Perceptions of Circumstances vs. Effort in Education and the Demand for Redistribution: Evidence from a Survey Experiment

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Motivation

- Educational inequality is concern for policy-makers:
 - Circumstances out of individual's control determine educational achievement (e.g., Schuetz et al. 2008, Björklund and Salvanes 2011, OECD 2018)
 - Educational inequality \rightarrow income inequality and intergenerational immobility (e.g., Corak 2013)
- Policy aim: Increase opportunities for children from disadvantaged families to mitigate the impact of family background
 - Preferences for governmental redistributive measures (e.g., Alesina et al. 2018; Hoy and Mager 2021)
 - Relationship b/w extent of inequality and demand for redistribution
 - Perceived fairness of outcomes and sources of inequality

Paper in a Nutshell

Research Question

How does information about educational inequality in Germany affect

(i) fairness views

(ii) demand for private and governmental redistribution

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Inform randomly selected treatment group about relationship between children's academic school attendance and their parents' socioeconomic status

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Survey Experiment

Inform randomly selected treatment group about relationship between children's academic school attendance and their parents' socioeconomic status

Results

(i) Information about educational inequality strongly increases the view that mainly external circumstances determine educational success.

(ii) Information increases private donations to charities but does not affect support for equity-enhancing educational policies.

Related Literature

- Relationship b/w inequality and preferences for governmental redistribution
 - e.g., Piketty 1995; Bénabou and Ok 2001; Alesina and Giuliano 2011; Hvidberg et al. 2020
- Perceptions regarding fairness and sources of inequality as important factor
 - e.g., Alesina and Glaeser 2010; Bénabou and Tirole 2006; Alesina and Angeletos 2005, Alesina and La Ferrara 2005; Roth and Wohlfahrt 2018
- Shift in perceptions about extent of inequality & preferences for governmental redistribution
 - e.g., Cruces et al. 2013; Kuziemko et al. 2015; Karadja et al. 2017; Hoy and Mager 2021; Fehr et al. 2019; Alesina et al. 2018; Lergetporer et al. 2020
- Determinants of charitable giving
 - e.g., Côté et al. 2015; Duquette and Hargaden 2021; Payne and Smith 2015

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Our Contribution

- Outcomes: Private and public redistribution
- Information: Educational inequality

Data: ifo Education Survey 2019

- Survey of the German population on education policy
 - Respondents sampled and surveyed through online platform in May 2019
 - 2,094 (preferred sample)
 - ► Follow-up survey roughly two weeks later: 80% recontact rate
 - Sample broadly representative of German population in terms of age, gender, region and household income
 Microcensus
- Questions
 - Cover different topics of education policy
 - Roughly 30 questions + background information
 - Median completion time: 30 minutes

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Sample Balance

	Control group	Uncond. SES Gap			
	Mean	Mean	Difference	p-value	
Age	53.18	52.95	-0.24	0.72	
Female	0.52	0.55	0.03	0.20	
Born in Germany	0.95	0.96	0.01	0.54	
City size $> 10,000$	0.34	0.39	0.05	0.03	
Partner in household	0.59	0.58	-0.01	0.64	
Parent(s) with university degree	0.28	0.30	0.03	0.18	
Highest educational attainment					
No degree/basic degree	0.23	0.24	0.01	0.71	
Middle school degree	0.37	0.34	-0.03	0.15	
Univ. entrance degree	0.40	0.42	0.02	0.29	
Employment status					
Full-time	0.33	0.32	-0.01	0.78	
Part-time	0.12	0.14	0.02	0.22	
Self-employed	0.05	0.06	0.01	0.61	
Unemployed	0.05	0.04	-0.01	0.32	
Retired/III/etc	0.45	0.44	-0.01	0.72	
Parent status	0.61	0.59	-0.02	0.44	
Party preference					
CDU	0.17	0.19	0.01	0.46	
SPD	0.18	0.15	-0.04	0.03	
Grüne	0.14	0.16	0.01	0.47	
Linke	0.10	0.10	0.00	0.86	
FDP	0.06	0.05	-0.01	0.17	
AfD	0.09	0.11	0.02	0.16	
None	0.22	0.23	0.00	0.94	
Other	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.22	
Educ. Important for vote	0.70	0.72	0.02	0.26	
General voting	0.87	0.87	0.00	0.94	
Patience	6.51	6.35	-0.16	0.10	
Risk tolerance	4.60	4.74	0.14	0.22	
Monthly household income (€)	2556.21	2567.73	11.52	0.86	
West Germany	0.79	0.80	0.01	0.52	
Work in education sector	0.10	0.10	0.00	0.92	
Trust in government	0.32	0.32	0.00	0.93	

