incorporate estimates of fixed overhead costs and imperfect competition in the labor market in a general equilibrium analysis with production networks. Baqaee and Farhi (2020) discuss the relevance of fixed costs in a framework that abstracts from imperfect competition in the labor market.

Our paper is also related to a large literature on firm growth. A series of papers study the role of growth in the number of customers and products in overall firm-level growth (see, e.g., Einav et al., 2021, Argente et al., 2018a, Argente et al., 2018b, and Fitzgerald et al., 2016). Hottman et al. (2016) and Bernard et al. (2019) provide evidence that differences in demand are a key determinant of heterogeneity in firm performance. Sterk et al. (2021), Foster et al. (2016), and others examine the life-cycle patterns of firms. Exploiting our detailed data on firms, workers and production networks, we show how the firms use of and payments to labor and intermediate inputs change in response to demand shocks. A related literature in labor economics examines the rent sharing between firms and workers, exploiting changes in patents, demand, or taxes and subsidies (see, e.g., Van Reenen, 1996, Guiso et al., 2005, Kline et al., 2019, Friedrich et al., 2019, Berger et al., 2022, Kroft et al., 2020, Howell and Brown, 2020, Lamadon et al., 2022, and Chan et al., 2021). All of these papers focus on outcomes at directly affected firms. Our main contribution to this literature is to study the effects of firm-level demand shocks across the supply chain, including the firms that are only indirectly exposed to the demand shocks through their buyers.

2 Data and estimation sample

Our analyses combine multiple administrative data sources from Belgium for the period 2002-2014. Below we briefly describe our data and sample selection; additional details are given in Appendix A.

⁵Several papers analyze endogenous production networks that allow for the creation or destruction of firm-to-firm links in response to economic shocks. See Oberfield (2018), Lim (2018), Taschereau-Dumouchel (2018), Elliott et al. (2021), Acemoglu and Tahbaz-Salehi (2020), and Arkolakis et al. (2021). For tractability, we abstract from this adjustment mechanism in our model.

2.1 Data on firms

The National Bank of Belgium (NBB) provided us with three datasets on firms, each covering the period 2002-2014. These datasets can be linked through (anonymized) firm identifiers, assigned and recorded by the government for the purpose of collecting value-added taxes (VAT). For details on the linking procedure, we refer to Dhyne et al. (2015) and Dhyne et al. (2021).

The first dataset is the Business-to-Business (B2B) transactions database. Every year, all VAT-liable firms are legally required to report annual sales to every other VAT-liable firm in Belgium. This information must be reported to the tax authority provided that annual sales to a given buyer exceed 250 euro. Thus, the B2B dataset allows us to measure the firms' domestic production networks as well as their purchases from and sales to domestic suppliers and buyers.

We merge this dataset with information on the firms' international trade and their annual accounts. The information on international trade comes from the Belgian customs records and the intra-EU trade declarations, which contain the value of imports and exports (disaggregated by the EU's eight-digit coding system for products) and the countries of origin or destination. The annual accounts contain detailed information from the firm's balance sheets on sales, revenues, operating profits, ownership shares in other enterprises, costs of inputs (such as capital, labor, and intermediates), as well as four-digit (NACE) industry codes and geographical identifiers (at the postal code level).

Importantly, the annual accounts also include information about the number of full-time equivalent (FTE) workers. The calculation of FTE is an employee's actual scheduled hours divided by the regular scheduled hours for a full-time workweek. To measure the (average) hourly wage that each firm pays to its workers, we divide the firm's labor cost by the number of FTE workers.

A limitation with the Belgian data is that all the information is recorded at the level of the VAT identifier. This creates a challenge because a firm may have several VAT identifiers (for accounting or tax reasons). If a firm has multiple VAT identifiers, we follow Dhyne et al. (2021) in aggregating the data up to the firm level using information from the annual accounts about the ownership structure. Further details on the aggregation procedure are provided in Appendix A.1.

2.2 Data on individual workers

As described above, the firm data offers information on the number of FTE workers and the wages paid to these workers. This allows us to measure changes over time in the labor cost, hourly wages, and the size of the workforce of a given firm. The firm data do not, however,

allow us to follow the same workers over time.

To do so, we add information from matched employer-employee data for the period 2003-2014. The employer-employee data are provided to NBB by the Banque Carrefour de la sécurité sociale (Crossroads Bank for Social Security, BCSS), and then linked by NBB to our firm data (see Appendix A.2 for details.) The linked data consist of a random sample of 500,000 workers, drawn from the population of firms with 10 or more FTE employees at least once during the period 2003-2014. We have to work with this subsample of workers in larger firms because of restrictions imposed by the Belgian social security administration.

As discussed in greater detail later, this subsample of workers is useful for two reasons. First, it lets us perform an analysis of the wage impacts of worker mobility across firms. This allows us to examine if the hourly wage paid to a given worker depends on the firm for which she works. Second, it lets us restrict the estimation sample to stayers, who are observed working for the same firm over several years. This allows us to examine whether changes in a firm's labor cost are a result of changes in the wage that it pays to a given worker or changes in the composition and quality of its workforce.

2.3 Estimation samples

Most of our analyses use only the firm data. In these analyses, we impose a few restrictions to construct a suitable estimation sample. We restrict our analysis to firms in the private, non-financial sectors with at least one FTE employee and positive labor costs and sales. Following De Loecker et al. (2014) and Dhyne et al. (2021), we also restrict our analysis to firms with tangible assets of more than 100 euro and positive total assets in at least one year during our sample period 2002-2014. In the remainder of the paper, we refer to this sample as the main estimation sample.

As evident from Appendix A.3, the main estimation sample covers a large majority of the aggregate value added, gross output, labor costs, exports, and imports in the Belgian economy. In this appendix, we also present summary statistics on the workers and the firms. These statistics show, for example, that about half of the workers are categorized as white-collar workers and that the wages are 70 percent higher than those of blue-collar workers.

In a few of our analyses, we will rely on the subsample for which we have additional information from the worker data (i.e., the firms with 10 or more FTE employees at least once from 2002 to 2014). Even though this subsample contains only about a quarter of all firms, it still makes up most of the total sales, inputs, and trade in the Belgian economy.

3 Motivating empirical facts

We next present three sets of empirical facts about the Belgian economy that we use to motivate and guide the choices of model and econometric specification.


3.1 Firm-level sales, labor costs, and input purchases

The first set of facts describes the relationships in our data between firm-level sales, labor costs, and intermediate input purchases. We find that input purchases respond nearly proportionally to changes in sales. In contrast, changes in sales are associated with less than proportionate changes in labor costs. This finding is difficult to reconcile with the usual homothetic production function with constant return to scale. Instead, it is suggestive of sizable fixed overhead costs in labor.

We begin by describing the cross-sectional relationships between firm-level sales, labor costs, and intermediate input purchases. We pool the cross-sectional data for the entire period 2002-2014. In an attempt to adjust for differences across industries, we first demean the log of each variable using the firm's four-digit industry average. Thus, a firm with reported log sales of zero has the sales of an average firm in its industry. Next, we use local polynomial regressions to non-parametrically estimate the relationships between log labor costs and log sales (panel (a) of Figure 1) and log input purchases and log sales (panel (b) of Figure 1). In these cross-sectional comparisons across firms, we find that both labor and intermediate input purchases are nearly proportionally aligned with sales.

It is admittedly difficult to learn much from such cross-sectional comparisons. For example, large and productive firms may be systematically different from smaller and less productive firms in the production technology they use. A natural way to start addressing this concern is to examine changes over time within firms in sales, labor costs, and intermediate input purchases. In panels (c) and (d) of Figure 1, we perform the same analyses as in the two first panels, except that we now look at changes within firms over a four year period. We find that input purchases respond close to proportionally to changes in sales (a slope coefficient of 0.82). In contrast, changes in sales are associated with less than proportionate changes in labor costs (a slope coefficient of 0.57). While these results could be interpreted as suggestive evidence of sizable fixed overhead costs in labor, we need to be cautious. Input costs and sales are simultaneously determined and may be affected by many omitted variables. To draw conclusions about fixed versus variable costs we therefore will, in Section 4, develop an explicit model and construct an instrument that isolates the variation in sales that is induced by an exogenous change in demand.

Figure 1: Relationship between firm-level sales, labor costs, and input purchases



Notes: The figures use the main estimation sample of private-sector firms in Belgium from 2002 to 2014 (see Section 2.3 for details). They display the relationship between firm-level sales, labor costs, and input purchases, using the smoothed values of kernel-weighted local polynomial regression estimates with 95 percent confidence intervals. We use the Epanechnikov kernel function with kernel bandwidth of 0.05. In panels (a) and (b), each variable is demeaned with four-digit industry-year fixed effects. Log sales and four-year changes in log sales are trimmed at the top and bottom 1 percentiles.

3.2 Indirect export and exposure to foreign demand

The second set of facts build on the work of Dhyne et al. (2021). As in their analysis, we combine the data on domestic firm-to-firm sales with information on firms' foreign trade transactions to show that even though direct exporters are rare, a majority of firms are indirectly exporting. This finding motivates why our model and analysis will include indirect export through the production network to measure the firms' exposure to foreign demand.

To arrive at this conclusion, we first construct measures of the firms' total export. As

in Dhyne et al. (2021), we assume the firm’s composition of inputs in production does not vary across its buyers, so that we can measure the total export of a firm by the total share of output that it sells directly or indirectly to foreign markets (i.e., the total export share). Formally, the total export share of firm k , r_{kF}^{Total} , is defined as the share of revenue from direct export, r_{kF} , and the share of revenue coming from sales to other domestic firms, multiplied by the total export shares of those firms:

$$r_{kF}^{Total} = r_{kF} + \sum_{i \in W_k} r_{ki} r_{iF}^{Total}, \quad (1)$$

where W_k denotes the set of buyers of firm k , and r_{kF} and r_{ki} are the share of k ’s revenue that comes from direct export and from sales to domestic firm i , respectively. The denominator of the export shares is the total revenue of the firm, which consists of sales to other domestic firms, sales to households, and direct exports.

It is important to observe that the definition of the total export share is recursive. A firm’s total export share is the sum of its direct export share and the share of its sales to other domestic firms multiplied by the total export shares of those firms. Thus, the total export share is high if a lot of the firm’s output is exported directly to foreign markets or indirectly via sales to domestic buyers with high export shares.

In panel (a) of Table 1, we compare the (direct and total) export participation and shares of firms that directly export to those that only export indirectly. While few Belgian firms are directly exporting, a majority of the firms are indirectly exporting through sales to domestic buyers that subsequently trade internationally. In fact, even the firms that do not directly export are, on average, selling nearly 10 percent of their output indirectly to foreign markets.

3.3 Wage differentials and firm effects

Using the firm and worker data, the third set of facts show that i) firms that are more exposed to foreign markets are larger, more productive, and pay higher wages, and that ii) these wage differentials cannot be entirely explained by observed or unobserved differences across workers. These findings motivate why we will depart from the canonical model of a competitive labor market where wages depend only on the marginal product of workers and not the firm that employs them.

A large body of previous work has documented that firms that export look very different from non-exporters along a number of important dimensions. This is also true in the Belgian data: the descriptive statistics reported in panel (b) of Table 1 show that the direct exporters not only are more productive and have higher sales but also have more employees and pay higher wages than other firms. This pattern in the data is consistent with an imperfectly competitive labor market where each individual firm faces an upward-sloping labor supply

Table 1: Descriptive statistics in 2012

(a) Direct and total export participation			
	Exporters and non-exporters	Exporters only	Non-exporters only
Number of observations	98,745	11,892	86,853
Fraction of firms with total export participation	0.875	1.000	0.858
Average export shares:			
Total export	0.138	0.445	0.096
Direct export	0.039	0.322	0.000
Indirect export	0.100	0.122	0.096

(b) Firm characteristics			
	Exporters and non-exporters	Exporters only	Non-exporters only
Log sales	13.6	15.5	13.3
Log TFP	10.7	11.3	10.6
Log value added	12.5	13.9	12.3
Log FTE employment	1.5	2.5	1.3
Log average wage	10.5	10.8	10.5

Notes: This table uses the main estimation sample of private-sector firms in Belgium in 2012 (see Section 2.3 for details). Panel (a): The total export share of firm k , r_{kF}^{Total} , is recursively defined as $r_{kF}^{Total} = r_{kF} + \sum_{i \in W_k} r_{ki} r_{iF}^{Total}$, which can be decomposed into direct export share, r_{kF} , and indirect export share, $\sum_{i \in W_k} r_{ki} r_{iF}^{Total}$. Panel (b): For each column, we report the averages of variables listed on the left for a set of firms noted at the top of the column. Firms' sales consist of their sales to other firms in the NBB sample (network sales), sales to households at home, and direct exports to foreign markets. Firms' TFPs are calculated using the estimation procedure of Wooldridge (2009). Firms' value added and FTE employment are from the reported values from the annual accounts. Firms' average wages are the reported labor costs divided by their FTE employment.

curve, implying that wages are an increasing function of firm size and productivity. However, several alternative explanations exist.

One alternative explanation is that workers could be paid differentially because of unobserved skill differences, not imperfect competition (see, e.g., Abowd et al., 1999, Gibbons et al., 2005). To investigate this possibility, we run a set of wage regressions on a sample of workers who switch firms (and have at least four years of tenure at both the origin and destination firms, to ensure that we can accurately measure their wages both before and after the move). This sample is based on the subset of firms for which we have additional information from the worker data (see Section 2.3 for details). The results are presented in Table 2. In the first column, we regress the log wages of workers on a dummy variable for being employed in a firm that directly exports, controlling only for calendar year effects. In the second and third columns, we add controls for observable worker characteristics and sector fixed effects, respectively. In the final column, we use the panel dimension of the data to add controls for worker fixed effects. By including these fixed effects, we control for any time-invariant (observed or unobserved) worker heterogeneity. Since aggregate shocks are absorbed by the time fixed effects, identification is achieved from a common trend assumption in the workers' wages in the absence of moving to firms that directly export. In

Appendix C.1, we empirically assess this assumption, finding support for common trends prior to the move.

Table 2: Wage regressions on the sample of movers

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Exporter dummy	0.229*** (0.00375)	0.131*** (0.00307)	0.0639*** (0.00361)	0.0258*** (0.00288)
Number of workers	10,179	10,179	10,179	10,179
Number of firms	7,101	7,101	7,101	7,101
Calendar year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Worker characteristics		Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry FE			Yes	Yes
Worker FE				Yes

Notes: This table uses the subsample of firms for which we have additional information from the worker data (see Section 2.3 for details). For each column, we run a worker-level regression of log FTE wage on the sample of movers between any firms. Movers in year t are defined as workers who are employed by the origin firms at no later than $t - 4$, switch their jobs between $t - 1$ and t , and stay at their destination firms at least until $t + 3$. The sample is balanced from $t - 4$ to $t + 3$. Observations in years $t - 1$ and t are dropped from the regressions, to ensure we only use full-year employment spells in a given firm. Worker characteristics include worker class (blue collar or white collar)—which can vary across employers for the same worker—gender, and age bin-year effects. Industry fixed effects are included at the NACE four-digit level. $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Taken together, the results in Table 2 show that controlling for (observed and unobserved) worker characteristics significantly reduces the differences in wages between workers in firms that do and do not directly export, highlighting the benefits of using panel data in our setting. Nevertheless, even after controlling for worker characteristics, workers in firms that directly export still earn about 2.6 percent more than workers in firms that do not directly export, consistent with imperfect competition in the labor market.

An alternative explanation to imperfect competition for why (even the same) workers are paid differently across firms is that observed wages may not necessarily reflect the full compensation that individuals receive from working in a given firm. Indeed, both survey data (e.g., Hamermesh, 1999, Pierce, 2001, Maestas et al., 2018) and experimental studies (e.g., Mas and Pallais, 2017, Wiswall and Zafar, 2018, Chen et al., 2020) suggest that workers may be willing to sacrifice higher wages for better non-wage job characteristics or amenities when choosing an employer. Thus, the wage premia in firms that directly export could reflect compensating differentials for unfavorable amenities, not imperfect competition. To distinguish between compensating differentials and imperfect competition as sources of wage differentials, we will, in Section 5, exploit changes in employment and wages within firms in response to plausibly exogenous foreign demand shocks.

