# Shopping Frictions and Household Heterogeneity 7 

Theory and Empirics

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## Disclaimer 60

The researcher's own analyses calculated (or derived) based in part on data from Nielsen
Consumer LLC and marketing databases provided through the NielsenIQ Datasets at the Kilts Center for Marketing Data Center at The University of Chicago Booth School of Business.

The conclusions drawn from the NielsenIQ data are those of the researcher and do not reflect the views of NielsenIQ. NielsenIQ is not responsible for, had no role in, and was not involved in analyzing and preparing the results reported herein.

## Research Question (?)

How do households make consumption decisions in the presence of price dispersion?

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In particular, I am interested in:
(i) how do paid prices for the same goods differ across the income distribution?
(ii) what theoretical frameworks are consistent with the observed differences?
(iii) what are macroeconomic implications of the new theories in comparison to the standard consumption models?

## Preview of the results

ㅋ (Some of) the main empirical findings

1. Employees with earnings above the median level pay from $1.5 \%$ to $7.1 \%$ higher prices than employees with below-median earnings.
2. The causal link between the income level and paid prices is established by exploiting a quasi-experimental setup of the Economic Stimulus Act of 2008.
3. The price channel accounts for between 8 and $22 \%$ of overall responses in consumption expenditures to transitory shocks.
if Theory:
4. A standard incomplete-market model where households endogenously choose paid prices through consumer search.
5. The calibrated model confirms that substantial impact of the price channel on adjustments of consumption expenditures in other dimensions.

## Empirical Patterns 쿷

## Data \& Methodology

## Kilts-Nielsen Consumer Panel

, 40,000-60,000 American households from 2004 through 2014.
$\checkmark$ Each panelist uses in-home scanners or mobile apps to provide information to Nielsen about their grocery purchases from any outlet in all US markets.
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## Household price indices

$\checkmark$ The consumption baskets differ across households.
$\checkmark$ To explore heterogeneity in prices, for each household using methodology proposed by Aguiar-Hurst (AER, 2007), I compute individual price indices for each household.

## High Earners Pay Higher Prices

Aguiar-Hurst price index of household $j$ in month $m$ :

$$
\bar{P}_{j, m}=\frac{\sum_{i \in I, t \in m} p_{i, t}^{j} q_{i, t}^{j}}{\sum_{i \in I, t \in m} \bar{p}_{i, t}^{r(j)} q_{i, t}^{j}}
$$

where $\bar{p}_{i, m}^{r(j)}$ is the average price of good $i$ in region $r(j)$ in month $m$.

|  | $\ln \bar{P}_{j, m}$ |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| HH Earnings > median(HH Earnings) | $0.020^{* * *}$ | $0.015^{* * *}$ | $0.071^{* * *}$ | $0.052^{* * *}$ |
|  | (0.002) | (0.002) | (0.002) | (0.002) |
| Non-employed in working age (Male) | $-0.007^{* * *}$ | $-0.006^{* * *}$ | $-0.014^{* * *}$ | $-0.010^{* * *}$ |
|  | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.002) | (0.002) |
| Non-employed in working age (Female) | $-0.007^{* * *}$ | $-0.004^{* * *}$ | $-0.010^{* * *}$ | $-0.006^{* * *}$ |
|  | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.002) | (0.001) |
| Retired (Male) | -0.002 | 0.0001 | -0.00002 | -0.001 |
|  | (0.002) | (0.002) | (0.004) | (0.003) |
| Retired (Female) | 0.002 | 0.001 | 0.002 | 0.001 |
|  | (0.002) | (0.002) | (0.004) | (0.003) |
| HH composition dummies | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Age dummies (both heads) | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Month dummies | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year dummies | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Scantrack market dummies | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Product aggregation | Bar code | Bar code | Features | Features |
| Area aggregation | Nationwide | Scantrack | Nationwide | Scantrack |
| Number of observations | 5,084,254 | 5,084,254 | 5,084,254 | 5,084,254 |
| Number of panelists | 150,153 | 150,153 | 150,153 | 150,153 |

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where $\bar{p}_{i, m}^{r(j)}$ is the average price of good $i$ in region $r(j)$ in month $m$.

## Remarks

1. High earners pay higher prices than low earners.
2. Low earners pay similar prices to non-employed and retirees.

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$\checkmark$ I exploit a quasi-experimental setup of the Economic Stimulus Act of 2008, a program consisting in sending tax rebates to about 130 million eligible taxpayers. Eligible households received their payments as tax rebates. Due to the scale of the program, randomization in the timing of disbursement had to be introduced.
$\checkmark$ For single individuals ESPs were between $\$ 300$ and $\$ 600$, while for married couples filing jointly, between $\$ 600$ and $\$ 1,200$.