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Circumstances vs. Effort

August 25, 2022

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
Information Treatment - Institutional Background

- Strong educational inequality in Germany in international comparison
- Pattern in academic school attendance rates:
 - ▶ 19 percent of 15-year-old children in lowest 50 percent of families, in terms of their social background and family income, attend a *Gymnasium* (highest track schools)
 - 49 percent of children in the highest 50 percent of families attend a Gymnasium (highest track schools)

 \rightarrow resulting gap: 30 percentage points

Information Treatment


49 percent of schoolchildren from the better-off half of all families (in terms of social background and social background and family income) attend a Gymnasium. Among schoolchildren from the worse-off half of all families, the figure is 19 percent. This results in a difference of 30 percentage points.



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Experimental Setup



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Empirical Strategy

$$y_i = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 T_i^{\text{uncond}} + \delta' X_i + \epsilon_i \tag{1}$$

where:

- *y_i* is the outcome variable of interest for respondent *i* (i.e. fairness views or demand for redistribution)
- T_i^{uncond} indicates whether respondent *i* received information on the gap in *Gymnasium* attendance
 - α_1 : unbiased estimates for the causal treatment effect of information provision
- X_i is a vector of control variables
- ϵ_i is the error term

Eliciting Fairness Views

- Degree to which individuals are responsive for their own economic success and the extent to which own effort (vs. external circumstances) pays off
- Q: Some say that success in life depends primarily on one's own effort.
 Others say that success in life depends primarily on external circumstances.
 In your opinion, what determines whether one achieves the following in life?
 - mainly own effort
 - rather own effort
 - rather external circumstances
 - mainly external circumstances
 - ► Elicit these views for both a high educational degree as well as a high income

↓ Question




Figure 1: Effect on Fairness Views (High Educational Degree)

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


Figure 2: Effect on Fairness Views (High Income)

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Results - Persistence of Treatment Effects

	High educational degree	High income	
	Perceived role of external circumstances		
	(4-point sca	ale)	
	(1)	(2)	
Uncond. SES gap	0.256***	0.052	
	(0.039)	(0.042)	
Follow-up	-0.017	-0.049*	
	(0.029)	(0.030)	
Uncond. SES gap x Follow-up	-0.183***	-0.036	
	(0.040)	(0.043)	
Covariates	Yes	Yes	
Control mean	1.812	2.192	
Observations	1671	1670	
R-squared	0.063	0.042	
Persistent treatment effects			
Uncond. SES gap + Uncond. SES gap \times Follow-up	0.074**	0.016	
	(0.035)	(0.040)	

Notes: OLS regressions. Dependent variables: (1) external circumstances are decisive for high educational attainment (4-point scale), (2) external circumstances are decisive for high income (4-point scale). Control mean of the outcome variable in the control group. Covariates include: age, female, born in Germany, West Germany, living in large city, risk, patience, parents with university education, income, current employment status, middle school degree, high school degree, partner living in household, parental status, work in education sector and imputation dummies. Sample: respondents who participated in the follow-up survey. Data source: ifo Education Survey 2019. Robust standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

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Prior Beliefs

- Misperception in prior beliefs about educational inequality: On average, Germans believe that
 - ... 71 percent of students from a more advantaged family attend the academic school (accurate value 49 percent)
 - ... 30 percent of students from a less advantaged family attend the academic school (accurate value 19 percent)