4 Model

Motivated and guided by the empirical evidence presented in the previous section, we now develop a model and then analyze the comparative statics properties of the relationship between key variables.⁶ The goals of the model are threefold. First, the comparative statics show the elasticities we need to recover to quantify and interpret how firms and workers respond to and are affected by changes in foreign demand. Second, the model makes explicit the data, instrument, and assumptions we need to identify and estimate these elasticities. Lastly, the model makes it possible to perform counterfactuals to quantify and explain the aggregate welfare implications of changes in foreign demand (or productivity).

4.1 Model environment

We model Belgium as a small open economy where firms take the prices in the foreign market as given. Our model is parsimonious and restrictive in several ways. For example, we take all buyer-supplier relationships as given, in terms of both the domestic firm-to-firm links and the firms' direct export and import participation. However, in other important ways, the model is rich and flexible as compared to much of the existing work on production networks.

One important feature of our model is that we allow for imperfect competition, in the form of monopsonistic competition in the labor market and monopolistic competition in the product market. To let the labor supply facing the firm be imperfectly elastic, we assume that many firms compete with one another for workers who have heterogeneous preferences over amenities. This assumption gives rise to firms having an increasing marginal cost of labor, consistent both with the descriptive evidence in Section 3.3 and with recent empirical findings from countries other than Belgium (see, e.g., Almunia et al., 2021, Lamadon et al., 2022, and Kroft et al., 2020). In the product market, we assume a market structure in which firms have many competitors, but each one sells a single differentiated good. As a result, the product demand facing the firm may be imperfectly elastic. The firms may sell to households with heterogeneous preferences, to other domestic firms, and directly to foreign markets. Intermediate inputs may be purchased from other domestic firms or imported directly from abroad.

Another important feature of our model is that we allow the production of goods to depend on both fixed and variable costs of labor and intermediate goods. The reason we allow for fixed overhead costs is that both the descriptive evidence in Section 3 as well as previous studies indicate that such expenses can be important in matching key moments of

⁶The model is similar to the one in Huneus et al. (2021), with a key distinction being that the cost structure of firms differs, and our model incorporates fixed overhead costs that lead to increasing returns to scale in production. We also consider a small open economy, whereas their model considers a closed economy.

the data on firms and workers in developed countries, at least in the short or medium run (see, e.g., Bartelsman et al., 2013, Traina, 2018, and Autor et al., 2020).

Product demand. The households in the economy consist of workers and firm owners. All households have the same preferences for goods. The utility of a household from final good consumption is denoted by C , which is a CES aggregator of the household's purchases of each firm's goods, q_{kH} :

$$C = \left(\sum_{k \in \Omega} (\beta_{kH} q_{kH})^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \right)^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}}, \quad (2)$$

where Ω denotes the set of all available products and H denotes domestic final demand from households. With the CES structure, one can write $P = \left(\sum_{k \in \Omega} \beta_{kH}^{\sigma-1} p_k^{1-\sigma} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}}$ as the aggregate price index. The demand for product k (which is produced by firm k) can be expressed as

$$q_{kH} = \beta_{kH}^{\sigma-1} \frac{p_k^{-\sigma}}{P^{1-\sigma}} E_H, \quad (3)$$

with E_H being the aggregate income of workers and firm owners, and similarly for exports, we have

$$q_{kF} = p_k^{-\sigma} D_{kF}, \quad (4)$$

where D_{kF} is the exogenous foreign demand shifter for firm k .

Labor supply. We consider an environment where labor is hired in a spot market, and each worker has idiosyncratic preferences over firms that are private information. Because of this information asymmetry, a firm cannot price-discriminate with respect to workers' reservation wages. Each worker n supplies one unit of labor and has the following preference for working at firm k :

$$v_{nk} = \log w_k - \log P + \nu_{nk}, \quad (5)$$

where w_k denotes the wage at firm k , P is the aggregate price index, and ν_{nk} denotes worker n 's idiosyncratic taste for the non-wage attributes or amenities of firm k .

This specification of preferences allows for the possibility that workers are heterogeneous in their preferences over the same firm. The importance of this source of horizontal differentiation is governed by the variance of ν_{nk} . For empirical tractability, we assume that ν_{nk} is distributed according to a Type-1 Extreme Value distribution with parameter ε .

Given the set of offered wages by all firms, worker n chooses a firm k to maximize her utility. Due to the distributional assumption on ν_{nk} , we obtain the following firm-specific labor supply curve:

$$\ell_k = A w_k^\varepsilon, \quad (6)$$

where $A = \frac{1}{\sum_j w_j^\varepsilon} L$. The term L is the aggregate labor supply.

Firms' production technology. Each firm produces a unique differentiated product and has a firm-specific production technology to convert variable labor, domestic inputs, and foreign inputs into output. It also has firm-specific fixed overhead input requirements for labor and inputs purchased from other firms. Finally, each firm has an exogenous set of domestic suppliers as well as exogenous access to the import or export market. We denote variables associated with variable inputs with superscript v and variables associated with fixed overhead inputs with superscript f .

Let the fixed overhead input requirement of firm k be denoted by \bar{q}_k^f . This fixed overhead input requirement can be fulfilled via a CES production technology by choosing inputs from a set of domestic suppliers Z_k as well as imports. The technology parameters ω_{jk}^f and ω_{Fk}^f are given. For all firms that do not directly import to fulfill the fixed input requirement, we have $\omega_{Fk}^f = 0$. Specifically, firm k 's technology to fulfill its exogenous fixed overhead input requirements is as follows:

$$\bar{q}_k^f = \left(\sum_{j \in Z_k} \omega_{jk}^f \left(q_{jk}^f \right)^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} + \omega_{Fk}^f \left(q_{Fk}^f \right)^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \right)^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}}. \quad (7)$$

Note that the term on the left-hand side is exogenously given, whereas the inputs on the right-hand side, q_{jk}^f and q_{Fk}^f , can be endogenously chosen. In addition, firm k has a fixed overhead labor input requirement $\bar{\ell}_k^f$. By letting the fixed overhead input requirements be firm-specific, our specification is flexible enough to capture that large firms may have higher overhead costs, as suggested by Traina (2018) and De Loecker et al. (2020).

After fulfilling the fixed overhead requirements, the output production function has constant returns to scale. Firms combine variable labor inputs and a variable intermediate input bundle in a Cobb-Douglas fashion. The variable intermediate input bundle is a CES aggregate of variable inputs purchased from their suppliers and variable imports. We write the output production function of firm k as follows:

$$q_k = \phi_k (q_k^v)^{1-\alpha_{\ell k}} (\ell_k^v)^{\alpha_{\ell k}}$$

$$q_k^v = \left(\sum_{j \in Z_k} \omega_{jk}^v \left(q_{jk}^v \right)^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} + \omega_{Fk}^v \left(q_{Fk}^v \right)^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \right)^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}}, \quad (8)$$

where $\alpha_{\ell k}$, ω_{jk}^v , and ω_{Fk}^v are the saliency parameters for labor inputs, inputs from individual suppliers, and imports. The term ϕ_k represents the exogenous Hicks-neutral productivity term of firm k . The left-hand side of equation (8), the total output of firm k , is an endogenous

variable. Note that the CES substitutability parameters in firms' production technology are restricted to be the same as the substitutability parameter in final demand. This assumption, which is common in the literature (see Huneus et al., 2021 and Demir et al., 2021 for example), implies that firms face the same demand elasticity regardless of who they sell their output to, and, thus, charge common markups under monopolistic competition.

Firm k 's use of labor inputs, ℓ_k , inputs from supplier j , q_{jk} , and imports q_{Fk} are equal to the sum of their usage as variable and fixed inputs:

$$\begin{aligned}\ell_k &= \ell_k^v + \bar{\ell}_k^f \\ q_{jk} &= q_{jk}^v + q_{jk}^f \quad \forall j \in Z_k \\ q_{Fk} &= q_{Fk}^v + q_{Fk}^f.\end{aligned}\tag{9}$$

Firm's problem. We now turn to the firm's profit maximization problem. Recall that the idiosyncratic preferences of workers are private information and thus unobserved to the firm. However, the firm knows the distribution of the idiosyncratic preferences. The firm views itself as infinitesimal within both the product and labor markets, acting monopolistically competitive in the output market and monopsonistic in the labor market. Firm k maximizes its profits by taking as given the labor supply curve (as in $w_k(\ell_k)$), the required fixed costs of \bar{q}_k^f and $\bar{\ell}_k^f$, the intermediate input prices, as well as the price of imports p_{Fk} .

Given this environment, each firm k chooses demand for inputs and its output price to solve

$$\max_{\{q_{jk}^v\}, q_{Fk}^v, \{q_{jk}^f\}, q_{Fk}^f, \ell_k^v, p_k} p_k q_k(\ell_k^v, \{q_{jk}^v\}, q_{Fk}^v) - w_k(\ell_k) \ell_k - \sum_{j \in Z_k} p_j q_{jk} - p_{Fk} q_{Fk}, \tag{10}$$

such that equations (6) to (9) hold.

Price. The first-order condition with respect to the firm's output price yields that firm k charges a firm-level markup of $\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}$ over its marginal cost, as it faces a common residual demand elasticity of σ . This result is a consequence of the assumption of firms engaging in monopolistic competition when they sell to other firms or sell to final demand.

Labor costs. The first-order condition with respect to variable labor inputs yields the following expression for firm k 's variable labor cost share out of its total sales:

$$\frac{\ell_k^v w_k(\ell_k)}{p_k q_k(\ell_k^v, \{q_{jk}^v\}, q_{Fk}^v)} = \frac{\varepsilon}{\varepsilon + 1} \frac{\partial \log q_k(\ell_k^v, \{q_{jk}^v\}, q_{Fk}^v)}{\partial \log \ell_k^v} \left(1 + \frac{d \log p_k}{d \log q_k}\right). \tag{11}$$

The first term in equation (11) represents the markdown of labor cost, which comes from the upward-sloping supply curve that has a constant elasticity of ε . The steeper the slope of the labor supply curve (low ε), the greater the markdown. The second term is the output elasticity with respect to variable labor inputs, which is summarized by the parameter $\alpha_{\ell k}$. The third term captures the inverse of the demand elasticity, which can be written as a constant term of $1 + \frac{d \log p_k}{d \log q_k} = \frac{\sigma - 1}{\sigma}$.

Intermediate input purchases. We now turn our attention to intermediate input purchases. Similar to equation (11), the first-order condition of firm k for variable input purchases from supplier j yields the following equation for the share of intermediate inputs from supplier j out of firm k 's total sales:⁷

$$\frac{p_j q_{jk}^v}{p_k q_k(\ell_k^v, \{q_{jk}^v\}, q_{Fk}^v)} = \frac{\partial \log q_k(\ell_k^v, \{q_{jk}^v\}, q_{Fk}^v)}{\partial \log q_{jk}^v} \left(1 + \frac{d \log p_k}{d \log q_k}\right). \quad (15)$$

The share of variable inputs from supplier j depends on two parameters. The first is the output elasticity with respect to the variable input, and the second is the inverse of the demand elasticity the firm faces.

General equilibrium. Equations for aggregate trade balance, labor market clearing, and aggregate income are presented in Appendix B.1. The general equilibrium features a set of firms' wages, $\{w_k\}$, and aggregate expenditure, E_H , such that firms and workers optimize and markets clear (see Appendix B.1 for details).

4.2 Comparative statics and target parameters

We now analyze the comparative statics properties of the relationship between key variables in the model. These comparative statics show the elasticities we need to recover to quantify

⁷The profit maximization problem of (10) also yields the following relationships for the fixed input bundle. Firms minimize the cost of their fixed input purchases, $\sum_{j \in Z_k} p_j q_{jk}^f + p_{Fk} q_{Fk}^f$, such that equation (7) holds. We obtain the price index for the fixed input bundle:

$$c_k^f = \left(\sum_{j \in Z_k} (\omega_{jk}^f)^\sigma p_j^{1-\sigma} + (\omega_{Fk}^f)^\sigma p_{Fk}^{1-\sigma} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}}. \quad (12)$$

The individual demand for the fixed inputs is expressed as

$$q_{jk}^f = (\omega_{jk}^f)^\sigma p_j^{-\sigma} (c_k^f)^\sigma \bar{q}_k^f \quad (13)$$

$$q_{Fk}^f = (\omega_{Fk}^f)^\sigma p_{Fk}^{-\sigma} (c_k^f)^\sigma \bar{q}_k^f. \quad (14)$$

and interpret how firms and workers respond to and are affected by exogenous changes in demand.

Elasticity of labor cost with respect to a demand-driven change in a firm’s output.

The change in the labor cost in response to a demand-driven change in a firm’s output is informative about the share of labor inputs that is used for fixed overhead costs. Using equation (9) and taking the total derivative of equation (11) while holding firms’ labor-specific technology parameter $\alpha_{\ell k}$, labor supply elasticity ε , and worker amenity draws $\{\nu_{nk}\}$ fixed, we obtain⁸

$$\frac{d \log (\ell_k w_k (\ell_k))}{d \log (p_k q_k (\ell_k^v, \{q_{jk}^v\}, q_{Fk}^v))} = \frac{\ell_k^v \varepsilon + 1}{\ell_k \frac{\ell_k^v}{\ell_k} + \varepsilon}. \quad (16)$$

Equation (16) illustrates that the labor cost elasticity of firm k is a function of its variable share of labor inputs $\left(\frac{\ell_k^v}{\ell_k}\right)$ and the labor supply elasticity ε it faces. One extreme case is that all labor inputs are fixed $\left(\frac{\ell_k^v}{\ell_k} = 0\right)$, so that changes in sales do not get passed on to labor costs. The other extreme case is that all labor inputs are variable $\left(\frac{\ell_k^v}{\ell_k} = 1\right)$. Labor costs are then changing proportionally to changes in sales. Between these two extremes cases, some but not all labor is fixed. The response of labor costs to changes in sales is monotonically increasing in variable share of labor inputs (until the labor cost elasticity is equal to one).

More generally, the labor cost elasticity depends on both the variable share of labor inputs and the labor supply elasticity ε . If there is perfect competition in the labor market ($\varepsilon = \infty$), the labor cost elasticity increases linearly with the variable share of labor inputs. However, if firms face upward-sloping labor supply curves, they pay lower wages than they otherwise would by hiring fewer workers, which effectively amplifies the share of labor inputs that is fixed. Thus, for a given variable share of labor inputs, the elasticity of labor costs is declining in ε (i.e., as the labor supply curve gets steeper and labor markets become less competitive).

Elasticity of input purchases with respect to a demand-driven change in a firm’s output.

The change in intermediate input purchases in response to a demand-driven change in a firm’s output is informative about the share of input purchases that is used for fixed overhead costs. Using equation (9) and taking the total derivative of equation (15) while holding firms’ input-factor-specific technology parameters $\left(\left\{\alpha_{\ell k}, \omega_{jk}^v, \omega_{Fk}^v, \omega_{jk}^f, \omega_{Fk}^f\right\}, \sigma\right)$ and

⁸See Appendix B.2 for the derivation. Note that both a firm’s foreign demand parameter, D_{kF} , and its productivity parameter ϕ_k are allowed to vary. Equation (16) is therefore consistent with both a demand-driven and a TFP-driven change in sales.

relative prices of the suppliers fixed, we obtain⁹

$$\frac{d \log (p_j q_{jk})}{d \log (p_k q_k (\ell_k^v, \{q_{jk}^v\}, q_{Fk}^v))} = \frac{q_{jk}^v}{q_{jk}}. \quad (17)$$

Equation (17) implies a one-to-one relationship between the share of the firm's intermediate inputs that is variable costs in the production and the elasticity of intermediate purchases in response to a demand-driven change in the firm's output.

