

Pricing an Unknown Climate

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Intro

Equilibrium **climate sensitivity**

- Warming response to a doubling of preindustrial CO₂

IPCC's AR6 guesstimate:

- *Likely* range 2.5-4C
 - translate into hugely different scenarios for life on planet
- Refers to 66% *subjective* probability
- Different methods imply quite different results; paleoclimate data, instrumental records, physical process understanding, “emergent constraints”,...

Any temperature level in the ‘likely’ range (and beyond...)

- far above any recent historic record
 - huge extrapolation
- ↔ Hard uncertainty or **ambiguity**.
(~ not objectively quantifiable)

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What is our *attitude* to the *subjectivity* of the uncertainty?

- Don't care: Expected Utility
- Do care: Ambiguity Aversion
 - ① Capacities - abandon probability distributions
 - ② Maximin expected utility - set of probability distributions, pick worst (Gilboa & Schmeidler, 1989)
 - Robust Control (Hansen and Sargent, 2001)
 - Used by most of previous literature on climate ambiguity
 - ③ Smooth Ambiguity Aversion - subjective second order distribution governed by more aversion(KMM 2005)
 - [Recursive smooth ambiguity aversion](#) (KMM 2009) permits anticipated Bayesian learning and time-consistent dynamics
- Should we care?
 - Tomorrow 16:00 room N29 session "Decision Theory": von Neumann-Morgenstern-based 'normative' axiomatization

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
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Contribution


- ① Social cost of carbon under ambiguity aversion
 - Formula: General climate-economy model
 - Quantitative premium: DICE-based IAM

- ② Framework
 - Recursive dynamic programming model
 - Social planner framework with
 - rational foresight and
 - *anticipated* learning
 ↪ Decision maker updates subjective climate sensitivity prior based on temperature observations (Kelly & Kolstad 1999)
 - Klibanoff et al. (2009)'s recursive smooth ambiguity aversion to distinguishes
 - subjective climate sensitivity prior from
 - (objective) temperature stochasticity

Climate-Economy model



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
Temperature dynamics:

$$\tilde{T}_{t+1} = \chi_t(M_{t+1})\tilde{s} + \xi_t(T_t) + \tilde{\epsilon}_t$$

\tilde{s} : subjectively uncertain climate sensitivity (epistemological)

$\tilde{\epsilon}$: objective temperature shocks (stochastic)

Climate-Economy model - Numerics



Bayesian learning dynamics:

$$\tilde{s}_t \sim N(\mu_{s,t}, \sigma_{s,t}) \quad \& \quad \hat{T}_t \Rightarrow \tilde{s}_{t+1} \sim N(\mu_{s,t+1}, \sigma_{s,t+1})$$

- Conjugate normal prior
- Update to $\mu_{s,t+1}, \sigma_{s,t+1}$ after observing stochastic temperature realization

Preferences

KMM's (2009) smooth ambiguity aversion

- Risk averse to temperature stochasticity,
- Ambiguity averse to climate sensitivity uncertainty,
- Ambiguity and ambiguity aversion disentangled,
- Ambiguity aversion is ‘moderate’:
 - Limit of infinite ambiguity aversion returns
 - maximin expected utility (Gilboa & Schmeidler 1989),
 - and, “thus”, robust control (Hansen & Sargent 2001)
- Time consistent
- Decision maker learns (and anticipates to do so!)
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KMM's smooth ambiguity aversion

Bellman equation

with stochasticity, uncertainty, and smooth ambiguity aversion:

$$V_t = \max_{c_t, \mu_t} L_t u(c_t) + \beta \times \left\{ f^{-1} \left\{ \int_S f \left(\mathbf{E}_{\epsilon_t} [V_{t+1}] \right) d\Pi(s, t) \right\} \right\}$$

value fct today = current utility + disc future value fct

f : concave function characterizing additional aversion

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Results: Theory

How is the SCC affected by climate sensitivity ambiguity?

