

# College Graduation and Labor Market Conditions

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# Persistent effects of entering the labor market in a recession

## ▶ College graduation

Genda, Kondo and Ohta (2010), Kahn (2010), Oreopoulos, Von Wachter and Heisz (2012), Cutler, Huang and Lleras-Muney (2015), Altonji, Kahn and Speer (2016), Fernández-Kranz and Rodríguez-Planas (2018), Schwandt and Von Wachter (2019), Arellano-Bover (2020), von Wachter (2020), Forsythe (2020), Rothstein (2021)

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- Match initially with smaller firms and in lower-paying occupation
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## ▶ High-school graduation, Military re-enlistment

Raaum and Røed (2006), Genda, Kondo and Ohta (2010), Borgschulte and Martorell (2018), Fernández-Kranz and Rodríguez-Planas (2018), Schwandt and Von Wachter (2019), Stuart (2020)

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- ▶ Which students postpone graduation?

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- ▶ Explore time-geography-major variation in labor market conditions



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- ▶ Use panel data from one large public university to further explore the effects

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  - Students with higher scores
  - In higher-earning majors
  - More advantaged backgrounds



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  - Students with higher scores
  - In higher-earning majors ⇒ Distributional impact of recessions
  - More advantaged backgrounds

Institutional setting and data

## Setting: Brazil

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	<b>Public Universities</b>	<b>Private Institutions</b>
Tuition	Tuition Free	Charge Tuition
Quality	High	Low-medium
Selectivity	Highly Selective	Non-selective
Avg Candidates/Seat	12.1	1.6
% Enrollment	~ 25%	~ 75%
% students working FT	22.7%	42.6%

# Data

## **A. Higher Education Census**

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- ▶ Demographics + course characteristics
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- ▶ Large public university (4,200/year)
- ▶ Transcripts
- ▶ Bi-annually 2003-2017

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- ▶ 2000, 2010



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- ▶ Matched employer-employee
- ▶ Hiring at the state-occupation level

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**Local Major-Weighted Hiring measure**

# Empirical Strategy

## Empirical strategy


- ▶ Student  $i$ , major  $m$ , state  $s$  and expected to graduate at year-semester  $t_1$ :

$$Y_i = \beta H_{t_1(i),s(i),m(i)} + \underbrace{\eta_{t_0(i),m(i)}}_{\text{Major-Entry Time}} + \overbrace{\nu_{p(i)}}^{\text{Program FE}} + \gamma X_i + \varepsilon_i$$


Grad Time  $\nearrow$   
Geography  $\nearrow$   
Major  $\nearrow$

- ▶  $H_{t_1(i),m(i),s(i)}$  is a (local major-weighted) hiring measure
- ▶ Standard errors clustered at the state and major level

# 2014-2016 recession



# MWH measure



Hiring Measure



National



Major-State

# Results

# Students in public universities postpone graduation

<i>Outcome:</i>		<i>On-time graduation</i>				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Hiring (s.e.)	-0.014 (0.024)					
Hiring x Public (s.e.)		-0.081 (0.031)	-0.072 (0.031)	-0.071 (0.030)	-0.076 (0.033)	-0.070 (0.031)
Hiring x Private (s.e.)		0.004 (0.033)	0.014 (0.027)	0.019 (0.028)	-0.023 (0.037)	-0.003 (0.040)
N Obs	4,058,758	4,058,758	4,058,758	4,058,758	4,058,758	4,058,758
p-value ( $\beta_{\text{public}} = \beta_{\text{private}}$ )	-	{0.032}	{0.012}	{0.015}	{0.132}	{0.084}
Major-State FE	✓	✓	-	-	-	-
Program FE	-	-	✓	✓	✓	✓
Demographics	-	-	✓	✓	✓	✓
Time Trend	Quadratic	Quadratic	Quadratic	Quadratic	Admission Time FE	Major-Admission Time FE




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
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Time Trend	Quadratic	Quadratic	Quadratic	Quadratic	Admission Time FE	Major-Admission Time FE

