

“Monitoring Open List Systems: does Panachage Backfire on Women?”

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Motivation

- ▶ **Open list system:** choice of candidates is possible
 - ▶ Individual campaigns matter
- ▶ **Panachage** allows voters to choose candidates across lists
 - ▶ Networking abilities of candidates beyond ideology identification are crucial
- ▶ Since women have less time and smaller networks, gender differences may emerge
- ▶ Adopted in Switzerland, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Ecuador, El Salvador, Germany, France and Italy ("Voto Disgiunto").
- ▶ Very little evidence of panachage effects on female representation

The paper in a nutshell

- ▶ Exploit municipal elections in Ticino (Switzerland):
 - ▶ Open lists System plus Panachage
 - ▶ Elections for Municipio and Consiglio
- ▶ Unique dataset on preference votes:
 - ▶ cast by party supporters
 - ▶ cast by other parties' supporters (Panachage)
 - ▶ cast by non-partisan voters
 - ▶ Controls: incumbent politicians, age, ranking within the party.
- ▶ Study gender gaps in:
 - ▶ Probability to be elected
 - ▶ Preferences cast within the party
 - ▶ Preferences cast by non-party supporters (through Panachage)

Preview of the results

Gender gap in Elections in Municipio (execut. chamber)

- ▶ Women less likely to be elected
- ▶ Women collect less preference votes (and not by party seats)
- ▶ Driver: Gender gap in Panashage votes

Gender gap in Panashage votes

- ▶ **Robust across ideologies**
- ▶ Robust for incumbent politicians

Mechanism: voter side story

- ▶ Used more by male voters
- ▶ Male voters prefer male politicians

Background and Literature

Gender gaps are dominant in the political arena

- ▶ Globally: only 22% of the gender gap in politics closed (WEF, 2021)
- ▶ Europe: women represent 33% of politicians in legislative and government cabinets
- ▶ Switzerland: women represent 41,5% of the national council, but slow improvements at local level (2019 elections).

Women face obstacles in recruiting process

- ▶ Less prone to compete for political seats because more time constrained (Schlozman et al., 1994), or less confident or less motivated (Fox and Lawless, 2004)
- ▶ Not enough visibility by parties (Kunovich and Paxton, 2005; Kjaer and M. L. Krook, 2019)

Background and Literature

Electoral rules may play a role

- ▶ Proportional rules favor female representation (Profeta and Woodhouse, 2018)
- ▶ Mixed Evidence on Open vs Close lists (Soberg Shugar, 1994; Carey and Matthew Soberg Shugart, 1995)
- ▶ **Panachage: experimental evidence on its positive effects on female representation (Golder et al., 2017)**

Preferential votes

- ▶ Preference votes used to reward candidates and signal their popularity to parties (Crisp et al. 2013; Kemahlioglu et al, 2009; Ware, 2002)
- ▶ Used as an affirmative action tool (Baltrunaite et al, 2019)
- ▶ Highly ineffective in reshaping lists (Farrell, 2011; Gallagher and Mitchell 2005).

Institutional setting

- ▶ Swiss Municipal elections in Ticino to appoint
 - ▶ Members of Consiglio (legislative body): max 60 (on av. 22)
 - ▶ Members of Municipio (executive body): max 7 (on av. 4)
 - ▶ Mayor is chosen by the members of Municipio
 - ▶ Every four years
- ▶ Voters' choices:
 - ▶ The party
 - ▶ Candidates within the the party
 - ▶ Candidates from other lists (Panachage)

Voters' choices

<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Party 1	Party 2	Party 3
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Candidate1a	<input type="checkbox"/> Candidate2a	<input type="checkbox"/> Candidate3a
<input type="checkbox"/> Candidate1b	<input type="checkbox"/> Candidate2b	<input type="checkbox"/> Candidate3b
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Candidate1c	<input type="checkbox"/> Candidate2c	<input type="checkbox"/> Candidate3c
<input type="checkbox"/> Candidate1d	<input type="checkbox"/> Candidate2d	<input type="checkbox"/> Candidate3d
<input type="checkbox"/> Candidate1e	<input type="checkbox"/> Candidate2e	<input type="checkbox"/> Candidate3e
<input type="checkbox"/> Candidate1f	<input type="checkbox"/> Candidate2f	<input type="checkbox"/> Candidate3f

(Option a)