 \rightarrow SES gap in academic school attendance: 41 percentage points on average (accurate value 30 percentage points)

ightarrow ex-ante unclear how respondents react due to misperceptions



Results - Posterior Beliefs

	Belief: SES gap in academic school attendance		Belief: Academic school attendance high SES		Belief: Academic school attendance low SES	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Uncond. SES gap	0.942	1.154	-0.869	-0.784	-1.811***	-1.938***
	(1.033)	(1.032)	(0.813)	(0.808)	(0.668)	(0.671)
Covariates	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Control mean	38.689	38.689	68.957	68.957	30.268	30.268
Observations	1671	1671	1671	1671	1671	1671
R-squared	0.000	0.040	0.001	0.042	0.004	0.028

Notes: OLS regressions. Dependent variables: (1) - (6) respondents stated posterior belief as indicated in the table header. Control mean: mean of the outcome variable in the control group. See table 1 for included covariates, Data source: ifo Education Survey 2019. Sample: respondents in the follow-up survey. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

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Eliciting Preferences for Redistribution (Private)

Individual donations to charities (revealed preferences)

- Respondents can donate any amount $b/w\ 0$ and 80 tokens to one or two charities
 - Deutsches Kinderhilfswerk e.V.
 - Chancenstiftung
 - Deutsches Kinderhilfswerk e.V. and Chancenstiftung



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	Average donations	No donation	Full donation
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Uncond. SES gap	3.267**	-0.093***	0.004
	(1.401)	(0.020)	(0.020)
Covariates	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control mean	37.499	0.338	0.303
Observations	2093	2093	2093
R-squared	0.061	0.056	0.046

Notes: OLS regressions. Dependent variables: (1) dummy variable coded one if amount of donation is 0, (2) amount of donations stated by respondents (in lifepoints), (3) dummy variable coded one if amount of donation is above; (4) dummy coded one if amount of donation is above the median donation. Control mean: mean of the outcome variable in the control group. Covariates include: age, female, born in Germany, West Germany, living in large city, risk, patience, parents with university education, income, current employment status, middle school degree, high school degree, partner living in household, parental status, work in education sector and imputation dummies. Data source: ifo Education Survey 2019. Robust standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01

Eliciting Preferences for Redistribution (Public)

Policy aiming at equality of opportunity

- Ask whether survey participants favor or oppose increased governmental spending for children from less advantaged families with the purpose of increasing equality of opportunity
 - additional expenditures usually have to be financed through taxes



Eliciting Preferences for Redistribution (Public)

Policy aiming at equality of opportunity

- Ask whether survey participants favor or oppose increased governmental spending for children from less advantaged families with the purpose of increasing equality of opportunity
 - additional expenditures usually have to be financed through taxes

Question

	Support inequality-reducing	Opposition inequality-reducing	Five-point
	policies	policies	scale
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Uncond. SES gap	-0.011	0.015	-0.005
	(0.019)	(0.015)	(0.043)
Covariates	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control mean	0.751	0.126	3.823
Observations	2094	2094	2094
R-squared	0.034	0.023	0.040

Notes: OLS regressions. Dependent variables: (1) dummy variable coded one if respondent is mainly/rather in favor of inequality-reducing policies, (2) dummy variable coded one if respondent is rather not/not at all in favor of inequality-reducing policies, (3) support for inequality-reducing policies (5) point scale from strongly favor to strongly oppose). Control mean: mean of the outcome variable in the control group. Covariates include: age, female, born in Germany, West Germany, living in large city, risk, patience, parents with university education, income, current employment status, middle school degree, high school degree, partner living in household, parental status, work in education sector and imputation dummies. Data source: if o Education Survey 2019. Robust standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.01

Results - Heterogeneity

- Potential explanations for why information treatment affect private redistribution, but not preferences for governmental redistribution
 - Partisan biases or political ideology
 - Trust in government
 - Policy effectiveness
 - Causal Forest

▶ Results

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Conclusion

We find that

- ... information about the extent of educational inequality strongly increases the view that mainly external circumstances rather than effort determine educational success.
- ... effects persist into a follow-up survey conducted two weeks later.
- ... information also increases private donations to charities aiming at increasing equality of opportunity (*preferences for private redistribution*).
- ... information does not affect public support for equity-enhancing educational policies (*preferences for governmental redistribution*).
- ... political ideology, trust in government or doubts about policy effectiveness cannot explain the difference in treatment effects on charitable donations vs. policy preferences.