The tax rebates survey conducted by Nielsen on behalf of Broda and Parker (JME, 2014) contains information on the week of receiving the ESP. This is merged with data from the KNCP.

## Prices are causally related to income (cont'd)

Response to the ESP

$$
\ln \bar{P}_{j, m}
$$

|  | $(1)$ | $(2)$ | $(3)$ | $(4)$ |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Quarter before, $\beta_{-1}$ | 0.002 | 0.001 | 0.002 | 0.003 |
|  | $(0.001)$ | $(0.001)$ | $(0.002)$ | $(0.002)$ |
| Quarter of receipt, $\beta_{0}$ | $0.006^{* * *}$ | $0.004^{*}$ | $0.009^{* *}$ | $0.008^{* * *}$ |
|  | $(0.002)$ | $(0.002)$ | $(0.003)$ | $(0.003)$ |
| One quarter after, $\beta_{1}$ | $0.008^{* * *}$ | $0.005^{* *}$ | $0.009^{* *}$ | $0.011^{* * *}$ |
|  | $(0.003)$ | $(0.002)$ | $(0.005)$ | $(0.004)$ |
| Two quarters after, $\beta_{2}$ | $0.008^{* *}$ | $0.006^{* *}$ | $0.011^{* *}$ | $0.013^{* * *}$ |
|  | $(0.003)$ | $(0.003)$ | $(0.006)$ | $(0.005)$ |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Month dummies | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Product aggregation | Bar code | Bar code | Features | Features |
| Area aggregation | Nationwide | Scantrack | Nationwide | Scantrack |
| Number of observations | 345,768 | 345,768 | 345,768 | 345,768 |
| Number of panelists | 29,289 | 29,289 | 29,289 | 29,289 |

## Decomposition of the expenditure responses to the ESP

$$
\begin{equation*}
\underbrace{\mathbb{E} \ln \left(\frac{\bar{P}_{j, \tau+s} Q_{j, \tau+s}}{\bar{P}_{j, \tau-1} Q_{j, \tau-1}}\right)}_{\text {Overall response to ESP }}=\underbrace{\mathbb{E}\left(\ln \bar{P}_{j, \tau+s}-\ln \bar{P}_{j, \tau-1}\right)}_{\text {Price channel }}+\underbrace{\mathbb{E}\left(\ln Q_{j, \tau+s}-\ln Q_{j, \tau-1}\right)}_{\text {Consumption channel }}, \tag{1}
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\end{equation*}
$$

| Product aggregation | Area aggregation | Price channel:$\frac{\mathbb{E}\left(\ln \bar{P}_{j, \tau+s}-\ln \bar{P}_{j, \tau-1}\right)}{\mathbb{E} \ln \left(\frac{\bar{P}_{j, \tau+\xi} Q_{j, \tau+s}}{\bar{P}_{j, \tau-1} Q_{j, \tau-1}}\right)}$ |  |  | Consumption channel:$\frac{\mathbb{E}\left(\ln Q_{j, \tau+s}-\ln Q_{j, \tau-1}\right)}{\mathbb{E} \ln \left(\frac{P_{j, \tau+\tau} Q_{j, \tau+s}}{P_{j, \tau-1} Q_{j, \tau-1}}\right)}$ |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | $Q T R_{0}$ | QTR ${ }_{1}$ | QTR 2 | $Q T R_{0}$ | QTR ${ }_{1}$ | QTR ${ }_{2}$ |
| Bar code | Nationwide | 12.5\% | 11.6\% | 12.0\% | 87.5\% | 88.4\% | 88.0\% |
| Bar code | Scantrack | 8.1\% | 8.5\% | 10.0\% | 91.9\% | 91.5\% | 90.0\% |
| Features | Nationwide | 22.2\% | 15.3\% | 18.1\% | 77.8\% | 84.7\% | 81.9\% |
| Features | Scantrack | 16.8\% | 16.3\% | 19.0\% | 83.2\% | 83.7\% | 81.0\% |

Theoretical Frameworki@

## Building Blocks of the Economy

1. Standard incomplete-markets economy with life cycle.
(Huggett, JME 1996; Ríos-Rull, REStud 1996; Imrohoroglu et al., ET 1995)
2. Two classes of agents:

- fixed measure of households,
- continuum of retailers.

