Do Enfranchised Immigrants Affect Politicians' Behaviour?

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Abstract

Immigrants are a large and growing unenfranchised group across many developed countries. Does immigrants' enfranchisement affect how politicians respond to immigration? I study the unique UK context, where immigrants from Ireland and the Commonwealth have voting rights in all elections immediately upon arrival, but these rights are not accorded to other immigrants. I analyse how politicians discuss immigration using text analysis of the universe of speeches in the UK parliament and how MPs vote on immigration bills between 1972 and 2011. I use a shift-share instrument exploiting pre-existing settlement patterns to address immigrants' endogenous location choice. I find that politicians exposed to higher enfranchised immigration spend more time in the parliament discussing issues that affect immigrants positively, yet they vote to increase immigration restrictions. Enfranchisement leads to more political engagement of immigrants, and politicians respond to this engagement. The political cost of favouring enfranchised immigrants is compensated by restricting future immigration.

Key words: Enfranchisement, Immigrants, Representation, Parliament.
JEL Codes: J15, D72, F22, H11.

1 Introduction

Many developed countries have a large and growing share of immigrants. In the US, the foreign-born population was 45 million in 2015 (14% of the population) and is projected to reach 78 million by 2065.[1] Immigration is affecting the economic and political conditions in many ways, such as increasing polarisation and reducing support for redistributive policies (Dahlberg et al., 2012; Guriev and Papaioannou, 2020). A key issue is the enfranchisement of immigrants. Politicians do not directly represent immigrants' due to their political exclusion. There is some evidence that immigrants' naturalisation leads to more integration (Hainmueller et al., 2017; Gathmann and Keller, 2018), but naturalisation takes many years (even decades for some in the US).[2] The native population also fear that, in enfranchising immigrants, they will lose control of the political process. This leads them to oppose the enfranchisement of existing immigrants, and it also leads to opposition against new immigration (Bloemraad et al., 2008; Brettell and Hollifield, 2014).

In this paper, I ask the question: Does the political inclusion of immigrants affects how politicians in the host countries react to immigration? Politicians may find some electoral benefits in addressing concerns of the enfranchised immigrants, whose preferences may be distinctly different from those of the natives. At the same time, pro-immigration policies may bear electoral costs (higher vote share for populist parties) due to natives' hostility towards immigrants (Barone et al., 2016; Halla et al., 2017; Dustmann et al., 2019; Edo et al., 2019). In addition, the evidence on politicians' responsiveness to voters' concerns points to out-group prejudice and in-group favouritism (Butler and Broockman, 2011; Iyer et al., 2012; Butler, 2014). It is unclear whether enfranchisement makes a difference in politicians' behaviour.

The United Kingdom provides a unique context to answer this question. Unlike any other immigrant receiving country, it allows immigrants from Ireland and the Commonwealth[3] to vote in all elections immediately upon arrival. On the other hand, migrants from other countries do not have the same rights until they become UK citizens (disenfranchised, henceforth). I exploit within- and across-constituency

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[1]Source: Pew Research Center projections for 2015 − 2065, last accessed September 2021.

[2]As of September 2021, the US government was processing immigrant applications for Mexican family-based visa filed in February 1999 and employment-based visa for the skilled workers from India filed in January 2014. Source: Visa Bulletin, Number 57, Volume X, US Department of State.

[3]The Commonwealth originated as a group of countries that were a part of the British Empire.

variation in immigration from enfranchised and disenfranchised countries. To overcome the endogeneity in the location of immigrants, I use a shift-share instrumental variable approach, in which historical settlement across constituencies is interacted with the overall migration inflow by country (Angrist and Krueger, 1999; Card, 2009). The instrument exploits the fact that immigrants tend to cluster geographically in the receiving country, and newcomers tend to settle in places where their ethnic community is large.

I analyse the incumbent's response to immigration using data on the universe of UK parliament speeches and voting behaviour on immigration bills between 1972 and 2011. The text data allows me to capture incumbents' sentiments in a nuanced way. I use dictionary-based methods to find parliamentary speeches about immigrants. Quantitatively, I calculate the share of parliament days in each year during which each member of parliament (MP) talked about immigrants. Qualitatively, I estimate a sentiment score of those speeches using the valence norms associated with the speech text (higher scores indicate a positive sentiment). Lastly, I compute an average probability that an MP voted in favour of and against immigrants in amendments to the immigration bills tabled in the parliament.

I investigate how enfranchised and disenfranchised immigration to a constituency affects incumbents' speeches and voting in the parliament about immigrants. I measure immigration as the changes in the fraction of foreign-born individuals over the constituency population. I split the foreign-born population into the enfranchised and the disenfranchised groups. I define the native population as the individuals born in the UK. The UK parliament meets for about 154 days a year. On average, an MP talks about immigrants on 7.8% of parliament days (12 days). The average share of foreign-born population is 8.8% and is almost equally distributed across the two groups (4.6% are enfranchised and 4.2% are disenfranchised).

First, I analyse the effect on speeches. I find that a 1 SD (or five percentage points) higher enfranchised immigration share in the population increases the share of parliament days on which MPs mention immigrants by 1.3 p.p. (a 16.66% or 2-day increase). The MPs also talk about immigrants positively: the valence norms increase by 0.23 SD. The increase in parliament discussions due to enfranchised immigration comes from a higher use of words specific to immigrants from the enfranchised countries. In contrast, a 1 SD higher disenfranchised immigration

reduces the parliament days where MPs talk about immigrant issues by 19%, and the sentiment is less positive: the valence norms reduce by 0.23 SD.

Second, I analyse the voting on bills. I find that a 1 SD increase in enfranchised immigration makes MPs 9.3 p.p. more likely to vote to amend a bill against immigration (20% higher probability on a mean of 0.459) and 8.1 p.p. less likely to vote to amend a bill in favour of immigration to keep the bill at status quo. I find an opposite results for the MPs exposed to disenfranchised immigration. These 2SLS results are robust to the exclusion of ethnically close enfranchised immigrants (from Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and Ireland) and the inclusion of controls for party vote shares, stock of immigrants, observable characteristics of immigrants, and the ethnic-minority identity of MPs. In addition, I recover the effect of immigration shocks on outcomes through exposure as suggested by Borusyak et al. (2020).

I explain the opposite results on speeches and voting using politicians' electoral benefits and costs. The political inclusion of immigrants makes makes MPs directly responsible for their representation in the parliament. Also, helping immigrant voters with their concerns is potentially an easy way for politicians to gain trust and enhance their reputation among the immigrant community (Butler et al., 2012; Bussell, 2019). On the other hand, there are electoral costs due to natives' hostility. In the UK context, Blinder and Allen (2016) find that natives' preference to reduce immigration goes as far back as the 1970s and concerns are similar for both EU and non-EU immigration. The electoral benefits could explain the positive representation of enfranchised immigrants in the parliament. In contrast, there are no electoral benefits from the disenfranchised immigrants and natives' hostility could explain their negative representation.

Analysing the electoral cost argument, I find that constituencies with more enfranchised immigration did not observe any changes over time in the party affiliation of their representatives but saw underlying shifts in the parties' vote shares. In particular, enfranchised immigration decreased vote shares for the Labour party and increased vote shares for the other parties, particularly the Green party and right-wing populist parties.[4] These results suggest that as MPs addressed immigrants'

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[4]Immigration did not have any impact on the turnout of voters or migration of the natives.

concerns and spoke positively about them (potentially due to electoral benefits), a fraction of natives increased their support for the alternative parties.

In further analysis, I find that incumbents only respond to enfranchised immigration when the electoral costs are low. This claim is supported by two findings. First, I find that incumbents are unlikely to appeal to immigrant voters in constituencies with high electoral competition. Immigration is a salient issue during the elections, and this result hints that incumbents do not want to lose the support of the majority natives while earning immigrant votes. Second, the MPs in constituencies with a higher Labour party vote share are more likely to respond favourably to the enfranchised immigration in the parliament. This result suggests the importance of a large voter base with a pro-immigration ideology in getting politicians to talk positively about immigrants in parliament.