Thank you for your attention!

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Attention Check Question

Question asked half-way through the survey:

It sometimes happens that survey participants do not read individual questions accurately. To ensure that you read the questions accurately, we ask you to ignore the following question and enter the number twenty-two in the text field.

The German states are also responsible for universities and colleges. What do you think, how many currently have tuition fees?

While none of the 16 German states currently have tuition fees, only respondents who answered 22 were left in the final sample.

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Representativeness

	Microe (1		Analysis sample (2)	
Age	50.764	(0.030)	52.725	(0.272)
Female	0.513	(0.001)	0.532	(0.009)
Living in West Germany (excl. Berlin)	0.801	(0.001)	0.795	(0.007)
Net household income above median	0.479	(0.001)	0.441	(0.009)
Educational attainment		. ,		. ,
University entrance degree (Fachabitur/Abitur)	0.326	(0.001)	0.404	(0.009)
Middle school degree (Mittlere Reife)	0.299	(0.001)	0.360	(0.009)
No degree / basic degree	0.375	(0.001)	0.234	(0.008)
Working full-time	0.421	(0.001)	0.332	(0.009)
Observations	405,748		3,082	

Notes: Means; standard errors in parentheses. Column (1): all people aged 18 or older in the Microcensus 2015 (representative of the German population). Column (2): our analysis sample. Data sources: Microcensus 2015 and if of Education Survey 2019.

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Eliciting Fairness Views

[Q24a] Manche sagen, dass Erfolg im Leben vor allem von eigener Anstrengung abhängt. Andere sagen, dass Erfolg im Leben vor allem von äußeren Umständen abhängt, die man selbst nicht beeinflussen kann.

Was entscheidet Ihrer Meinung nach darüber, ob man Folgendes im Leben erreicht?

	Hauptsächlich	Eher eigene	Eher äußere	Hauptsächlich
	eigene	Anstrengung	Umstände	äußere
	Anstrengung			Umstände
Einen hohen	0	0	0	0
Bildungsabschluss				
Ein hohes Einkommen	0	0	0	0

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	High Educat	tional Degree	High Income		
	Perceived role	Perceived role	Perceived role	Perceived role	
	of external	of external	of external	of external	
	circumstances	circumstances	circumstances	circumstances	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	
Uncond. SES gap	0.121***	0.123***	0.038*	0.036*	
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.021)	(0.021)	
Covariates	No	Yes	No	Yes	
Control mean	0.173	0.173	0.350	0.350	
Observations	2094	2094	2093	2093	
R-squared	0.020	0.060	0.002	0.040	

Notes: OLS regressions. Dependent variables: (1) - (2) dummy variable coded one if respondent thinks that it is mainly/rather external circumstances that are decisive for high educational attainment, (3) - (4) dummy variable coded one if respondent thinks that it is mainly/rather external effort that is decisive for high income. Control mean: mean of the outcome variable in the control group. Covariates include: age, female, born in Germany, West Germany, living in large city, risk, patience, parents with university education, income, current employment status, middle school degree, high school degree, patient living in household, parental status, work in education sector and imputation dummies. Data source: ifo Education Survey 2019. Robust standard errors in parenthess, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

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	(1) 4-point scale	(2) Mainly external cir- cumstances (dummy)	(3) Rather external cir- cumstances (dummy)	(4) Rather effort (dummy)	(5) Mainly effort (dummy)
High educational de					
Uncond. SES gap	0.257***	0.033***	0.090***	-0.023	-0.100***
	(0.035)	(0.008)	(0.017)	(0.022)	(0.020)
Covariates	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control mean	1.802	0.020	0.153	0.435	0.391
Observations	2094	2094	2094	2094	2094
R-squared	0.073	0.019	0.048	0.014	0.053