Labor supply elasticity and demand-driven changes in a firm's output. The firm-specific labor supply elasticity governs how much the firm's employment increases if it raises the wage it is paying. Leveraging equation (6), we obtain the following relationship between the labor supply elasticity and the ratio of the average response of labor costs and employment to an increase in sales:

$$\sum_k \frac{d \log (\ell_k w_k (\ell_k))}{d \log (p_k q_k (\ell_k^v, \{q_{jk}^v\}, q_{Fk}^v))} \Big/ \sum_k \frac{d \log \ell_k}{d \log (p_k q_k (\ell_k^v, \{q_{jk}^v\}, q_{Fk}^v))} = \frac{\varepsilon + 1}{\varepsilon}. \quad (18)$$

Equation (18) provides the basis for estimating the labor supply elasticity in Section 5. The labor supply elasticity also determines the firm's wage-setting power and its markdown of wages relative to the marginal revenue product of labor.

Worker rents. In our model, worker rents are due to the idiosyncratic taste component ν_{nk} , giving rise to upward sloping labor supply curves and employer wage-setting power. We assumed that employers do not observe the idiosyncratic taste for amenities of any given worker. This information asymmetry implies that firms cannot price-discriminate with respect to workers' reservation wages. As a result, the equilibrium allocation of workers to firms creates surpluses or rents for inframarginal workers, defined as the excess return over that required to change a decision, as in Rosen (1986).

Intuitively, the area above the labor supply curve constitutes the rents of workers. These rents represent the willingness-to-pay to stay at the current firm which, on average, is greater when the labor supply curve is steeper. Following Lamadon et al. (2022) and Kroft et al. (2020), the additional rents of workers due to a demand-driven increase in sales can be

⁹See Appendix B.2 for the derivation.

expressed as:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{d(\ell_k w_k(\ell_k))}{1 + \varepsilon} &= \underbrace{\ell_k dw_k(\ell_k)}_{\text{incumbent workers}} \\ &+ \underbrace{(w_k(\ell_k) + dw_k(\ell_k)) \left(\frac{\ell_k + d\ell_k}{1 + \varepsilon} - \ell_k \right)}_{\text{new workers}} + \frac{\varepsilon}{1 + \varepsilon} \ell_k w_k(\ell_k). \end{aligned} \quad (19)$$

The additional rents for incumbents is the wage change multiplied by the number of incumbent workers. The additional rents for new hires is the wage bill of new hires minus the wage bill required to make them indifferent between the new and initial firm choices.

4.3 Instrumenting the change in firms' sales

The comparative statics of the model consider a change in the sales of a firm due to an exogenous change in the demand it faces. In the data, however, sales may change for many reasons other than demand, including shifts in input prices, technology, preferences, or amenities. To address this identification challenge, we now construct an instrument that intends to isolate the variation in sales that is induced by a change in foreign demand.

To obtain plausibly exogenous variation in the exports of firm k , $d \log X_{nF,t}$, we follow Hummels et al. (2014) and Dhyne et al. (2021) and construct a measure of the change in the world import demand for this firm ($d \log X_{kF,t}^{shock}$):

$$d \log X_{kF,t}^{shock} = \sum_{c,p} r_{k,c,p,t-1}^{\text{EX}} d \log WID_{c,p,t}, \quad (20)$$

where c denotes countries and p denotes products. We denote the lagged share of firm k 's exports to country-product c, p in k 's total exports with $r_{k,c,p,t-1}^{\text{EX}}$. The term $WID_{c,p,t}$ represents country c 's imports of product p from all other countries excluding Belgium. We define firm k 's direct export shock on its total sales using the lagged export share, $r_{kF,t-1} d \log X_{kF,t}^{shock}$. We further define the firm's total export shock, which includes its own direct export shock as well as takes into account the firm's indirect exposure to the direct export shocks through its buyers, as $\sum_n \tilde{H}_{kn,t-1} r_{nF,t-1} d \log X_{nF,t}^{shock}$. The term $\tilde{H}_{kn,t-1}$ captures the share of firm k 's total sales that are purchased by firm n directly and indirectly through firm k 's buyers and their buyers, and so on.¹⁰

Given this measure of total export shock, we can construct our first stage regression

¹⁰The term $\tilde{H}_{kn,t-1}$ is defined as the k, n element of matrix \tilde{H}_{t-1} . The matrix \tilde{H}_{t-1} is defined as $(I - R_{t-1})^{-1}$, which the k, n element of matrix R_{t-1} is the share of revenue of firm k that is sold to firm n , $r_{kn,t-1}$.

equation, which instruments the change in sales of a firm with its total export shock:

$$d \log X_{k,t} = \alpha + \beta_{Et} \sum_n \tilde{H}_{kn,t-1} r_{nH,t-1} + \beta \sum_n \tilde{H}_{kn,t-1} r_{nF,t-1} d \log X_{nF,t}^{shock} + \varphi_{k,t}. \quad (21)$$

The ultimate purpose of this equation is to isolate plausibly exogenous, demand-driven variation in sales that we can use to identify the elasticities derived out above. Unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity across firms (e.g., in technology, amenities or input prices) is eliminated by looking at changes over time within firms. To eliminate changes in sales that reflect shifts in domestic household demand, we control for $\sum_n \tilde{H}_{kn,t-1} r_{nH,t-1}$, where $r_{nH,t-1}$ is firm n 's lagged revenue share to households. Furthermore, we include both industry-year fixed effects and firm fixed-effects as controls in our difference specification. As a result, we allow for differential time trends in the outcomes of interest across firms (linearly at the firm level and unrestricted at the industry level). The motivation for doing so is that the foreign demand shock to a firm might covary with underlying secular trends in or shocks to the firm's outcomes, such as in its use of factor inputs (e.g., because of changes to input prices facing the firm or from shifts in the workers' valuation of the firm's amenities). In addition to including this set of controls, we perform a battery of robustness checks, discussed in Section 5.3.

5 Firm responses and worker impacts of foreign demand shocks

In this section, we quantify and explain the firm responses and worker impacts of changes in firm sales that are induced by changes in foreign demand. To do so, we will use the instrumental variables approach described in Section 4.3 to recover the elasticities defined by the comparative statics in Section 4.2. Armed with these elasticities, we then perform model based simulations to understand the direct and indirect effects of foreign demand shocks to production networks.

5.1 Graphical evidence

We begin our presentation of results with a graphical inspection of the IV approach described in Section 4.3. To do so, we plot a set of first-stage and reduced-form estimates that allow us to visually inspect the pre-trends in that data and the timing of the responses to the foreign demand shocks.

To make these plots, we run a series of first difference regressions. In these regressions, the dependent variable is the (percentage) change from year $t + \kappa - 1$ to year $t + \kappa$ in the


outcome of firm k (denoted generically by $d \log W_{k,t+\kappa}$). The regressor of interest is our instrument, the (percentage) change from year $t-1$ to t in the foreign demand the firm faces (as measured by the foreign demand shock, $\sum_n \tilde{H}_{kn,t-1} r_{nF,t-1} d \log X_{nF,t}^{shock}$). Our specification of the first difference regressions is given by

$$d \log W_{k,t+\kappa} = \alpha^\kappa + \beta_{Et}^\kappa \sum_n \tilde{H}_{kn,t-1} r_{nH,t-1} + \beta^\kappa \sum_n \tilde{H}_{kn,t-1} r_{nF,t-1} d \log X_{nF,t}^{shock} + \varphi_{k,t}^\kappa. \quad (22)$$

For each outcome variable we consider, we estimate this model separately for different choices of κ . The outcome is measured prior to the shock if $\kappa \in \{-3, -2, -1\}$, at the same time as the shock if $\kappa = 0$, and after the shock if $\kappa \in \{1, 2, 3\}$. As explained in Section 4.3, all specifications control for industry-year fixed effects, firm fixed effects, and shifts in domestic household demand as measured by the share of firm k 's sales that is (directly or indirectly) sold to domestic households in the previous year, $\sum_i \tilde{H}_{ji,t-1} r_{iH,t-1}$.

Characterizing the foreign demand shock. The first set of outcome variables we consider is the past and future values of the foreign demand shock. In Figure 2, we report estimates (and 95 percent confidence intervals) of the coefficient β^κ for different choices of κ for this outcome.

Figure 2: Characterizing the foreign demand shock



Notes: This figure uses the main estimation sample of 995,739 firm-year observations in Belgium from 2002 to 2014 (see Section 2.3 for details). We run seven firm-level regressions based on equation (22) for κ from -3 to 3 with total export shock as the outcome variable. Total export shocks are defined in Section 4.3. This figure shows the point estimates as well as 95 percent confidence intervals. Variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 0.5 percentiles. All specifications include industry-year fixed effects and firm fixed effects.

By construction, the estimate for $\kappa = 0$ is equal to one. The estimates for other values of κ can be small or large depending on the statistical dependence between the current foreign


demand shock and past or future foreign demand shocks. The results suggest that foreign demand shocks to a firm are weakly correlated over time. A firm that currently experiences a demand shock is not much more likely to have experienced a demand shock in the past or experience a demand shock in the future. In other words, the changes in the foreign demand shocks over time are reasonably consistent with a unit root process. This suggests that we can infer lagged responses from regressions of future outcomes on current foreign demand shocks.

Examining the first-stage and reduced-form estimates. In Figure 3, we examine how the shocks to foreign demand affect a wide range of outcomes. For each outcome variable, this is done by plotting the estimate (and 95 percent confidence intervals) of the coefficient β^κ for different choices of κ . In panel (a), we focus on the outcome variable in the first stage regression of our IV model: total sales (which include sales to foreign markets as well as sales to domestic firms and households). This panel displays how past, current, and future total sales statistically depend on current foreign demand shocks.

We find that an increase in the foreign demand facing a firm leads to an instantaneous, sharp and fairly persistent increase in its total annual sales. The point estimates suggest that if foreign demand increases by 10 percent, the firm's sales are expected to instantaneously (i.e., for $\kappa = 0$) increase by 3.1 percent. Over time, the yearly increases in sales decline modestly. As of the fourth year after this shock (i.e., for $\kappa = 3$), the cumulative increase in sales is approximately 2.4 percent. Thus, the cumulative or total impact on sales is about three-quarters of the immediate effect. If, for example, a foreign demand shock leads to a 10 percent instantaneous increase in sales, the firm's cumulative sales are expected to increase by 7.6 percent.

In panels (b)-(f) of Figure 3, we shift attention to the reduced-form estimates of the IV model. For all outcomes, we find significant instantaneous impacts of the foreign demand shocks. The delayed or lagged responses, however, vary across outcomes. Our estimates suggest that both the wage a firm pays and its use of intermediate inputs (from either domestic sources or from abroad) increase instantaneously and persistently in response to a foreign demand shock. By comparison, employment and labor cost increase gradually over time, consistent with some form of adjustment costs. The yearly increases in these variables decline over time, and there is little if any additional growth as of the fourth year after the shock. Guided by these estimates, we will be measuring the total responses to the foreign demand shocks by cumulating the impacts over time for κ equal to 0 to 3.

Figure 3: Examining the first stage and reduced form of the IV model



Notes: The figures use the main estimation sample of 995,739 firm-year observations in Belgium from 2002 to 2014 (see Section 2.3 for details). For each panel, we run seven firm-level regressions based on equation (22) for κ from -3 to 3 and report the responses of the outcome variable to the total export shock defined in Section 4.3. Each panel shows the point estimates as well as 95 percent confidence intervals. Variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 0.5 percentiles. All specifications include industry-year fixed effects and firm fixed effects.

5.2 IV estimates

In Table 3, we present the IV estimates of the impacts of the changes in firm sales that are induced by the foreign demand shocks. The first-stage regression of the IV model is given by equation (21). Using the same notation, we can express the second stage as a regression in first differences of the outcome variable of interest, $d \log W_{k,t+\kappa}$, on the total sales of the firm, $d \log X_{k,t}$:

$$d \log W_{k,t+\kappa} = \tilde{\alpha}^\kappa + \gamma_{Et}^\kappa \sum_n \tilde{H}_{kn,t-1} r_{nH,t-1} + \gamma^\kappa d \log X_{k,t} + \tilde{\varphi}_{k,t}^\kappa. \quad (23)$$

For each outcome we consider, we estimate the IV model by two-stage least squares regressions separately for each $\kappa \in \{0, 1, 2, 3\}$. We report both the instantaneous response, γ^0 , and the cumulative response, the sum of γ^0 , γ^1 , γ^2 , and γ^3 . As explained in Section 4.3, all specifications control for industry-year fixed effects, firm fixed effects, and shifts in domestic household demand as measured by the share of firm k 's sales that is (directly or indirectly) sold to domestic households in the previous year, $\sum_i \tilde{H}_{ji,t-1} r_{iH,t-1}$.

Table 3: IV estimates of the impact of changes in firm sales that are induced by the foreign demand shocks

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Average wage	FTE Employment	Labor cost	Input purchases	Domestic input purchases
Instantaneous response (γ^0)	0.0868*** (0.0296)	0.0679** (0.0322)	0.153*** (0.0368)	0.946*** (0.0770)	0.764*** (0.0672)
Cumulative response ($\sum_{\kappa=0}^3 \gamma^\kappa$)	0.0915 (0.0571)	0.320*** (0.0273)	0.412*** (0.0698)	0.781*** (0.120)	0.599*** (0.104)
Industry-Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Firm FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: This table uses the main estimation sample of 995,739 firm-year observations in Belgium from 2002 to 2014 (see Section 2.3 for details). For each outcome variable, we estimate its elasticity with respect to sales. We run four firm-level 2SLS regressions based on equation (23) for $\kappa \in \{0, 1, 2, 3\}$ and report the instantaneous response (γ^0) as well as the cumulative response (the sum of four coefficients $\{\gamma^\kappa\}_{\kappa=0}^3$). The first-stage F-statistics for excluded instruments is 142.3. Variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 0.5 percentiles. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the NACE four-digit level, and standard errors of the cumulative responses are computed using the bootstrap method. $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Worker impacts, labor supply elasticity, and fixed overhead costs in labor inputs.

The first two columns of Table 3 report the impacts on wages and employment of the increase in sales that is induced by the foreign demand shocks. The point estimates suggest that if sales increase by 10 percent, the firm's average wage and employment are expected to instantaneously (i.e., for $\kappa = 0$) increase by 0.9 percent and 0.7 percent, respectively. Over time, the employment effects cumulate. As of the fourth year after the demand shock (i.e., for $\kappa = 3$), the cumulative impacts on wages and employment are about 0.9 percent and 3.2

percent, respectively.

The evidence that a foreign-demand-driven increase in sales causes the firm to bid up wages to hire more workers is at odds with the textbook model in which the labor supply curve facing the firm is perfectly elastic. Instead, it is consistent with the notion that firms face upward-sloping labor supply curves and, therefore, have wage-setting power in the labor market. Indeed, as shown formally in equation (18), we can recover the slope of the firm-specific labor supply curve, and thus the degree of imperfect competition in the labor market, from the employment and wage impacts of the foreign-demand-driven increase in sales.

This identification argument, however, requires that firms are shifted along their labor supply curve. A possible threat to identification is adjustment costs. Since our findings suggest that labor enters the firm slowly over time rather than immediately when the new wage is posted, the instantaneous impacts on wages and employment will understate the labor supply elasticity. Thus, we look at the cumulative responses to infer the labor supply elasticity. The 0.9 percent cumulative increase in wages relative to a 3.2 percent cumulative increase in employment is consistent with firms facing a labor supply elasticity of about 3.5. This labor supply elasticity suggests that wages in the Belgian economy are marked down 22 percent relative to the marginal revenue product of labor.

In the above estimation, we consider all the workers in our sample. However, we could also look at the incumbent workers who stay in the same firm. An advantage of doing so is that it keeps the composition of the workforce fixed, and thus, we are not confounding increases in the wages paid to a given worker with changes in the quality of the workers. In the first column of Table 4, we report the IV estimate on wages for the sample of stayers (who stay in the same firm before and after the demand shock, from $\kappa = -1$ to $\kappa = 3$). This sample is based on the subset of firms for which we have additional information from the worker data (see Section 2.3 for details). We find that their wages increase by 1.1 percent in response to a 10 percent increase in sales, which is similar to the impact for all workers.

Another advantage of the stayers sample is that it allows us to examine if the increase in our measure of FTE employment reflects the hiring of new workers or an increase in the working hours of incumbent workers. To do so, we report, in Table 4, the IV estimates on hours of work (as measured as the share of full-time employment) and on hourly wages for the sample of stayers. The estimated impact on hours of work is close to zero, whereas the effect on hourly wages is close to what we find for all workers. Taken together, these findings suggest that Belgian firms mostly adjust to demand shocks by hiring additional workers, not by increasing incumbent workers' hours of work.