3. Households:

- face idiosyncratic productivity shocks;
- make shopping decisions:
$\checkmark$ search for bargain prices,
$\checkmark$ number of purchases;
- make consumption-savings decisions using risk free bond.


## Consumption Basket and Its Cost

1. Consumption:

$$
c=m \cdot \kappa
$$

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$$
c=m \cdot \kappa
$$

2. The cost of consumption bundle:

$$
p \cdot c=\int_{0}^{m \kappa} p(i) d i
$$

where $p(i) \sim_{i i d} F(p ; s)$.

## Price Search Intensity

Let $G(p)$ be the cdf of prices quoted by retailers.

$$
F(p ; s)=(1-s) \underbrace{G(p)}_{\begin{array}{c}
\text { Captive } \\
\text { purchase }
\end{array}}+s \underbrace{\left(1-[1-G(p)]^{2}\right)}_{\begin{array}{c}
\text { Non-captive } \\
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$$

Using the weak law of large numbers proposed by Uhlig (ET, 1996):

$$
\int_{0}^{m \kappa} p(i) d i \xrightarrow{\text { a.s. }} \underbrace{m \kappa}_{c} \mathbb{E}(p \mid s) .
$$

## Price Search Intensity (cont'd)

## Proposition

The effective price is linear in the search intensity, $s$ :

$$
\mathbb{E}\left(p \mid s_{t}\right)=p^{0}-s_{t} M P B,
$$

where:
i. $p^{0}:=\int_{p}^{\zeta} x d G(x)$ is the price for the fully captive consumer;
ii. $M P B:=\mathbb{E} \max \left\{p^{\prime}, p^{\prime \prime}\right\}-p^{0}$ is the marginal (price) benefit of increasing the search intensity $s_{t}$.

## Household's Problem

$$
\mathcal{V}_{t}(a, \varepsilon, \eta)=\max _{c, m, s, p, a^{\prime}} u(c)-v(s, m)+\beta \mathbb{E}_{\eta^{\prime} \mid \eta} \mathcal{V}_{t+1}\left(a^{\prime}, \varepsilon^{\prime}, \eta^{\prime}\right)
$$

s.t.

$$
\begin{aligned}
& p c+a^{\prime} \leq(1+r) a+w y, \\
& c=m \kappa, \\
& p=p^{0}-s M P B, \\
& a^{\prime} \geq \underline{B}, \\
& s \in[0,1], \\
& \log y=\left\{\begin{array}{l}
\kappa_{t}+\eta+\varepsilon, \quad \text { for } t \leq T_{\text {work }}, \\
\log (r e p l) \cdot\left\{\kappa T_{\text {work }}+\eta_{T_{\text {work }}}+\varepsilon_{T_{\text {work }}}\right\}, \quad \text { for } t>T_{\text {work }}, \\
\eta^{\prime}
\end{array}\right. \\
&=\eta+\nu^{\prime} .
\end{aligned}
$$

## Model fitness ©ౌ

## 5 parameters targeted with 5 moments

| Moment | Data | Model |  |
| :--- | :--- | ---: | ---: |
| Transaction prices: | top v. bottom decile | 1.7 | 1.7 |
|  | rich work. v. poor work. | 1.045 | 1.05 |
| HH price index: | poor HtM v. poor work. | .99 | .99 |
|  | retirees v. poor work. | 1 | 1.01 |
| Saving-income ratio | 2.5 | 2.5 |  |

## Price channel and other states

| Channel | $\frac{\mathbb{E}\left(\ln P_{j, \tau}-\ln P_{j, \tau-1}\right)}{\mathbb{E} \ln \left(\frac{\bar{p}_{j, \tau} Q_{j, \tau}}{P_{j, \tau-1} Q_{j, \tau-1}}\right)}$ |
| :--- | :--- |
| Assets | $8.17 \%$ |
| Persistent income shocks | $8.13 \%$ |
| Transitory income shocks | $7.78 \%$ |

## Conclusions

$\checkmark$ Household prices differ across the income distribution. The effect more pronounced that previously documented for other dimensions.
$\checkmark$ Using the 2008 ESP, the causal link between paid prices and income of the households is established. The price channel accounts for between 8 and $22 \%$ of overall responses in consumption expenditures.
$\checkmark$ All findings can be rationalized by a new incomplete-market model augmented with a price search protocol.
$\checkmark$ Findings cast a new light on how household consumption responses in fiscal stimuli should be understood.

Thank you for your attention!