I find that incumbents compensate for rising electoral costs by voting to restrict future immigration and they vote in accordance with majority natives' preferences. This is supported by three findings. First, using survey data, I find that both types of immigrants are more open to future immigration than the natives even when they have UK citizenship. Second, the incumbents in constituencies that are tightly contested are more likely to vote to restrict future immigration to appeal to the majority natives' preferences. Third, I find that incumbents in constituencies with higher Labour party vote share are more likely to amend the immigration bill to increase restrictions.

Overall, I find that as the proportion of enfranchised immigrants increase the incumbents favour the enfranchised immigrants and yet vote to restrict future immigration. By contrast, an increase in proportion of the disenfranchised immigrants leads to an opposite effect. This prompts two questions: how are the two immigrant groups different from each other, and why do politicians pay attention to the enfranchised immigrants? I answer these questions with descriptive evidence using the European Social Survey.

I find that immigrants from the two groups have similar gender composition, marital status, education levels, employment opportunities and life satisfaction levels on average. The historical connections for the enfranchised groups do not make them spend more time learning about political news and they are not more likely

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to trust the UK parliament, legal system, political parties and politicians. The disenfranchised immigrants do not feel discriminated against due to a lack of voting rights.

On the second question, I analyse the political engagement of immigrants using questions from the politics section of the European Social Survey. I find that the enfranchised immigrants are 5.5 p.p. (or 13.6% on a mean of 0.404) more likely to say they have taken a socio-political action (the most popular actions are signing a petition, participating in protests, contacting politicians and boycotting products) compared to the disenfranchised immigrants. This difference in socio-political action is largest when the immigrants do not have UK citizenship and for the enfranchised immigrants from stronger democracies. English language skills do not explain this difference. From the same survey I find that the enfranchised immigrants say that they actively participate in the elections even when they do not have UK citizenship.[5]

The descriptive evidence suggests that the enfranchised immigrants are more politically engaged. To understand if the political engagement channel drives politicians' behaviour, I study the topics of the parliament debates and use 2SLS estimation. I find that enfranchised immigration led to a 30% increase in the share of parliament days on which incumbents have mentioned immigrants in petitions, private member bills and questions to ministers. This result is also driven by constituencies with enfranchised immigration from stronger democracies, similar to the survey evidence on socio-political actions. Thus, the political engagement channel explains the positive representation of enfranchised immigrants in the parliament. I find no heterogeneity in voting on bills due to the enfranchised immigration from the stronger democracies, as the voting direction is a response to the native constituents' attitudes.

Contribution Immigration attracts a lot of attention from the academic community and policymakers. My paper contributes to different strands of the literature. First, on the political economy of immigrants in host countries, the recent literature

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[5]In the national elections, the enfranchised immigrants with UK citizenship have the same turnout as natives. The turnout gap between natives and disenfranchised immigrants with UK citizenship is 14.3 p.p.

finds that the size of the foreign-born population is linked with a support for populism (Becker et al., 2017; Alabrese et al., 2019; Halla et al., 2017; Edo et al., 2019; Dustmann et al., 2019; Steinmayr, 2021; Lonsky, 2021). In these cases, immigrants do not have voting rights, and the incumbent's response stems from the economic and cultural threat perceived by natives and their exposure to the foreign-born population. I document the role played by immigrants in shaping the politicians' behaviour and the immigration policy in the host country. In a similar vein, Biavaschi and Facchini (2020) exploit variation across US states in access to the ballot in the national elections for the foreign-born population during the early 20th century. They find that electoral accountability to naturalised immigrants affects the voting behaviour of the US Members of Congress. Members of Congress support an open migration policy in response to the large numbers of naturalised US citizens, and the effect is reversed if enfranchisement is restricted. In my context, the enfranchised immigrant population is small, and the restrictions on future immigration come as a response to the natives' preferences.

Second, in the enfranchisement literature, Acemoglu and Robinson (2000, 2001) and Conley and Temimi (2001) argue that the elites extended the franchise and diluted their powers due to the threat of revolution and to prevent social unrest. However, immigrants in my context are not the same as the disenfranchised native population of the early 20th century.[6] An increasing mass of immigrants would open up demand for descriptive representation and increase the native hostility, thereby threatening the incumbent's position. In my setting, restricting future immigration and, therefore, the size of the immigrant population keeps power in the hands of the existing incumbents and native majority. Additionally, there is nascent literature on non-citizen enfranchisement in Europe (Ferwerda et al., 2020; Stutzer and Slotwinski, 2020; Koukal et al., 2021). It addresses the conditions that drive natives' willingness to enfranchise non-citizens at the regional level. The UK provides a unique context for analysing the effects of immigrant voting rights, as the enfranchisement decision was independent of the current economic and political conditions and the stock of immigrants.

Third, recent work analysing political speeches in the UK has found emotional rhetoric matters in the legislative arena (Spirling, 2016; Crabtree et al., 2020; Os-

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[6]The migration flow rate is much higher than the native population growth rate.

nabrügge et al., 2021). Using text analysis on speeches, I study how changes in population demographics affect how politicians' represent their constituents in the parliament. Existing research on politicians' responsiveness to voters has mainly focussed on field experimental audit studies (Butler and Broockman, 2011; Iyer et al., 2012; Broockman, 2013; Nye et al., 2015; Gell-Redman et al., 2018). All these studies find legislators respond to those constituents with whom they share personal characteristics such as race and ethnicity. My paper analyses legislator responsiveness in a non-experimental setting and over three decades. I find that incumbents respond to even those constituents with whom they do not share their race and ethnicity, i.e., enfranchised immigrants from countries other than Ireland, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada.

2   Conceptual Framework

In this section, I discuss the intuition behind the incumbent's decision to respond to the concerns of the immigrants in their constituency. An incumbent can decide to respond positively, negatively or not respond at all. Some immigrants are enfranchised, while some are not. A basic formal theoretical model is available in the Appendix Section C.

In my framework, a fraction of the native population dislike immigrants (of any kind) and consider them an economic and cultural threat. Addressing immigrants' concerns could increase the electoral costs for the incumbent, due to rise of populist parties (as documented by Barone et al. (2016); Halla et al. (2017); Dustmann et al. (2019); Edo et al. (2019)). I assume the natives' hostility towards immigrants is an increasing function of the size of the immigrant population. An incumbent finds no electoral gains in addressing the concerns faced by the disenfranchised immigrants (Gaikwad and Nellis, 2020). Given the electoral costs, an incumbent does not respond to the disenfranchised immigrants. As their population share increases, the electoral benefits remain zero, but the costs increase. A re-election minded incumbent must find ways to reduce the electoral costs. *Hypothesis 1: Incumbents respond negatively to an increase in the population of disenfranchised immigrants.*

On the other hand, an incumbent can reap electoral gains by addressing the concerns faced by enfranchised immigrants. These immigrants are a separate voting

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bloc whose preferences may differ from those of the majority (natives). An incumbent may worry about losing natives' support due to their hostility. A simple trade-off suggests that an incumbent should address the enfranchised immigrants if the benefits are higher than the costs. As the enfranchised immigrant population share increases, the electoral benefits and costs increase. A re-election minded incumbent would want to keep up with the existing vote base of both natives and enfranchised immigrants.

In this case, an incumbent can either focus on issues common to both enfranchised immigrants and natives or find ways to reduce the loss of natives' votes when addressing the immigrants, or do both. One example of such a policy is restricting future immigration. While the immigrants may or may not be favour this policy, it helps the incumbent reduce the electoral costs from natives' hostility towards immigrants. *Hypothesis 2: Incumbents may respond to existing enfranchised immigrants positively as their population grows, and at the same time seek to restrict future immigration.*

The electoral costs may also vary depending on the majority voters' ideology in the constituency. Political ideology could work synergistically for some parties and in complementary ways for others. *Hypothesis 3: Incumbents in constituencies where majority voters' have a pro-immigration ideology may be more likely to favour enfranchised immigrants.* This simple political agency framework gives us micro-foundations of politicians' behaviour toward enfranchised and disenfranchised immigrants. In the following sections, I test how the conceptual framework fits the data.