The evidence that both wages and employment increase notably in response to the increase in sales that is induced by the foreign demand shock implies that labor costs also go up. The third column of Table 3 reports the estimated impacts on labor costs. These

Table 4: IV estimates on the wages and work rate of stayers

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Stayer wage	Stayer hourly wage	Stayer work rate
Cumulative response	0.1170***	0.1093***	0.0091
$(\sum_{\kappa=0}^3 \gamma^{\kappa})$	(0.0322)	(0.0317)	(0.0131)
Ind.-Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Firm FE	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: This table uses the subsample of firms for which we have additional information from the worker data (see Section 2.3 for details). For each outcome variable, we estimate its elasticity with respect to sales. We run four firm-level 2SLS regressions based on equation (23) for $\kappa \in \{0, 1, 2, 3\}$ and report the cumulative response (the sum of four coefficients $\{\gamma^{\kappa}\}_{\kappa=0}^3$). The first-stage F-statistics for excluded instruments is 81.8. Variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 0.5 percentiles. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the NACE four-digit level and computed using the bootstrap method. We compute firm-level average stayer wage, stayer hourly wage, and stayer work rate based on the balanced panel of stayers from $t - 1$ to $t + 3$. The analysis is based on 452,025 worker-year observations of stayers, which yield 75,849 firm-year observations of private-sector firms in Belgium from 2003 to 2014. $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

estimates suggest that if sales increase by 10 percent, the firm’s labor costs are expected to instantaneously (i.e., for $\kappa = 0$) increase by 1.5 percent. Over time, labor costs continue to grow as the employment effects cumulate. As of the fourth year after the demand shock (i.e., for $\kappa = 3$), the cumulative impact on labor costs reaches 4.1 percent.

As for the labor supply elasticity, we focus on the cumulative impacts to infer the elasticity of labor costs with respect to a demand-driven change in sales. The reason for doing so is that our comparative statics assume that firms are shifted along their labor demand curve. By comparing the cumulative impacts on total labor costs versus sales, we find an implied elasticity of labor costs of approximately 0.54.

As shown in equation (16), the elasticity of labor costs is informative about the presence of fixed overhead costs in labor inputs. In the absence of such costs, the elasticity would be equal to one in our model. If all labor is fixed, on the other hand, the elasticity would be zero. Our finding of a labor costs elasticity of 0.54 is therefore evidence of non-zero fixed overhead costs in labor inputs. However, it is not straightforward to quantify the magnitude of the fixed labor input share. Because of upward sloping labor supply curves, the relationship between the labor cost elasticity and the fixed shares of labor inputs is nonlinear. Thus, even if we know the average elasticity of labor costs, we do not necessarily know the share of labor costs that is fixed (on average or for any given firm).

This issue is resolved if one is willing to assume that the fixed share of labor inputs is homogeneous across firms. Under this restriction, we can plug our estimate of the labor cost elasticity into equation (16) and solve for the fixed share of labor inputs. We then find that 52 percent of the firm’s labor is fixed. In Appendix C.2, we let the fixed shares of labor inputs vary across different types of firms, such as exporters versus non-exporters and

manufacturing firms versus non-manufacturing firms. We find that the weighted averages of the fixed shares of labor inputs do not differ materially from the estimate under the restriction that the fixed shares of labor inputs are homogeneous across all firms.

Another special case in which one is easily able to recover the fixed share of labor cost is if the labor supply is perfectly elastic (i.e., $\varepsilon \rightarrow \infty$). In this case, the share of labor cost that, on average, is fixed would be pinned down directly by the estimated labor cost elasticity. If one imposes this restriction, which is admittedly at odds with the data, we would conclude that, on average, the fixed share of labor inputs is about 46 percent. This illustrates that the nonlinearities that arise because of the upward-sloping labor supply curves do not matter greatly for the estimates of the fixed shares of labor inputs.

Input purchases and fixed overhead costs in intermediate inputs. The fourth and fifth columns of Table 3 report the impacts on input purchases of the increase in sales that is induced by the foreign demand shocks. The estimates suggest that if sales increase by 10 percent, the firm’s total (domestic) input purchases are expected to instantaneously (i.e., for $\kappa = 0$) increase by about 9.5 (7.6) percent. By comparison, the cumulative impact on total input purchases, domestic input purchases, and total sales is around 7.8 percent, 6 percent, and 7.6 percent, respectively. These findings suggest that firms pass on a large share of their foreign demand shocks to their domestic suppliers.

As shown in equation (17), the change in input purchases due to a demand-driven change in sales allows us to draw inferences about both the presence and importance of fixed overhead costs in intermediate inputs. As for labor inputs, we focus on the cumulative impacts to infer the elasticity of input purchases with respect to a demand-driven change in sales. The reason for doing so is that our comparative statics assume that firms are shifted along their input demand curve. By comparing the cumulative impacts on total input purchases versus sales, we find that the implied elasticity of total input purchases is approximately equal to one. In other words, the fixed share of intermediate inputs is roughly equal to zero.

As shown in Figure 9 in Appendix C.3, the elasticities of input purchases, and thus, the fixed shares of intermediate inputs, vary systematically by the type of input. To reach this conclusion, we estimate the elasticities of (domestic and foreign) input purchases separately by the industry (as measured by the one-digit NACE code) of the firms’ suppliers. Close to half of all input purchases in the Belgian economy come from the manufacturing industry (including imported manufactured goods). We find that purchases from this industry increase by nearly as much (7.5 percent) as the cumulative increase in total sales (7.6 percent). This suggests that the elasticity of input purchases from this industry is close to one. Thus, we conclude that inputs from the manufacturing industry are predominately variable and can be adjusted in response to demand shocks.

In contrast, Figure 9 shows that input purchases from the service industry (a combination of NACE G to N one-digit sectors) have a larger share of fixed inputs. We compute the size-weighted average of the cumulative responses of these service inputs and find that purchases from this industry increase by around 4.8 percent. This implies that these service inputs—which supply around 30 percent of total input purchases in Belgium—have a fixed input cost share of 37 percent.

When interpreting our estimates of the fixed costs shares, it is useful to observe that the comparative statics in Section 4 hold the markups fixed. If one instead assumes that firms increase the markup on the goods that they sell in response to an increase in foreign demand, the elasticities of labor cost and input purchases would be lower than one even in the absence of fixed costs. In this case, however, all elasticities would be uniformly lower than one, and there should be no differences between the elasticities of labor cost and total input purchases or between different types of input purchases. In contrast, we find a labor cost elasticity of 0.54, a total input purchase elasticity that is roughly equal to one, and systematic heterogeneity in the elasticities of input purchases by supplier industry.

Comparison with existing evidence. Our estimate of the labor supply elasticity is broadly comparable to existing work from countries other than Belgium. Card et al. (2018) review this work and pick 4.0 as the preferred value in their calibration exercise. More recent evidence includes Lamadon et al. (2022), who estimate an average labor supply elasticity in the U.S. economy of 4.6, and Kroft et al. (2020), who estimate a labor supply elasticity in the U.S. construction sector of 4.2. By comparison, Huneus et al. (2021) find labor supply elasticities that range from around 3 to 6 in Chile, and Chan et al. (2021) estimate the elasticity to be 5.7 in Denmark.

We are not aware of previous studies with directly comparable estimates of the fixed shares of labor or intermediate inputs. The closest comparison is arguably the results in De Loecker et al. (2020). Using data on American firms (from Compustat), they compute the share of total costs that is fixed. They measure fixed costs as the reported spending in the category “Selling, General and Administrative Expenses.” They conclude that the share of total costs that are fixed ranges from 18 to 22 percent during the period 2000-2016. By comparison, our estimates suggest that around 29 percent of total costs (including labor and intermediate inputs) are fixed in the Belgian economy.

5.3 Specification checks

We consider several alternative specifications to evaluate the sensitivity of the above estimates. These results are presented in Appendix C.4.

One possible concern with our baseline specification is that foreign demand shocks might be correlated with regional shocks that may directly affect both sales and input costs. To address this concern, we add location-year fixed effects to both the first stage and the reduced form equations. Location is measured using level 2 of the Eurostat NUTS classification. We find that the IV estimates relative to the cumulative increase in sales barely change when we include these controls.

A related concern is that foreign demand shocks might be correlated with changes in import prices that may directly affect both sales and input costs. We test this empirically, finding that the correlation between firm-level import price changes and the firm-level foreign demand change, $\sum_n \tilde{H}_{kn,t-1} r_{nF,t-1} d \log X_{nF,t}^{shock}$, is close to zero.

Another possible concern is that the differences between the instantaneous and cumulative responses may be confounded by non-random attrition of firms over time. To address this concern, we restrict our estimation sample to a balanced panel of firms that are observed for at least seven consecutive years (from κ equal to -3 to 3). It is reassuring to find that our IV estimates relative to the cumulative increase in sales are not substantially affected by this sample restriction.

We also conduct a robustness check that investigates the sensitivity of our results to weighting each firm by the level of employment (as measured in year $\kappa = -1$). By doing so, we assign more weights to larger firms. The IV estimates relative to the cumulative increase in sales do not materially change when we use these weights.

5.4 Direct and indirect effects of foreign demand shocks to production networks

The findings above suggest that Belgian firms face upward-sloping labor supply curves and sizable fixed overhead costs in labor inputs. We now perform a simulation to explore the implications of these findings for conclusions about firm responses and worker impacts of foreign demand shocks to direct exporters and their domestic suppliers. Our simulation considers a foreign demand shock that increases the export of a direct exporter by 10 percent. We draw 100 direct exporters from our estimation sample of firms in 2012 and then average the results from our simulation across these draws. In the simulation, we use a labor supply elasticity of 3.5, a fixed share of labor costs of 52 percent, and the input-specific fixed share of input costs (estimated in Appendix C.3).

The first step in the simulation is to use the elasticities of employment and wages with respect to sales to predict the employment and wage responses of a direct exporter to the demand shock. The next step is to simulate the spillover effects of the foreign demand shock to the domestic suppliers of the direct exporters. Most of these direct exporters have many


suppliers. Instead of looking at the spillover or indirect effects to each of these suppliers, we focus on the supplier that sells most of its output to the direct exporter. For this key supplier, we simulate the employment and wage responses to the foreign demand shock by combining our estimates of the input purchase elasticities with data on the share of sales to the direct exporter. In the same way, we continue the simulation of the spillover effects through the production network by predicting the employment and wage responses of the key supplier’s key supplier, and so on.

The results from this simulation exercise for employment and wages are reported in the solid lines of panels (a) and (b) of Figure 4, respectively. We find that, on average, a direct exporter raises employment by 1.37 percent and the wages it pays by 0.39 percent in response to a foreign demand shock that increases the firm’s direct export by 10 percent. As evident in Figure 4, this shock cascades through the production network as the direct exporters buy more inputs both directly from their own suppliers and indirectly from the suppliers’ (direct and indirect) suppliers. These indirect demand effects increase, on average, the employment and wages of the direct exporter’s key supplier by 0.3 and 0.08 percent, respectively. In other words, the key supplier experiences one-fifth of the percentage increases in wages and employment of the direct exporter. These indirect demand effects decay quickly with the distance to direct exporters in the supply chain. In fact, the foreign demand shock has little if any impact on the employment and wages of the key supplier’s key supplier.

An implication of the direct and indirect effects on wages and employment is that workers in the production network will capture rents as a result of the foreign demand shock. As evident from equation (19), these rents depend on the labor supply curve it faces and the increase in labor costs in response to the demand shock. We use our estimates of these quantities to compute the worker rents induced by the demand shock, capturing incumbent and new workers both in the firm that directly exports and in its direct and indirect suppliers. In total, workers earn 38,000 euro in additional rents as a result of a foreign demand shock that increases the firm’s direct export by 10 percent. Panel (c) of Figure 4 shows how these rents are shared among the workers in the production network. On average, the workers in the directly exporting firm get 75 percent of the total rents (28,000 euro). The remaining rents are shared among the other workers in the production network, with most of it (18 percent of the total additional rents) going to the workers of the direct suppliers.

To help interpret the magnitudes and mechanisms of the direct and indirect effects we redo the simulations under the assumptions of a perfectly competitive labor market and no fixed overhead costs. The results from this simulation are shown by the dotted lines in the three panels of Figure 4. In each of these panels, we also report results from a simulation with imperfect competition in the labor market (same labor supply elasticity as we estimate) but no fixed overhead costs. These results are shown by the stippled lines. We find that

Figure 4: Simulation results of foreign demand shock transmission along the supply chain



Notes: For each panel, we report the simulation results of the transmission of foreign demand shocks along the supply chain (see the discussion in the text for how the simulation is done). The first two panels present the employment and wage response at the direct exporter, the direct exporter’s key supplier, the key supplier of the exporter’s key supplier, and so on. The bottom panel aggregates the rents to the workers in firms that direct export, to workers in their direct suppliers, to workers in their suppliers’ suppliers, and so on (up to three links). In each line of every figure, we make different assumptions regarding the fixed shares of labor inputs. For the solid lines, we use our estimated labor supply elasticity $\varepsilon = 3.5$ as well as the fraction of fixed inputs for both labor and intermediate inputs (at NACE one-digit level); for the stippled lines, we assume that all inputs are variable; and for the dotted lines, we further assume that the labor market is perfectly competitive with $\varepsilon = \infty$.

the employment responses of Belgian firms to foreign demand shocks decrease by nearly half because of the upward sloping labor supply curves and the fixed overhead costs. Most of this reduction can be attributed to the fixed costs. In the absence of such costs, the increase in wages would be 84 percent larger for the direct exporters relative to what we find with fixed overhead costs and upward-sloping labor supply curves. As a result, workers would earn more rents if there were no fixed costs, but the sharing of the rents would be only marginally

affected as the fixed costs do not vary much across direct exporters and their suppliers.

A potential concern with the simulations discussed above is that they assume that the direct exporters and their suppliers do not face different labor supply curves or fixed overhead costs. To address this concern, we re-estimate the labor supply curves and the fixed overhead cost shares in labor inputs separately for the direct exporters and for the firms that do not directly export. Interestingly, the labor supply curves and the fixed cost shares do not materially differ between the firms that do and do not directly export. Consistent with this finding, we show in Appendix C.5 that both the estimates of direct and indirect effects and the results on the (sharing of) the additional rents are robust to allowing for heterogeneity in the labor supply curves and the fixed shares of labor inputs.

Another potential concern with the simulations is that they assume the fixed labor cost share is homogeneous across all firms in the economy. To address this concern, we estimate both the labor supply elasticity and the labor cost elasticity separately for manufacturing and non-manufacturing firms. These separate estimates allow us to compute industry-specific fixed labor cost shares (under the assumption that the fixed labor cost shares do not vary across firms within these industries). As shown in Appendix C.5, the simulation results do not materially change when we allow the fixed labor cost shares to vary across industries.

6 Aggregate implications of the foreign demand shocks

The simulation results in the previous section point to the importance of production networks, upward-sloping labor supply curves, and fixed overhead costs to accurately predict how firms respond to and workers are affected by foreign demand shocks. However, this simulation relies on several simplifying assumptions. In particular, it considers a demand shock to a single (randomly drawn) direct exporter, and it abstracts from general equilibrium effects and the need to adjust imports if exports fall. We now relax these assumptions and consider the aggregate effects of foreign demand shocks to a production network. The primary goal of this analysis is to quantify how changes in foreign demand propagate through a small open economy and affect firms and workers.

Throughout this section, the foreign demand shock we consider is a five percent increase in foreign tariffs on all Belgian exports. We implement this shock by expressing it as a change in the foreign demand shifters. Let \hat{x} denote the change in variable x , defined as the ratio of the post-shock value x' over the pre-shock value x . Given this definition, a uniform foreign demand shock of $\hat{D}_{kF} = 1.05^{-\sigma}$ is approximately equal to an 18 percent decline in the foreign demand shifters.

6.1 Counterfactual economies

We consider several counterfactual economies, defined by alternative parameterizations of the model outlined in Section 4.