<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Party 1	Party 2	Party 3	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Party 1	Party 2	Party 3
<input type="checkbox"/> Candidate1a	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Candidate2a	<input type="checkbox"/> Candidate3a	<input type="checkbox"/> Candidate1a	<input type="checkbox"/> Candidate2a	<input type="checkbox"/> Candidate3a
<input type="checkbox"/> Candidate1b	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Candidate2b	<input type="checkbox"/> Candidate3b	<input type="checkbox"/> Candidate1b	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Candidate2b	<input type="checkbox"/> Candidate3b
<input type="checkbox"/> Candidate1c	<input type="checkbox"/> Candidate2c	<input type="checkbox"/> Candidate3c	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Candidate1c	<input type="checkbox"/> Candidate2c	<input type="checkbox"/> Candidate3c
<input type="checkbox"/> Candidate1d	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Candidate2d	<input type="checkbox"/> Candidate3d	<input type="checkbox"/> Candidate1d	<input type="checkbox"/> Candidate2d	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Candidate3d
<input type="checkbox"/> Candidate1e	<input type="checkbox"/> Candidate2e	<input type="checkbox"/> Candidate3e	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Candidate1e	<input type="checkbox"/> Candidate2e	<input type="checkbox"/> Candidate3e
<input type="checkbox"/> Candidate1f	<input type="checkbox"/> Candidate2f	<input type="checkbox"/> Candidate3f	<input type="checkbox"/> Candidate1f	<input type="checkbox"/> Candidate2f	<input type="checkbox"/> Candidate3f

(Option b)

(Option c)

Party 1	Party 2	Party 3
<input type="checkbox"/> Candidate1a	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Candidate2a	<input type="checkbox"/> Candidate3a
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Candidate1b	<input type="checkbox"/> Candidate2b	<input type="checkbox"/> Candidate3b
<input type="checkbox"/> Candidate1c	<input type="checkbox"/> Candidate2c	<input type="checkbox"/> Candidate3c
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Candidate1d	<input type="checkbox"/> Candidate2d	<input type="checkbox"/> Candidate3d
<input type="checkbox"/> Candidate1e	<input type="checkbox"/> Candidate2e	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Candidate3e
<input type="checkbox"/> Candidate1f	<input type="checkbox"/> Candidate2f	<input type="checkbox"/> Candidate3f

(Option d)

How Seats are determined?

- 1 Party Seats function of **party votes** and **panachage votes** taken/cast outside the party:
 - ▶ Party votes (N.Seats \uparrow)
 - ▶ Panachage from Non partisan voters (N.Seats \uparrow)
 - ▶ Panachage from other parties' supporters (N.Seats \uparrow)
 - ▶ Panachage in favour of other parties (N.Seats \downarrow)

\implies Candidates good in Panachage are more appealing for parties
- 2 Once seats are assigned, **candidates with more preferences votes** are appointed

Gender gap in probability to be Elected

Table 1: Dep var: Elected in *Consiglio*

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Female	-0.047*** (0.008)	-0.045*** (0.008)	-0.046*** (0.007)	-0.046*** (0.007)	0.005 (0.008)	0.005 (0.008)
Left		-0.054** (0.024)	-0.029** (0.012)	-0.030** (0.012)	-0.008 (0.010)	
Civic		0.021 (0.020)	-0.047*** (0.012)	-0.047*** (0.012)	-0.021* (0.011)	
Age				0.000 (0.000)	-0.001*** (0.000)	-0.001** (0.000)
Incumbent					0.569*** (0.010)	0.576*** (0.010)
R-squared	0.002	0.004	0.078	0.078	0.309	0.342
N	16363	16363	16362	16362	15177	15177
Municipal FE	-	-	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	-	-	YES	YES	YES	YES
Party FE	-	-	-	-	-	YES

Notes. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Gender gap in probability to be Elected

Table 2: Dep var: Elected in *Municipio*

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Female	-0.154*** (0.013)	-0.149*** (0.013)	-0.143*** (0.013)	-0.128*** (0.014)	-0.036** (0.017)	-0.048** (0.020)
Left		-0.095*** (0.025)	-0.084*** (0.019)	-0.088*** (0.020)	-0.053*** (0.015)	
Civic		-0.008 (0.024)	-0.088*** (0.014)	-0.095*** (0.015)	-0.041** (0.018)	
Age				0.003** (0.001)	0.001*** (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)
Incumbent					0.638*** (0.013)	0.650*** (0.015)
R-squared	0.020	0.027	0.081	0.095	0.360	0.433
N	6075	6075	6075	6075	4252	4252
Municipal FE	-	-	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	-	-	YES	YES	YES	YES
Party FE	-	-	-	-	-	YES

Notes. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Gender gap in election: where does it come from?

