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Globalization and Populism:
The Last Sixty Years

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EEA-ESEM Annual Meeting
Bocconi University

August 23, 2022

Introduction

Populism has been on the rise in recent decades (Guriev and Papaioannou, 2021; Guiso et al., 2017; Rodrik, 2021; Funke et al., 2020)

Among the several **determinants**, the literature in Economics highlights the role of **globalization** in its two dimensions:

- Imports – Becker et al. (2017); Colantone and Stanig (2018); Autor et al. (2020); Colantone et al. (2021); Aksoy et al. (2022); etc.
- Immigration – Barone et al. (2016); Guiso et al. (2017); Halla et al. (2017); Mayda et al. (2022); Moriconi et al. (2022); etc.

Introduction

Existing studies: How is <u>populism</u> usually defined?

- Narrow ideology splitting society between pure people and corrupted elite (Mudde, 2004) + Commitment to protect (Guiso et al., 2017; Rodrik, 2018; Morelli et al., 2021) + Other dimensions
- Measured with volume of populism = vote share of populist parties (dichotomous classifications based on expert views)

Existing studies: How is <u>globalization</u> analyzed?

- Imports and immigration usually studied *separately*: many studies!
- With some exceptions (Autor et al. (2020); Aksoy et al. (2022) for imports, Edo et al. (2019); Moriconi et al. (2019, 2022) for immig), lack of *skill-specific* dimension
- More generally, lack of *cultural* (or diversity) dimension

Contributions

RQ: what are the long-term trends in populism? How populism is linked to skill-specific dimension of globalization?

Two main objectives:

① Describe long-term evolution of populism

- Large sample: 55 countries, 628 elections, 1206 parties, 60-y span
- Richer and comparable measures of populism along different margins (volume vs. mean + left-right dimension)

② Unified analysis of populism response to globalization:

- Skill structure of both trade & migration shocks
- Gravity-based IV using origin-year sources of variation
- Interaction with potential amplifiers: recessions, social media, diversity/cultural distance

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Contributions

Preview of the results:

- Trends: fluctuations since 1960s, surge since 2007-08 (RW/EU)

- Closely linked to skill structure of imports and immigration

- Imports of LS labor intensive goods

    - Increase total/RW populism along mean & volume margins
    - Effect increases with de-industrialization and internet coverage
    - Effect is smaller if origin mix of goods is more diverse
    - No effect on LW populism (exc. severe crisis, EU, prop. repr.)

- Immigration of LS workers

    - Substitution of LW for RW populism along volume margin
    - No effect on volume of total populism and mean margin
    - No amplifying effect of cultural distance (or diversity)

Populism score

<u>Data</u> – Manifesto Project Database (MPD)

- Content analysis of parties' manifesto (salience, position)
- Coverage: 55 countries, 628 national election campaigns, 1,206 parties (at least one seat), 3,860 party-election pairs (1960-2018)
- Unbalanced sample of countries: breaks in 1973 and 1990   ▸ Sample

<u>Populism Score</u> (party-level + mean margin) – Unsupervised and theory-based approach (PCA) + Cluster analysis with k-means

- Anti-establishment stance (**AES**) as in Mudde (2004)
- Commitment to protect (**CTP**) as in Morelli et al. (2021), etc.

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Populism score - Definition

Populism Score – MPD variables

- Anti-establishment stance (**AES**)
  - AES1 (+): Corruption (need to eliminate corruption & clientelism)
  - AES2 (+): Anti-pluralism view (lack of competence of others)

- Commitment to protect (**CTP**)
  - CTP1 (+): Protection of internal market
  - CTP2 (-): Favorable mentions of internationalism
  - CTP3 (-): Favorable mentions of EU
  - CTP4 (+): Government ownership of industries

- Two-step PCA based on correlation matrix
  $\Rightarrow S_{i,e,t}^p$ Parties' populism score

▸ Populism Score

Populism score - Properties

Parties' Populism Score $(S^p_{i,e,t})$

- Average of AES and CTP (standardized)
- Mean $= 0$; SD $= 0.81$
- Distinctive features
    1. Self-determined by parties' manifesto
    2. Continuous (extent) and time-varying
    3. Well correlated with existing data   ▸ Correlations
        i. Van Kessel (2015) - Dummy, time-invariant, 2000-2013
        ii. Swank (2018) - RW Dummy, time-invariant, 1960-2015
        iii. PopuList (Rooduijn et al., 2019) - Dummy, time-invariant, 1989-2018
        iv. Gpop 1 (Grzymala-Busse and McFaul, 2020) - Dummy, time-invariant, 1960-2018
        v. Gpop 2 (Hawkins et al., 2019) - Continuous, based on electoral speeches
        vi. Chapell Hill Expert Survey (Bakker et al., 2015) - Continuous, 2018

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Populism score - Properties

- **Populist party** ($\mathbf{1}^p_{i,e,t} = 1$ if $S^p_{i,e,t} \geq \eta \times SD$) ▸ Thresholds
  - $\eta = 1$ "maximizes" partial correlation with alternative definitions
  - $\eta = 1$ "maximizes" RAF with most alternative definitions

- Can be combined w. **Left-Right** index (Budge and Laver, 2016)
  - (LW, Centrist, RW) = (1st, 2nd, 3rd) terciles of left-right distr.

