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Communication Effort and the Cost of Language: Evidence from Stack Overflow

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Communication frictions hinder information flows

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Communication frictions hinder information flows

- Not-aligned incentives between sender and receiver
- Language barriers

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Communication frictions hinder information flows

- Not-aligned incentives between sender and receiver
- Language barriers

To what extent the cost of language affects communication effort?

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- \rightarrow Q&A website about computer programming (100M+ visitors/month)
- Sender is user answering the question
- Receiver is user asking the question

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This paper Data from Stack Overflow:

- \rightarrow Q&A website about computer programming (100M+ visitors/month)
- Sender is user answering the question
- Receiver is user asking the question

- Sender writes higher quality answers if she can use her native language rather than a foreign? How much?

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- Do incentives matter?

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- Sender is user answering the question
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- Sender writes higher quality answers if she can use her native language rather than a foreign? How much?
- Do incentives matter?
- Does the quality of the question matter?

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- Sender is user answering the question
- Receiver is user asking the question

- Sender writes higher quality answers if she can use her native language rather than a foreign? How much?
- Do **incentives** matter?
- Does the quality of the question matter?
- Is there heterogeneity across users?

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- Bob needs some information to take an action \rightarrow asks question with effort E_Q
- Alice internalizes a share (γ) of **Bob's utility** \rightarrow answers question with effort E_A

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Theoretical framework

- Bob needs some information to take an action \rightarrow asks question with effort E_Q
- Alice **internalizes** a share (γ) of **Bob's utility** \rightarrow answers question with effort E_A Sender best-response effort choice:

$$\mathsf{R}(\mathsf{E}_{\mathsf{Q}}) = rac{\mathsf{E}_{\mathsf{Q}}(\sqrt{\gamma}\mathsf{k}_{\mathsf{A}} - oldsymbol{s}\lambda_{\mathsf{A}})}{\lambda_{\mathsf{A}}(\mathsf{E}_{\mathsf{Q}} + oldsymbol{s})},$$

Where:

- k_A and λ_A are Alice's expertise and language cost respectively

- s is precision of prior

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After a drop in the language cost ($\Delta\lambda_{\mathcal{A}}<$ 0):

- Effort increases

$$\Delta R(E_Q) = -\frac{E_Q \sqrt{\gamma} k_A \Delta \lambda_A}{\lambda''_A \lambda'_A (E_Q + s)} > 0 \tag{1}$$

and:

- the effect's size depends on the size of the change in the cost of language:

$$\frac{\partial \Delta R(E_Q)}{\partial \Delta \lambda_A} = -\frac{E_Q \sqrt{\gamma} k_A}{\lambda'_A \lambda'_A (E_Q + s)} > 0 \quad \text{if} \quad \Delta \lambda_A < 0 \tag{2}$$

- the effect is positive on the effort made by the questioner:

$$\frac{\partial \Delta R(E_Q)}{\partial E_Q} = -\frac{\sqrt{\gamma} k_A \lambda''_A \lambda'_A \Delta \lambda_A s}{\left[\lambda''_A \lambda'_A (E_Q + s)\right]^2} > 0 \quad \text{if} \quad \Delta \lambda_A < 0 \tag{3}$$

- the effect is positive on the degree of incentive alignment:

$$\frac{\partial \Delta R(E_Q)}{\partial \gamma} = -\frac{E_Q k_A \Delta \lambda_A}{2\sqrt{\gamma} \lambda''_A \lambda'_A (E_Q + s)} > 0 \quad \text{if} \quad \Delta \lambda_A < 0 \tag{4}$$

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Staggered implementation of languages:



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Staggered implementation of languages:



Treated users: natives

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Data

All answers of:

- users participating in both English and non-English languages (treatment)
- random sample of users participating only in English (control)

			#answers	#authors	Earliest	Latest
Group	Post in:	Status				
Control	SO		6976	536	2008-09-16	2017-08-27
Treatment	SO	Not yet Treated	128984	2680	2008-08-12	2015-10-29
		Treated	100610	2089	2010-10-10	2017-08-28
	SOJ	Treated	3435	204	2014-10-10	2017-08-25
	SOP	Treated	30273	1183	2013-12-12	2017-08-27
	SOR	Treated	8448	137	2010-12-20	2017-08-28
	SOS	Treated	15139	1156	2015-10-30	2017-08-28

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Variables

- Quality of contributions (effort): number of pieces of code in the answer (Example)
- Incentives: amount of auctioned points for answer
- **empathy**: whether questioner speaks the **same language**, questioner's **picture**, questioner has **full name**
- competition: number of other answers in same question, number of viewings

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Raw data



Average number of pieces of code

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Effect of a reduction in the cost of language