Table 3: Dep var: Party Votes and Preference votes


Body	Consiglio		Municipio	
	(1) (Party Votes)	(2) (SharePref.Votes)	(3) (Party Votes)	(4) (SharePref.Votes)
Female	-13.327 (12.590)	0.001 (0.001)	20.909 (15.171)	-0.012** (0.006)
Num.Candidates	15.189*** (4.724)		43.107*** (9.346)	
Age	-1.428*** (0.529)	-0.000 (0.000)	-2.454*** (0.747)	0.001*** (0.000)
Incumbent	78.186*** (15.372)	0.036*** (0.002)	167.284*** (34.737)	0.105*** (0.007)
Order	2.031* (1.190)	-0.001*** (0.000)	7.504*** (1.873)	-0.020*** (0.002)
Left	-155.924*** (41.288)	0.003 (0.006)	-153.318*** (45.367)	-0.002 (0.010)
Civic	-147.472** (73.251)	0.017*** (0.006)	-185.680*** (65.279)	0.042*** (0.014)
R-squared	0.746	0.311	0.756	0.409
N	9979	9979	2957	2957
Municipal FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES

Focus on Preference Votes

- ▶ Which category is driving the gender gap?
- ▶ Distinguish among preferences cast by:
 - ▶ Party supporters
 - ▶ Supporters of opponent parties (Panashage)
 - ▶ Non-Partisan Voters
- ▶ Here: shown for Municipio

Descriptive evidence

Figure 1: Candidates individual preferences



Main Regression

$$\text{ShareVotes}_{c p m y} = \alpha + \beta \text{Female}_c + \gamma \text{OtherParties} + \delta \text{NonPartisan} + \theta \text{Female} \times \text{OtherParties} + \sigma \text{Female} \times \text{NonPartisan} + \eta X_c + Z_m + T_y + I_y \epsilon_i \quad (1)$$

β measures gender gap in preference votes within the party

δ measures diff in diff: votes of female (vs male) in Panachage (vs within party)

θ measures diff in diff: votes of female (vs male) from non-partisan voters (vs within party)

Results I

Table 4: Gender Gap in Preference votes

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Female (β)	-0.023*** (0.004)	-0.004 (0.005)	-0.001 (0.005)	-0.003 (0.005)	-0.004 (0.005)	-0.001 (0.004)	
% Other Parties Pan.Votes	0.004 (0.004)	0.005 (0.004)	0.005 (0.004)	0.005 (0.004)	0.005 (0.004)	0.005 (0.003)	0.004*** (0.002)
% Non-Partisan Pan.Votes	0.001 (0.004)	0.001 (0.004)	0.001 (0.004)	0.001 (0.004)	0.001 (0.004)	0.001 (0.003)	0.001 (0.002)
% Other Parties Pan.Votes X Female (δ)	-0.015** (0.007)	-0.020** (0.008)	-0.020** (0.008)	-0.020*** (0.007)	-0.020*** (0.007)	-0.020*** (0.006)	-0.015*** (0.003)
% Non-Partisan Pan.Votes X Female (θ)	-0.002 (0.007)	-0.005 (0.007)	-0.005 (0.007)	-0.005 (0.007)	-0.005 (0.007)	-0.005 (0.006)	-0.002 (0.003)
Incumbent		0.137*** (0.004)	0.131*** (0.004)	0.119*** (0.004)	0.120*** (0.004)	0.142*** (0.004)	
Age			0.001*** (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	
Order				-0.021*** (0.001)	-0.021*** (0.001)	-0.013*** (0.001)	
Left					-0.002 (0.003)		
Civic					0.042*** (0.006)		
R-squared	0.276	0.322	0.325	0.372	0.376	0.606	0.929
N	10107	8871	8871	8871	8871	8871	10107
Municipal FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES		-
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	-
Party FE	-	-	-	-	-	YES	-
Candidate FE	-	-	-	-	-	-	YES

Notes. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Robustness Checks

Table 5: Gender Gap in Preference Votes

Candidates in	Civic List			Left Wing Party			Right Wing party		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Female (β)	-0.013 (0.015)	-0.019** (0.008)		0.026*** (0.007)	0.023*** (0.005)		-0.008 (0.006)	-0.012** (0.005)	
% Other Parties Pan.Votes	0.007 (0.013)	0.007 (0.009)	0.008 (0.005)	0.011 (0.007)	0.011* (0.006)	0.010*** (0.003)	0.003 (0.005)	0.003 (0.005)	0.003 (0.002)
% Non-Partisan Pan.Votes	0.003 (0.012)	0.003 (0.008)	0.002 (0.005)	0.005 (0.006)	0.005 (0.005)	0.005* (0.003)	-0.001 (0.005)	-0.001 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.002)
% Other Parties Pan.Votes X Female (δ)	-0.026 (0.023)	-0.026* (0.015)	-0.024*** (0.009)	-0.028** (0.012)	-0.028*** (0.009)	-0.028*** (0.006)	-0.008 (0.010)	-0.008 (0.009)	-0.008* (0.004)
% Non-Partisan Pan.Votes X Female (θ)	-0.008 (0.021)	-0.008 (0.013)	-0.007 (0.009)	-0.012 (0.011)	-0.012 (0.008)	-0.012** (0.006)	0.003 (0.009)	0.003 (0.008)	0.003 (0.004)
Incumbent	0.069*** (0.016)	0.101*** (0.010)		0.151*** (0.008)	0.166*** (0.007)		0.087*** (0.005)	0.107*** (0.005)	
Age	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)		0.001*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)		0.000 (0.000)	-0.000* (0.000)	
Ranking	-0.016*** (0.003)	-0.008*** (0.002)		-0.013*** (0.001)	-0.008*** (0.001)		-0.019*** (0.001)	-0.014*** (0.001)	
R-squared	0.421	0.721	0.927	0.472	0.665	0.915	0.351	0.497	0.922
N	1002	1002	1077	2760	2760	2763	4350	4350	4383
Municipal FE	YES	YES	-	YES	YES	-	YES	YES	-
Year FE	YES	YES	-	YES	YES	-	YES	YES	-
Party FE	-	YES	-	-	YES	-	-	YES	-
Candidate FE	-	-	YES	-	-	YES	-	-	YES