- **Discussion**:
  - Adding more MPD components reduces partial correlations with existing measures
  - $S^p_{i,e,t}$ is highly correlated with attitudes towards immig., cultural conservatism, multiculturalism (post-2006) in centrist/RW parties
  - The 1-SD threshold justified by unsupervised clustering ▸ K-means

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Margins of populism

Volume Margin – Votes gained by all populist parties

$$\Pi_{e,t}^{V} = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{I} \sum_{i=1}^{P} \mathbf{1}_{i,e,t}^{p} \pi_{i,e,t}^{p}}{\sum_{i=1}^{I} \sum_{i=1}^{P} \pi_{i,e,t}^{p}}, \tag{1}$$

Mean Margin – Vote-weighted mean score of all parties

$$\Pi_{e,t}^{M} = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{I} \sum_{i=1}^{P} S_{i,e,t}^{p} \pi_{i,e,t}^{p}}{\sum_{i=1}^{I} \sum_{i=1}^{P} \pi_{i,e,t}^{p}}, \tag{2}$$

These variables are also computed at the country level (dependent)

Populism's trends - Mean and Volume Margins

(a) Mean Margin

(b) Volume Margin

▸ Balanced sample Mean   ▸ Nb pop. parties   ▸ Balanced sample Volume   ▸ Rodrik (2020)

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Dichotomous class. – Elections with populists

(a) LW Populist

(b) RW Populist

▸ Mean score LW/RW

Empirical specification - Baseline Model

$$
\begin{cases}
\Pi_{i,e,t}^M = \alpha^M + \beta^M \mathbf{X}_{i,e,t} + \sum_S \gamma_S^M \mathbf{Mig}_{i,e,t}^S \\
+ \sum_S \zeta_S^M \mathbf{Imp}_{i,e,t}^S + \theta_i^M + \theta_t^M + \epsilon_{i,e,t}^M, \\
\\
\Pi_{i,e,t}^V = \exp\left[\alpha^V + \beta_S^V \mathbf{X}_{i,e,t} + \sum_S \gamma_S^V \log(\mathbf{Mig}_{i,e,t}^S)\right. \\
\left. + \sum_S \zeta_S^V \log(\mathbf{Imp}_{i,e,t}^S) + \theta_i^V + \theta_t^V + \epsilon_{i,e,t}^V\right]
\end{cases}
\tag{3}
$$

- OLS for $\Pi_{i,e,t}^M$, and PPML $\Pi_{i,e,t}^V$ (non-negative variable, 60% of zeroes)
- Full set of country and year FEs
- $\mathbf{Mig}_{i,e,t}^S$: LS and HS immigration flows
- $\mathbf{Imp}_{i,e,t}^S$: LS and HS imports of manuf. goods
- $\mathbf{X}_{i,e,t}$ includes GDPpc + Hum Cap + Empl. rate + Nb. parties
- All variables = Averages of t and $t-1$

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Empirical specification - IV strategy

IV Approach - **Gravity-model** in "stage-zero"   ▸ Gravity Model

- Strategy in line with China shock (Autor et al., 2020), weather shocks at origin (Munshi, 2003), or other shocks (Boustan, 2010; Monras, 2020; Klemans and Magruder, 2018)

- Predict skill-specific flows w. origin-time and dyadic FEs

$$Y_{ij,t} = \exp\left[\alpha + \theta'_{ij} + \theta_{ij} * Post_{1990} + \theta_{j,t} + \epsilon_{ij,t}\right]$$

