

Of Shrimps and Men: Innovation, Competition and Product Diversity

Amanda De Pirro¹ Renaud Foucart¹

¹Lancaster University, United Kingdom

EEA-ESEM, 24th August 2022

A classic view of innovation

- ▶ Innovation gives a **temporary advantage** to the innovator, until laggards eventually **catch up** (Aghion et al., 2005)
- ▶ Intuition: innovation is a way to temporarily **escape competition**
- ▶ Led to a large literature on Innovation Vs Competition (see recent review by Griffith and Van Reenen, 2021)

This paper

What if the “catch up” phase is more competitive than before the innovation?

- ▶ First paper to show that innovation can be detrimental to the innovator's profit due to the choice of product variety
- ▶ We illustrate the theory by using the US shrimp industry case

How Innovation Killed the American Shrimp: before innovation

Large-scale shrimp aquaculture began developing in 1970 based on local species: L. Vannamei (US) Vs P. Monodon (Asia)



Figure 1: United States




Figure 2: Asia

The US innovation

- ▶ Different varieties, same problem: mass mortality due to periodical outbreaks
- ▶ High volatility in production
- ▶ **INNOVATION:** in 1998, the US developed a technology able to protect Vannamei shrimps against the major diseases (TVR)


The gains from innovation

Figure 3: US Shrimps production (source: Wyban, 2009)




The innovation catch-up


- ▶ Increasing availability of TVR broodstocks of *L. Vannamei*: Asian countries switch their production to the US variety




(a) Thailand



(b) Vietnam



(c) China



(d) India

How Innovation Killed the American Shrimp: after innovation



Figure 4: United States




Figure 5: Asia

....but cheaper

What about the US profits?

Figure 6: Aggregate US industry profit (1991-2019)



Goal of the theory

1. Show that in a market in which producers compete in quantity (Cournot) and can choose a variety...
2. an innovation (cost reduction) can lead to lower product diversity ...
3. ... and lower profit in the catch up phase

Some related results

- ▶ Innovator is in a “pesky little brother” relationship with laggard (Besen and Farrell, 1994)
- ▶ Vives (2008): more substitutability leads to more efforts to innovate
- ▶ Cournot Paradox (Seade, 1985; Amir et al., 2017)
- ▶ Braess Paradox (Braess, 1968; Braess et al., 2005)

Setup

- ▶ Two representative firms, Home (h) and Foreign (f), produce shrimps
- ▶ Two kind of shrimps available, the white legs shrimps “Vannamei” (v) and the tiger shrimps “Monodon” (m)
- ▶ Each of the firms can produce only one variety, and chooses a quantity
- ▶ If h and f produce the same variety: Cournot competition
- ▶ If they choose different varieties: differentiated Cournot competition (Singh, 1984)

Setup

Inverse demand for firm $i \in \{h, f\}$ is given by

$$p_i^k = A - q_i^k - g(k, l)q_j^l, \quad (1)$$

- ▶ with $k, l \in \{v, m\}$ the chosen variety of each firm
- ▶ For $k \neq l$, $g = \gamma \in (0, 1)$ characterizes the level of substitution between both types of shrimps à la Singh (1984)
- ▶ For $k = l$, $g = 1$ (standard Cournot)

The three phases of innovation

1. **Pre-innovation:** both firms produce at constant marginal cost $c_i^k = c > 0$ for all $k \in \{v, m\}$
2. **Innovation:** innovator h can produce variety v at marginal cost $c_h^v = 0$ (other costs remain c)
3. **Catch up:** both firms can produce variety v at marginal cost $c_i^v = 0$ for all $i \in \{h, f\}$ (cost for the other variety m remains c)

Interpretation: c is a measure of how important the innovation is

Pre-innovation phase profit

Lemma

The Pre-innovation phase has two Nash equilibria in pure strategy, in which both firms choose different varieties.

		Foreign	
		v	m
Home	v	$\frac{(A-c)^2}{9}, \frac{(A-c)^2}{9}$	$\frac{(A-c)^2}{(2+\gamma)^2}, \frac{(A-c)^2}{(2+\gamma)^2}$
	m	$\frac{(A-c)^2}{(2+\gamma)^2}, \frac{(A-c)^2}{(2+\gamma)^2}$	$\frac{(A-c)^2}{9}, \frac{(A-c)^2}{9}$

Innovation phase profit

Lemma

The innovation phase has either one or two Nash equilibria in pure strategy. For $c \leq \frac{A(1-\gamma)}{\gamma+5} = \tilde{c}$, the two equilibria are similar to the pre-innovation phase, both firms choose different varieties. For $c > \tilde{c}$, in the unique equilibrium the innovator h produces the variety v in which it has a cost advantage, the other firm f produces the other variety m .

		Foreign	
		v	m
Home	v	$\frac{(A+c)^2}{9}, \frac{(A-2c)^2}{9}$	$\frac{(A(2-\gamma)+\gamma c)^2}{(4-\gamma^2)^2}, \frac{(A(2-\gamma)-2c)^2}{(4-\gamma^2)^2}$
	m	$\frac{(A-c)^2}{(2+\gamma)^2}, \frac{(A-c)^2}{(2+\gamma)^2}$	$\frac{(A-c)^2}{9}, \frac{(A-c)^2}{9}$

Catch-up phase profit

Lemma

The catch up phase has either one or two Nash equilibria in pure strategy. For $c \leq \frac{1}{6}A(2 - \gamma)(1 - \gamma) = \bar{c}$, the two equilibria are similar to the pre-innovation phase, both firms choose different varieties. For $c > \bar{c}$, in the unique equilibrium both firms produce variety v .

		Foreign	
		v	m
Home	v	$\frac{A^2}{9}, \frac{A^2}{9}$	$\frac{(A(2-\gamma)+\gamma c)^2}{(4-\gamma^2)^2}, \frac{(A(2-\gamma)-2c)^2}{(4-\gamma^2)^2}$
	m	$\frac{(A(2-\gamma)-2c)^2}{(4-\gamma^2)^2}, \frac{(A(2-\gamma)+\gamma c)^2}{(4-\gamma^2)^2}$	$\frac{(A-c)^2}{9}, \frac{(A-c)^2}{9}$

Proposition: The innovation curse

1. For $c > \bar{c}$, both firms produce variety v in the catch-up phase, while both produce different varieties in the pre-innovation phase
2. For $c < \frac{1}{3}A(1 - \gamma) = c^*$, the catch-up phase profit when both firms produce variety v is strictly lower than the pre-innovation profit when both produce different varieties, for both firms
3. As $\tilde{c} < \bar{c} < c^*$ there always exists a $c \in (\bar{c}, c^*)$ such that innovation leads to lower profit in the catch up phase than pre-innovation




Figure 7: Critical values of c , for $A = 3$.

Main message

- ▶ A cautionary tale for innovation as a means of escaping competition
- ▶ Related issues:
 - ▶ External validity
 - ▶ Political equilibrium