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	TWFE	TWFE 1	TWFE 2	TWFE 3	BJS	BJS 1	BJS 2	BJS 3
after	0.392*	0.387*	0.388*	0.205*	0.656***	0.677***	0.683***	0.663***
	(0.107)	(0.111)	(0.111)	(0.0551)	(0.0412)	(0.0397)	(0.0387)	(0.0751)
Observations	293777	292919	292919	280407	293777	292846	292846	199564
cse	Nat-lang							
Controls								
QEffort	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Competition	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes
Empathy	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes

Standard errors in parentheses

* *p* < 0.05, ** *p* < 0.01, *** *p* < 0.001

Robustness

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Effect is driven by who is "switching" the most categories: guantiles of #answers no-Eng

quantiles of $\frac{\#answe}{\#answe}$	rs after				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	
	TWFE	TWFE 2	BJS	BJS 2	
Low imes after	0.0988	0.125	0.228***	0.212*	Ī
	(0.114)	(0.102)	(0.0571)	(0.101)	
MediumLow $ imes$ after	0.224	0.0889	0.472***	0.217**	
	(0.122)	(0.106)	(0.0460)	(0.0795)	
MediumHigh $ imes$ after	0.660*	0.232	0.562***	0.644***	
	(0.198)	(0.125)	(0.0351)	(0.113)	
High $ imes$ after	1.475***	0.838*	1.883***	2.214***	
-	(0.142)	(0.174)	(0.0211)	(0.0825)	
Observations	292919	280407	292846	199564	
cse	Nat-lang	Nat-lang	Nat-lang	Nat-lang	
Controls					
QEffort	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Competition	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Empathy	No	Yes	No	Yes	

Standard errors in parentheses

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Effect increases in questioner's effort

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	TWFE	TWFE 2	BJS	BJS 2
Low imes after	0.143	-0.0522	0.374***	0.388***
	(0.129)	(0.0693)	(0.0638)	(0.0927)
MediumLow $ imes$ after	0.581**	0.401**	0.868***	0.869***
	(0.100)	(0.0543)	(0.0788)	(0.107)
MediumHigh $ imes$ after	0.578**	0.400**	0.884***	0.912***
	(0.103)	(0.0455)	(0.0708)	(0.0977)
Liller the second	0.500**	0.440***	0.077***	0.007***
High \times after	0.592**	0.413***	0.977***	0.927***
	(0.0709)	(0.0236)	(0.0328)	(0.0596)
Observations	292919	280407	292846	199564
cse	Nat-lang	Nat-lang	Nat-lang	Nat-lang
Controls				
QEffort	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Competition	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Empathy	No	Yes	No	Yes

Standard errors in parentheses

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Effect increases in incentives

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	TWFE	TWFE 2	BJS	BJS 2
Low imes after	0.373*	0.190*	0.666***	0.652***
	(0.110)	(0.0534)	(0.0391)	(0.0758)
MediumLow $ imes$ after	1.235*	1.045*	1.645***	1.088***
	(0.287)	(0.236)	(0.192)	(0.189)
Mar Proved Parks and an	0.000	0 4 0 5	0 750***	0 0 0 5 5 * * *
MediumHign × after	2.296	2.135	2.759***	2.355***
	(0.831)	(0.874)	(0.425)	(0.447)
High $ imes$ after	3.008***	2.651**	3.477***	2.976***
9	(0.268)	(0.209)	(0.388)	(0.408)
Observations	292919	280407	292846	199564
cse	Nat-lang	Nat-lang	Nat-lang	Nat-lang
Controls				
QEffort	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Competition	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Empathy	No	Yes	No	Yes

Standard errors in parentheses

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What trade-off for the platform?

How many languages should Stack Overflow have?

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Implementing multiple languages:

- Quality increases by 24% when writers use their first language (GOOD)

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- Quality increases by 24% when writers use their first language (GOOD)
- Answers are 7% more likely to solve the questioner's problem (GOOD)

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- Quality increases by 24% when writers use their first language (GOOD)
- Answers are 7% more likely to solve the questioner's problem (GOOD)
- At least 42.8% of non-native English users joined because of the availability of their language (GOOD)

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- Quality increases by 24% when writers use their first language (GOOD)
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- At least 42.8% of non-native English users joined because of the availability of their language (GOOD)
- New joiners provide significantly lower quality contributions (BAD)

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- No significant externalities to English website (GOOI



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- Quality increases by 24% when writers use their first language (GOOD)
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- No significant externalities to English website (GOOD)
- Only 11% of programming languages discussed in Stack Overflo are discussed in all websites (BAD)

