"Monitoring Open List Systems: does Panachage Backfire on Women?"

Giulia Savio

AXA Research Lab on Gender Equality

Bocconi University

EEA Milan, September 2022

Motivation

- **Open list system**: choice of candidates is possible
  - Individual campaigns matter
- **Panachage** allows voters to choose candidates across lists
  - Networking abilities of candidates beyond ideology identification are crucial
- Since women have less time and smaller networks, gender differences may emerge
- Adopted in Switzerland, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Ecuador, El Salvador, Germany, France and Italy ("Voto Disgiunto").
- Very little evidence of panachage effects on female representation

The paper in a nutshell

- ▶ Exploit municipal elections in Ticino (Switzerland):
  - ▶ Open lists System plus Panachage
  - ▶ Elections for Municipio and Consiglio

- ▶ Unique dataset on preference votes:
  - ▶ cast by party supporters
  - ▶ cast by other parties'supporters (Panachage)
  - ▶ cast by non-partisan voters
  - ▶ Controls: incumbent politicians, age, ranking within the party.

- ▶ Study gender gaps in:
  - ▶ Probability to be elected
  - ▶ Preferences cast within the party
  - ▶ Preferences cast by non-party supporters (trough Panachage)

Preview of the results

Gender gap in Elections in Municipio (execut. chamber)

- ▶ Women less likely to be elected
- ▶ Women collect less preference votes (and not by party seats)
- ▶ Driver: Gender gap in Panashage votes

Gender gap in Panashage votes

- ▶ **Robust across ideologies**
- ▶ Robust for incumbent politicians

Mechanism: voter side story

- ▶ Used more by male voters
- ▶ Male voters prefer male politicians

Background and Literature

Gender gaps are dominant in the political arena

- ▶ Globally: only 22% of the gender gap in politics closed (WEF, 2021)
- ▶ Europe: women represent 33% of politicians in legislative and government cabinets
- ▶ Switzerland: women represent 41,5% of the national council, but slow improvements at local level (2019 elections).

Women face obstacles in recruiting process

- ▶ Less prone to compete for political seats because more time constrained (Schlozman et al., 1994), or less confident or less motivated (Fox and Lawless, 2004)
- ▶ Not enough visibility by parties (Kunovich and Paxton, 2005; Kjaer and M. L. Krook, 2019)

Background and Literature

Electoral rules may play a role

- ▶ Proportional rules favor female representation (Profeta and Woodhouse, 2018)
- ▶ Mixed Evidence on Open vs Close lists (Soberg Shugar, 1994; Carey and Matthew Soberg Shugart, 1995)
- ▶ **Panachage: experimental evidence on its positive effects on female representation (Golder et al., 2017)**

Preferencial votes

- ▶ Preference votes used to reward candidates and signal their popularity to parties (Crisp et al. 2013; Kemahlioglu et al, 2009; Ware, 2002)
- ▶ Used as an affirmative action tool (Baltrunaite et al, 2019)
- ▶ Highly ineffective in reshaping lists (Farrell, 2011; Gallagher and Mitchell 2005).

Institutional setting

- ▶ Swiss Municipal elections in Ticino to appoint
  - ▶ Members of Consiglio (legislative body): max 60 (on av. 22)
  - ▶ Members of Municipio (executive body): max 7 (on av. 4)
  - ▶ Mayor is choosen by the members of Municipio
  - ▶ Every four years

- ▶ Voters' choices:
  - ▶ The party
  - ▶ Candidates within the the party
  - ▶ Candidates from other lists (Panachage)

Voters' choices

(Option a)

(Option b)

(Option c)

(Option d)

How Seats are determined?

1. Party Seats function of **party votes** and **panachage votes** taken/cast outside the party:

   - Party votes (N.Seats ↑)
   - Panachage from Non partisan voters (N.Seats ↑)
   - Panachage from other parties' supporters (N.Seats ↑)
   - Panachage in favour of other parties (N.Seats ↓)

   ⟹ Candidates good in Panachage are more appealing for parties

2. Once seats are assigned, **candidates with more preferences votes** are appointed

Gender gap in probability to be Elected

Table 1: Dep var: Elected in *Consiglio*

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Female	-0.047***	-0.045***	-0.046***	-0.046***	0.005	0.005
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Left		-0.054**	-0.029**	-0.030**	-0.008	
		(0.024)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.010)	
Civic		0.021	-0.047***	-0.047***	-0.021*	
		(0.020)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.011)	
Age				0.000	-0.001***	-0.001**
				(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Incumbent					0.569***	0.576***
					(0.010)	(0.010)
R-squared	0.002	0.004	0.078	0.078	0.309	0.342
N	16363	16363	16362	16362	15177	15177
Municipal FE	-	-	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	-	-	YES	YES	YES	YES
Party FE	-	-	-	-	-	YES

Notes. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Gender gap in probability to be Elected

