Preference Conditions for Linear Demand Functions

Theodoros Diasakos¹

EEA-ESEM 2022

¹Stirling Management School, University of Stirling Theodoros Diasakos (EEA-ESEM 2022) Preference Conditions for Linear Demand Fun

э

Characterizations in the literature

Let $\mathcal{N} := \{1, \ldots, n\}$ be the number of commodities. Take the *n*th commodity as the numeraire and $k \in \mathcal{N} \setminus \{n\}$. Let also $K := \{1, \ldots, k\}$, $M := \{k + 1, \ldots, n\}$, and $M_0 := M \setminus \{n\}$.

Let *B* be a $k \times k$ matrix of constants and suppose that the (total) demand function $x : \mathbb{R}_{++}^n \supseteq Q \to X$ is such that

$$x_{\mathcal{K}}(q) := \alpha\left(q_{\mathcal{M}_{0}}, w\right) + Bq_{\mathcal{K}}$$

with $\alpha: \mathcal{Q}_{\mathcal{M}} \to \mathbb{R}^k$ a continuous function.

La France (JET 1985): *B* symmetric and -ve semidefinite. (i) $\alpha(q_{M_0}, w) = \alpha(q_{M_0}) \Rightarrow$ quasi-linear/quadratic indirect utility. (ii) $\alpha(q_{M_0}, w) \Rightarrow$ Leontief indirect utility.

Amir et al. (JET 2017): *B* symmetric, -ve definite with non-zero diagonal entries

 $\alpha(\cdot) = \alpha \Rightarrow x_{\mathcal{K}}(\cdot)$ is generated by a quasi-linear/quadratic direct utility.

Linear demand functions more generally

Let \succeq be a continuous, strictly convex, and strictly monotonic weak order on $X \subseteq \mathbb{R}^{n}_{++}$ (open and convex).

Let $\mathcal{N} := \{1, \ldots, n\}$ be the number of commodities. Take the *n*th commodity as the numeraire and $k \in \mathcal{N} \setminus \{n\}$. Let also $K := \{1, \ldots, k\}$, $M := \{k + 1, \ldots, n\}$, and $M_0 := M \setminus \emptyset$.

Let B be a $k \times k$ matrix of constants and suppose that \succeq generates the (total) demand function $x : \mathbb{R}_{++}^n \supseteq Q \to X$ where

$$x_{\mathcal{K}}\left(\boldsymbol{q}
ight) :=lpha\left(\boldsymbol{q}_{\mathcal{M}}
ight) +B\boldsymbol{q}_{\mathcal{K}}$$

with $\alpha: Q_M \to \mathbb{R}^k$ a continuous function.

Main result

Theorem

The following are equivalent:

(i). \succeq is differentiable.

(ii). Q is open in \mathbb{R}^n_{++} , B is non-singular, $M_0 = \emptyset$ while $\alpha(\cdot)$ is constant. (iii). $M_0 = \emptyset$ and $\alpha(\cdot)$ is constant while \succeq is represented by the utility function $u: X \to \mathbb{R}$ given by

$$u(x_{K}, x_{n}) := x_{n} - x_{K}\widetilde{B}\alpha - x_{K}\widetilde{B}x_{K}/2$$

where $\alpha = \alpha(\cdot)$ and \widetilde{B} is a non-singular $k \times k$ matrix of constants (specifically, $\widetilde{B} := B^{-1}$). (iv). Q is open in \mathbb{R}^n_{++} , B is symmetric and negative definite while $M_0 = \emptyset$ and $\alpha(\cdot)$ is constant. (v). Q is open in \mathbb{R}^n_{++} , $M_0 = \emptyset$, $\alpha(\cdot)$ is constant while $x_{\mathcal{K}}(\cdot)$ satisfies the strict Law of Demand:

$$(q_{K}-\widetilde{q}_{K})(x_{K}(q_{K})-x_{K}(\widetilde{q}_{K}))<0 \qquad orall q_{K}, \widetilde{q}_{K}\in Q_{K}: \ q_{K}
eq \widetilde{q}_{K}$$

Applications

Let $\mathcal{N} = \{1,2,3\}$ and take the 3rd commodity as the numeraire.

The demand function $x_1(q_1, q_2, w) = f(w) - 2q_1 + q_2$ cannot be rationalized with (weakly) smooth preferences.

The demand function $x_1(q_1, q_2, w) = 1 - 2q_1 + q_2$ can be rationalized with (weakly) smooth preferences *if* we also have $x_2(q_1, q_2, w) = \alpha_2 + q_1 + b_{22}q_2$ where

$$B:=\left[\begin{array}{cc} -2 & 1\\ 1 & b_{22} \end{array}\right]$$

is -ve definite.