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- Quality increases by 24% when writers use their first language (GOOD)
- Answers are 7% more likely to solve the questioner's problem (GOOD)
- At least 42.8% of non-native English users joined because of the availability of their language (GOOD)
- New joiners provide significantly lower quality contributions (BAD)
- No significant externalities to English website (GOOD)
- Only 11% of programming languages discussed in Stack Overflo are discussed in all websites (BAD)
- 33.6% of programming languages discussed in Stack Overflo are discussed in more than one website (BAD)

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- Language barriers induce substantial lower quality of communication
- A policy that reduces language barriers is ineffective if not complemented with incentives and reciprocity

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Conclusion

- Language barriers induce substantial lower quality of communication
- A policy that reduces language barriers is ineffective if not complemented with incentives and reciprocity
- A platform should implement additional languages ONLY if the community benefiting is large enough

Thank you!

Feedback very welcome: jacopo.bregolin@liverpool.ac.uk

Share of non-native English speakers increases

	After	Before	Not_registered	Tot
SOJ	1579	695	3588	5862
SOP	12178	3386	7800	23364
SOR	23661	279	23352	47292
SOS	7593	3720	5064	16377
Tot	45011	8080	39804	92895

Table: Number of active non-native English users who registered in the English website before treatment, after treatment, or did not register. Active means that published at least an answer or question in the non-English websites of the corresponding row.

New joiners contribute lower quality

Average number of code snippets used in answers across authors



Users' participation in English before treatment

Externalities on the English website

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	TWFE	TWFE 1	TWFE 2	TWFE 3	BJS	BJS 1	BJS 2	BJS 3
after \times InSo	0.196**	0.186**	0.185**	0.178*	0.203***	0.209***	0.216***	0.203*
	(0.0234)	(0.0347)	(0.0342)	(0.0421)	(0.0555)	(0.0534)	(0.0528)	(0.0948)
Observations	293777	292919	292919	280407	236495	235574	235574	176512
cse	Nat-lang							
Controls								
QEffort	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Competition	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes
Empathy	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes

Effect on contribution quality in English after treatment.

Standard errors in parentheses

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Inefficiency in aggregating information

Number of non-English languages with the tag Whether tag is in English site	0.0	1.0	2.0	3.0	4.0
0.0	430	8	3	1	28
1.0	152	29	17	9	

Table: Number of programming languages for which at least a question has been made in 0, 1, 2, 3, or 4 of the non-English languages. Rows split the sample based on whether the tag appears in the English website (1) or not (0)

Estimation

Let **i be answers**, **j be users**, **t be weeks**. TWFE:

$$numCodes_{i(jt)} = \alpha_j + \alpha_t + \beta D_{jt} + W'_{i(jt)} \gamma + \varepsilon_{i(jt)},$$

Borusyak, Jaravel, Spiess (2021 WP):

[Step 1]
$$numCodes_{i(jt)} = \alpha_j + \alpha_t + W'_{i(jt)}\gamma + \varepsilon_{i(jt)}$$
 if *j* not treated at time *t*,
[Step 2] $num\hat{C}odes_{i(jt)} = \hat{\alpha}_j + \hat{\alpha}_t + W'_{i(jt)}\hat{\gamma}$ if *j* treated at time *t*,
 $\hat{\tau}_{i(jt)} = numCodes_{i(jt)} - num\hat{C}odes_{i(jt)}$ if *j* treated at time *t*.
[Step 3] $\hat{\tau} = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i(jt)|j \text{ treated at time t}} \hat{\tau}_{i(jt)}$.

Estimation: Heterogeneity and 2nd degree effects

Let **c be some category** at either user or answer level.

TWFE:
$$numCodes_{i(jt)} = \alpha_j + \alpha_t + \sum_c \beta_c D_{jt} \mathbf{1}_{c(j)} + \mathbf{W}'_{i(jt)} \gamma + \varepsilon_{i(jt)},$$

BJS: $\hat{\tau}_c = \frac{1}{N_c} \sum_{i(jt)|j \text{ treated at time t}} \hat{\tau}_{i(jt)} \mathbf{1}_{c(j)}$

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Robustness: quality as probability that answer is best answer

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	TWFE	TWFE 1	TWFE 2	TWFE 3	BJS	BJS 1	BJS 2	BJS 3
after	0.0211***	0.0209***	0.0203**	0.00873	0.105***	0.105***	0.0931***	0.0705***
	(0.00245)	(0.00240)	(0.00244)	(0.00440)	(0.00425)	(0.00420)	(0.00340)	(0.00742)
Observations	293777	292919	292919	280407	293777	292846	292846	199564
cse	Nat-lang							
Controls								
QEffort	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Competition	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes
Empathy	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes

Standard errors in parentheses

* *p* < 0.05, ** *p* < 0.01, *** *p* < 0.001

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Example: effort measure

