

Dynamic Macroeconomic Implications of Immigration

Conny Olovsson, Karl Walentin and Andreas Westermark

EEA Milan Aug 2022

- Immigration an important policy issue
- Immigration flows are volatile and vary in their composition
- We ask how migration “shocks” dynamically affect the macroeconomy, with an emphasis on:
 - GDP per capita
 - Unemployment
 - Real wages

- Immigration an important policy issue
- Immigration flows are volatile and vary in their composition
- We ask how migration “shocks” dynamically affect the macroeconomy, with an emphasis on:
 - GDP per capita
 - Unemployment
 - Real wages
- We are the first to do this in a search and matching model

1. Long-term, non-EU immigration (family, work, refugees)

- Set up a general equilibrium model to quantify the effects of immigration in **Sweden**
 - Centered on the labor market
 - Builds on detailed labor market data of various groups
 - Focus on supply effects in the short to medium term
- We study the **dynamic** effects of immigration shocks on the economy
 - Simple data indicates that macro effects of immigration are largest in the short run
 - ⇒ steady state analysis insufficient (i.e. most of the literature)
- Can use model to:
 - 1 Quantify how migration affects unemployment
 - 2 Relate productivity growth and migration flows
 - 3 Quantify fiscal effects of migration
 - 4 Spell out the macroeconomic effects of policies that improve integration

2. Work-permit immigration (less well calibrated)

Outline of the presentation


- Literature
- Data
- Model
- Effects of an immigration shock

- Fiscal effects - Storesletten (JPE 2000)
 - Effects depend a lot on individual characteristics
 - Compositional effects important
- Macro/modelling perspective:
 - Some research on aggregate implications
 - Canova and Ravn, (1998, 2000)
 - No search and matching framework
 - Busch, Krueger, Ludwig, Popova and Iftikhar (JME, 2020)
 - Study the refugee wave around 2015 in Germany
 - But, focus on welfare implications and abstract from unemployment.

- Empirical:
 - Mainly study wages of natives: no or small affects
 - Dustmann, Fabbri, and Preston (EJ, 2005):
 - UK: No clear effect of immigration on aggregate employment or unemployment
 - **Furlanetto and Robstad (RED, 2019):**
 - Norway: Immigration reduces unemployment and lowers productivity (SVAR)
 - But, study limited to effect of job-related migration, mainly from EU

- Obtained rich dataset on entire Swedish population of 20-64 year olds 2000-2017 (from the population registry) with:
 - Country of birth (actually continent) - use group averages
 - Date and reason for migration
 - Labor status
 - Labor income
 - Demographic info

Integration is a gradual process...



- Unemployment rate of immigrants as a function of number of years in the country.
- Labor force participation rate slowly increasing over time

Education and relative productivity of immigrants

- Formal education levels are similar between groups:

	Natives	Immigrants	Refugees
Fraction college educated	36%	34%	29%

- **Our view:** Unemployment rates are higher for immigrants because of lower productivity compared to natives
 - Sweden-specific skills (Swedish language skills!)
 - Lower individual productivity (e.g. worse/different education system), or
 - Worse match between worker and employer
 - Discrimination
- Lower productivity of immigrants supported by estimates of Ek (2019)
 - Matched employer-employee data

Immigration can have both positive and negative effects on the economy

- “Demographic dividend” (fiscal)
 - Lowers the age-dependency ratio
- Positive or negative effects depending on relation between natives and immigrants in terms of:
 - Education and productivity
 - Unemployment rates
 - Labor force participation rates

⇒ **Composition of immigrants key**

- Search and matching labor market
- Permanent exogenous immigration
 - No emigration
- Model of “Perpetual Youth” approach of Blanchard-Yaari
- Agents are born/immigrate as workers
- Retire with some exogenous probability
 - Higher probability for immigrants - capture that arrive in country at average age of 31 years.
- Retirees die with some exogenous probability
 - Different probabilities a short-cut to capture shorter time in non-working age (childhood) for immigrants
⇒ “Demographic dividend”
- Labor of natives and immigrants perfect substitutes in production

Model overview, part II

- Two education groups, college (high) and non-college (low). Technology:

$$Y \equiv F(n_H, n_L, K) = A^{tfp} K^\alpha Z(n_H, n_L)^{1-\alpha},$$

where A^{tfp} is total factor productivity, K is capital, α the capital share and Z is a CES aggregate over the two types of labor

$$Z = \left(a n_H^{\frac{\rho-1}{\rho}} + (1-a) n_L^{\frac{\rho-1}{\rho}} \right)^{\frac{\rho}{\rho-1}}$$

- Here

$$n_g = \sum_i \varepsilon_i n_{i,g},$$

- Labor force participation exogenous process
 - Matches data for natives and immigrants
- Separate labor markets for the two groups, C-D matching function