Table 2: Dep var: Elected in *Municipio*

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Female	-0.154***	-0.149***	-0.143***	-0.128***	-0.036**	-0.048**
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.017)	(0.020)
Left		-0.095***	-0.084***	-0.088***	-0.053***	
		(0.025)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.015)	
Civic		-0.008	-0.088***	-0.095***	-0.041**	
		(0.024)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.018)	
Age				0.003**	0.001***	0.001***
				(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Incumbent					0.638***	0.650***
					(0.013)	(0.015)
R-squared	0.020	0.027	0.081	0.095	0.360	0.433
N	6075	6075	6075	6075	4252	4252
Municipal FE	-	-	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	-	-	YES	YES	YES	YES
Party FE	-	-	-	-	-	YES

Notes. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Gender gap in election: where does it come from?

Table 3: Dep var: Party Votes and Preference votes

Body	Consiglio		Municipio	
	(1) (Party Votes)	(2) (SharePref.Votes)	(3) (Party Votes)	(4) (SharePref.Votes)
Female	-13.327	0.001	20.909	-0.012**
	(12.590)	(0.001)	(15.171)	(0.006)
Num.Candidates	15.189***		43.107***	
	(4.724)		(9.346)	
Age	-1.428***	-0.000	-2.454***	0.001***
	(0.529)	(0.000)	(0.747)	(0.000)
Incumbent	78.186***	0.036***	167.284***	0.105***
	(15.372)	(0.002)	(34.737)	(0.007)
Order	2.031*	-0.001***	7.504***	-0.020***
	(1.190)	(0.000)	(1.873)	(0.002)
Left	-155.924***	0.003	-153.318***	-0.002
	(41.288)	(0.006)	(45.367)	(0.010)
Civic	-147.472**	0.017***	-185.680***	0.042***
	(73.251)	(0.006)	(65.279)	(0.014)
R-squared	0.746	0.311	0.756	0.409
N	9979	9979	2957	2957
Municipal FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES

Focus on Preference Votes

- Which category is driving the gender gap?

- Distinguish among preferences cast by:
  - Party supporters
  - Supporters of opponent parties (Panashage)
  - Non-Partisan Voters

- Here: shown for Municipio

Descriptive evidence

Figure 1: Candidates individual preferences

Main Regression

$$ShareVotes_{cpmy} = \alpha + \beta Female_c + \gamma OtherParties + \delta NonPartisan +$$
$$\theta Female \times OtherParties + \sigma Female \times NonPartisan + \eta X_c + Z_m + T_y + I_y \epsilon_i$$
(1)

β measures gender gap in preference votes within the party

δ measures diff in diff: votes of female (vs male) in Panachage (vs within party)

θ measures diff in diff: votes of female (vs male) from non-partisan voters (vs within party)

Results I

Table 4: Gender Gap in Preference votes

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Female (β)	-0.023***	-0.004	-0.001	-0.003	-0.004	-0.001	
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)	
% Other Parties Pan.Votes	0.004	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.004***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.002)
% Non-Partisan Pan.Votes	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.002)
% Other Parties Pan.Votes X Female (δ)	**-0.015****	**-0.020****	**-0.020****	**-0.020*****	**-0.020*****	**-0.020*****	**-0.015*****
	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.003)
% Non-Partisan Pan.Votes X Female (θ)	-0.002	-0.005	-0.005	-0.005	-0.005	-0.005	-0.002
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.003)
Incumbent		0.137***	0.131***	0.119***	0.120***	0.142***	
		(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	
Age			0.001***	0.001***	0.001***	0.000	
			(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	
Order				-0.021***	-0.021***	-0.013***	
				(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	
Left					-0.002		
					(0.003)		
Civic					0.042***		
					(0.006)		
R-squared	0.276	0.322	0.325	0.372	0.376	0.606	0.929
N	10107	8871	8871	8871	8871	8871	10107
Municipal FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	-	-
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	-
Party FE	-	-	-	-	-	YES	-
Candidate FE	-	-	-	-	-	-	YES

Notes. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 5: Gender Gap in Preference Votes