3   Context: Enfranchisement in the UK

In most countries, the right to vote is limited to citizens of that country. The UK provides an unusual institutional setting as it is one of the few countries that enfranchises some non-citizens in national elections. Some countries have extended voting rights to non-citizens but often in a restrictive way, either through membership in a supranational group[7] or via bilateral agreements. The UK grants voting

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[7]Supranational group (for example, the European Union) usually involves multinational agreements in which the member countries agree to some degree of reciprocity regarding voting rights.

rights to residents from Irish and Commonwealth citizens for all levels of government immediately upon their arrival in the country.[8]

The general elections are scheduled to take place every five years on the first Thursday in May. All voters vote for a single-member parliamentary constituency to elect a member of parliament (MP) from a choice set of candidates from different political parties or independent candidates. The prime minister is whoever is the leader of the winning party across all 650 parliamentary constituencies using the first-past-the-post voting system. There are two major political parties, the Labour Party and the Conservative Party.

Historically, over the 19th and early 20th-century voting rights were extended from property-owning men to all men and women in the British Empire resident in Britain through the Representation of the People Act, 1928. In 1921, Ireland was established as a self-governing dominion within Britain.[9] Around the same time in 1926, Britain and its dominions formed a voluntary supranational political association− the Commonwealth of Nations. The group agreed they were "equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another in any aspect of their domestic or external affairs and united by the common allegiance to the Crown" (Balfour Declaration, Imperial Conference, 1926).

Over the years, most countries gained independence from Britain and created their citizenship laws. However, people from Ireland and the Commonwealth resident in the UK retained their right to vote in the UK. Simultaneously, people from other countries residing in the UK are not enfranchised for all elections until they become UK citizens. The membership of the Commonwealth has changed over time, with countries such as Pakistan, South Africa, Gambia, and the Maldives leaving and later rejoining the group. Some countries, for example, Cameroon, Rwanda and Mozambique have no association with the British Empire but are a part of the Commonwealth and have voting rights. Ireland left the Commonwealth in 1949, but its citizens still have voting rights when resident in the UK. Zimbabwe left in 2003 but applied to rejoin in 2018.[10]

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[8]Source: The Election Commission, last accessed September 2021.
[9]Source: The UK Parliament, Key Dates, last accessed September 2021.
[10]Source: Commonwealth Association of Nations, Britannica, last accessed September 2021.

Figure 1 shows a world map of the countries whose residents in the UK have a right to vote immediately upon arrival. Overall, the enfranchised countries are a very diverse group, with both developing and developed countries. Currently, there are 54 member countries in the Commonwealth. The major immigrant sending countries by region are the Pacific (Australia and New Zealand), Europe (Ireland, Cyprus and Malta), the Caribbean and Americas (Canada, Bahamas, Dominica, Jamaica, and Barbados), Asia (Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, Malaysia, Singapore and Sri Lanka) and Africa (Kenya, Nigeria, Uganda and South Africa). Appendix Table A1 provides the full list of the enfranchised countries by region. Notably, the enfranchisement of foreign-born non-citizens was not due to their presence in the UK in large numbers in the early 20th century.

4 Data

4.1 Census Data

I use census data for 1981, 1991, 2001 and 2011 to get data on the number of foreign-born individuals and measure immigrant population flows. My analysis begins from the 1981 Census because the data on foreign-born individuals disaggregated by individual country group at the parliamentary constituency level is publicly available from this period. All analysis utilising census data in this paper is limited to England and Wales, due to the non-availability of data for Scotland and Northern Ireland disaggregated at the constituency level.[11]

The 1981 Census divides the foreign-born population into seven subgroups for the enfranchised population and three for the disenfranchised population. The sub-groups of the enfranchised population are: the old Commonwealth (Australia, New Zealand, Canada), East Africa and Other Africa, India, Bangladesh, the Caribbean and New Other (Cyprus and Far Eastern Colonies). In comparison, the disenfranchised population had Pakistan, Europe and the rest of the world.[12] Censuses from 1991, 2001 and 2011 divide the foreign-born population into a higher number of sub-groups than the 1981 census. Appendix Table A2 provides the mapping for

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[11]England and Wales together make up 89% of the UK population.
[12]Pakistan left the Commonwealth in 1972 and rejoined in 1989.

individual country groups across census years. Henceforth, the immigrants in a given constituency refer to the foreign-born population.

The Boundary Commission altered the parliamentary constituency boundaries in 1974, 1983, 1997 and 2010. To make comparisons over time, I use publicly available information to match the parliamentary constituencies to their parent units and work with stable constituency units. For England and Wales, the number of constituency units went from 570 to 192 in my study period. I, therefore construct all the variables as a weighted average by the electorate size of the constituency.

4.2   European Social Survey

The European Social Survey is an individual-level repeated cross-sectional survey on socio-economic and political values for 28 European countries. There have been nine biannual survey waves between 2002 and 2018. The main advantage of using this survey over other surveys is that it provides detailed information on each respondent's country of birth that I can use to identify immigrants from the two groups.[13] I take the UK sample of this survey and focus on the respondents not born in the UK, similar to the census data on foreign-born population.

4.3   Parliament Speeches

The UK parliament makes the full text of individual legislators' speeches, publicly available online via Hansard.[14] I web-scraped Hansard for the years between 1972 and 2011. I use the data from the House of Commons, the elected house of the parliament, which contains proceedings of the Common Chamber, written ministerial statements, petitions, divisions, and proceedings from the Commons General and Public Bill Committees.

For each parliament sitting (day), Hansard provides the speaker's name, the full text of the speech, and the broad topic and the sub-topic under which the politician spoke. A parliament day is a dynamic process of MP's deliberating on different issues. I define a parliament speech as the complete speech text for each MP within

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[13]Appendix Section D describes and discusses two more datasets— UK Household Level Panel Survey (2009 − 2019) and British Household Panel Survey (1991 − 2008).

[14]Hansard reports speeches in Parliament verbatim.

each broad topic and sub-topic on a given parliament day. Appendix Table A3 provides a dummy example to illustrate how a single speech for each MP is identified using parliament deliberations. Appendix Table A4 provides examples using some snippets of the speeches from Hansard. Some speeches have both a broad topic and a sub-topic, while some have a broad topic. Overall, the dataset contains information from 7,436 parliament days covering 3 million parliament speeches.

Since the electoral outcome data from the Commons Library does not have the name of the winning MP, I obtain MP names from TheyWorkForYou.[15] I first map the parliament days to the parliament sessions (via the general election cycle). Then, I map the speaker's name from Hansard to a constituency using the MP names for each parliament session. Overall, I was able to match 95% of the parliament speeches to a constituency. The match rate is not 100% because of the difficulty in mapping common speaker names (for example, Mr Smith) to a unique constituency. Within the sub-sample of the text data relevant for my analysis (i.e., the speeches about immigrants), the match rate is 97%.

4.4   Construction of the Outcome Variables

To understand how MPs talk about immigrants in the parliament, I sub-set the parliament speeches about immigrants with a dictionary-based approach, i.e., I use words commonly used in the literature to extract speeches about immigrants (Saalfeld, 2011; Geese et al., 2015; Slapin and Kirkland, 2020). The major keywords are: immigra* / migra* / foreigner* / asylum* / refugee* and minorit*. This step selects all speeches given in parliament that mention immigrants. To get a precise measure of speeches by an individual MP for their constituency, I use those speeches which contain the words capturing immigrants *and* constituency together within a single speech.[16] For each constituency unit and year, I compute three types of outcome variables.

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[15]TheyWorkForYou is a UK-based charity organisation. It provides a list of Members of Parliament and their respective constituencies since the 1918 UK general election.

[16]Appendix Table A5 provides a detailed glossary of all words used. I group the words under broad headers such as Immigrants, Visa & Nationality, Enfranchised countries, Disenfranchised countries, Refugees and Constituency.

Discussions   First, I calculate a quantitative measure of debates in parliament. I measure what is the percentage of parliament days in a year where an MP spoke about immigrants. I call this outcome variable "Discussions". One might also think of the volume of the parliament debates, i.e., total speech words per parliament day or per speech day about immigrants. Or simply the count of speeches per parliament day or per speech day about immigrants. Given the limited time for each MP to express their views through the speaker in the parliament, I focus on the share of speeches about immigrants per year.