Applications

Let $\mathcal{H} = \{1, \dots, H\}$ be customers in a market, each with demand

$$x^h(q) = \alpha^h + B^h q, \quad h \in \mathcal{H}$$

These demands can be rationalized only if each B^h is symmetric and -ve definite. Hence, only if $B := \sum_{h \in \mathcal{H}} B^h$ is also symmetric and -ve definite.

The aggregate demand function

$$\mathbf{x}(q) = \sum_{h \in \mathcal{H}} \left(\alpha^h + B^h q \right)$$

is rationalizable by a single hypothetical agent with preferences given by the Theorem.

通 ト イ ヨ ト イ ヨ ト

Applications

Estimation of utilities that generate demand functions (Deaton EJ1978): The form $u(x) = (x - \alpha)A(x - \alpha)$ is consistent with linear demand only if

(i) the (n-1)th principal minor of A is symmetric and -ve definite, and (ii). $A_{nn} = 0 = A_{nj+A_{jn}}$ for all j = 1, ..., n-1.

Additive preferences (Houthakker ECMA1960): An additive $u(\cdot)$ is consistent with linear demand *only if* it is of the form $u(x) = x_n + \sum_{j=1}^{n-1} (\alpha_j x_j + b_j x_j^2)$ - i.e., *B* is diagonal.

Integrability of demand systems that are independent of income (Nocke and Schutz JET2017): x(q) that satisfies the Law of Demand and there exists $v(\cdot)$ such that $\nabla_q v(q) = -x(q)$.

ロトメポトメミトメミト・ミ

Taking $k \in \mathcal{N} \setminus \{n\}$, let $K := \{1, ..., k\}$, $M := \{k + 1, ..., n\}$, $M_0 := M \setminus \{n\}$ and B be a $k \times k$ matrix of constants. Suppose also that the continuous, strictly convex, and strictly monotonic weak order \succeq on X generates the (total) demand function $x : Q \to X$ where

$$x_{\mathcal{K}}(q) := \alpha(q_{\mathcal{M}}) + Bq_{\mathcal{K}}$$

with $\alpha: Q_M \to \mathbb{R}^k$ a continuous function. The following are equivalent: (i). \succeq is differentiable. (ii). Q is open in \mathbb{R}^n_{++} , B is non-singular, $M_0 = \emptyset$ while $\alpha(\cdot)$ is constant.

伺 ト イヨト イヨト

Differentiable preferences [Rubinstein (2006)]

 \succeq is *differentiable* at $x \in X$ if there exists $p_x \in \mathbb{R}^n \setminus \{0\}$ that makes the following sets

$$\{y \in \mathbb{R}^n : p_x y > 0\}$$

and

$$\{y \in \mathbb{R}^n : \exists \lambda_x^* > 0 \text{ such that } x + \lambda y \succ x \quad \forall \lambda \in (0, \lambda_x^*)\}$$

coincide.

If it exists, p_x will be referred to as a preference gradient at x.

Preference gradients graphically Integrability



Figure: p, p^* support \mathcal{U}_x ; neither is a preference gradient.



Figure: *p* is a preference gradient.

Diasakos and Gerasimou (AEJ: Micro 2022)

The following are equivalent for a continuous weak order \succeq on X: (i). \succeq is strictly convex, strictly monotonic, and differentiable. (ii). There is a unique, open set $Y \subseteq \mathbb{R}^n_{++}$ and a unique, homeomorphic demand function $x : Y \to X$ that is generated by \succeq .

Indifference-projection functions

Consider the *indifference-projection correspondence* $I_n(\cdot|x) : \mathcal{I}_x^{-n} \twoheadrightarrow \mathcal{I}_x^n$ for good *n* by requiring

$$y_n \in I_n(y_{-n}|x) \iff y \in \mathcal{I}_x,$$

The graph of this correspondence is the indifference set \mathcal{I}_{x} .

 $I_i(\cdot|x)$ is actually a *function* that is locally convex and thus also continuous.

 $l_i(\cdot|x)$ is differentiable at y_{-i} if and only if the local subdifferential $\partial l_i(y_{-i}|x)$ is a singleton, in which case the unique subgradient coincides with the gradient.

The indifference-projection gradient **back**

Let $q_{-n}(x)$ denote the -ve of the gradient (equivalently, the unique subgradient) of the indifference-projection function $l_n(\cdot|x)$ for good n at x.