Implementation

- IV/2SLS for $\Pi^M_{i,e,t}$
- Reduced-form IV for $\Pi^V_{i,e,t}$

Baseline results

	Volume ($\Pi_{i,e,t}^{V}$)			Mean ($\Pi_{i,e,t}^{M}$)		
	All	RW	LW	All	RW	LW
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
(log) $\text{Imp}_{i,t-1 \to t}$ (LS)	0.83***	1.33**	1.49*	3.78**	4.28***	-0.11
	(0.30)	(0.56)	(0.62)	(1.65)	(1.47)	(0.70)
(log) $\text{Imp}_{i,t-1 \to t}$ (HS)	-0.71	-1.30***	-1.25	-0.21	-0.50*	0.36
	(0.44)	(0.49)	(0.86)	(0.43)	(0.28)	(0.23)
(log) $\text{Mig}_{i,t-1 \to t}$ (LS)	0.14	1.52***	-1.78***	-0.17	1.73	-1.28
	(0.34)	(0.55)	(0.59)	(1.93)	(2.45)	(1.28)
(log) $\text{Mig}_{i,t-1 \to t}$ (HS)	-0.28	-1.32***	1.17*	1.86	-2.63	3.65
	(0.29)	(0.48)	(0.64)	(4.99)	(4.74)	(3.49)
Observations	575	575	575	578	461	470
(Pseudo-)R^2	0.40	0.37	0.51	0.50	0.41	0.48
Year & Country FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

IV results

	Volume ($\Pi_{i,e,t}^V$)			Mean ($\Pi_{i,e,t}^M$)		
	All	RW	LW	All	RW	LW
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
(log) Imp$_{i,t-1\to t}$ (LS)	0.91*	1.82**	0.97	4.99**	4.06**	1.29
	(0.50)	(0.84)	(0.84)	(2.33)	(1.77)	(1.42)
(log) Imp$_{i,t-1\to t}$ (HS)	-1.22*	-2.14**	-0.72	-0.22	-0.59	0.45
	(0.66)	(0.87)	(0.83)	(0.54)	(0.38)	(0.37)
(log) Mig$_{i,t-1\to t}$ (LS)	0.53	1.97***	-1.70*	0.52	0.74	-0.75
	(0.43)	(0.58)	(0.92)	(3.13)	(3.01)	(1.53)
(log) Mig$_{i,t-1\to t}$ (HS)	-1.04*	-2.02**	0.60	0.99	3.15	3.34
	(0.56)	(0.89)	(1.23)	(10.12)	(7.90)	(4.75)
Observations	575	575	575	578	461	470
(Pseudo)-R^2	0.40	0.36	0.50	0.06	0.09	0.01
K-Paap F-stat				12.05	11.36	9.45
Year & Country FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Summary of the results (in normal times)

- Skill dimension is instrumental!
- Imports in LS intensive goods
  - Increase volume & mean margins of total and RW populism
  - Supp (vol): increasing share of votes for populists (intensive)
  - Supp (mean): incr. score of moderately populist parties only
- Immigration of LS workers
  - Substitution of LW by RW populism
  - Supp (vol): along the extensive margin (nb. of parties > one seat)
  - Supp (mean): No impact on the mean margin
- If anything, HS intensive shocks reduce volume of RW populism

- Robust effects to export, emigration, turnout, political system, etc. ▶ Robustness

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Are these effect amplified by other events?

Interactions with potential amplifiers of <u>LS shocks</u> (dummies)

- Economic crisis (negative growth spells)
- De-industrialization (ΔManuf in bottom decile)
- Spread of social media (internet coverage in top decile)
- Diversity of goods vs. cultural distance (in top decile)

<u>Results</u>

▸ Amplifiers Results

❶ LS import effect Volume Margin
- ↑ De-industrialization and internet coverage
- ↓ Diversity import basket

❷ LS import effect Mean Margin
- ↑ Economic Crisis and internet coverage
- ↓ Diversity import basket

❸ LS migration effect Volume Margin
- ↑ Economic Crisis on LW
- ∅ Cultural distance

Concluding remarks

1. New continuous measures of populism (vol. and mean margins)
2. Populist parties have gained ground for 20 years (RW in EU!)
3. Link with size and structure of globalization shocks
   - Heterogeneous effects on margins of populism
   - Skill structure matters!
   - Populism response to LS import shocks (de-indust., internet)
   - Trade diversification reduces populism responses
   - LS migration shocks induce a substitution of LW for RW populism
   - We find no amplifying effect of cultural distance
4. Perspective to work at party level (entry/exit, electoral compet.)
5. And to study the reverse causal impact of populism on the size and skill structure of trade and migration shocks (vicious circles)

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Thanks for your attention!

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Our sample ▸ Back

Populism score - PCA ▸Back

| | I. PCA (AES/CTP) | | | II. Corr. btw. AES & CTP | | | |
| | EV | Score | Corr. | AES | CTP | L-R | R^2 |
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(7)	(8)
Anti-establish- ment (AES):				-	.09† (.02)	.01† (.00)	0.27
- Pol. corruption	1.07	.71	.73‡				
- Anti-pluralism	.93	.71	.73‡				
Commitment to Protect (CTP):				.13** (.04)	-	-.01* (.00)	0.11
- Protectionism	1.29	.41	.48‡				
- Internationalism	.96	-.41	-.46‡				
- EU institutions	.92	-.60	-.67‡				
- Nationalization	.83	.55	.63‡				

Level of significance: * $p<0.05$; ** $p<0.01$; † $p<0.001$; ‡ $p<0.00001$.