Valence   Second, I compute a qualitative measure of the speeches using the sentiment analysis of the text. This measure is conditional on an MP delivering a speech about immigrants. I use the valence norms proposed by Warriner et al. (2013), which provides valence scores for approximately 14,000 words, each rated on a scale of 1 to 9. The valence score tells us the pleasant emotion conveyed by a word, with higher numbers indicating more positive sentiment. I start by removing the punctuation and converting all the text to lower case. Next, I lemmatise the words to reduce them to their base forms while maintaining the context using the NLTK WordNet lemmatiser (Bird et al., 2009). Finally, I compute the valence score by taking the mean valence rating of all words in the entire text of the MP's speech.

Voting on Bills   Third, I calculate an average probability of voting on all bills in a given Census year. I follow DEMIG (2015) to get a list of all acts proposed in the UK parliament related to immigration during my time period of study.[17] The voting on amendments to the bills could be pro- or anti-immigration, depending on the current draft of the bill. I classify the proposed amendment to the bill either in favour (pro immigrants) or against (anti-immigrants) by hand-coding the speech of the MP who started the amendment. I capture the names of MPs who voted in favour ('ayes') or against ('noes') those amendments, where 'ayes' would imply voting to amend and 'noes' implies voting to maintain status quo on the bill. Thus, I measure two outcome variables- amendments in favour and against immigrants on bills tabled in the parliament.

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[17]Appendix Table A6 provides a short description of bills, including a one-line summary and target groups (including specific nationalities).

Electoral Outcomes I analyse the electoral outcomes between the 1970 and 2010 general elections using the election results from the Commons Library research briefing reports.[18] The dataset includes the voters and vote share for different political parties, turnout, and electorate size for each constituency. I re-define these variables for the 192 parent constituency units using a weighted average by the electorate size of the constituencies. Appendix Table A7 provides a mapping of general election dates to census years. There have been eleven general elections in the UK during my study period, all scheduled in the five-year interval.

5 Empirical Framework

5.1 Main Estimation Equation

My research question is, does enfranchised immigration affect MPs' speeches and voting related to immigration bills. I employ a constituency-level difference model to answer this question because of the slow changes in my outcome variables over time (Appendix Figure A1), and the five or six-year waiting period for immigrants to apply for citizenship. My outcome variables are parliament debates and voting (details on the construction in Section 4.4). My explanatory variables are enfranchised and disenfranchised immigration. I measure immigration (migration flow) in the census year t as a change in the stock of foreign-born population between the census years t and $t-10$. Immigration is calculated separately for the foreign-born population from the enfranchised countries and the disenfranchised countries.

I regress the *change* in the outcome in the constituency c between the years t and $t-10$ ($Y_{crt} - Y_{crt-10}$), on the *change* in the share of foreign-born enfranchised (Imm_{crt}^{Enf}) and foreign-born disenfranchised ($\text{Imm}_{crt}^{DisEnf}$) between the census years. The immigration between census year t and $t-10$ is mapped to the outcome variables between years t and $t-9$. Since the constituency population could be an outcome of immigration, the number of immigrants from each group is scaled by the baseline constituency population (Census 1981).

$$Y_{crt} - Y_{crt-10} = \beta_1 \text{Imm}_{crt}^{Enf} + \beta_2 \text{Imm}_{crt}^{DisEnf} + \delta_r + \delta_t + \Delta\epsilon_{crt} \tag{1}$$

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[18]The dataset is publicly available at the Commons Library, last accessed on September 2021.

In the above equation, the δ_t are period fixed effects to account for time-specific characteristics which are similar across constituencies that affect the outcome variable, for example, election years. The δ_r represents the region fixed effects controlling for regional-time trends in a levels specification.[19] The difference specification eliminates any time-constant constituency specific characteristics that may affect the outcome variables and the immigrant allocation in the same way. My coefficient of interest is β_1. It is an estimate of the effect of changes in the fraction of enfranchised immigrants within the same constituency over time, compared to other constituencies within the same region in a given year, controlling for changes in the fraction of the disenfranchised immigrants. I cluster standard errors at the constituency level.

Consistency of β_1 requires that immigration from the enfranchised group (Imm_{crt}^{Enf}) and the disenfranchised group ($\text{Imm}_{crt}^{DisEnf}$) is strictly exogenous in the above equation, i.e., $\text{E}(\Delta\epsilon_{crt}|\text{Imm}_{crt}^{Enf}) = 0$ and $\text{E}(\Delta\epsilon_{crt}|\text{Imm}_{crt}^{DisEnf}) = 0$. A priori, urban cities with diverse cultures and more job opportunities might attract more immigrants, or immigrants might settle in otherwise declining constituencies, where the cost of starting a new business and housing prices are lower. In any case, the omitted variables are likely to make OLS estimates of equation (1) biased.

5.2 Leave-Out Shift-Share Instrument

To deal with the endogeneity problem, I construct a modified version of the Bartik instrument (Card, 2001). The instrument combines immigrant shares of the different groups in 1981 with subsequent aggregate shocks of immigrants, excluding the individuals that eventually settled in a given constituency. Formally, Imm_{crt}^k where $k \in \{Enf, DisEnf\}$ is instrumented with

$$Z_{crt}^k = \frac{1}{P_{crt}} \sum_j \alpha_{jc} O_{jt}^{-c}, \tag{2}$$

where P_{crt} is the baseline constituency population (where t = 1981) and α_{jc} is the share of individuals from the country group j (for each k) living in the constituency c in 1981. O_{jt}^{-c} is the number of immigrants from a country group j that entered

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[19]England and Wales are divided into 10 regions, a region contains on average 19 constituencies.

the UK between census years t and $t - 10$, net of those that eventually settled in the constituency.

This "leave-out" strategy is employed so that local area changes do not contaminate the instrument (similar to Burchardi et al. (2019) and Tabellini (2020)). As a robustness check, I also estimate the leave-out instrument at the county level to eliminate any concerns about immigrant pull factors that might be correlated across constituencies within a county.[20] The instrument exploits time-series variation in immigrants entering the UK from the two groups in a given decade and a cross-sectional variation in the share of immigrants from a country group j living in different constituencies in 1981.

Figure 2 shows the spatial variation (across- and within-constituency) in the share of foreign-born and share of enfranchised foreign-born across the 192 constituencies using the 1981 Census. Panel (a) is the share of the foreign-born population over the total population divided across quartiles. The London, Birmingham and Oxford areas had the highest proportion of foreign-born population, while constituencies farthest away from these areas had the lowest foreign-born population. Panel (b) plots the share of the enfranchised foreign-born population over the total foreign-born population across quartiles. A given constituency may have a large fraction of the foreign-born population but a large part of that fraction might be disenfranchised. Simultaneously, a constituency might have a small proportion of enfranchised foreign-born population.

5.3   Identification Assumptions

Since most new immigrants tend to settle in places where existing immigrants live, the endogenous variables and the shift-share instrument are directly correlated. Next, the instrument and the error term should not be correlated conditional on the observable covariates, i.e., the constituencies that received more immigrants before 1981 must not be on different trajectories of the evolution of economic and political conditions in the subsequent decades. I test the validity of these two identifying assumptions in the following section.

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[20]The 192 parliamentary constituencies of England and Wales are divided into 43 counties.

First, I examine if larger immigrant stocks pre-1981 had an independent and time-varying effect on the political or the economic conditions in the future periods. I control for the 1981 population shares of the different country groups in my main specification to account for linear trends in the initial distribution of immigrants. The aim is to test if specific immigrant groups (e.g. from India or Bangladesh) were more likely to settle in particular areas to influence the local political and economic conditions by holding the differences within the immigrant sending country group constant.

Second, I augment my baseline specification with the 1981 economic characteristics such as the share of the economically active population and the fraction of employment by industry (agriculture, manufacturing, construction, etc.). I test if the initial economic conditions had a time-varying effect on the economic conditions across constituencies. I include time-varying economic characteristics of the immigrants, party affiliation and ethnic-minority identity of MPs and immigrant stocks as additional controls. I also include constituency level fixed effects in my baseline specification to control for constituency level time-trends that affect the outcome variables.

Third, Jaeger et al. (2018) suggest that the instruments might be vulnerable to bias from the dynamic adjustments to past shocks. I directly test if pre-period changes in quantity and quality of discussions about immigrants are uncorrelated with subsequent immigration changes predicted by the instrument. I also include lagged immigrant inflows in the model and instrument with a lagged version of the instrument. This isolates the variation in inflows uncorrelated with current local demand shocks and the adjustment to past supply shocks.