# Heterogeneity



# Robustness



## Up to now

- ▶ Using the universe of college students:
  - Delaying effect for students in public universities
  - Larger effects for students in better courses and higher SES

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  - Larger effects for students in better courses and higher SES
  
- ▶ Using detailed data from one large university:
  - by student admission scores
  - by individual level SES variables
  - by working status
  - credit accumulation

## UFBA – Larger effects for students with higher scores

<i>Outcome:</i>	<i>On-time graduation</i>			
	Overall	by Admission Score Tercile		
		1st	2nd	3rd
Hiring	-0.181	-0.117	-0.216	-0.220
(s.e.)	(0.046)	(0.056)	(0.067)	(0.063)
[p-value]	[0.000]	[0.040]	[0.002]	[0.001]
N obs	41,475	34,477		

## UFBA - Heterogeneity (outcome: on-time graduation)

	Hiring	Std Error	P-value	P-value Difference
<b>Working in Junior Year</b>				
Yes	-0.010	(0.081)	[0.907]	-
No	-0.228	(0.044)	[0.000]	{0.003}
<b>Public High School</b>				
Yes	-0.120	(0.053)	[0.026]	-
No	-0.313	(0.061)	[0.000]	{0.000}
<b>Mother Education Level</b>				
Less than High School	-0.106	(0.047)	[0.026]	-
High School	-0.190	(0.059)	[0.002]	{0.215}
Some College and more	-0.313	(0.063)	[0.000]	{0.001}
<b>Family Income</b>				
Level 1	-0.117	(0.052)	[0.028]	-
Level 2	-0.186	(0.062)	[0.003]	{0.256}
Level 3	-0.306	(0.054)	[0.000]	{0.003}



## No Effects on credit accumulation (IV)

<i>Outcome</i>	First Stage	Second Stage
	<i>On-time graduation</i>	<i>Credits Completed</i>
Hiring	-0.245	
(s.e.)	(0.058)	
{F-stat}	{17.867}	
On-time graduation		-220.3
(s.e.)		(331.6)
[p-value]		[0.508]
N Obs	20,206	20,206

# Conclusions

1. Students in public universities postpone graduation in a recession (↑5.5pp unemp  $\Rightarrow$  ↓ 2.1pp (6.5%) on-time graduation)
2. No tuition in public schools seems to play an important role
3. Effects are larger for:
  - Students in better courses / higher earning majors
  - Students with better socioeconomic characteristics
  - Students not (formally full-time) working while in college
4. Results point to the effect that students with better family resources are more likely to postpone graduation when facing worse labor market conditions  $\Rightarrow$  aggravate inequality

# Appendix

- ▶ Introduction and Motivation
- ▶ Institutional Setting & Data
- ▶ Descriptive Statistics
- ▶ Empirical Strategy
- ▶ Results
- ▶ Results UFBA
- ▶ Conclusion
- ▶ Contributions
- ▶ Education in Brazil
- ▶ Late Graduation
- ▶ Costs & Benefits on Postponing
- ▶ Example Empirical Strategy
- ▶ Weights
- ▶ More Results and Robustness:
  - Panel
  - Tobit
  - Heterogeneity Gender
  - Heterogeneity Majors
  - Reweighting
  - Balance
  - Placebo
  - Credits while in college

# Descriptive Statistics

	Mean			Number of Observations		
	Private	Public	UFBA	Private	Public	UFBA
On-time graduation	0.457	0.324	0.216	3,129,095	1,540,563	42,154
<u>Demographics</u>						
Age at admission	19.310	19.246	-	3,343,106	1,622,900	-
Female	0.609	0.561	0.551	3,343,106	1,622,900	29,550
Black or Native	0.335	0.404	0.754	1,992,907	1,047,273	25,465
<u>Program-level variables</u>						
Top-10% programs (ENADE)	0.051	0.354	-	3,106,390	1,314,787	-
Top-10% programs (CPC)	0.062	0.166	-	3,104,399	1,313,623	-
≥50% of mothers with College+	0.147	0.254	-	3,014,310	1,254,876	-
≥50% from public high-schools	0.614	0.436	-	3,014,310	1,254,876	-
≥50% working full-time	0.310	0.080	-	3,014,310	1,254,876	-
<u>Individual-level variables</u>						
Working full-time in Junior Year	-	-	0.208	-	-	42,154