Without ambiguity aversion:

$$SCC_0 = -\frac{1}{u'(c_0)} \mathbf{E}_0^s \mathbf{E}_0^T \left[\sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \sum_{\tau=1}^t \prod_{j=1}^t \mathcal{R}_j \mathbf{E}_j^s \mathcal{P}_j \mathbf{E}_j^T u'_t(c_t) \frac{\partial F_t}{\partial T_t} \frac{\partial T_t}{\partial CO_{2,\tau}} \frac{\partial CO_{2,\tau}}{\partial E_0} \right]$$

Ambiguity aversion introduces 2 weights:

- Pessimism and
- Prudence

Results: Theory

How is the SCC affected by climate sensitivity ambiguity?

With ambiguity aversion:

$$SCC_0 = - \frac{1}{u'(c_0)} \mathbf{E}_0^s \mathbf{E}_0^T \left[\sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \sum_{\tau=1}^t \prod_{j=1}^t \mathcal{R}_j \mathbf{E}_j^s \mathcal{P}_j \mathbf{E}_j^T u'_t(c_t) \frac{\partial F_t}{\partial T_t} \frac{\partial T_t}{\partial CO_{2,\tau}} \frac{\partial CO_{2,\tau}}{\partial E_0} \right]$$

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Results: Theory

How is the SCC affected by climate sensitivity ambiguity?

Pessimism bias:

$$\mathcal{P}_t = \frac{f'(\cdot)}{\mathbf{E}_t^s(f'(\cdot))}$$

- More weight on bad outcomes.
- All else equal, pessimism increases SCC.

$$f'(\cdot) = f'(\mathbf{E}^s[V_{t+1}(\cdot)])$$

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How is the SCC affected by climate sensitivity ambiguity?

Ambiguity prudence:


$$\mathcal{R}_t = \frac{\mathbf{E}_t^s (f'(\cdot))}{f'(f^{-1}(\cdot))}$$

- Prudence = ambiguity aversion decreases in *welfare*.
- Mean-zero shocks to welfare: ambiguity prudence increases SCC.
- But: climate sensitivity uncertainty impact on welfare (highly) non-linear.

Results: Quantitative

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
- *Optimal* emission trajectory
- Expected-draws ($\epsilon_t = 0 \forall t$)
- Stochastic temperature,
+ Uncertain CS,
+ Ambiguity aversion
- Ambiguity aversion:
RAA=10



Results: Quantitative

How is the SCC affected by climate sensitivity ambiguity?

- *Optimal* emission trajectory
- Expected-draws ($\epsilon_t = 0 \forall t$)
- Stochastic temperature,
+ Uncertain CS,
+ Ambiguity aversion
- Extreme ambiguity aversion:
RAA=100




Results: Quantitative

How is the SCC affected by climate sensitivity ambiguity?

Impact *off* optimal trajectory:

- % difference:
RAA=10 – No AA
- Year 2040
- Subsection of state-space
- Largest effect: high CO₂ & CS prior variance




Note: We show optimal policy after wandering off.

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Related literature

- Lange and Treich (2008)
- Berger et al. (2016), Berger and Marinacci (2020)
- Millner et al. (2013)
- Lemoine and Traeger (2016)
- Xepapadeas & Yannacopoulos (2018), Brock & Xepapadeas (2021)
- Rudik (2020)
- Barnett et al. (2020)

Summing up:

Evaluate climate sensitivity ambiguity in setting that is

- time consistent (possibly rationally/normatively attractive)
- permits moderate ambiguity aversion
- includes anticipated Bayesian learning

Theory:

- introduces two weighting terms into SCC:
pessimism weighting & *prudence*

Empirics:

- implies only a small positive policy premium of ambiguity

Conclusion for practitioner:


- Error small simply using
 - regular Bayesian expected utility model
 - using best guess prior and neglecting ambiguity

Appendix 1: Epstein-Zin comparison

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
Comparison to [Epstein-Zin](#) preferences & according risk aversion:

- *Optimal* emission trajectory
- Moderate ambiguity aversion: **RAA=10**
- Epstein-Zin: **RRA=10**



Appendix 2: Ambiguity premium over Ambiguity Aversion

How is the SCC affected by climate sensitivity ambiguity?



- (Very) moderate effect in optimum $\approx < 1 - 8\%$
- At least initially almost linear increase

Appendix: IPCC Assessment of Climate Sensitivity

IPCC (AR6): Uncertainty in warming projections *dominated* by climate's sensitivity to additional emissions

Dots show central estimates (when available). Bars show likely (66% chance) range. Whiskers show very likely (5% to 90%) range.