Notes: OLS regressions. Dependent variables: (1) external circumstances are decisive for high educational attainment (4 point scale), (2) dummy variable coded one if respondent thinks that it is mainly external circumstances that are decisive for high educational attainment, (3) dummy variable coded one if respondent thinks that it is rather external circumstances that are decisive for high educational attainment, (4) dummy variable coded one if respondent thinks that it is rather effort that is decisive for high educational attainment, (5) dummy variable coded one if respondent thinks that it is rather effort that is decisive for high educational attainment, (5) dummy variable coded one if respondent thinks that it is rather effort that is decisive for high educational attainment. (5) dummy variable coded one if respondent thinks that it is calculated one high educational attainment. (5) dummy variable coded one if respondent thinks that it is calculated one high educational attainment. Control mean: mean of the outcome variable in the control group. Covariates include: age, female, born in Germany, Nevis Germany, living in large city, risk, patience, parents with university education, income, current employment status, middle school degree, high school degree, partner living in household, parental status, work in education sector and imputation dummies. Data source: ifo Education Survey 2019. Robust standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

▲ back

7/23

	(1) 4-point scale	(2) Mainly external cir- cumstances (dummy)	(3) Rather external cir- cumstances (dummy)	(4) Rather effort (dummy)	(5) Mainly effort (dummy)
High income	0.048	0.011	0.025	-0.023	-0.000
Uncond. SES gap	(0.037)	(0.011)	(0.020)	(0.022)	(0.018)
Covariates	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control mean	2.181	0.058	0.291	0.424	0.227
Observations	2093	2093	2093	2094	2093
R-squared	0.042	0.018	0.026	0.014	0.029

Notes: OLS regressions. Dependent variables: (1) external circumstances are decisive for high income (4 point scale), (2) dummy variable coded one if respondent thinks that it is mainly external circumstances that are decisive for high income, (3) dummy variable coded one if respondent thinks that it is rather external circumstances that are decisive for high income, (4) dummy variable coded one if respondent thinks that it is rather effort that is decisive for high income, (5) dummy variable coded one if respondent thinks that it is income. Control mean: mean of the outcome variable in the control group. Covariates include: age, female, born in Germany, West Germany, living in large city, risk, patience, parents with university education, income, current employment status, middle school degree, high school degree, partner living in household, parental status, work in education sector and imputation dummies. Data source: ifo Education Survey 2019. Robust standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.01.

▲ back

Eliciting Prior and Posterior Beliefs

- Respondent's information status at baseline: prior beliefs about extent of educational inequality
- Ask respondents about
 - Share of students from the more advantaged half of all families (in terms of social background and family income) who attend an academic school (*Gymnasium*)
 - Share of students from the less advantaged half of all families (in terms of social background and family income) who attend an academic school (*Gymnasium*)
- Same question to elicit posterior beliefs

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Eliciting Prior and Posterior Beliefs

[Q09] Denken Sie an einen Vergleich zwischen Kindern aus der besser und schlechter gestellten Hälfte aller Familien (in Bezug auf sozialen Hintergrund und familiäre Einkommensverhältnisse).



Was schätzen Sie, wie viel Prozent der Schülerinnen und Schüler aus der....

- ... besser gestellten Hälfte aller Familien besuchen ein Gymnasium? Prozent
- ... schlechter gestellten Hälfte aller Familien besuchen ein Gymnasium? ... Prozent

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Prior Beliefs

8-30 8 25 25 25 20 20 20 Percent 15 Percent 15 Percent 15 9 9 9 ŝ ŝ ŝ 0 0 0 20 40 60 80 100 20 40 60 80 100 -50 50 -100 ò 100 0 0 (iii) Belief: SES gap in academic school attendance (i) Belief: Academic school attendance high SES (ii) Belief: Academic school attendance low SES

Figure 3: Distribution of prior beliefs about educational inequality

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Posterior Beliefs




Figure 4: Distribution of posterior beliefs about educational inequality

August 25, 2022

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Eliciting Charitable Donations

Bei dieser Frage erhalten Sie zusätzlich zu den Lifepoints, die Sie für diese Umfrage bekommen, einen Bonus von 80 Lifepoints.