Candidates in	Civic List			Left Wing Party			Right Wing party		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Female (β)	-0.013	-0.019**		0.026***	0.023***		-0.008	-0.012**	
	(0.015)	(0.008)		(0.007)	(0.005)		(0.006)	(0.005)	
% Other Parties Pan.Votes	0.007	0.007	0.008	0.011	0.011*	0.010***	0.003	0.003	0.003
	(0.013)	(0.009)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.002)
% Non-Partisan Pan.Votes	0.003	0.003	0.002	0.005	0.005	0.005*	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.012)	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.002)
% Other Parties Pan.Votes X Female (δ)	**-0.026**	**-0.026***	**-0.024*****	**-0.028****	**-0.028*****	**-0.028*****	**-0.008**	**-0.008**	**-0.008***
	(0.023)	(0.015)	(0.009)	(0.012)	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.004)
% Non-Partisan Pan.Votes X Female (θ)	-0.008	-0.008	-0.007	-0.012	-0.012	-0.012**	0.003	0.003	0.003
	(0.021)	(0.013)	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.004)
Incumbent	0.069***	0.101***		0.151***	0.166***		0.087***	0.107***	
	(0.016)	(0.010)		(0.008)	(0.007)		(0.005)	(0.005)	
Age	0.000	-0.000		0.001***	0.000***		0.000	-0.000*	
	(0.000)	(0.000)		(0.000)	(0.000)		(0.000)	(0.000)	
Ranking	-0.016***	-0.008***		-0.013***	-0.008***		-0.019***	-0.014***	
	(0.003)	(0.002)		(0.001)	(0.001)		(0.001)	(0.001)	
R-squared	0.421	0.721	0.927	0.472	0.665	0.915	0.351	0.497	0.922
N	1002	1002	1077	2760	2760	2763	4350	4350	4383
Municipal FE	YES	YES	-	YES	YES	-	YES	YES	-
Year FE	YES	YES	-	YES	YES	-	YES	YES	-
Party FE	-	YES	-	-	YES	-	-	YES	-
Candidate FE	-	-	YES	-	-	YES	-	-	YES

Mechanism

Candidate Side

- ▶ H1: Gender Differences in Networks
    - ▶ Assumption: tight networks in small towns.
    - ▶ Heterogeneity: Small versus larger municipalities
    - ▶ Not confirmed
- ▶ H2: Gender Differences in ideological consistency
    - ▶ Gender differences in attracting voters ideologically close (versus voters ideologically distant)
    - ▶ Not confirmed

Voter Side

- ▶ **H3: Gender differences in voting behaviour**
    - ▶ Panashage more popular among male voters
    - ▶ Same sex preference in voting behavior

Mechanism I

Table 6: Gender differences in voting behaviour

Dep Var.	(1) Fed. Turnout	(2) Cant. Turtout	(3) Panachage	(4) Panachage	(5) Pref. women
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Female	-0.0249	-0.0206	-0.0521*	-0.0415	0.0139***
	(0.0153)	(0.0232)	(0.0281)	(0.0285)	(0.0050)
Age, 71-19	0.0049***	0.0040***	-0.0039***	-0.0032***	-0.0001
	(0.0004)	(0.0007)	(0.0008)	(0.0009)	(0.0001)
Married	-0.0299***	-0.0519***	-0.0134	-0.0102	0.0016
	(0.0078)	(0.0116)	(0.0151)	(0.0151)	(0.0026)
Catholic	0.0811***	0.1069***	0.0229	0.0208	-0.0097*
	(0.0170)	(0.0271)	(0.0310)	(0.0311)	(0.0050)
High Education	0.0488***	0.0679***	0.0101	0.0020	0.0080
	(0.0164)	(0.0262)	(0.0292)	(0.0294)	(0.0052)
Left	0.0041	0.0437	0.0880***	0.0899***	0.0266***
	(0.0185)	(0.0282)	(0.0322)	(0.0323)	(0.0067)
Center	-0.1212***	-0.0718***	-0.0081	-0.0025	0.0121**
	(0.0187)	(0.0272)	(0.0373)	(0.0372)	(0.0049)
Urban	-0.0043	-0.0441	-0.0185	-0.0208	-0.0013
	(0.0210)	(0.0290)	(0.0369)	(0.0370)	(0.0102)
Work				0.0680**	
				(0.0297)	
Constant	0.4810***	0.5748***	1.0291***	0.9521***	0.0547
	(0.0422)	(0.0584)	(0.0685)	(0.0750)	(0.0343)
R-squared	0.076	0.066	0.093	0.096	0.164
N	3347	1436	1057	1055	2450
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

Party response

Table 7: Share of female politicians at time t+1

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Share of female candidates (time t)	0.305**	0.275*	0.277*	0.548***	0.603
	(0.137)	(0.145)	(0.146)	(0.157)	(0.681)
Dummy gap in Panachage (time t)	-0.087**	-0.103**	-0.082	-0.222**	-0.048
	(0.041)	(0.042)	(0.070)	(0.101)	(0.231)
Dummy gap within party (time t)			-0.027	0.108	-0.040
			(0.070)	(0.108)	(0.195)
Left		0.044	0.040		
		(0.036)	(0.037)		
Civic		0.063	0.063		
		(0.050)	(0.050)		
R-squared	0.203	0.248	0.249	0.792	0.990
N	82	82	82	82	82
Municipal FE	-	-	-	-	YES
Party FE	-	-	YES	YES	YES

Policy Discussion

- Gender differences in panachage cause gender gap in elections, particularly in executive body

- Information policies: make women aware of this trait

- Reforming electoral systems, to limit the double burden of panachage:
    1 **Lower probability to be appointed**, given party seats
    2 **Strategic party decisions** on the composition of their lists

    $\implies$ **Call for quotas!**