Fourth, in my context, I allow the initial population shares of the country groups to be endogenously distributed, and the identification follows from the quasi-random assignment of shocks. Therefore, following Borusyak et al. (2020), I show a similar inference using the transformed IV regression estimated at the level of shocks that has a numerical equivalence to the existing shift-share instrumental variable regression.

5.4 Individual Surveys

$$Y_{irt} = \gamma I(\text{Enfranchised Immigrant})_i + \beta' X_{irt} + \delta_r + \delta_t + \epsilon_{irt} \qquad (3)$$

Using the European Social Survey, I analyse the differences between immigrants from the enfranchised and the disenfranchised groups. I estimate the following linear regression where Y_{irt} is the outcome variable for individual i residing in the region r surveyed in the survey round year t. The γ coefficient captures the average differences in the outcome variable for respondents between the two groups after accounting for individual controls (X_{irt} − education level, employment status, and life satisfaction) and region (δ_r) and time fixed effects (δ_t). I use post-stratification and population weights on my estimates to account for the sampling error and the non-response bias.

6 Results

6.1 Summary Statistics

Panel (c) of the Figure 2 plots the proportion of the enfranchised and the disenfranchised foreign-born population over constituency population between census years in a box plot, where the box represents the interquartile range and the black line inside the box is the median. A key takeaway from this figure is that neither the enfranchised (orange colour) nor the disenfranchised (blue colour) groups dominate in any census period. In the 1981 Census, both groups of immigrants were on average just two or three per cent of the total population. Even by the 2011 Census, the mean population of the two groups was just about 6%. Some outlier constituencies (black dots) have a large share of immigrants, but those are small in number and balanced between the two groups.

Table 1 presents the summary statistics for variables used in the data analysis. A constituency had an average population of 274,000 with about 8.8% foreign-born population. The foreign-born population comprises the enfranchised and the disenfranchised groups with a mean population of 4.6% and 4.2%, respectively. The UK parliament met on average 155 days in a year, varying between 125 days (minimum) and 178 days (maximum) between 1981 and 2011. An average MP spoke on about 53% of the parliament days, on average talked about immigrants concerns

for about 7.8% of the days. For comparison, the other topics and the average percentage days MPs spoke about them are: Tax (8.1%), NHS (4.4%), European Union (4%) and LGBTQ (0.003%). The sentiment scores are conditional on MPs talking about those issues in the parliament. An average speech score for addressing immigrants across constituencies in a given year was 5.6, with a standard deviation of 0.08. On average, 52% of MPs voted for amendments in favour of immigrants and 46% of MPs voted against immigrants on the bills in the parliament.

The first-stage F statistics are presented at the bottom of the tables; the KP F stat is the Kleibergen-Paap F-stat for weak instruments. The F-stat (Enf) and F-stat (Dis-Enf) are the Sanderson-Windmeijer partial F-stat for the joint significance of the instruments in the two separate first-stage regressions. Figure 3 reports the graphical analogue of the first-stage regressions (Appendix Table A8). The results from the first stage suggest the instrument is strong and predictive of the immigrants location.

6.2   Effect on Parliament Speeches

Until recently, researchers used party manifestos and voting records to measure political preferences (Dinas and Gemenis, 2010; Cage et al., 2021). Speeches in parliament allow MPs to express their views in a nuanced way and are less likely to be subject to partisan control than their voting records. I discuss how the enfranchisement of immigrants has impacted debates in parliament about immigrants. Table 2 shows the paper's main results with the OLS estimation of equation (1) in Columns 1 and 4 and 2SLS estimation in Columns 2, 3, 5 and 6.

Overall, I find that the OLS point estimates are lower than the 2SLS estimates for the enfranchised group, suggesting a negative selection effect. The enfranchised immigrants are attracted to declining constituencies, where, for example, they can set up new businesses. While for the disenfranchised immigrants, the OLS estimates are higher than the 2SLS estimates. These estimates suggest a positive selection effect, where those immigrants are attracted to constituencies with diverse cultures and opportunities to work. For example, this omitted cultural variable positively impacts the outcome variable and the share of disenfranchised immigrants.

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Quantitative Effects   Columns 1, 2 and 3 present results on the outcome variable "Discussions". On average, the MPs spoke about immigrants on 7.8% of the parliament days. Column 2 suggests that a 1 SD (or five p.p.) higher enfranchised immigration increases the share of parliament days on which MPs talk about immigrants by 1.3 p.p. (16.66% relative to the mean outcome variable in levels). I find that this increase comes from higher use of words for the enfranchised countries and not the disenfranchised countries (Appendix Table A11 Column 4), i.e., the speeches are targeted towards the enfranchised immigrants. In contrast, a disenfranchised immigration of similar magnitude reduces the parliament discussions by 1.5 p.p. (effect size: 19.2%).

To interpret these results, I compare debates in parliament on other topics. Given that the UK parliament meets in person for about 155 days in the year, an average MP speaks about their constituency concerns for about 34 days (22.3%), about NHS for 7 days (4.4%), about taxes for 12 days (8.1%). Table 2 Column 2 suggests that 5% more enfranchised immigrants in a constituency increases the incidence of days on which immigration is discussed by 2 days. Overall, for a constituency that receives 5% more immigrants and in which 50% are enfranchised, there is no change in the frequency of mentions of immigrants in parliament debates (the positive and negative effects cancel each other).

Qualitative Effects   Columns 4, 5 and 6 ("Valence") use a standardized measure of the valence scores. There is a drop in the sample size for the speech valence because not all MPs talk about immigrants in the parliament.[21] The 2SLS results in Column 5 suggest that a 1 SD increase in the enfranchised immigration in a constituency increases the valence scores by 0.23 SD, i.e., the MPs talk more positively about immigrants. I find that the disenfranchised immigration leads to a fall in the valence scores by a similar magnitude.

In Table 2 Columns 3 and 6, I augment the baseline specification by including as control variables: vote shares of parties in the constituency, stock of immigrants, ethnic-minority identity of MPs and observable characteristics of the immigrants

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[21]Table A9 replicates Table 2 by replacing the missing valence scores with the last available score for each constituency. I find almost similar results suggesting that missing data is not a big concern.

(age, gender, marital status, employment and educational levels).[22] If immigration impacts these variables, then some of the changes in the outcome variables might be mediated through them. Reassuringly, neither the economic nor the statistical significance of the coefficients are affected.[23] Additionally, I find that dropping the enfranchised immigrants who come from countries that are most ethnically close to natives (Ireland, Australia, Canada and New Zealand) does not affect the results (Appendix Table A12).

Robustness Appendix Section E provides a detailed discussion of the robustness checks. I summarise them in this paragraph. The main results in Table 2 are robust to alternative versions of the estimation strategy, i.e., in levels, in decades, and using share of enfranchised immigration (Appendix Section E.1). In Appendix Section E.2, I construct the instrument without the leave-out version and with a leave-out version at the county level. Appendix Section E.3 addresses any concerns that the 1981 immigrants' settlements and other constituency-specific characteristics are correlated and might have had a time-varying effect on economic and political conditions in later periods. Additionally, I observe a similar inference using the shock level transformation that has a numerical equivalence to the shift-share instrument as suggested by Borusyak et al. (2020).

In summary, I find robust evidence that politicians update their behaviour in the parliament in response to the changes in enfranchised and disenfranchised immigration. There are no electoral benefits from putting more effort into helping the disenfranchised immigrants. If the member of parliament is concerned about hostility from natives[24], they typically do not raise issues relating to immigrants and are more likely to talk about them less positively (Hypothesis 1). For the enfranchised group, the incumbents respond by increasing time spent in the parliament mentioning immigrants and address them with positive sentiment. The electoral benefits increase as the size of the enfranchised group increases. Next, I examine how the electoral costs change for incumbents.

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[22]I use average values of these variables using individual data from the British Household Panel Survey (1991 − 2008) and UK Household Level Panel Survey (2009 − 2019).

[23]Table A10 shows the results are robust to the inclusion of individual controls one at a time.

[24]Evidence from Blinder and Allen (2016) suggests that natives preference to reduce immigration are not new and go as far back as 1970s.