One of these economies is constructed to mirror the actual Belgian economy. We then use the estimates we obtained in Section 5, including the estimated value of the labor supply curve ($\varepsilon = 3.5$) and the estimated values of the fixed cost shares in labor inputs and input purchases. For the fixed cost shares of input purchases, we use the estimates for each NACE one-digit industry obtained in Appendix C.3. One of the alternative counterfactual economies is constructed by shutting down the fixed overhead costs. This is done by imposing the restriction $\bar{\ell}_k^f = \bar{q}_k^f = 0$, so all the inputs of firms are variable inputs, as is standard in previous work. In another counterfactual economy, we allow for fixed costs but shut down imperfect competition in the labor market. This economy is constructed by setting $\varepsilon = \infty$ so that the labor supply is perfectly elastic. The last counterfactual economy we consider has a perfectly competitive labor market and no fixed costs.

6.2 Parameterization and solution of the model

For each of the counterfactual economies, it is necessary to parameterize the model in order to calculate key variables and predict the impacts of the foreign demand shocks. Prior work on trade and production networks highlight the importance of holding key variables fixed to meaningfully compare results across counterfactual economies (see, e.g., Baqaee and Farhi, 2022). We therefore impose the restriction that certain firm-level observables (i.e., firms' total labor costs, imports, exports, and purchases from and sales to other domestic firms) are identical across the alternative parameterizations of the model and equal to what we observe in the data (in 2012, our reference year throughout this section).

To rationalize that different parameterizations of the model are producing identical firm-level observables, we let certain parameters vary across the counterfactual economies, including the firm-level productivity parameters, ϕ_k , the technology parameters, ω_{jk}^v , ω_{Fk}^v , ω_{jk}^f , and ω_{Fk}^f , and the workers' preference parameters, ν_{nk} . For each counterfactual economy, these parameters are assumed to be invariant to the foreign demand shock. With this assumption, we can solve for the counterfactual changes without recovering these underlying parameters by implementing the technique developed by Dekle et al. (2007). We solve for the counterfactual outcomes using the system of equations described in Appendix B.3.

We further parameterize the model as follows. We calculate the Belgian trade balance as the difference between exports and imports in our reference year, 2012. We hold the trade balance fixed throughout the counterfactual analyses. We set $\sigma = 4$, a common choice in the prior literature (see, e.g., Antras et al., 2017, Oberfield and Raval, 2021, and Dhyne et al.,

2021). This choice implies that firms charge a common markup of $\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1} = 1.33$ over marginal cost.

As shown in Appendix D.1, our parameterization of the model may create firm-level discrepancies between the theory-implied variable input costs, $(\frac{\varepsilon}{\varepsilon+1}\alpha\ell_k + 1 - \alpha\ell_k) \frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma} p_k q_k$, and the observed variable input costs, $w_k \ell_k^v + \sum_j p_j q_{jk}^v + p_{Fk} q_{Fk}^v$. A possible reason for these discrepancies is the firms' usage of inventories, which we do not model. To deal with these discrepancies, we follow Dhyne et al. (2022) in imposing that the firm-level ratios of the theory-implied variable input cost over the observed variable input costs are invariant to the foreign demand shock. A natural interpretation of this assumption is that the amount of inventory the firm uses (or accumulates) relative to its inputs and sales does not change in response to the foreign demand shocks.¹¹

6.3 Impacts of foreign demand shocks in the actual economy


We begin by analyzing the impacts of the foreign demand shocks in our representation of the actual Belgian economy with firms that face fixed overhead costs and upward-sloping labor supply curves. The results are presented in the white bars in Figure 5. This figure shows the firm-level distributions of changes in output (panel (a)), marginal costs (panel (b)), and wages (panel (c)).

We find that most but not all firms decrease their output in response to the foreign demand shocks. The median firm reduces its output by 4.7 percent. The marginal costs of firms fall, with the median firm experiencing a cost reduction of 4.8 percent. Marginal costs fall primarily because the cost of labor decreases significantly for all firms. The median firm reduces its wage by 8.8 percent.

To interpret these results, it is important to observe that the foreign demand shocks have both direct and indirect effects. A reduction in foreign demand would directly reduce the output of the firms that sell directly or indirectly to foreign markets. This translates to a reduction in demand for both labor and intermediate inputs, thereby lowering the prices on these factors. Indirect equilibrium effects also influence how firms respond to and workers are affected by the foreign demand shock. Importantly, imports have to be reduced to ensure trade balance. The foreign price is exogenous and fixed, and the wage is the only price that can move to ensure trade balance. This decline in wages contributes to reducing marginal costs, increasing labor, and raising output, especially among firms that rely heavily on labor (instead of foreign inputs) in their production. Indeed, some of these firms experience an overall increase in output as a result of the foreign demand shock, as evident from the right tail of the distribution in panel (a) of Figure 5.

¹¹In Appendix D.1, we show that this assumption is isomorphic to assuming that firm k charges a firm-specific markup of $\frac{p_k q_k}{w_k \ell_k^v + \sum_j p_j q_{jk}^v + p_{Fk} q_{Fk}^v}$.

Figure 5: Firm-level distribution of changes in output, marginal costs, and wages in response to a 5 percent increase in foreign tariffs, with and without fixed inputs



Notes: The three panels in this figure show the distribution of the changes in firm-level variables due to a uniform 5 percent increase in foreign tariffs on Belgian exports. Panel (a) shows the distribution of firm-level output changes, \hat{q}_k , panel (b) shows the distribution of firm-level marginal cost changes, \hat{c}_k , and panel (c) shows the distribution of firm-level nominal wage changes, \hat{w}_k . In all panels, the white bars represent the distributions when one allows for fixed inputs, and the grey bars represent the distributions when one does not allow for fixed inputs. In this figure, we allow for imperfect competition in the labor market, $\varepsilon = 3.5$.

6.4 How fixed costs affect the impacts of foreign demand shocks

We now shift attention to how fixed overhead costs affect the propagation and implications of foreign demand shocks. To do so, Figure 5 compares the impacts of these shocks in our representation of the actual Belgian economy (white bars) to those we obtain in the

counterfactual economy where firms face upward-sloping labor supply curves but no fixed costs in labor or intermediate goods (grey bars).

The results suggest that fixed overhead costs lead to foreign demand shocks having larger and more dispersed impacts on both output and marginal cost. In the economy without fixed overhead costs, the median firm reduces output by 0.5 percent and marginal costs by 3.5 percent. By comparison, output and marginal costs decline by 4.7 and 4.8 percent if one incorporates the fixed overhead costs. These differences are mirrored in the changes in nominal wages. Shutting down fixed costs attenuates the decline in the nominal wage of the median firms by almost 4 percentage points (from 8.8 percent in the economy with fixed costs to 5.1 percent in the economy with no fixed costs).


Fixed overhead costs amplify the consequences of foreign demand shocks because they make foreign inputs (labor) relatively more (less) important for total variable costs. To understand why, recall that the Lerner Symmetry Theorem establishes the equivalence between any intervention that increases the cost of import and export by the same amount. Thus, the five percent increase in foreign tariffs is equivalent to a five percent increase in tax on imports. An increase in the cost of imports has a larger impact on the firms' total variable costs, and, in turn, on output and real wages, if the economy has sizable fixed overhead costs in labor while imported inputs are predominately variable costs. Empirically, we show, in Figure 11 of Appendix D.2, that (direct and indirect) imports make up a considerably larger share of the total variable costs when we take our estimates of fixed overhead costs into account.

6.5 How imperfect competition in the labor market affects the impacts of foreign demand shocks

We now turn to an analysis of how imperfect competition in the labor market affects the propagation and implications of foreign demand shocks. To do so, Figure 6 compares the impacts of these shocks in our representation of the actual Belgian economy (white bars) to those we obtain in the counterfactual economy where firms face fixed costs in labor and intermediate goods and perfectly elastic labor supply curves (grey bars). This figure shows the firm-level distributions of changes in output (panel (a)), marginal costs (panel (b)), and nominal wages (panel (c)).

The results suggest that imperfect competition in the labor market does not greatly change the impacts of the foreign demand shocks on output or marginal costs. These findings are mirrored in the changes in nominal wages. In the economy without imperfect competition in the labor market, the five percent increase in foreign tariffs on Belgian exports produces an 8.7 percent decline in the nominal wages of all firms. By comparison, nominal wages decline

Figure 6: Firm-level distribution of changes in output, marginal costs, and wages in response to a 5 percent increase in foreign tariffs, with and without imperfect competition in the labor market



Notes: The three panels in this figure show the distribution of the changes in firm-level variables due to a uniform 5 percent increase in foreign tariffs on Belgian exports. Panel (a) shows the distribution of firm-level output changes, \hat{q}_k , panel (b) shows the distribution of firm-level marginal cost changes, \hat{c}_k , and panel (c) shows the distribution of firm-level wage changes, \hat{w}_k . In all panels, the white bars represent the distributions when one allows for imperfect competition in the labor market, and the grey bars represent the distributions when one assumes perfect competition in the labor market. Because all firms have common wages under perfect competition in the labor market, the corresponding wage change is depicted as a vertical line in panel (c). In the figure, we allow for fixed input costs in both labor inputs and input purchases.

by 8.8 percent for the median firm if one incorporates that firms face upward-sloping labor supply curves. Taken together, these findings suggest that the essential feature to accurately

predict the impacts of the foreign tariff is fixed overhead costs, not imperfect competition in the labor market.

It is important to observe that this conclusion is an empirical result and does not follow by assumption. In our model, imperfect competition in the labor market should amplify the impacts of the foreign demand shocks on output, marginal costs, and (nominal and real) wages. To see this, recall our discussion of equation (16) in Section 5.2. This equation shows that the elasticity of labor cost with respect to a demand-driven change in the firm’s output depends on the share of labor inputs that is variable and the labor supply curve it faces. All else equal, the steeper the labor supply curve, the larger the elasticity of labor costs. However, the sensitivity of the elasticity of labor cost to the labor supply elasticity depends on the variable labor shares. Given our estimates of the variable labor shares, the estimated value of the labor supply elasticity of 3.5 has only a modest impact on the firm responses to the foreign demand shocks.

6.6 Implications for real wages


We conclude the analysis of foreign demand shocks by studying how the implications for *real* wages vary across the counterfactual economics. The results are reported in Figure 7. For each counterfactual economy, this figure presents our estimate of how the increase in foreign tariffs on Belgian exports would affect the average real wage, $\sum_k \frac{w_k \ell_k}{\sum_j w_j \ell_j} \hat{w}_k \hat{\ell}_k / \hat{P}$.¹²

The reduction in real wages is largest in our representation of the actual Belgian economy with firms that face fixed overhead costs and upward sloping labor supply curves. In this economy, the five percent increase in foreign tariffs on Belgian exports produces a 5.7 percent fall in the average real wage. In the counterfactual economy with fixed costs and perfectly elastic labor supply, this increase in foreign tariffs results in a 5.6 percent fall in the average real wage. By comparison, the average real wage declines only by 3.6 percent in the counterfactual economy with no fixed costs and upward-sloping labor supply curves. The smallest effect on the average real wage, a 3.3 percent decline, is found in the counterfactual economy with no fixed costs and perfectly elastic labor supply.

Taken together, these findings show that the essential feature to accurately predict the impacts of foreign tariffs on the real wages of Belgian workers is fixed overhead costs, not imperfect competition in the labor market. Furthermore, our results suggest that the way the labor market is typically modeled in existing research on foreign demand shocks—with no fixed costs and perfectly elastic labor supply—may grossly understate the decline in real

¹²In Appendix D.3, we report the same set of results for the changes in real income, \hat{E}/\hat{P} , which captures not only the impacts on wages and consumer prices but also the effects on profits. The results are qualitatively the same. However, the quantitative impacts are larger, reflecting the negative effects of foreign tariffs on firms’ profits.

Figure 7: Changes in average real wage in response to a 5 percent increase in foreign tariffs



Notes: In this figure, we report the changes in average real wage, $\sum_k \frac{w_k \ell_k}{\sum_j w_j \ell_j} \hat{w}_k \hat{\ell}_k / \hat{P}$, due to a uniform 5 percent increase in foreign tariffs on Belgian exports. Each bar represents the responses under different parameterizations of the model presented in Section 4. We use our estimated labor supply elasticity $\varepsilon = 3.5$ in the counterfactual Belgian economies with upward-sloping labor supply curves. Wages are common across all firms under the parameterization in which we assume $\varepsilon = \infty$, hence $\sum_k \frac{w_k \ell_k}{\sum_j w_j \ell_j} \hat{w}_k \hat{\ell}_k / \hat{P} = \hat{w} / \hat{P}$. When accounting for fixed inputs, we use the fraction of fixed inputs for both labor and intermediate inputs (at NACE one-digit level) that we obtained in Section 5.

wages due to an increase in foreign tariffs.

6.7 Shocks to variables other than foreign demand

While our paper is centered around foreign demand shocks, the presence of fixed costs and imperfect competition could also have important implications for the analyses of other types of shocks. In Appendix D.4, we explore this by considering the propagation and implications of domestic productivity shocks, $\{\hat{\phi}_k\}$.

The analyses in this appendix closely follow the analyses in Subsections 6.3-6.6, except that we now replace the foreign demand shocks with a uniform 5 percent reduction in the productivity of all manufacturing firms. The results echo the key insights from our analyses of the foreign demand shocks. Fixed overhead costs and, to a lesser extent, imperfect competition in the labor market matter considerably for the predicted impacts of domestic

productivity shocks.

7 Conclusion

The goal of our paper was to quantify and explain the firm responses and worker impacts of foreign demand shocks to domestic production networks. To capture that firms can be indirectly exposed to such shocks by buying from or selling to domestic firms that import or export, we used Belgian data with information on both domestic firm-to-firm sales and foreign trade transactions. Our estimates of firm responses suggest that Belgian firms pass on a large share of a foreign demand shock to their domestic suppliers, face upward-sloping labor supply curves, and have sizable fixed overhead costs in labor.

Motivated and guided by these findings, we developed and estimated an equilibrium model that allows us study how idiosyncratic and aggregate changes in foreign demand propagate through a small open economy and affect firms and workers. Our results suggest that the way in which the labor market is typically modeled in existing research on foreign demand shocks—with no fixed costs and perfectly elastic labor supply—would grossly understate the decline in real wages due to an increase in foreign tariffs. When interpreting these results, it is useful to observe that our model is parsimonious and restrictive in several ways. For example, we take all buyer-supplier relationships as given, in terms of both the domestic firm-to-firm links and the firms' direct export and import participation. Furthermore, we do not model firm entry and exit. Such adjustments could be especially important if one studies larger foreign demand shocks.

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A Data appendix

A.1 Aggregating VAT identifiers into firms

As discussed in the main text, the NBB datasets are available at the level of VAT identifiers. In order to conduct our analyses at the firm level, we aggregate multiple VAT identifiers into the firm identifiers, using the same procedure as in Dhyne et al. (2021). We leverage the information from ownership filings in the annual accounts as well as the Balance of Payments survey to determine if a pair of VAT identifiers belongs to the same firm. We aggregate multiple VAT identifiers to the same firm if they are linked with at least 50 percent of ownership or if they share the same foreign parent firm that holds at least 50 percent of their shares. In order to determine the foreign parent firm of a given VAT identifier, we apply a “fuzzy string matching” method, comparing all possible pairs of foreign firms’ names. Lastly, we correct for potential misreporting by linking the pair of VAT identifiers that are linked one year before and one year after.

After collecting multiple VAT identifiers that belong to the same firm, we then assign their firm identifier using the “most representative” VAT identifiers among them. The criteria for selecting such “head VAT” identifiers are explained in detail in Appendix C.4 of Dhyne et al. (2021). Once we determine the head VAT identifiers for all firms that have multiple VAT identifiers, we then sum up all the variables across VAT identifiers to the firm level. In order to avoid the double counting of transactions within the firm, we further adjust total sales and inputs by the amount of B2B sales between the pair of VAT identifiers that belong to the same head VAT identifier. For other variables such as firms’ age, their primary industry, and location of their main economic activities, we take those of head VAT identifiers.