Sie haben die Möglichkeit, diese Lifepoints an zwei gemeinnützige Stiftungen zu spenden. Beide Stiftungen setzen sich unter anderem für bessere Chancen für Kinder aus schlechter gestellten Familien in Deutschland ein. Der Geldwert der von Ihnen gespendeten Lifepoints wird an die gemeinnützigen Stiftungen überwiesen. Die nicht gespendeten Lifepoints werden **Ihnen nach** Abschluss der Befragung gutgeschrieben.

Wie viele Ihrer 80 Lifepoints möchten Sie insgesamt spenden?

Lifepoints

0 bedeutet, dass Sie nichts spenden möchten; 80 bedeutet, dass Sie alle zusätzlichen Lifepoints spenden möchten.

- o An Deutsches Kinderhilfswerk e.V.
- o An Die Chancenstiftung
- o An Deutsches Kinderhilfswerk e.V. und Die Chancenstiftung zu gleichen Teilen

Klicken Sie hier, wenn Sie mehr über die beiden Stiftungen erfahren möchten.

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13/23

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Results - Private Donations to Charities




Figure 5: Distribution of charitable donations across information treatments

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14/23

Eliciting Policy Preferences

Sind Sie dafür oder dagegen, mehr staatliche Mittel für Kinder aus schlechter gestellten Familien auszugeben, um die Chancengleichheit zu erhöhen?

Bitte denken Sie daran, dass die zusätzlichen Mittel oft durch Steuern finanziert werden müssen.

- o Ich bin sehr dafür
- o Ich bin eher dafür
- o Ich bin eher dagegen
- o Ich bin sehr dagegen
- o Ich bin weder dafür noch dagegen

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Results - Heterogeneous Effects by Political Ideology

	(1)	(2)	(3)			
	Perceived role of external circumstances (education)					
	(left-leaning)	(right-leaning)	(no attachment)			
Uncond. SES gap	0.169***	0.079***	0.119***			
	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.037)			
Covariates	No	No	No			
Control mean	0.200	0.141	0.148			
Observations	868	710	472			
R-squared	0.035	0.011	0.021			

Notes: OLS regressions. Dependent variables: (1) - (3) dummy variable coded one if respondent thinks that it is mainly/rather external circumstances that is decisive for high educational attainment. Control mean: mean of the dummy variable for the control group. See Table 1 for included covariates. Data source: ifo Education Survey 2019. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: p < 0.05, *** p < 0.05.

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Results - Heterogeneous Effects by Political Ideology

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	
		Average donati	ons	Support inequality-reducing policies			
	(left-	(right-	(no attach-	(left-	(right-	(no attach-	
	leaning)	leaning)	ment)	leaning)	leaning)	ment)	
Uncond. SES gap	3.424	2.847	1.453	-0.010	-0.014	0.013	
	(2.218)	(2.444)	(2.983)	(0.024)	(0.035)	(0.044)	
Covariates	No	No	No	No	No	No	
Control mean	41.390	35.161	33.428	0.862	0.692	0.627	
Observations	867	710	472	868	710	472	
R-squared	0.002	0.002	0.006	0.000	0.000	0.001	

Notes: OLS regressions. Dependent variables: (1) - (3) amount of donations stated by respondents (in lifepoints); (4) - (6) dummy variable coded one if respondent is mainly/rather in favor of inequality-reducing policies, Control mean: mean of the dummy variable for the control group. See Table 1 for included covariates. Data source: ifo Education Survey 2019. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.0.