- Workers differ in terms of productivity, also within groups
- Gradual integration: Productivity of immigrants grow with the number of years in the country (prob π)
 - Stops growing at some point with prob ϕ (can't get better than fluent in the language, etc)
- Values

$$\begin{aligned}
 W_{i,g}^{na} = & (1 - \tau) w_{i,g}^{na} + \beta p^m R^{m'} + \beta (1 - p^m) \{ \\
 & (1 - \phi) (1 - \pi) \left[(1 - \delta_g) W_{i,g}^{na'} + \delta_g U_{i,g}^{na'} \right] \\
 & + (1 - \phi) \pi \left[(1 - \delta_g) W_{i+1,g}^{na'} + \delta_g U_{i+1,g}^{na'} \right] \\
 & + \phi \left[(1 - \delta_g) W_{i,g}^{e'} + \delta_g U_{i,g}^{e'} \right] \}.
 \end{aligned}$$

- Government
 - Taxes labor income, and
 - Spends on unemployment benefits, social welfare and **pensions**
 - Balanced budget (in baseline)

Key assumptions

- 1 Same unemployment benefit level for all workers within an education group and varying productivity
 - Effectively implies a minimum wage
 - Yields **structural unemployment** in model
 - Unemployment replacement rates that capture “cap” in benefit system:
 - Top income quartile : 0.425
 - Bottom three income quartiles: 0.649
 - 2 Different productivity distributions for natives and immigrants
 - Use Ek (2019)'s estimate that **mean** productivity of immigrants is 73% of native Swedes
 - ⇒ Higher structural unemployment for immigrants
 - Calibrate productivity **dispersion** to fit unemployment rates of groups
 - Gradual integration
- Both assumption key to match slowly decaying unemployment





- No detailed description here
- Some parameters set to standard values, e.g., discounting
- Calibrate productivity **dispersion** to fit unemployment rates of groups
- Calibrate productivity **mean** to fit relative productivity
- Calibrate integration parameters to match decaying unemployment among immigrants
- Calibrate benefit parameters to match replacement rates

Model captures unemployment differences across groups

	Unemployment	
	Data	Model
High-skill natives	3.34%	3.36%
Low-skill natives	8.71%	8.74%
High-skill immigrants	15.34%	15.00%
Low-skill immigrants	22.12%	20.98%

...and falling unemployment as immigrants integrate



Key moments in steady state

Moment	Model, baseline
Aggregate unemployment	8.71%
Labor income tax rate	37.6%
Average wage for immigrants/natives	77.6%
Net transfers from natives to immigrants	2.1%

...and government expenditures largely (78%) related to non-working age population


⇒ large scope for demographics to affect public finances

- **We consider an increase in immigration corresponding to one percent of the population**
 - Roughly the increase in migration during the refugee crisis in 2015
 - Modelled as an increased inflow over four quarters


For comparison: **small** steady state effects of immigration

	Change from 1% more refugees
GDP per capita	-0.46%
GDP per working age	-0.60%
Aggregate unemployment	+0.30 pp
Labor income tax rate	+0.34 pp
Net transfers from natives to immigrants	+0.18 pp



Effects on GDP and employment/population rate



Effects on unemployment







Effects on taxes and transfers



Comparing steady state and dynamic effects of immigration

	Steady state effect	Max dynamic effect
GDP per capita	-0.46%	-1.64%
GDP per working age	-0.60%	-2.48%
Labor income tax rate	+0.30 pp	+1.55 pp
Aggregate unemployment	+0.34 pp	+2.13 pp
Net transfers from natives to immigrants	+0.18 pp	+0.82 pp
Welfare of natives	-0.35%	-0.33%

Work-permit - immigrants with same productivity as natives (demographic dividend)





Takeaways from immigration shock results

- Fairly large initial negative effects on employment rate and GDP per capita from non-EU migration
 - Unsurprising given the low initial employment rates in data (and model)
 - Implies drag on Swedish economy
 - GDP per capita: -1.64 %
 - Unemployment: +2.13 pp
 - Taxes: +1.55 pp
 - Wages - small effect for natives
 - But effects on levels decrease over time
- Short-run effects different in *order of magnitude* compared to long-run effect
 - Confirmed that steady state analysis not sufficient
- Tax smoothing mutens effect
- Large positive effects on employment rate and GDP per capita from work-permit migration
- Demographic dividend - composition important

Concluding remarks

- Set up model to capture **dynamic** macroeconomic effects of migration
- Calibrated to Swedish recent migration and integration
 - Captures key dynamic properties of data
- Computed effects of a shock similar to the refugee crisis of 2015
 - Obtained initially negative effects on economy
 - Results robust to varying assumptions
- **All comments very welcome**
- Thank you!

Downgrading



Imperfect substitutes