A.2 Merging NBB datasets with BCSS datasets

The BCSS datasets are available at the level of Banque Carrefour des Entreprises (Crossroads Bank for Enterprises, BCE) identifiers. All businesses in Belgium are required to register with the BCE, which assigns them the unique identifiers upon registration. Registration with the BCE is required for firms to pay VAT, so the BCE identifiers can be easily converted to VAT identifiers. In order to match the BCSS datasets with the NBB datasets, we first convert all BCE identifiers to VAT identifiers and then aggregate multiple VAT identifiers into firms, as explained in Appendix A.1.

A.3 Coverage and summary statistics on the merged sample

Table 5 reports the coverage of our main estimation sample (NBB sample) in 2012 and compares it to the official aggregate statistics obtained from Eurostat. Our sample covers a

large majority of the aggregate value added, gross output, labor costs, exports, and imports in the Belgian economy. We also report the coverage of the subsample of firms for which we have additional information from the worker data (merged NBB-BCSS sample for the firms with 10 or more FTE employees at least once from 2002 to 2014), which still makes up most of the total sales, inputs, and trade in the Belgian economy. In Table 6, we also present summary statistics on the workers and the firms by firms' export status and worker types, obtained from the merged NBB-BCSS dataset.

Table 5: Coverage of NBB and NBB-BCSS datasets in 2012

	Eurostat	
GDP (excl. Gov.&Fin.)	248	
Output (excl. Gov.&Fin.)	672	
Import	310	
Export	311	
	NBB sample	NBB-BCSS sample
Count:		
Total	98,745	26,470
Direct exporters	11,892	7,024
Indirect exporters	74,529	18,043
Value added	164	145
Total sales	796	704
Network sales	225	190
Import	292	279
Export	292	281
Labor cost	100	90
Employment (FTE)	1,824,066	1,578,505

Notes: All numbers except for count and employment are denominated in billion euro in current prices. Belgian GDP and output are for all sectors excluding the public and financial sectors. Data for Belgian GDP, output, imports, and exports are from Eurostat. Firms' value added is from the reported values from the annual accounts. Firms' sales consist of their sales to other firms in the NBB sample (network sales), sales to households at home, and direct exports to foreign markets.

Table 6: Summary statistics by firms' export status and worker types

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	All	Blue-collar	White-collar	Male	Female
<i>Number of stayers</i>					
All firms	49.41	24.58	24.83	33.02	16.39
Exporter	114.27	50.06	64.22	79.57	34.70
Non-exporter	25.57	15.21	10.36	15.92	9.66
<i>Average stayer wage</i>					
All firms	32,246	24,006	40,403	34,180	28,352
Exporter	35,467	26,032	42,823	37,270	31,335
Non-exporter	26,958	21,557	34,890	28,502	24,413

Notes: All summary statistics are computed on the merged NBB-BCSS sample in 2012. Workers are considered as stayers at firm j in 2012 if they work for firm j throughout 2012 as well as in the last quarter of 2011 and the first quarter of 2013.

B Model appendix

B.1 General equilibrium of the model in Section 4.1

We characterize the firm-level outcomes implied by the firms' profit maximization and cost minimization problem. First, the sum of the variable and fixed costs of firm k can be written as

$$\begin{aligned}
TC_k = & \phi_k^{-1} \frac{\frac{1+\varepsilon}{\varepsilon} (1 - \alpha_{\ell k}) + \alpha_{\ell k}}{\left(\frac{1+\varepsilon}{\varepsilon} (1 - \alpha_{\ell k})\right)^{1-\alpha_{\ell k}} \alpha_{\ell k}^{\alpha_{\ell k}}} \left(\sum_{j \in Z_k} (\omega_{jk}^v)^\sigma p_j^{1-\sigma} + (\omega_{Fk}^v)^\sigma p_{Fk}^{1-\sigma} \right)^{\frac{1-\alpha_{\ell k}}{1-\sigma}} w_k^{\alpha_{\ell k}} q_k \\
& + \left(\sum_{j \in Z_k} (\omega_{jk}^f)^\sigma p_j^{1-\sigma} + (\omega_{Fk}^f)^\sigma p_{Fk}^{1-\sigma} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}} \bar{q}_k^f \\
& + w_k \bar{\ell}_k^f,
\end{aligned} \tag{24}$$

where the first term represents the variable costs, the second term represents the fixed input purchases, and the last term represents the fixed labor costs. Note that firms face a common demand elasticity of σ regardless of whom they sell to; hence,

$$p_k = \mu_k c_k = \frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1} c_k. \tag{25}$$

Taking the total derivative of the total cost with respect to output quantity, one can derive the firm's marginal cost,

$$c_k = \frac{1}{\phi_k \alpha_{\ell k}^{\alpha_{\ell k}} (1 - \alpha_{\ell k})^{1-\alpha_{\ell k}}} \left(\sum_{j \in Z_k} (\omega_{jk}^v)^\sigma p_j^{1-\sigma} + (\omega_{Fk}^v)^\sigma p_{Fk}^{1-\sigma} \right)^{\frac{1-\alpha_{\ell k}}{1-\sigma}} \left(\frac{1 + \varepsilon}{\varepsilon} w_k \right)^{\alpha_{\ell k}}. \tag{26}$$

The marginal cost follows the standard structure except that the firm's wage enters the cost with a wedge of $\frac{1+\varepsilon}{\varepsilon}$. One can then derive the total variable input cost of the firm—the first term in equation (24)—in terms of its sales $p_k q_k$, by substituting in equations (25) and (26):

$$w_k \ell_k^v + \sum_j p_j q_{jk}^v + p_{Fk} q_{Fk}^v = \left(\frac{\varepsilon_m}{\varepsilon_m + 1} \alpha_{\ell k} + 1 - \alpha_{\ell k} \right) \frac{\sigma - 1}{\sigma} p_k q_k. \tag{27}$$

The firm's variable labor input share out of its variable cost, $s_{\ell k}^v$, is a constant but lower than the Cobb-Douglas parameter $\alpha_{\ell k}$ as a result of the upward-sloping labor supply curve:

$$s_{\ell k}^v = \frac{\frac{\varepsilon}{1+\varepsilon} \alpha_{\ell k}}{1 - \alpha_{\ell k} + \frac{\varepsilon}{1+\varepsilon} \alpha_{\ell k}}. \tag{28}$$

The share of variable inputs from firm j out of firm k 's variable cost can be expressed as the share of variable input purchases times the share of firm j 's goods out of the variable input purchases:

$$s_{jk}^v = \frac{1 - \alpha_{lk}}{1 - \alpha_{lk} + \frac{\varepsilon}{1+\varepsilon}\alpha_{lk}} \frac{(\omega_{jk}^v)^\sigma p_j^{1-\sigma}}{\sum_{j \in Z_k} (\omega_{jk}^v)^\sigma p_j^{1-\sigma} + (\omega_{Fk}^v)^\sigma p_{Fk}^{1-\sigma}}. \quad (29)$$

Analogously, the share of variable imports in variable cost is expressed as

$$s_{Fk}^v = \frac{1 - \alpha_{lk}}{1 - \alpha_{lk} + \frac{\varepsilon}{1+\varepsilon}\alpha_{lk}} \frac{(\omega_{Fk}^v)^\sigma p_{Fk}^{1-\sigma}}{\sum_{j \in Z_k} (\omega_{jk}^v)^\sigma p_j^{1-\sigma} + (\omega_{Fk}^v)^\sigma p_{Fk}^{1-\sigma}}. \quad (30)$$

Similar to the variable input purchases, one can write firm j 's share and import share in firm k 's total purchases of fixed intermediate inputs as follows:

$$s_{jk}^f = \frac{(\omega_{jk}^f)^\sigma p_j^{1-\sigma}}{\sum_{j \in Z_k} (\omega_{jk}^f)^\sigma p_j^{1-\sigma} + (\omega_{Fk}^f)^\sigma p_{Fk}^{1-\sigma}} \quad (31)$$

$$s_{Fk}^f = \frac{(\omega_{Fk}^f)^\sigma p_{Fk}^{1-\sigma}}{\sum_{j \in Z_k} (\omega_{jk}^f)^\sigma p_j^{1-\sigma} + (\omega_{Fk}^f)^\sigma p_{Fk}^{1-\sigma}}. \quad (32)$$

Firm-level sales consist of the sum of domestic sales to other firms as either variable or fixed inputs, domestic sales to domestic final demand, and exports. Therefore, we have the following equation for firm k 's sales:

$$p_k q_k = \sum_{i \in W_k} s_{ki}^v \frac{p_i q_i}{\mu_i} + \sum_{i \in W_k} s_{ki}^f c_i^f \bar{q}_i^f + s_{kH} E_H + p_k^{1-\sigma} D_{kF}, \quad (33)$$

where W_k is the set of firm k 's domestic buyers and

$$s_{kH} = \frac{\beta_{kH}^{\sigma-1} p_k^{1-\sigma}}{\sum_j \beta_{jH}^{\sigma-1} p_j^{1-\sigma}} \quad (34)$$

is firm k 's share in household expenditure.

We close the model by assuming that all variable profits generated by firms are transferred back to households. We obtain the following expression for aggregate household income:

$$E_H = \sum_k w_k \ell_k^v + \sum_k \frac{\mu_k - 1}{\mu_k} p_k q_k - \sum_j \sum_k p_j q_{jk}^f - \sum_k p_{Fk} q_{Fk}^f - TB, \quad (35)$$

where TB is the aggregate trade balance. Labor market clearing implies that firms' labor

demand equals the total labor supply in each labor market:

$$L_m = \sum_k \frac{1}{w_k} s_{\ell_k}^v \frac{p_k q_k}{\mu_k} + \sum_k \bar{\ell}_k^f. \quad (36)$$

Definition 1 (Equilibrium) *Given the set of price of imports p_{Fk} , foreign demand shifters D_{kF} , aggregate trade balance TB , aggregate labor supply L , firms' domestic supplier sets Z_k and their importing and exporting decisions, and firms' fixed overhead input requirements \bar{q}_k^f and $\bar{\ell}_k^f$, an equilibrium is the firms' wages, $\{w_k\}$, and the aggregate expenditure, E_H , such that equations (6)–(8), (12)–(14), and (25)–(36) hold.*

B.2 Derivations of equations (16) and (17)

To obtain equation (16), we take the total derivative of equation (11) while holding supply-side technology parameters fixed. From equation (11), the right-hand side of which is constant, we have

$$d \log \ell_k^v w_k (\ell_k) = d \log p_k q_k (\ell_k^v, \{q_{jk}^v\}, q_{Fk}^v).$$

Further rearranging using equation (9), we obtain

$$\begin{aligned} d \log \ell_k w_k (\ell_k) + d \log \left(1 - \frac{\bar{\ell}_k^f}{\ell_k} \right) &= d \log p_k q_k (\ell_k^v, \{q_{jk}^v\}, q_{Fk}^v) \\ d \log \ell_k w_k (\ell_k) + \frac{\bar{\ell}_k^f}{\ell_k^v} d \log \ell_k &= d \log p_k q_k (\ell_k^v, \{q_{jk}^v\}, q_{Fk}^v). \end{aligned}$$

We know from the labor supply curve of equation (6) that

$$\begin{aligned} d \log \ell_k &= \varepsilon d \log w_k \\ &= \frac{\varepsilon}{1 + \varepsilon} d \log w_k \ell_k. \end{aligned}$$

Plugging this in, we have

$$\left(1 + \frac{\bar{\ell}_k^f}{\ell_k^v} \frac{\varepsilon}{1 + \varepsilon} \right) d \log w_k \ell_k = d \log p_k q_k (\ell_k^v, \{q_{jk}^v\}, q_{Fk}^v),$$

and hence

$$\frac{d \log w_k \ell_k}{d \log p_k q_k (\ell_k^v, \{q_{jk}^v\}, q_{Fk}^v)} = \frac{\ell_k^v}{\ell_k} \frac{1 + \varepsilon}{\frac{\ell_k^v}{\ell_k} + \varepsilon}.$$

We take a similar approach in deriving equation (17). The output elasticity in equation (15) can be written as

$$\frac{\partial \log q_k(\ell_k^v, \{q_{jk}^v\}, q_{Fk}^v)}{\partial \log q_{jk}^v} = (1 - \alpha_{\ell k}) \omega_{jk}^v \left(\frac{q_{jk}^v}{q_k^v} \right)^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}},$$

where q_k^v is the CES bundle of variable intermediate inputs. The term $\frac{q_{jk}^v}{q_k^v}$ depends only on the relative prices of firm k 's suppliers, which we assume to be constant. Then one can write the total derivative of equation (15) as

$$d \log p_j q_{jk}^v = d \log p_k q_k(\ell_k^v, \{q_{jk}^v\}, q_{Fk}^v).$$

Further rearranging using equation (9), we obtain

$$d \log p_j q_{jk} + d \log \left(1 - \frac{q_{jk}^f}{q_{jk}^v} \right) = d \log p_k q_k(\ell_k^v, \{q_{jk}^v\}, q_{Fk}^v).$$

The fixed input purchases from firm j are given by equation (13) and only depend on the prices of firm j and the prices of other suppliers of firm k , which are all taken as fixed. Hence, one can further rearrange and obtain the following:

$$\begin{aligned} d \log p_j q_{jk} + \frac{q_{jk}^f}{q_{jk}^v} d \log q_{jk} &= d \log p_k q_k(\ell_k^v, \{q_{jk}^v\}, q_{Fk}^v) \\ \frac{d \log p_j q_{jk}}{d \log p_k q_k(\ell_k^v, \{q_{jk}^v\}, q_{Fk}^v)} &= \frac{q_{jk}^v}{q_{jk}^f}. \end{aligned}$$

B.3 System of counterfactual changes in variables

B.3.1 Counterfactual changes in response to import price and foreign demand shocks

As outlined in Appendix D.1, we assume that firms charge a common markup of $\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}$, as in Section 4, and in the baseline assume that firms have monopsony power in labor markets, $\varepsilon = 3.5$. We introduce the term adj_k , which represents the discrepancy between a firm's theory-implied variable input cost, $\left(\frac{\varepsilon}{\varepsilon+1} \alpha_{\ell k} + 1 - \alpha_{\ell k} \right) \frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma} p_k q_k$, and its observed variable input cost, $varinput_k = w_k \ell_k^v + \sum_j p_j q_{jk}^v + p_{Fk} q_{Fk}^v$:

$$adj_k = \underbrace{\left(\frac{\varepsilon}{\varepsilon+1} \alpha_{\ell k} + 1 - \alpha_{\ell k} \right) \frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma} p_k q_k}_{\text{theory implied input}} - \underbrace{varinput_k}_{\text{observed input}}.$$

In this counterfactual exercise, we assume that the ratio of adj_k relative to the firm's variable inputs is fixed, leading to the following relationship:

$$\widehat{varinput}_k = \frac{\left(\frac{\varepsilon}{\varepsilon+1}\alpha_{\ell k} + 1 - \alpha_{\ell k}\right) \frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma} p_k q_k}{\widehat{varinput}_k} \widehat{p}_k q_k - \frac{adj_k}{\widehat{varinput}_k} \widehat{adj}_k,$$

where we have $\widehat{varinput}_k = \widehat{p}_k q_k = \widehat{adj}_k$.

Therefore, the steps to solve for the counterfactual outcomes are as follows:

1. Guess the changes in firm-level wages \hat{w}_k . If $\varepsilon = \infty$, then the guess is common across all firms.
2. Compute the firm-level changes in total and variable labor inputs, $\hat{\ell}_k$ and $\hat{\ell}_k^v$, using equations (6) and (9):

$$\begin{aligned} \hat{\ell}_k &= \frac{\hat{w}_k^\varepsilon}{\sum_j \ell_j \hat{w}_j^\varepsilon} L \\ \hat{\ell}_k^v &= \frac{\ell_k}{\ell_k^v} \hat{\ell}_k - \frac{\bar{\ell}_k^f}{\ell_k^v}. \end{aligned}$$

Skip this step if $\varepsilon = \infty$.