The preference gradient p_x coincides with p(x), the inverse demand at this bundle, and is determined by

$$q_{-n}(x) = -\nabla I_n(x_{-n}|x),$$

$$q_n(x) = \frac{1}{x_n + q_{-n}(x) \cdot x_{-n}},$$

$$p(x) = q_n(x)(1, q_{-n}(x)),$$

where $q_{-n}(x) \gg 0$, $q_n(x) > 0$ and $p(x) \gg 0$.

\succeq differentiable \Rightarrow *B* non-singular

If *B* is singular, there exist $v \in \mathbb{R}^k \setminus \{0^k\}$: $Bv = 0^k$. Let \succeq be differentiable. Taking $q \in Q$ and $\varepsilon > 0$ sufficiently small, we have $(q_K + \lambda v, q_M) \in Q$ for any $\lambda \in (-\varepsilon, \varepsilon)$. Define the function $q_K : (-\varepsilon, \varepsilon) \to Q_K$ by $q_K(\lambda) := q_K + \lambda v$. We have

$$x_{\mathcal{K}}\left(q_{\mathcal{K}}+\lambda v,q_{\mathcal{M}}
ight)=\mathsf{a}\left(q_{\mathcal{M}}
ight)+Bq_{\mathcal{K}}+\lambda Bv=x_{\mathcal{K}}\left(q
ight)$$

and we can show that

$$\begin{aligned} x_n \left(q_K \left(\lambda \right), q_M \right) + q_{M_0} x_{M_0} \left(q_K \left(\lambda \right), q_M \right) &= x_n \left(q \right) + q_{M_0} x_{M_0} \left(q \right) \\ &- \left(q_K \left(\lambda \right) - q_K \right) x_K \left(q \right) \\ &= x_n \left(q \right) + q_{M_0} x_{M_0} \left(q \right) \\ &- \lambda v x_K \left(q \right) \end{aligned}$$

\succeq differentiable \Rightarrow *B* non-singular back

Case I: There exists
$$x^0 \in X$$
: $vx_K^0 = 0$.
Then $q^0 \in Q$: $x^0 = x(q^0)$ wgives $q^0x(q^0 + \lambda v) = (q^0 + \lambda v)x^0$. $\rightarrow | \leftarrow$

Case II: There exists
$$x^0 \in X \ vx_K^0 = vx_K(q_K^0, q_{M_0}^0, w')$$
.
Letting $\lambda := -(w' - w^0) / vx^0$ we get that $q^0x(q_K^0 + \lambda v, q_{M_0}^0, w^0) = w'$
while $(q_K^0 + \lambda v)x_K(q_K^0, q_{M_0}^0, w') + q_M^0x_Mx(q_K^0, q_{M_0}^0, w') = w^0$. $\to | \leftarrow$.

Case III: $vx_{K}(q_{K}, q_{M_{0}}, w) \neq vx_{K}(q_{K}, q_{M_{0}}, w')$ for all $(q_{K}, q_{M_{0}}, w), (q_{K}, q_{M_{0}}, w') \in Q$. Consider the sets

$$\begin{array}{rcl} Q^{0} & := & \left\{ q \in Q : \; x_{M} \left(q \right) = x_{M}^{0} \right\} \\ X^{0} & := & \left\{ x \in X : \; x_{M} = x_{M}^{0} \right\} \\ X^{*}_{K} & := & \left\{ x_{K} \in X_{K}^{0} : \; vx_{K} = vx_{K}^{0} \right\} \end{array}$$

Then income must remain constant along the hyperplane $X_{\mathcal{K}}^*$. $\rightarrow | \leftarrow$.

 \succeq differentiable, B non-singular \Rightarrow $M_0 = \varnothing$ (see

Let \succeq be differentiable and $M_0 \neq \emptyset$. For $x \in X$ and $q_M \in Q_M$ consider the sets

$$\begin{array}{lll} X^{q_M} & := & \{ \widetilde{x} \in X : \exists q_K \in Q_K, \ \widetilde{x} = x(q_K, q_M) \} \\ Q^x_M & := & \{ q_M \in Q_M : \exists \widetilde{x} \in X^{q_M}, \ \widetilde{x} \sim x \} \end{array}$$

Take $x^0 \in X$ and notice that \mathcal{I}_{x^0} can be partitioned as $\mathcal{I}_{x^0} = \bigcup_{q_M \in Q_M^{x^0}} \mathcal{I}_{x^0|q_M}$ where $\mathcal{I}_{x^0|q_M} := \mathcal{I}_{x^0} \cap X^{q_M}$. Restricting thus attention to the domain $X^{q_M^0}$, we trace $\mathcal{I}_{x^0|q_M^0}$ as long as we obey the following system of partial differential equations

$$\begin{array}{lll} \partial x_n / \partial x_j &=& -q_j^0, & j \in M_0 \\ \partial x_n / \partial x_j &=& \left(B^{-1} (\alpha \left(q_M^0 \right) - x_K) \right)_j, & j \in K \end{array}$$