Mechanism

Candidate Side

- ▶ H1: Gender Differences in Networks
 - ▶ Assumption: tight networks in small towns.
 - ▶ Heterogeneity: Small versus larger municipalities
 - ▶ Not confirmed
- ▶ H2: Gender Differences in ideological consistency
 - ▶ Gender differences in attracting voters ideologically close (versus voters ideologically distant)
 - ▶ Not confirmed

Voter Side

- ▶ **H3: Gender differences in voting behaviour**
 - ▶ Panashage more popular among male voters
 - ▶ Same sex preference in voting behavior

Mechanism I

Table 6: Gender differences in voting behaviour

Dep Var.	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Fed. Turnout	Cant. Turtout	Panachage	Panachage	Pref. women
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Female	-0.0249 (0.0153)	-0.0206 (0.0232)	-0.0521* (0.0281)	-0.0415 (0.0285)	0.0139*** (0.0050)
Age, 71-19	0.0049*** (0.0004)	0.0040*** (0.0007)	-0.0039*** (0.0008)	-0.0032*** (0.0009)	-0.0001 (0.0001)
Married	-0.0299*** (0.0078)	-0.0519*** (0.0116)	-0.0134 (0.0151)	-0.0102 (0.0151)	0.0016 (0.0026)
Catholic	0.0811*** (0.0170)	0.1069*** (0.0271)	0.0229 (0.0310)	0.0208 (0.0311)	-0.0097* (0.0050)
High Education	0.0488*** (0.0164)	0.0679*** (0.0262)	0.0101 (0.0292)	0.0020 (0.0294)	0.0080 (0.0052)
Left	0.0041 (0.0185)	0.0437 (0.0282)	0.0880*** (0.0322)	0.0899*** (0.0323)	0.0266*** (0.0067)
Center	-0.1212*** (0.0187)	-0.0718*** (0.0272)	-0.0081 (0.0373)	-0.0025 (0.0372)	0.0121** (0.0049)
Urban	-0.0043 (0.0210)	-0.0441 (0.0290)	-0.0185 (0.0369)	-0.0208 (0.0370)	-0.0013 (0.0102)
Work				0.0680** (0.0297)	
Constant	0.4810*** (0.0422)	0.5748*** (0.0584)	1.0291*** (0.0685)	0.9521*** (0.0750)	0.0547 (0.0343)
R-squared	0.076	0.066	0.093	0.096	0.164
N	3347	1436	1057	1055	2450
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

Party response

Table 7: Share of female politicians at time t+1

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Share of female candidates (time t)	0.305** (0.137)	0.275* (0.145)	0.277* (0.146)	0.548*** (0.157)	0.603 (0.681)
Dummy gap in Panachage (time t)	-0.087** (0.041)	-0.103** (0.042)	-0.082 (0.070)	-0.222** (0.101)	-0.048 (0.231)
Dummy gap within party (time t)			-0.027 (0.070)	0.108 (0.108)	-0.040 (0.195)
Left		0.044 (0.036)	0.040 (0.037)		
Civic		0.063 (0.050)	0.063 (0.050)		
R-squared	0.203	0.248	0.249	0.792	0.990
N	82	82	82	82	82
Municipal FE	-	-	-	-	YES
Party FE	-	-	YES	YES	YES

Policy Discussion

- ▶ Gender differences in panachage cause gender gap in elections, particularly in executive body
- ▶ Information policies: make women aware of this trait
- ▶ Reforming electoral systems, to limit the double burden of panachage:
 - 1 **Lower probability to be appointed**, given party seats
 - 2 **Strategic party decisions** on the composition of their lists

⇒ **Call for quotas!**