3. Solve for \hat{c}_k using equation (26):

$$\hat{c}_k = \left(\sum_{j \in Z_k} \frac{s_{jk}^v}{1 - s_{\ell k}^v} \hat{c}_j^{1-\sigma} + \frac{s_{Fk}^v}{1 - s_{\ell k}^v} \hat{p}_{Fk}^{1-\sigma} \right)^{\frac{1-\alpha_{\ell k}}{1-\sigma}} \hat{w}_k^{\alpha_{\ell k}}.$$

4. Compute the change in shares and prices using equations (29), (30), (31), (32), and

(34):

$$\begin{aligned}
\hat{s}_{jk}^v &= \frac{\hat{c}_j^{1-\sigma}}{\sum_{j \in Z_k} \frac{s_{jk}^v}{1-s_{\ell k}^v} \hat{c}_j^{1-\sigma} + \frac{s_{Fk}^v}{1-s_{\ell k}^v} \hat{p}_{Fk}^{1-\sigma}} \\
\hat{s}_{Fk}^v &= \frac{\hat{p}_{Fk}^{1-\sigma}}{\sum_{j \in Z_k} \frac{s_{jk}^v}{1-s_{\ell k}^v} \hat{c}_j^{1-\sigma} + \frac{s_{Fk}^v}{1-s_{\ell k}^v} \hat{p}_{Fk}^{1-\sigma}} \\
\hat{s}_{jk}^f &= \frac{\hat{c}_j^{1-\sigma}}{\left(\hat{c}_k^f\right)^{1-\sigma}} \\
\hat{s}_{Fk}^f &= \frac{\hat{p}_{Fk}^{1-\sigma}}{\left(\hat{c}_k^f\right)^{1-\sigma}} \\
\left(\hat{c}_k^f\right)^{1-\sigma} &= \sum_{j \in Z_k} s_{jk}^f \hat{c}_j^{1-\sigma} + s_{Fk}^f \hat{p}_{Fk}^{1-\sigma} \\
\hat{s}_{kH} &= \frac{\hat{c}_k^{1-\sigma}}{\sum_j s_{jH} \hat{c}_j^{1-\sigma}}.
\end{aligned}$$

5. Solve for $\widehat{p_k q_k}$ using equation (33):

$$\widehat{p_k q_k} = \sum_{i \in W_k} r_{ki}^v \hat{s}_{ki}^v \widehat{p_i q_i} + \sum_{i \in W_k} r_{ki}^f \hat{s}_{ki}^f \hat{c}_i^f + r_{kH} \hat{s}_{kH} \hat{E}_H + r_{kF} \hat{c}_k^{1-\sigma} \hat{D}_{kF}$$

where we have the following revenue shares of firm k :

$$r_{ki}^v = \frac{s_{ki}^v p_i q_i}{p_k q_k \mu_i}, \quad r_{ki}^f = \frac{p_k q_{ki}^f}{p_k q_k}, \quad r_{kH} = \frac{s_{kH} E_H}{p_k q_k}, \quad r_{kF} = \frac{p_k^{1-\sigma} D_{kF}}{p_k q_k}.$$

The change in aggregate household expenditure is written as

$$\begin{aligned}
\hat{E}_H &= \sum_k \frac{w_k \ell_k}{E_H} \hat{w}_k + \sum_k \frac{\pi_k^v}{E_H} \widehat{p_k q_k} - \sum_j \sum_k \frac{p_j q_{jk}^f}{E_H} \hat{s}_{jk}^f \hat{c}_k^f - \sum_k \frac{p_{Fk}^f q_{Fk}^f}{E_H} \hat{s}_{Fk}^f \hat{c}_k^f \\
&\quad - \sum_k \frac{w_k \bar{\ell}_k^f}{E_H} \hat{w}_k - \frac{TB}{E_H} + \sum_k \frac{adj_k}{E_H} \widehat{adj}_k,
\end{aligned} \tag{37}$$

where $\widehat{adj}_k = \widehat{p_k q_k}$ and $\pi_k^v = \left(1 - \left(\frac{\varepsilon_m}{\varepsilon_m + 1} \alpha_{\ell k} + 1 - \alpha_{\ell k}\right) \frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}\right) p_k q_k$.

6. Update \hat{w}_k with the following and iterate from Step 2 until \hat{w}_k converges:

$$\hat{w}_k^{new} = \frac{\widehat{p}_k \widehat{q}_k}{\hat{\ell}_k^v}$$

$$\hat{w}_k = d\hat{w}_k^{new} + (1 - d)\hat{w}_k.$$

If $\varepsilon = \infty$, then use the following to update the common guess of wage change:

$$\hat{w}_k^{new} = \frac{\sum_k w_k \ell_k^v \widehat{p}_k \widehat{q}_k + \sum_k w_k \bar{\ell}_k^f \hat{w}_k}{\sum_k w_k \ell_k}.$$

7. Finally, check that the trade balance holds (i.e., the exogenous TB is unchanged).

B.3.2 Counterfactual changes in response to firm productivity shocks

The system of counterfactual changes in variables when one considers changes in firms' productivities is similar to that presented in Appendix B.3.1. Instead of the changes in import price \hat{p}_{Fk} , we consider changes in productivities, $\hat{\phi}_k$. Hence, we replace Step 3 in Appendix B.3.1 with the following equation that solves for \hat{c}_k given the shocks $\hat{\phi}_k$ and guess of \hat{w}_k :

$$\hat{c}_k = \hat{\phi}_k^{-1} \left(\sum_{j \in Z_k} \frac{s_{jk}^v}{1 - s_{\ell k}^v} \hat{c}_j^{1-\sigma} \right)^{\frac{1-\alpha_{\ell k}}{1-\sigma}} \hat{w}_k^{\alpha_{\ell k}}.$$

B.4 Total import shares

Consider a change in the price of imported goods when the labor market is competitive ($\varepsilon = \infty$). The first-order approximated change in the aggregate price index upon small changes in prices of imports $\frac{dp_{Fk}}{p_{Fk}}$, foreign demand shifters $\frac{dD_{kF}}{D_{kF}}$, and the changes in wages $\frac{dw}{w}$ can be computed as follows. First, the changes in firm k 's marginal costs $\frac{dc_k}{c_k}$ can be written as

$$\frac{dc_k}{c_k} = \sum_{j \in Z_k} s_{jk}^v \frac{dc_j}{c_j} + s_{Fk}^v \frac{dp_{Fk}}{p_{Fk}} + \alpha_{\ell k} \frac{dw}{w}. \quad (38)$$

Changing to vector notation, this can be further arranged to

$$d\mathbf{c} = \left(I - S' \right)^{-1} (d\mathbf{c}_F + d\mathbf{c}_L), \quad (39)$$

where $d\mathbf{c}$ is a $I \times 1$ vector whose k 's element is the percentage change in k 's marginal cost, $\frac{dc_k}{c_k}$. The $I \times I$ matrix S records the variable input cost shares from the domestic production network—the (j, k) element of matrix S is s_{jk}^v . The cost-based Leontief inverse matrix

$(I - S')^{-1}$ captures firms' overall exposure to all other firms as buyers of their goods. The $I \times 1$ vectors $d\mathbf{c}_F$ and $d\mathbf{c}_L$ record the direct variable cost effect of import price and labor cost changes: the k 'th element of $d\mathbf{c}_F$ is $s_{Fk}^v \frac{dp_{Fk}}{p_{Fk}}$, and the k 'th element of $d\mathbf{c}_L$ is $\alpha_{lk} \frac{dw}{w}$. The aggregate price change is a weighted average of the firm-level cost changes, using the household expenditure share on firm k , s_{kH} , as the weight:

$$\frac{dP}{P} = \sum_k s_{kH} \frac{dc_k}{c_k}. \quad (40)$$

If one assumes a uniform price change across all imports, then the above equation for firms' cost changes becomes

$$\frac{dc_k}{c_k} = s_{Fk}^{v,Total} \frac{dp_F}{p_F} + \left(1 - s_{Fk}^{v,Total}\right) \frac{dw}{w}, \quad (41)$$

where

$$s_{Fk}^{v,Total} = s_{Fk}^v + \sum_{j \in Z_k} s_{jk}^v s_{Fj}^{v,Total} \quad (42)$$

is the total import share of variable inputs.

C Additional empirical results

C.1 Additional results on exporter premium on wages


In Section 3.3, we run a set of wage regressions on a sample of movers to estimate wage premium for firms that directly export. Identification is achieved from a common trend assumption in the workers' wages in the absence of moving to direct exporters. In this section, we empirically assess this assumption by performing the following movers analysis. We consider a sample of workers who switch their main jobs between $t - 1$ and t and have tenures of no fewer than four years at both origin and destination firms. We then use the balanced panel of movers from $t - 4$ to $t + 3$ and estimate the effects of moving from non-exporters to exporters by running the following regression:

$$\log w_{n,s} = \sum_{\kappa=-4}^3 \eta_{\kappa} \mathbf{1}[s = \kappa] + \sum_{\kappa=-4}^3 \tau_{\kappa} \mathbf{1}[s = \kappa, T(n) = 1] + \zeta_n + \xi_{n,s}, \quad (43)$$

where $\log w_{n,s}$ denotes mover n 's log wage in year s (relative to the year of move), $T(n)$ is an indicator for the move from non-exporters to exporters, and ζ_n is a worker fixed effect. In order to ensure that we only use full-year employment spells in a given firm, we drop the observations in years $t - 1$ and t . We also pool all movers in the regression and assume that the effects of moving from exporters to non-exporters are symmetric.

Figure 8 presents a graphical representation of the exporter wage premium. In this figure, we report the estimated coefficients τ_{κ} in equation (43) for κ from -4 to 3 and normalize the estimates by setting $\tau_{-2} = 0$. As in Table 2, we additionally control for calendar year effects, observable time-varying worker characteristics, and sector fixed effects. Our findings support common trends prior to the move, suggesting that the wage growth of workers moving to a firm that does not directly export can be a valid counterfactual for those moving to a firm that directly exports.

Figure 8: Graphical representation of exporter wage premium from movers analysis



Notes: This figure uses the subsample of firms for which we have additional information from the worker data (see Section 2.3 for details). We run a worker-level regression based on equation (43) and report the estimated coefficients $\{\tau_{\kappa}\}_{\kappa=-4}^3$. We define movers in year t as workers who are employed by the origin firms at no later than $t - 4$, switch their jobs between $t - 1$ and t , and stay at their destination firms at least until $t + 3$. The sample of movers is balanced from $t - 4$ to $t + 3$. Observations in years $t - 1$ and t are dropped from the regression to ensure that we only use full-year employment spells in a given firm. The estimates are normalized by setting $\tau_{-2} = 0$. The assignment to the exporter or non-exporter category is made based on firms' export participation status at $t - 2$ for both origin and destination firms. Industry fixed effects are included at the NACE four-digit level.

C.2 Fixed labor input shares by firm categories

In Section 5.2, we assume that the fixed share of labor inputs is homogeneous across all firms in the Belgian economy. In this section, we allow the fixed shares of labor inputs to vary across firm categories. Table 7 reports our estimates when we distinguish between exporters and non-exporters or between manufacturing firms and non-manufacturing firms. In doing so, we first estimate the cumulative elasticities of labor cost and employment for each firm category by interacting our IV model in equation (23) with firm categories. We then use equation (18) and equation (16) to solve for the labor supply elasticity (ε) and fixed share of labor inputs ($1 - \ell_k^v/\ell_k$), respectively. In the third column, we also report the weighted averages of fixed labor input shares, weighted by the shares of aggregate sales by firm categories. We find that these weighted averages are not substantially different from our main estimate in the first row, in which the fixed shares of labor inputs are assumed to be homogeneous across all firms.

Table 7: Labor supply elasticities and fixed shares of labor inputs by firm categories

	Labor supply elasticity (ε)	Fixed share of labor inputs ($1 - \ell_k^v/\ell_k$)	
		by category	weighted average
All firms	3.48	0.52	
Exporters	3.23	0.52	0.52
Non-exporters	3.83	0.52	
Manufacturing firms	3.41	0.63	0.55
Non-manufacturing firms	3.73	0.45	


Notes: This table uses the main estimation sample of 995,739 firm-year observations in Belgium from 2002 to 2014 (see Section 2.3 for details). For each row, we report the labor supply elasticity (ε) and fixed share of labor inputs ($1 - \ell_k^v/\ell_k$) by firm category. To obtain the labor supply elasticity, we first estimate the cumulative elasticities ($\sum_{\kappa=0}^3 \gamma^\kappa$) of labor cost and employment based on equation (23) and use equation (18) to solve for the labor supply elasticity. We then use equation (16) to solve for the variable share of labor inputs (ℓ_k^v/ℓ_k). We use the shares of aggregate sales by firm categories as weights when computing the weighted average of fixed labor input shares.

C.3 Elasticities of input purchases by suppliers' industries

In this section, we allow the elasticity of input purchases, and, thus, the fraction of an input that is used as a fixed factor, to vary across the types of inputs. In order to estimate the cumulative elasticities of input purchases by different types of inputs, we first categorize the purchases of inputs by the industry of supplier for domestic purchases and by the HS product code for import transactions. We then use an HS to NACE concordance to map the product-level import transactions to the industry level, so that we classify both domestic and foreign input purchases by supplying industries.

Figure 9 shows the cumulative elasticities of (domestic and foreign) input purchases at the NACE one-digit level. We report those elasticities relative to the cumulative increase in total sales of 0.76, as referenced by the dotted red line. For instance, we find that purchases from the manufacturing industry, which account for around half of all input purchases in the Belgian economy, increase by 7.5 percent when firms receive foreign demand shocks to increase their sales by 7.6 percent. On the other hand, input purchases from most of the service industry (NACE G to N one-digit sectors) do not increase as much, implying that service inputs have higher fixed input cost shares.

Figure 9: Elasticities of input purchases by suppliers' NACE one-digit industries



Notes: This figure uses the main estimation sample of 995,739 firm-year observations in Belgium from 2002 to 2014 (see Section 2.3 for details). For each bar, we report the cumulative elasticities of input purchases from suppliers' respective industries. To compute the cumulative elasticities, we run four firm-level regressions based on equation (23) for κ from 0 to 3 and compute the sum of four coefficients $\{\gamma^\kappa\}_{\kappa=0}^3$. Variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 0.5 percentiles. The dotted red line corresponds to the cumulative response of sales. We report the cumulative elasticities at NACE one-digit sections. We exclude the public and financial sectors from our sample, and we drop NACE S (Other Service Activities) because of the small sample size. (*) We include the input purchases from NACE 46.71 (Wholesale of solid, liquid and gaseous fuels and related products) and NACE 47.3 (Retail sale of automotive fuel in specialised stores) in NACE D (Electricity, Gas, Steam and Air Conditioning Supply) instead of NACE G (Wholesale and Retail Trade; Repair of Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles).

C.4 Specification checks

In this section, we consider several alternative specifications to our main results presented in Table 3. For each alternative specification, we also report the cumulative increase in sales ($\sum_{\kappa=0}^3 \beta^\kappa$ in equation (22)) relative to its instantaneous response to the foreign demand shock (β^0). Table 8 shows the sensitivity of our results to additionally controlling for location-year fixed effects. We use level 2 of the Eurostat NUTS classification as a measure of location. In Table 9, we restrict our estimation sample to a balanced panel of firms that are observed for at least seven consecutive years (from κ equal to -3 to 3). Table 10 reports the results in which we weight each firm by its lagged employment. In these specifications, our IV estimates relative to the cumulative increase in sales are not substantially affected.