6.3 Effect on Party Vote Shares

Recent evidence suggests immigration is linked to the rise of anti-immigrant populist parties, a strong indication of natives' displeasure with the existing political system (Halla et al., 2017; Dustmann et al., 2019; Guriev and Papaioannou, 2020). To understand a change in the electoral costs, in the Table 3, I analyse the link between immigration and changes in vote shares of parties in the constituencies. Vote shares of political parties are split into four groups: the Labour party (Column 1), the Conservative party (Column 2), regional parties Liberal Democrats and Plaid Cymru (Column 3) and other parties (populist parties, the Green party and independent candidates in Column 4).[25]

I find that only an increase in the enfranchised immigration leads to a rise in vote share for the other parties (namely, the populist parties and the Green party). The results suggest that as incumbents spoke positively about immigrants, natives in the constituency moved away from the Labour party (a left-leaning pro-immigration party) towards alternative options. On the other hand, in the constituencies with higher disenfranchised immigration, incumbents were already talking less positively about immigrants, and I find no impact on vote share for the other parties (Column 4). There is a drop in the Conservative vote share and an increase in the Labour vote share.[26]

I find that these changes in party vote shares did not happen against a background of natives moving in or moving out of the constituencies that observed these migration flows (Appendix Table A13, Column 1). Nor did the turnout of voters change significantly in these constituencies. Enfranchised immigration led to a marginal decrease in turnout by 1.4%, i.e., a fall by 0.009 p.p. (Table A13, Column 2).[27] Additionally, the party affiliation of the MP representing these constituencies did not change with the enfranchised immigration (Table A13, Column 3 to

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[25]The House of Commons Library reports votes shares for the Green party and UKIP party separately from 2005 GE but combines votes shares for the UKIP party, the Green party and independent candidates as other votes before the 2005 GE. For consistency, I combine them across all years.

[26]This could be due to the Labour party increasing its efforts more in the constituencies with disenfranchised immigration than enfranchised immigration, as the incumbent is already talking positively about immigrants in the latter.

[27]While both enfranchised and disenfranchised immigrants could influence the local and the national politics, I focus on the members of parliaments' actions because the local elections have a meagre turnout of natives (around 25-30%). The European immigrants are enfranchised at the local elections, but their turnout is even lower than the enfranchised immigrants.

6). Conservative MPs lost their seats in the constituencies with higher disenfranchised immigration (after a significant fall in vote shares), and they were replaced by Labour and regional party MPs.

While party affiliation of the representatives in the constituency does not change, I analyse if there is a more descriptive representation of ethnic-minority MPs. Since the descriptive representation will take some time,[28] I test for this argument by slightly modifying equation (1). I look at changes in the outcome variable in the ten years following the changes in the share of foreign-born in the constituency in the previous ten years. I find evidence that the enfranchised immigration increased the probability that the local MP of a constituency will be someone from an ethnic-minority background in the following decade (Appendix Table A14). A similar increase in the disenfranchised group does not affect the descriptive representation. Reassuringly, I find no impact on parliament speeches by those constituencies that had a descriptive representation of the ethnic-minority MPs (Table A15).

Overall, as incumbents favour the enfranchised immigrants, natives respond by increasing vote shares for the other parties, but the party affiliation of MPs does not change. The electoral costs seem to be compensated by some other move, and incumbents hold on to their positions. It could be that incumbents focus on policies favoured by both natives and immigrants or find ways to reduce the anti-immigrant votes among natives, or do both. Feigenbaum and Hall (2015) also find that the US legislators take strategic positions on foreign-trade bills in response to the economic shocks from Chinese import competition, and these shocks did not affect the re-election of incumbents. To understand these effects, I analyse the voting on bills related to immigration.

6.4 Voting on Immigration Bills

This outcome variable is of particular interest because it relates to the action of voting, rather than just participating in debate about immigration. However, it could be subject to party controls. Slapin and Kirkland (2020) shows that within-party rebellion is limited in the UK. In Table 4, I analyse how immigration affects voting on amendments to bills in favour and against immigrants.

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[28]The ethnic-minority MPs are mostly second- or third-generation immigrants who won seats.

I find that a 1 SD increase in the enfranchised immigration makes MPs 9.3 p.p. significantly more likely to amend the bill to make future immigration tougher (Column 3). On the amendments in favour of immigrants, I find that the MPs with a 1 SD higher enfranchised immigration are 8.1 p.p more likely to vote against amendments in favour of immigrants and to keep the bill at status quo. Table 4 Columns 2 and 4 includes additional controls apart from region and year fixed effects, and the results look similar to the estimation without the controls.[29]

At the same time, a 1 SD higher disenfranchised immigration makes MPs 14.7 p.p. (28% effect) more likely to vote for amendments in favour of immigrants and 16.3 p.p less likely to vote against the immigrants (Column 3). An incumbent with rising disenfranchised immigration does not find any electoral benefits from these immigrants, and speaking less positively about the immigrants helps to contain electoral costs. These findings validate Hypothesis 2: incumbents favour existing enfranchised immigrants and, at the same time, restrict future immigration. Given the size of the mean dependent variable, the results suggest that the two types of immigration to the UK had large effects on the immigration policy. In addition, voting on bills to restrict future immigration helps the incumbent increase the support of natives in their constituency who have anti-immigration preferences. They are a majority in the constituency, and the incumbent accommodates their preferences. I find several pieces of evidence supporting this argument.

First, using data from the European Social Survey, in Appendix Table A16, I confirm that as compared to natives, existing immigrants are more likely to be open towards prospective immigrants, and even immigrants with UK citizenship do not favour less future immigration.[30] Second, in constituencies with higher electoral competition (lower win margin), both immigrants' and natives' votes could be pivotal. I find that the incumbents take a cautious approach in this case. They do not talk favourably for the enfranchised immigrants if win margins are low and also refrain from voting to restrict future immigration (Appendix Table A17). The incumbents are more open to both enfranchised immigrants' and natives' preferences

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[29]In Appendix Table A11, I provide evidence that my main results are robust to the exclusion of speeches with words related to visa and nationality and that involve discussion of immigration bills. These speeches may capture discussions about future immigrants, and incumbents may have a different sentiment in them. The point estimates remain almost similar here because only a small fraction of the speeches are dropped.

[30]I can not reject a null for a difference between enfranchised and disenfranchised immigrants.

when the win margins are high.

Third, the incumbent MPs are more likely to be favourable to the enfranchised immigrants in constituencies where the vote share of the Labour party is high. A large vote base supportive of immigration helps incumbents (Appendix Table A18, Columns 2 and 4). This result supports Hypothesis 3. At the same time, as the Labour party lost some votes in the process, those constituencies were most likely to vote to restrict future immigration to appease the preference of the native majority (Column 6). A similar and opposite pattern is also visible for the constituencies with higher Conservative party vote shares (Appendix Table A19).

In summary, as enfranchisement leads to immigrants' political inclusion, the incumbents respond to them favourably. However, immigrants are not a big voting bloc, and there is anti-immigrant sentiment among natives. Incumbents take this into account and only respond when it is not costly to do so and compensate by restricting future immigration. In the following sub-section, I investigate how these two immigrant groups are different and why politicians pay attention to the enfranchised immigrants.

6.5 Enfranchised vs Disenfranchised Immigrants

I begin by studying descriptively how enfranchised and disenfranchised immigrants differ in socio-demographic characteristics. I use the variables from the European Social Survey for the first-generation immigrants.[31] Table 5 provides balance statistics.

I regressed the outcome variable on an indicator variable for whether the foreign-born respondent is from an enfranchised country in a survey year. Columns 1 and 2 present the average values for respondents from the disenfranchised (DisEnf) and the enfranchised (Enf) groups, respectively. I obtain the p-values in Column 3 using an indicator variable for the enfranchised immigrants, i.e., the γ coefficient in equation (3). In Column 4, I compute the q-values following the False Discovery Rate method by Benjamini and Hochberg (1995) to handle multiple hypothesis

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[31]The academic literature has widely used this survey to study natives' political preferences on immigration (for example, Card et al. (2005); Luttmer and Singhal (2011); Alesina et al. (2019)).

testing. I use post-stratification weights and population weights on my estimates to account for sampling error and non-response bias.