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Results - Heterogeneous Effects by Trust in Government

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Perceived role of		Perceived role of		Average donations		Support inequality-	
	circumsta	nces	circumsta	inces	-		reducing polic	ies
	(high educ.	degree)	(high inco	ome)				
	(high trust)	(low trust)	(high trust)	(low trust)	(high trust)	(low trust)	(high trust)	(low trust)
Uncond. SES gap	0.131***	0.098***	0.021	0.074**	1.965	4.164*	-0.021	-0.003
	(0.022)	(0.032)	(0.026)	(0.036)	(1.739)	(2.470)	(0.024)	(0.031)
Covariates	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
Control mean	0.175	0.170	0.381	0.283	35.150	42.491	0.730	0.798
Observations	1422	672	1421	672	1421	672	1422	672
R-squared	0.024	0.014	0.000	0.006	0.001	0.004	0.001	0.000

Notes: OLS regressions. Dependent variables: (1) - (2) dummy variable coded one if respondent thinks that it is mainly/rather external circumstances that is decisive for high educational attainment; (3) - (4) dummy variable coded one if respondent thinks that it is mainly/rather external circumstances that is decisive for high income; (5) - (6) amount of donations stated by respondents (in lifepoints); (7) - (8) dummy variable coded one if respondent timmy variable coded one if respondent is mainly/rather in favor of inequality-reducing policies. Control mean: mean of the dummy variable for the control group. See Table 1 for included covariates. Data source: ifo Education Survey 2019. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: * p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

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Policy Effectiveness

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)	.2	4	.6	.8	
Increase government spending on schools with large number of low-SES students State assumption of kindergarten fees for all children (> 4 years old) Tracking of students after grade 6 Expansion of scholarship programs that support low-income students at university/college Introduction of compulsory preschool for all children (> 4 years old) Increase in teacher salary at schools with large number of low-SES students Move to all-day school system (until 3pm)					
	Joint teaching of studen		abilities at all schools		

Figure 6: Suitability of reform proposal to increase equality of opportunity $\langle \Box \rangle + \langle \overline{\partial} \rangle + \langle$

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Results - Heterogeneity




Figure 7: ATE within N-tiles (as defined by predicted by CATE) - Average donations

August 25, 2022

20/23

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Results - Heterogeneity




Figure 8: ATE within N-tiles (as defined by predicted by CATE) - Policy preferences

August 25, 2022 21 / 23

Results - Heterogeneity

Table: Variable Importance

Descriptions

Donations				
Variable				
Monthly hh Income (€)	0.18			
Patience	0.17			
Age	0.17			
Risk tolerance	0.10			
City size \geq 100,000	0.06			
Retired/III/etc.	0.04			
Univ. entrance degree	0.03			
Parent(s) higher edu	0.03			
Right leaning party	0.02			
Female	0.02			
Work in education sector	0.02			
No party preference	0.02			
Unemployed	0.02			
Educ. important for vote	0.02			
West Germany	0.01			
Partner in household	0.01			
General voting	0.01			
Middle school degree	0.01			
Trust in government	0.01			
Parent status	0.01			
Full-time employed	0.01			
Left leaning party	0.01			
Part-time employed	0.01			
Self-employed	0.00			

Policy Preferences

Variable	
Age	0.17
Patience	0.17
Monthly hh Income (€)	0.14
Risk tolerance	0.12
West Germany	0.05
Born in Germany	0.05
Full-time employed	0.03
Right leaning party	0.03
City size > 100,000	0.03
No party preference	0.02
Educ. important for vote	0.02
Parent(s) higher edu	0.02
Part-time employed	0.02
Female	0.02
Partner in household	0.02
Parent status	0.02
General voting	0.01
Middle school degree	0.01
Trust in government	0.01
Retired/III/etc.	0.01
Univ. entrance degree	0.01
Unemployed	0.01
Left leaning party	0.01
Work in education sector	0.01
Self-employed	0.00
No degree	0.00

Katharina Wedel

Born in Germany

No degree

0.00

0.00

August 25, 2022

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Results - Heterogeneity (Policy Preferences)

Covariates	Ntile1	Ntile2	Ntile3	Ntile4	p-value (1 vs. 4)
Age	48.27	51.85	53.63	58.68	0.00
Risk tolerance	5.07	4.78	4.61	4.01	0.00
Patience	7.75	7.09	6.30	4.66	0.00
Monthly household income (\in)	2.61	2.41	2.39	3.02	0.00

Covariates by Ntiles (Policy Preferences)

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