# Reasons to postpone graduation

1. Avoid “scarring” effect of unemployment
2. Increase human capital (Malacrino and Saggio 2017)
3. Students have some subsidies
  - Public transportation fare
  - Food (in public schools) – highly subsidized
  - Cultural activities
4. More likely to find jobs as a student

You can be an intern and firms don't need to comply if any of labor market regulations (minimum wage, payroll tax, severance payment)

# On-time graduation decision

*Table: Summary of costs and benefits associated with delaying graduation*

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## Costs

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- (C1) Forgone earnings while in college
- (C2) Direct costs of attending college (tuition and others)
- (C3) Worse signal for firms in the job-searching

## Benefits

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- (B1) Avoid the scarring effects of unemployment
  - (B2) Universities job-finding resources more valuable with higher demand
  - (B3) Complete additional coursework
  - (B4) Remaining eligibility for internships
  - (B5) Access to students' subsidies (e.g. transportation, cultural activities)
- 
-



# Education in Brazil

*Table: Education at Glance 2019*

Level	% of 25-64 years-old	% Bachelor's
Less than Primary	13.7	-
Primary	19.7	-
Lower Secondary	13.6	-
Upper secondary	34.6	-
Bachelor's	17.4	100
MA	0.8	4.6
PhD	0.2	1.4




# College enrollment rose in 2000-2014



# Late graduation is not a rare event


Other Countries [More](#)




Notes: Distribution of students that graduated up to 8 semesters after expected graduation

# Graduation trends Brazil x US [Back](#)


## Brazil




## United States




# Graduation over time (all) [Back](#)




# Graduation over time (enrolled in senior year) [Back](#)



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


# Higher Education in Brazil: courses have different durations




# Location

## Proportion of students in IHE at the same location they were born





# Majors and Sectors




# Empirical Strategy

Index	Example	Obs
$i$	Lucas	
$m(i)$	Economics	
$p(i)$	Economics-USP-morning	
$s(i)$	São Paulo	
$t_0(i)$	2010	
$t_1(i)$	2013	(4-year major)
$Y_i$	0	(only graduated in 2014)

# Are $w_o^m$ stable (reliable) and dissimilar (uniqueness) - Overall


## Reliability

Correlation of same major (2010 x 2000 weights)



## Uniqueness


Correlation across majors



# Are $w_o^m$ stable (reliable) and dissimilar (uniqueness) - UFBA


## Reliability

Correlation of same major (each year)



## Uniqueness


Correlation across majors



# Study Sample

- ▶ In-person B.A. equivalent majors
- ▶ Age at initial enrollment between 17-22
- ▶ Programs with well defined duration and location
- ▶ Students enrolled in the year they are expected to graduate
  - i. Students that I expect to be affected
  - ii. Unit of observation is major-specific
  - iii. Larger sample size (graduations from 2009-2019) x (2012-2009)

## No effects for ever-graduating



## Increase average duration

- ▶ Considering the estimates for all semesters  $-1, 0, 1, \dots, 8$

⇒ Increase of 0.11 semesters on average

- ▶ Consistent with  $\approx 5.5\%$  of students delaying by 1 year
- ▶ Consistent with Tobit estimates with  $Y$  being the (censored) semester of graduation

# Tobit

	<i>Outcome: Semester of graduation</i>	
	(1)	(2)
Hiring	0.455	0.353
(s.e.)	(0.504)	(0.508)
[p-value]	[0.367]	[0.488]
Num.Obs.	1,260,875	1,024,315
Admission year FE	✓	✓
State FE	✓	✓
Demographics	✓	✓
Major FE	✓	✓
Schedule and Duration	✓	✓
Program Characteristics	-	✓