Among the foreign-born respondents in the survey, about 53% were from the en-franchised group.[32] On average, the disenfranchised group has younger respondents and a lower probability of living with a partner than the enfranchised group. Apart from these variables, I observe a balance between the two groups' respondents on education, labour force participation, job satisfaction, and overall life satisfaction. The survey offers several education measures: respondent's years of full-time education completed and education measured by an international standard classification, respondent's partner's, father's, and mother's education levels. The respondents from both groups are equally likely to have completed 14 years of full-time education. Just more than half of the respondents and a third of their partners report having undertaken paid work in the last seven days.

The historical association of the enfranchised immigrants with the UK could also make immigrants more familiar with the UK institutions (the parliament, legal system, and first-past-the-post voting). These immigrants might have more interest in the political situation in the country. I use the political attitude questions from the European Social Survey to study this argument. Appendix Figure A2 plots the coefficient of an indicator variable for the enfranchised group and the 95% confidence interval. The outcome variables presented on the y-axis are measured on a scale from $0 - 10$, except for TV and newspaper hours. All outcomes are standardised to make an easy comparison across variables.

I find that enfranchised immigrants do not display significantly higher interest in politics or spend more time learning about political news. At the same time, disenfranchised immigrants do not feel discriminated against due to a lack of voting rights. Both groups are equally likely to be satisfied with democracy and think the political system allows people to have a say or influence politics. There are insignificant differences between the immigrant groups regarding trust in UK parliament, UK legal system, political parties and politicians.[33] Enfranchised immigrants dis-

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[32]This proportion is similar to the distribution of foreign-born in the census data for this period.

[33]Disenfranchised immigrants show a stronger trust in the European Parliament; it could be because all European immigrants are disenfranchised and trust the European Parliament while the enfranchised immigrants have no prior connections to the European Parliament.

play higher confidence in their own ability to participate in politics, originating potentially from their political inclusion upon entry into the country.

The descriptive evidence from the European Social Survey suggests that immigrants from the two groups are balanced in many aspects. Next, I analyse why politicians respond to the enfranchised immigrants. One reason is that an immigrants' political inclusion makes the incumbent constitutionally responsible for their representation in the parliament. The incumbent may feel morally obliged to represent immigrants. Enfranchised immigrants might feel empowered and may get more involved in the local area. In addition, politicians can gain trust, and increase their vote base among the immigrant community by helping immigrant voters with their concerns (Butler et al., 2012; Bussell, 2019). To investigate this further, I analyse the political engagement of immigrants.

6.6   Political Engagement of Immigrants

The European Social Survey also collects information on the socio-political actions undertaken by respondents. The survey asks the question− "There are different ways of trying to improve things in the UK or help prevent things from going wrong. During the last 12 months, have you done any of the following?". The options and the average response rates are− contacted a politician or government official (15%); worked in a political party or action group, another organisation or association (10%); worn or displayed a campaign badge/sticker (8%); signed a petition (30%); taken part in a lawful public demonstration (5%); boycotted certain products (18%). Considering the low response rate for options other than signing petitions, I create a combined index (any action): an indicator variable that takes one if the respondent marked any of the options and zero otherwise.

I analyse the differences between respondents from the two groups to examine whether the enfranchised immigrants are different in their socio-political engagement. The first three columns of Table 6 present the results using the outcome variable signing a petition. Columns 4 to 6 present the results on the index variable− any action. In Columns 1 and 3, I study the level difference across the enfranchised and the disenfranchised immigrants. The enfranchised immigrants are 7.6 p.p. more likely to sign petitions (29% higher over a control mean of 0.260) and

5.5 p.p. more likely to have taken any action (13.6% more on a control mean of 0.404).[34]

Next, I analyse further what determines the socio-political actions of immigrants. The UK's immigrants come from a diverse set of countries, some from strong democracies and some from poor democracies. I use the democracy score for each respondent's country of origin published annually by Freedom House. I create a dummy variable for respondents from countries with an above-median democracy index. The enfranchised immigrants from poor democracies observe a sudden increase in their political and civil rights when they move to the UK.[35]

Suppose enfranchisement is empowering for immigrants. In that case, the most significant gains should come from immigrants from poor democracies relative to immigrants from strong democracies. Table 6, Columns 2 and 5 shows the result of a test for this argument, in which I analyse heterogeneity in the socio-political actions for the enfranchised immigrants. The largest difference in the socio-political actions between the enfranchised and the disenfranchised immigrants is when the respondents arrive in the UK from strong democracies (i.e., those with a high democracy score like the UK). The entire effect observed in Columns 1 and 3 is explained by respondents from strong democracies.

The results imply that enfranchisement and some experience with voting rights matter for the political engagement of the immigrants, and that enfranchisement per se is not empowering enfranchised immigrants. Next, I examine if the disenfranchised immigrants who have UK citizenship are also as politically engaged as the enfranchised immigrants. If immigrants' enfranchisement matters, it should be most important when they do not have UK citizenship.

I find that the enfranchised immigrants without UK citizenship are 10.8 p.p. (effect size 41.5% over a mean of 0.260) more likely to have signed a petition than the disenfranchised immigrants without UK citizenship (Table 6 Column 3). Taking

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[34]In Appendix Table A20, I replicate the analysis for the remaining individual options. The lower response rate for these options leads to insignificant differences across the immigrant groups.

[35]Freedom House provides a democracy index as the sum of political rights score and civil rights score on a scale of 1 to 14, where 14 is the highest. Within the Commonwealth member countries, the mean and SD of the score was 10.63 and 2.75, respectively. The UK is classified as the strongest democracy with a score of 14. Cameroon had the lowest score of 4.

up UK citizenship increases the probability of signing a petition for both groups by 13 p.p.. It is notable that there is no difference between enfranchised and disenfranchised immigrants in the likelihood of signing petitions when they both have UK citizenship. Column 6 tells a similar story: enfranchised immigrants without UK citizenship are 23.5% more likely to have taken any socio-political action in the last 12 months. These differences disappear once both groups have UK citizenship.

One may argue that a crucial requirement to undertake any socio-political action is English language skills, which might be a barrier for immigrants from the disenfranchised group. On the other hand, the enfranchised group may be more familiar with the English language, given their historical association with the UK. Using the UK household panel survey, which records respondents' English language skills (speaking and reading level), I find that the enfranchised immigrants appear to be worse in their English language skills (Appendix Table D1).

Beyond political engagement through socio-political actions, I find that the enfranchised immigrants say they actively participate in elections (Appendix Table A21). The enfranchised immigrants with UK citizenship are as likely to vote in the elections as natives. In contrast, the disenfranchised immigrants with UK citizenship are 14.3 p.p. less likely to vote than natives. The probability of voting for enfranchised immigrants without UK citizenship is 50% (turnout for the natives in the survey is 74.6%). Thus, initial political inclusion of immigrants also translates into a long term higher electoral participation.[36] Ferwerda et al. (2020) and Bratsberg et al. (2021) find similar evidence from Norway, immigrants with early access to political institutions are more likely to participate in subsequent electoral contests.

6.7 From Political Inclusion to Parliament Discussions

While the survey respondents may have some social desirability bias, the descriptive evidence points to higher political engagement of the enfranchised immigrants due to their political inclusion. In this sub-section, I analyse if incumbents respond to the political engagement of immigrants with the debate titles of the parliament speeches using 2SLS estimation. I examine if incumbents respond to pressure from immigrants by spending more time in parliament introducing petitions and private

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[36]Appendix Figure A3 suggests that the enfranchised immigrants are also more likely to take up UK citizenship than the disenfranchised immigrants and this gap has been growing over time.

member bills and asking questions to specific ministers. Any changes to time allocation on parliament days of this type will reflect a push explicitly coming from the political engagement.

Table 7 presents the findings. Columns 1 and 2 shows there are no changes in the parliament speeches on the extensive margin, i.e., the total speech words per parliament day (Column 1) or in the number of parliament days each year in which MPs participate in the parliament (Column 2).[37] Columns 3 to 5 address changes on the intensive margin. Column 3 shows how enfranchised immigration affected the outcome variable "Discussions", same as Table 2 Column 2. Table 7 Column 4 and 5 split up the changes in the parliament days spent in addressing immigrants (Column 3) into changes in time spent on petitions, direct questions and private member bills (Column 4) and addressing immigrants in the other remaining topics (other references− Column 5).