Integrating along $\mathcal{I}_{\chi^0|q^0_M}$ gives

$$x_n = x_K B^{-1} \alpha \left(q_M^0 \right) - x_K B^{-1} x_K / 2 - q_{M_0}^0 x_{M_0} + c_0, \qquad x \in \mathcal{I}_{x^0 | q_M^0}$$

for some integrating constant c_0 .

御下 くまた くまた

 \succeq differentiable, *B* non-singular, $M_0 = \emptyset \Rightarrow \alpha(\cdot)$ is constant **lock**

Let \succeq be differentiable. As $M_0 = \emptyset$, $\alpha(\cdot)$ is a function only of income. Suppose that $\alpha(w) \neq \alpha(w_0)$ for all $w \in (w_0 - \lambda_0, w_0 + \lambda_0) \setminus \{w_0\}$ for sufficiently small $\lambda_0 \in \mathbb{R}_{++}$.

Define the $(-\lambda_0, \lambda_0) \to \mathbb{R}^K$ function $\epsilon(\lambda) := B^{-1}(\alpha(w_0 + \lambda) - \alpha(w_0)).$

For $\lambda \in (-\lambda_0, \lambda_0)$ consider the sets

$$\hat{Q}_{K}^{\lambda} := \{ q_{K} \in Q_{K} : x_{n} (q_{K} - \epsilon (\lambda), w_{0} + \lambda) = x_{n} (q_{K}^{0} - \epsilon (\lambda), w_{0} + \lambda) \}$$

$$\hat{X}^{\lambda} := \{ x \in X : x_{n} = x_{n} (q_{K}^{0} - \epsilon (\lambda), w_{0} + \lambda) \}$$

We can show that there exist $\lambda_1 \in (-\lambda_0, \lambda_0)$ and $\rho_1 > 0$ such that

$$0 = \epsilon \left(\lambda_{1}\right) \left(x_{\mathcal{K}}\left(q_{\mathcal{K}}, w_{0}\right) - x_{\mathcal{K}}^{0}\right) \qquad \qquad \forall q_{\mathcal{K}} \in \mathcal{B}_{q_{\mathcal{K}}^{0}}\left(\rho_{1}\right)$$

Proposition

Let \succeq be a continuous, strictly convex, and strictly monotonic weak order on X. Taking $k \in \mathcal{N} \setminus \{n\}$, let also $\mathcal{K} := \{1, \ldots, k\}$, $M := \{k + 1, \ldots, n\}$, and B be a $k \times k$ matrix of constants. Suppose finally that the generated demand function $x : Y \to X$ is such that

$$x_{K}(p) := \alpha(p_{M}) + Bp_{K}$$

with $\alpha : Y_M \to R^k$ a continuous function. The following are equivalent. (i). \succeq is differentiable. (ii). Y is open in \mathbb{R}^n_{++} , B is non-singular and $M = \{n\}$.

When prices are normalized w.r.t. income

Theorem

Let $x: Y \to X$ be such that

$$x_{\mathcal{K}}(p) := \alpha + \gamma p_n + B p_{-n}, \qquad p \in Y$$

where $\alpha, \gamma \in \mathbb{R}^{n-1}$ are constants. The following are equivalent. (i). \succeq is differentiable. (ii). Y is open in \mathbb{R}^{n}_{++} and B is non-singular. (iii). \succeq is represented by the utility function $u: X \to \mathbb{R}$ given by

$$u(x) := \begin{cases} \left(x_n - x_{-n} \widetilde{B} \gamma \right) \exp\left(\int_{X_K^0} \frac{\widetilde{B}(x_{-n} - \alpha)}{1 - x_{-n} \widetilde{B}(x_{-n} - \alpha)} \mathrm{d} x_{-n} \right) & x_{-n} \in X_{-n}^0 \\ 0 & x_{-n} \in X_{-n} \setminus X_K^0 \end{cases}$$

where \tilde{B} is a non-singular $(n-1) \times (n-1)$ matrix of constants (with $\tilde{B}^{-1} = B$) while $X_{-n}^0 =: \{x_{-n} \in X_{-n} : x_{-n}\tilde{B}(x_{-n} - \alpha) \neq 1\}$.