Populism score - Correlations ▶ Back

	I. Van Kessel (2000-2013)			II. Swank (1960-2015)			III. PopuList (1989-2018)		
	Populist party (PRB)			RW Populist party (PRB)			Populist party (PRB)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
$S_{i,e,t}^p$	0.699***			0.460***			0.550***		
	(0.161)			(0.112)			(0.094)		
AES		0.247***			0.252**			0.156***	
		(0.091)			(0.100)			(0.054)	
CTP			0.474***			0.234***			0.428***
			(0.093)			(0.045)			(0.069)
Obs.	650	650	650	1658	1658	1658	1635	1635	1635
Countries	25	25	25	16	16	16	28	28	28

	IV. GPop 1 (1960-2018)			V. GPop 2 (1998-2017)			VI. CHES (1998-2018)		
	Populist party (PRB)			Average Populism Speeches (OLS)			People vs. Elite (OLS)		
	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)
$S_{i,e,t}^p$	0.376***			0.120**			1.262***		
	(0.081)			(0.052)			(0.210)		
AES		0.093*			0.057*			0.933***	
		(0.050)			(0.032)			(0.257)	
CTP			0.277***			0.087*			0.668***
			(0.053)			(0.046)			(0.130)
Obs.	2847	2847	2847	100	100	100	176	176	176
Countries	36	36	36	31	31	31	28	28	28

Populism Score - K-means clustering ▸ Back

(a) All parties

(b) Populist parties only

Populist parties - Threshold selection w. partial corr

(a) Van Kessel

(b) Swank

(c) PopuList

(d) Gpop 1

# Populist parties - Threshold selection w. RAF ▸Back

(a) Van Kessel

(b) Swank

(c) PopuList

(d) Gpop 1

Gravity model - First-stage ▸Back

	(1) $\mathrm{Imp}_{i,e,t}^{HS}$	(2) $\mathrm{Imp}_{i,e,t}^{LS}$	(3) $\mathrm{Mig}_{i,e,t}^{HS}$	(4) $\mathrm{Mig}_{i,e,t}^{LS}$
$\widehat{\mathrm{Imp}}_{i,e,t}^{HS}$	1.100*** (0.100)			
$\widehat{\mathrm{Imp}}_{i,e,t}^{LS}$		1.139*** (0.112)		
$\widehat{\mathrm{Mig}}_{i,e,t}^{HS}$			1.235*** (0.113)	
$\widehat{\mathrm{Mig}}_{i,e,t}^{LS}$				1.137*** (0.083)
Observations	575	575	575	575
Countries	52	52	52	52
Adj. R^2	0.94	0.93	0.86	0.86
Year & country FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓

Continuous score – Distribution

Continuous score – Theil

Dichotomous class. – dist. never-populists vs. others

Populism index

+
Not populist party

●
Populist party

Nb of populist parties - evolution ▸Back

# Rodrik (2020) - 19 countries, 31 parties ▸ Back

Figure 1 The global rise of populism. *Notes*: see Appendix for sources and methods.

Mean margin - Balanced sample ▸Back

Volume margin - Balanced sample ▸ Back

IV results – Time FE's

Volume margin ◆ Mean margin ○

Dichotomous class. – Mean score LW/RW populists

Populist parties   RW   LW

Robustness [▸ Back]

1. **Lag structure of glob. shocks**
   - Robust if shocks in t, in $t-1$, since $t-2$ or $e-1$
   - Effect of Imports on LW if shocks measured on longer periods

2. **Exports/Emigration (RHS) and Turnout (RHS/LHS)**
   - No significant effect (or response)
   - No effect on the estimates for imports and immigration

3. **Representative political system**
   - No effect on estimates, except LW response to LS imports

4. **Classification of populist parties (lax vs. strict def.)**
   - Less significant with stricter def (key parties exit the list)

5. **Sub-samples**
   - Robust to post-1990 dummy (attenuates responses to imports)
   - In EU_{28}: stronger effects + LW populism response to imports

6. **Robust to imputation of skill-specific flows**

Amplifiers ▸Back

(a) Economic crisis

(b) De-industrialization

1. Linear terms are insignificant

2. Effect of Imp on vol. reinforced in times of de-industrialization + LW response in times of crisis along volume and mean margins

3. Effect of LS immig is unaffected (except a drop in LW responses in crisis)

Amplifiers • Back

(a) Internet coverage

(b) Diversification/Culture

1. Linear effect of internet (+) and div (-) can be significant

2. Effect of Imp reinforced when internet coverage is large, attenuated if origin mix is more diverse (both margins for RW populism)

3. Cultural distance does not boost the populist response (drop in LW)

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