Table 8: IV estimates of the impact of changes in firm sales that are induced by the foreign demand shocks: including location-year fixed effects

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Sales	Average wage	FTE Employment	Labor cost	Input purchases	Domestic input purchases
<i>First stage</i>						
Instantaneous response (β^0)	0.312*** (0.0261)					
Cumulative response ($\sum_{\kappa=0}^3 \beta^\kappa$)	0.235*** (0.0291)					
Ratio ($\sum_{\kappa=0}^3 \beta^\kappa / \beta^0$)	0.754					
<i>Second stage</i>						
Instantaneous response (γ^0)		0.0897*** (0.0299)	0.0667** (0.0321)	0.155*** (0.0369)	0.942*** (0.0765)	0.760*** (0.0670)
Cumulative response ($\sum_{\kappa=0}^3 \gamma^\kappa$)		0.108** (0.0456)	0.323*** (0.0571)	0.432*** (0.0705)	0.779*** (0.145)	0.597*** (0.126)
Industry-Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Location-Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Firm FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: This table uses the main estimation sample of 995,739 firm-year observations in Belgium from 2002 to 2014 (see Section 2.3 for details). In Column (1), we estimate the responses of sales to the total export shock defined in Section 4.3. We run four firm-level regressions based on equation (22) for $\kappa \in \{0, 1, 2, 3\}$ and report the instantaneous response (β^0) as well as the cumulative response (the sum of four coefficients $\{\beta^\kappa\}_{\kappa=0}^3$) and compute their ratio. For each outcome variable in Columns (2)-(6), we estimate its elasticity with respect to sales. We run four firm-level 2SLS regressions based on equation (23) for $\kappa \in \{0, 1, 2, 3\}$ and report the instantaneous response (γ^0) as well as the cumulative response (the sum of four coefficients $\{\gamma^\kappa\}_{\kappa=0}^3$). The first-stage F-statistics for excluded instruments is 142.8. Variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 0.5 percentiles. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the NACE four-digit level, and standard errors of the cumulative responses are computed using the bootstrap method. $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 9: IV estimates of the impact of changes in firm sales that are induced by the foreign demand shocks: using a balanced panel of firms

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Sales	Average wage	FTE Employment	Labor cost	Input purchases	Domestic input purchases
<i>First stage</i>						
Instantaneous response (β^0)	0.423*** (0.0327)					
Cumulative response ($\sum_{\kappa=0}^3 \beta^\kappa$)	0.223*** (0.0363)					
Ratio ($\sum_{\kappa=0}^3 \beta^\kappa / \beta^0$)	0.530					
<i>Second stage</i>						
Instantaneous response (γ^0)		0.0999*** (0.0316)	0.0400 (0.0363)	0.139*** (0.0345)	0.863*** (0.0975)	0.730*** (0.0921)
Cumulative response ($\sum_{\kappa=0}^3 \gamma^\kappa$)		0.104*** (0.0332)	0.199*** (0.0405)	0.307*** (0.0567)	0.413*** (0.0978)	0.318*** (0.104)
Industry-Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Firm FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: This table uses the main estimation sample (see Section 2.3 for details). The analysis is based on 307,435 firm-year observations of private-sector firms in Belgium from 2002 to 2014 that are observed for at least seven consecutive years (from κ equal to -3 to 3). In Column (1), we estimate the responses of sales to the total export shock defined in Section 4.3. We run four firm-level regressions based on equation (22) for $\kappa \in \{0, 1, 2, 3\}$ and report the instantaneous response (β^0) as well as the cumulative response (the sum of four coefficients $\{\beta^\kappa\}_{\kappa=0}^3$) and compute their ratio. For each outcome variable in Columns (2)-(6), we estimate its elasticity with respect to sales. We run four firm-level 2SLS regressions based on equation (23) for $\kappa \in \{0, 1, 2, 3\}$ and report the instantaneous response (γ^0) as well as the cumulative response (the sum of four coefficients $\{\gamma^\kappa\}_{\kappa=0}^3$). The first-stage F-statistics for excluded instruments is 160.9. Variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 0.5 percentiles. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the NACE four-digit level, and standard errors of the cumulative responses are computed using the bootstrap method. $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 10: IV estimates of the impact of changes in firm sales that are induced by the foreign demand shocks: weighted by employment at $t - 1$

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Sales	Average wage	FTE Employment	Labor cost	Input purchases	Domestic input purchases
<i>First stage</i>						
Instantaneous response (β^0)	0.308*** (0.0456)					
Cumulative response ($\sum_{\kappa=0}^3 \beta^\kappa$)	0.140** (0.0591)					
Ratio ($\sum_{\kappa=0}^3 \beta^\kappa / \beta^0$)	0.454					
<i>Second stage</i>						
Instantaneous response (γ^0)		0.0807* (0.0471)	0.0869 (0.0582)	0.195*** (0.0715)	1.081*** (0.144)	0.764*** (0.115)
Cumulative response ($\sum_{\kappa=0}^3 \gamma^\kappa$)		0.0484 (0.0868)	0.208* (0.119)	0.268** (0.125)	0.511*** (0.117)	0.383*** (0.121)
Industry-Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Firm FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes


Notes: This table uses the main estimation sample of 995,739 firm-year observations in Belgium from 2002 to 2014 (see Section 2.3 for details). In Column (1), we estimate the responses of sales to the total export shock defined in Section 4.3. We run four firm-level regressions based on equation (22) for $\kappa \in \{0, 1, 2, 3\}$ and report the instantaneous response (β^0) as well as the cumulative response (the sum of four coefficients $\{\beta^\kappa\}_{\kappa=0}^3$) and compute their ratio. For each outcome variable in Columns (2)-(6), we estimate its elasticity with respect to sales. We run four firm-level 2SLS regressions based on equation (23) for $\kappa \in \{0, 1, 2, 3\}$ and report the instantaneous response (γ^0) as well as the cumulative response (the sum of four coefficients $\{\gamma^\kappa\}_{\kappa=0}^3$). The first-stage F-statistics for excluded instruments is 45.53. Variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 0.5 percentiles. In all regressions, we weight each firm by its employment at $t - 1$. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the NACE four-digit level, and standard errors of the cumulative responses are computed using the bootstrap method. $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

C.5 Direct and indirect effects of foreign demand shocks to production networks using heterogeneous estimates

In our main simulation in Section 5.4, we assume that all firms in the Belgian economy face the same labor supply curve and have the same fixed labor input share. In this section, we relax this assumption and allow the labor supply elasticities and fixed shares of labor inputs to vary across firm categories. Using the heterogeneous estimates by firm categories reported in Table 7 of Appendix C.2, we redo our simulation of foreign demand shock transmissions along the supply chain.

Figure 10 reports the simulated responses of FTE employment and average wage as well as additional worker rents generated by a foreign demand shock when we allow the labor supply curve elasticities and fixed shares of labor inputs to vary across firm categories. The results from the simulation exercise using separate estimates for the direct exporters and for the firms that do not directly export are reported by the dashed lines, and the dotted lines show the simulation results in which we use separate estimates for manufacturing and non-manufacturing firms. We find that our baseline results in Figure 4, also reported in Figure 10 as the solid lines, are robust to allowing for heterogeneity in the labor supply curve elasticities and fixed shares of labor inputs.

Figure 10: Simulation results of foreign demand shock transmission along the supply chain: using heterogeneous fixed labor input shares



Notes: For each panel, we report the simulation results of the transmission of foreign demand shocks along the supply chain (see the discussion in Section 5.4 for how the simulation is done). The first two panels present the employment and wage response at the direct exporter, the direct exporter’s key supplier, the key supplier of the exporter’s key supplier, and so on. The bottom panel aggregates the rents to the workers in firms that direct export, to workers in their direct suppliers, to workers in their suppliers’ suppliers, and so on (up to three links). In each line of every figure, we make different assumptions regarding the fixed shares of labor inputs. For the solid lines, we use our estimated labor supply elasticity $\varepsilon = 3.5$ as well as the fraction of fixed inputs for both labor and intermediate inputs (at NACE one-digit level); and for the stippled and dotted lines, we use heterogeneous labor supply curve elasticities and fixed labor input shares by firm categories reported in Appendix C.2.

D Additional counterfactual results

D.1 Setup of the counterfactual exercise

In our main counterfactual exercise in Section 6, we assume that firms charge a common markup of $\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}$ as in Section 4 and that firms have monopsony power in labor markets by setting $\varepsilon = 3.5$ using estimates from Section 5. We lay out the detailed steps to solve for the counterfactual outcomes in Appendix B.3.1.

By having firms set a common markup of $\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}$, we have a discrepancy between a firm's theory implied variable input cost, $\left(\frac{\varepsilon}{\varepsilon+1}\alpha_{\ell k} + 1 - \alpha_{\ell k}\right)\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}p_k q_k$, and its observed variable input cost, $varinput_k = w_k \ell_k^v + \sum_j p_j q_{jk}^v + p_{Fk} q_{Fk}^v$. We denote these firm-level discrepancies by adj_k :

$$adj_k = \underbrace{\left(\frac{\varepsilon}{\varepsilon+1}\alpha_{\ell k} + 1 - \alpha_{\ell k}\right)\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}p_k q_k}_{\text{theory-implied input}} - \underbrace{varinput_k}_{\text{observed input}}.$$

One interpretation of this term adj_k is the usage of firm k 's inventories. If $adj_k > 0$, then the firm is purchasing fewer variable inputs than what is implied from the theory and hence is using the past inventory of inputs to produce. If $adj_k < 0$, then the firm is purchasing more variable inputs than what is implied from the theory and hence is accumulating inventory for future use.

In the counterfactual exercise, we follow Dhyne et al. (2022) and assume that the ratio of adj_k relative to the firm's variable inputs—both the theory-implied inputs and the observed inputs—is fixed. This is consistent with an interpretation in which the fraction of how much inventory the firm uses (or accumulates) relative to its inputs and sales does not change in response to foreign shocks. With this assumption, we have the following relationship:

$$\widehat{varinput}_k = \frac{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}p_k q_k}{varinput_k} \widehat{p_k q_k} - \frac{adj_k}{varinput_k} \widehat{adj}_k,$$

where we have $\widehat{varinput}_k = \widehat{p_k q_k} = \widehat{adj}_k$.

This treatment of the differences in variable input costs is isomorphic to assuming that firms charge firm-specific markups of $\mu_k = \frac{p_k q_k}{w_k \ell_k^v + \sum_j p_j q_{jk}^v + p_{Fk} q_{Fk}^v}$, which can be read from the data. To see this, we refer to equation (37) in Appendix B.3.1, which illustrates how the change in aggregate income is affected by changes in firms' variable profits $\left(\frac{\pi_k^v p_k q_k}{E_H} \widehat{p_k q_k}\right)$ and the changes in the discrepancy terms $\left(\frac{adj_k}{E_H} \widehat{adj}_k\right)$. If one assumes that firms charge markups of μ_k , then the effect of the changes in their variable profits on aggregate income can be summarized by $\frac{\mu_k - 1}{E_H} p_k q_k \widehat{p_k q_k}$. With the assumption that firm sales and the discrepancy

terms move in tandem ($\widehat{adj}_k = \widehat{p_k q_k}$), the effects on aggregate income are isomorphic to each other.

D.2 Total import shares

To gain intuition on how accounting for firms' fixed inputs affects firms' and aggregate responses to foreign demand shocks, we focus on the firm-level measure of total import share, defined in Dhyne et al. (2021). Because we impose the trade balance condition, the uniform foreign demand shock that we consider in the exercises can also be seen as a shock where the prices of imports uniformly increase.¹³ A firm's total import share, which measures how much of the firm's variable inputs originate directly or indirectly from abroad, is a useful statistic that captures the degree of the firm's exposure to the foreign shock.

Firm k 's total import share, $s_{Fk}^{v,Total}$, is defined in a recursive manner as follows:

$$s_{Fk}^{v,Total} = s_{Fk}^v + \sum_{j \in Z_k} s_{jk}^v s_{Fj}^{v,Total}, \quad (44)$$

where s_{Fk}^v and s_{jk}^v are the shares of foreign imports and inputs from firm j in the firm's variable costs. As shown in Appendix B.4, firms' total import shares become relevant statistics in predicting firm-level outcomes at a first-order approximation: when the labor market is competitive, the costs of firms with higher total import shares increase more than those of firms with lower total import shares in response to a uniform increase in the price of imports.


Through the measure of firms' total import shares, one can see the two main effects of fixed inputs. On the one hand, if for example a large fraction of labor costs is a fixed input, the variable cost shares of s_{Fk}^v and s_{jk}^v become larger. This will magnify any direct cost shock from an import price change and indirect cost shocks from domestic suppliers. On the other hand, some of the foreign inputs are fixed as well, which, all else equal, lowers the direct cost shock through lower values of s_{Fk}^v . Quantitatively, however, more than 80 percent of imports are calculated as variable inputs (based on the estimated elasticities for the NACE one-digit level classification), and since around 50 percent of labor costs are fixed, the direct foreign input share tends to be larger under fixed inputs as well.

Panel (a) of Figure 11 plots the distributions of the total import shares, $s_{Fk}^{v,Total}$, one accounting for and another not accounting for fixed inputs. When one accounts for fixed inputs, the total import shares of firms in variable costs are larger (with the median firm having a share of 48 percent) than the total import shares of firms when not accounting for

¹³This symmetry is called Lerner's symmetry. It implies that the outcomes from this uniform change in foreign demand can be mapped into an equivalent set of outcomes from a uniform change in import prices. In this case, the 5 percent increase in foreign tariffs on Belgian exports is equivalent to a 5 percent uniform increase in the price of Belgian imports.

fixed inputs (with the median firm having a share of 39 percent). Relatedly, we compute and plot the share of how much of a firm's fixed inputs originate directly or indirectly from abroad in panel (b) of the figure. We find that these shares are generally much lower than the total import share of variable inputs: 9 percent of the median firm's fixed inputs originates from abroad.

Figure 11: Total import shares




Notes: The left panel shows the distribution of the firm-level total import shares in variable input costs, $s_{Fk}^{v,Total}$, defined in equation (44). The white bars show the distribution of the shares when one accounts for fixed inputs, and the grey bars show the distribution of the shares when one does not account for fixed inputs. The right panel shows the distribution of the firm-level total import shares in fixed input costs, $s_{Fk}^{f,Total}$. Firms' total import shares in fixed input costs are defined recursively as in $s_{Fk}^{f,Total} = s_{Fk}^f + \sum_{j \in Z_k} s_{jk}^f s_{Fj}^{f,Total}$.

D.3 Change in real income

Figure 12 reports the changes in real income, \hat{E}/\hat{P} , in response to a 5 percent increase in foreign tariffs.

Figure 12: Changes in real income in response to a 5 percent increase in foreign tariffs




Notes: In this figure, we report the changes in real income, \hat{E}/\hat{P} , due to a uniform 5 percent increase in foreign tariffs on Belgian exports. Each bar represents the response under different parameterizations of the model presented in Section 4. We use our estimated labor supply elasticity $\varepsilon = 3.5$ in the counterfactual Belgian economies with upward-sloping labor supply curves. When accounting for fixed inputs, we use the fraction of fixed inputs for both labor and intermediate inputs (at NACE one-digit level) that we obtained in Section 5.

D.4 Domestic productivity shocks


Figures 13 and 14 report the changes in average real wage and real income in response to a 5 percent reduction in productivity ϕ_k for all manufacturing firms. We outline the steps to solve for the counterfactual outcomes in Appendix B.3.2.

Figure 13: Changes in average real wage in response to a 5 percent reduction in manufacturing firms' productivity



Notes: In this figure, we report the changes in average real wage, $\sum_k \frac{w_k \ell_k}{\sum_j w_j \ell_j} \hat{w}_k \hat{\ell}_k / \hat{P}$, due to a 5 percent reduction in manufacturing firms' productivity. Each bar represents the response under different parameterizations of the model presented in Section 4. We use our estimated labor supply elasticity $\varepsilon = 3.5$ in the counterfactual Belgian economies with upward-sloping labor supply curves. Wages are common across all firms under the parameterization in which we assume $\varepsilon = \infty$, hence $\sum_k \frac{w_k \ell_k}{\sum_j w_j \ell_j} \hat{w}_k \hat{\ell}_k / \hat{P} = \hat{w} / \hat{P}$. When accounting for fixed inputs, we use the fraction of fixed inputs for both labor and intermediate inputs (at NACE one-digit level) that we obtained in Section 5.

Figure 14: Changes in average real income in response to a 5 percent reduction in manufacturing firms' productivity



Notes: In this figure, we report the changes in real income, $\sum_k \frac{w_k \ell_k}{\sum_j w_j \ell_j} \hat{w}_k \hat{\ell}_k / \hat{P}$, due to a 5 percent reduction in manufacturing firms' productivity. Each bar represents the response under different parameterization of the model presented in Section 4. We use our estimated labor supply elasticity $\varepsilon = 3.5$ in the counterfactual Belgian economies with upward-sloping labor supply curves. When accounting for fixed inputs, we use the fraction of fixed inputs for both labor and intermediate inputs (at NACE one-digit level) that we obtained in Section 5.