## Heterogeneity by gender and race

Outcome:		On-time graduation		
	(1)	(2)		p-value
	Men	Women	$(\beta_{\text{Men}} = \beta_{\text{Women}})$	
Effect	-0.080	-0.074		p-value
(s.e.)	(0.032)	(0.033)		{0.555}
[p-value]	[0.020]	[0.037]		
	White/Asian	Black/Native	$(\beta_{\text{White/Asian}} = \beta_{\text{Black/Native}})$	
Effect	-0.057	-0.047		p-value
(s.e.)	(0.041)	(0.029)		{0.753}
[p-value]	[0.179]	[0.115]		

# Reweighting


Outcome:	On-time graduation					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Reweighting for:	Benchmark	Majors	Demographics	% Students Public HS	Quality (ENADE)	Quality (CPC)
Hiring x Public (s.e.) [p-value]	-0.070 (0.031) [0.032]	-0.067 (0.033) [0.053]	-0.068 (0.033) [0.050]	-0.064 (0.036) [0.082]	-0.059 (0.035) [0.107]	-0.059 (0.035) [0.108]
Hiring x Private (s.e.) [p-value]	-0.003 (0.040) [0.934]	0.000 (0.032) [0.991]	-0.005 (0.035) [0.886]	0.000 (0.039) [0.995]	-0.016 (0.038) [0.676]	-0.016 (0.038) [0.683]
N Obs	4,058,758	4,016,188	4,058,743	3,452,328	3,600,588	3,596,268
p-value ( $\beta_{\text{public}} = \beta_{\text{private}}$ )	{0.084}	{0.058}	{0.099}	{0.159}	{0.350}	{0.352}
ratio ( $\beta_{\text{private}}/\beta_{\text{public}}$ )	0.048	0.006	0.075	0.004	0.273	0.267

# Balance


<i>Outcome:</i>	Women	Black/Native	Age at Entry
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Hiring	-0.001	0.003	0.075
(s.e.)	(0.007)	(0.023)	(0.052)
[p-value]	[0.931]	[0.913]	[0.160]
N Obs	4,058,758	2,552,777	4,058,758

# Heterogeneity


by majors



# Placebo



# Non-linear



# Credits while in college

	<i>Outcome:</i>				
	<i>Credits Obtained</i>				
Semesters before expected graduation:	5	4	3	2	1
Hiring x 1st T	13.704	-33.940	-63.994	-88.143	20.258
(s.e.)	(10.485)	(54.134)	(66.991)	(80.308)	(119.263)
[p-value]	[0.194]	[0.532]	[0.342]	[0.275]	[0.865]
Hiring x 2nd T	42.736	62.531	-26.726	-77.691	-102.736
(s.e.)	(35.096)	(35.366)	(76.511)	(62.047)	(101.729)
[p-value]	[0.226]	[0.080]	[0.728]	[0.214]	[0.315]
Hiring x 3rd T	39.303	98.585	-17.948	-93.984	-149.203
(s.e.)	(34.327)	(40.891)	(59.259)	(51.829)	(103.254)
[p-value]	[0.255]	[0.018]	[0.763]	[0.073]	[0.152]
N Obs	32,507	34,635	35,868	36,487	36,487

# Contributions

- ▶ **School attainment and labor market**

Betts and McFarland (1995), Card and Lemieux (2001), Petrongolo and San Segundo (2002), Raaum and Røed (2006), Clark (2011), Hershbein (2012), Barr and Turner (2013), Sievertsen (2016), Stuart (2020)

- **Not only college attainment, but timing**



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### ■ Data:

- More representative sample, heterogeneity analysis
- More disaggregated shocks, less assumptions

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### ■ Data:

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## ▶ Scarring effect of unemployment

- Timing is endogenous
- Compliers are different