Column 4 confirms that incumbents respond to the push from the enfranchised immigrants' political engagement in their constituency (a significant 28% rise in the parliament debates). If the political engagement of immigrants drives incumbents' behaviour, then incumbents must also respond more if there is more political engagement. I find the main result on parliament "Discussions" is also driven by constituencies with immigration from stronger democracies (Appendix Table A22, Columns 2 and 4). At the same time, there is no such effect on MPs' voting behaviour, which responds to the natives' preferences.

7   Conclusion

International migrants are a large and growing unenfranchised group across many developed countries. A growing literature on the political effects of immigration has documented a rise in support for populist parties and an increase in polarisation (Halla et al., 2017; Dustmann et al., 2019; Guriev and Papaioannou, 2020; Rozo and Vargas, 2021). The efforts to assimilate the immigrants have mainly concentrated on labour market policies (Lleras-Muney and Shertzer, 2015; Bandiera et al.,

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[37]I also do not find any changes in the overall distribution of speeches about immigrants across the group of words suggesting there are no larger changes in the way MPs refer to immigrants (Figure A4).

2019) and the importance of language skills (Dustmann and Fabbri, 2003; Bleakley and Chin, 2010; Fouka, 2020; Heller and Slungaard Mumma, 2020). The political inclusion of immigrants has received limited attention. Historically, the acquisition of voting rights has been an important tool for disempowered groups to overcome economic oppression.

In this paper, I exploit the unique setting of immigrants' enfranchisement in the UK to study how their political inclusion shapes politicians' response to immigration. I use cross-sectional and over-time variation in enfranchised immigration, and use a leave-out version of the shift-share instrument to overcome endogeneity in placement of immigrants across locations in the UK. I find that enfranchisement leads to a higher level of political engagement of immigrants (such as socio-political actions and voting).

The incumbents respond to this political engagement by spending more time in the parliament talking about immigrants and addressing them positively. However, the immigrants are a minority voting bloc, and there is anti-immigrant sentiment among the native majority. Therefore, the incumbents only respond when it is not too costly for them, i.e., when the vote base is more open to immigration (higher Labour party vote share) or when the electoral competition is not too fierce. The incumbents compensate for their actions by voting to restrict future immigration.

Findings in this article may be specific to the unique context of the UK. However, they may still be relevant for designing policies aimed at immigrants' integration and political inclusion. Sweden and Switzerland in recent years had referendums at the local level to enfranchise foreign-born non-citizens after a few years, much before naturalisation is possible. In the UK, while non-citizen voting enhanced the visibility and voice of immigrants and led to a representation of their concerns in the parliament in positive light, enfranchisement remains cheap talk.

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Figures

Figure 1—Enfranchised Countries

Disenfranchised Countries   Enfranchised Countries

Notes: The map highlights countries whose citizens have a right-to-vote in the UK in my analysis period. The voting rights are conditional on membership to the Commonwealth of Nations. The membership has changed slightly over time, the details are provided in Section 3. A full list of countries is in Appendix Table A1. The major immigrant sending countries by region are Pacific (Australia and New Zealand), Europe (Cyprus, Malta, Irish Republic), Caribbean and Americas (Canada, Bahamas, Dominica, Jamaica, Barbados), Asia (Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, Malaysia, Singapore, Sri Lanka) and Africa (Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Uganda, South Africa).
Data Source: https://www.gov.uk/register-to-vote and https://thecommonwealth.org/.

Figure 2—Distribution of Immigrants

Census 1981

(0.008, 0.03] (0.03, 0.043] (0.043, 0.07] (0.07, 0.344]

(a) Share Foreign-Born

Census 1981

(0.28, 0.52] (0.52, 0.57] (0.57, 0.65] (0.65, 0.86]

(b) Share Enfranchised Foreign-Born

(c) Share Immigrants over time

Notes: Using the 1981 Census, Panel (a) and (b) show the spatial distribution in quartiles of immigrants across England and Wales. Panel (a) is the share of foreign-born population over the total population. Panel (b) is the share of enfranchised foreign-born population over total foreign-born population. Panel (c) uses a box plot to show changes in the share of foreign-born over the total population across Census 1981, 1991, 2001 and 2011 divided into the enfranchised and the disenfranchised groups.

Data Source: The Census, 1981 − 2011.

Figure 3—First Stage: Partial Correlations

(a) Enfranchised Immigration   (b) Disenfranchised Immigration

Notes: The figure plots the relationship between the fraction of immigrants and the instrument, after partialling out region and year fixed effects for the enfranchised (Panel (a)) and the disenfranchised groups (Panel (b)). The F-statistic in the figure is the Sanderson-Windmeijer partial F-stat for the instruments' significance from two separate first-stage regressions.
Data Source: The Census, $1981 - 2011$.

Tables

Table 1—Summary Statistics

	Mean	SD	Min	Max	Obs.
Total Population (in thousands)	274.32	241.43	52.71	1347.49	5760
Share of Foreign-Born	0.088	0.09	0.01	0.50	5760
Share of Enfranchised Foreign-Born	0.046	0.05	0.00	0.30	5760
Share of Disenfranchised Foreign-Born	0.042	0.04	0.00	0.32	5760
Total Parliament Days per year	154.50	13.95	125	178	5760
Share of Speech Days:					
... Total	0.53	0.30	0.00	1.00	5760
... Immigrants	0.078	0.08	0.00	0.66	5760
Speech Valence:					
... Immigrants	5.60	0.08	4.59	6.14	5406
Voting Pro-Immigration on Bills	0.52	0.40	0.00	1.00	5750
Voting Anti-Immigration on Bills	0.46	0.40	0.00	1.00	5630

Notes: The sample includes a balanced panel of 192 constituencies over 30 years. The constituencies have been aggregated to their parent units to account for boundary changes over the years. The valence scores and voting are conditional on politicians making a speech or being present during the voting in the parliament.

Table 2—Effect of Enfranchisement on Parliament Speeches

	Δ Discussions			Δ Valence		
	(1) OLS	(2) 2SLS	(3) 2SLS	(4) OLS	(5) 2SLS	(6) 2SLS
Enfranchised Immigration	0.004	0.013**	0.013**	0.038	0.233***	0.205***
	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.033)	(0.077)	(0.073)
Disenfranchised Immigration	-0.002	-0.015**	-0.022***	-0.053	-0.230**	-0.219**
	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.043)	(0.090)	(0.103)
Mean DV (in levels)	0.078	0.078	0.078			
KP F Stat		21.73	27.31		22.44	28.04
F Stat (Enf)		47.17	56.31		43.27	53.55
F Stat (DisEnf)		51.34	57.47		60.82	70.12
Region FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls			Yes			Yes
Observations	5760	5760	5760	5091	5091	5091

Notes: This table presents the OLS (Columns 1 and 4) and the 2SLS (Columns 2, 3, 5 and 6) estimates of the effect of enfranchisement on the parliament speeches. The dependent variables are changes in the quantitative (Column 1 to 3) and qualitative (Columns 4 to 6) measures of the parliament speeches about immigrants. Discussions is the share of the parliament days where politicians talk about immigrants. Valence is the sentiment score associated with those speeches, a higher number indicates a positive emotion. Enfranchised and Disenfranchised immigration is the fraction of foreign-born population from the enfranchised and the disenfranchised countries over the baseline constituency population, and are instrumented using the shift-share instrument described in Section 5.1 of the main text. The control variables in Columns 3 and 6 include: vote shares of parties in the constituency, stock of immigrants, ethnic-minority identity of MPs and observable characteristics of the immigrants. The KP F stat is the Kleibergen-Paap F-stat for the joint significance of the two instruments in the first-stage regression. The F-stat (Enf) and F-stat (DisEnf) are the Sanderson-Windmeijer partial F-stat for the instruments' joint significance in the two separate first-stage regressions. Robust standard errors clustered at the constituency level are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 per cent level. Data Source: Text of Speech from the UK Parliament Hansard, $1972 - 2011$.

Table 3—Effect on Party Vote Shares

	Δ Vote Share			
	Labour	Conservative	LibDem + Plaid Cymru	Populist + Green + Independent
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Enfranchised Immigration	-0.012**	0.006	0.002	0.005**
	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.003)
Disenfranchised Immigration	0.018**	-0.022***	0.007	-0.003
	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.003)
Mean DV (in levels)	0.366	0.378	0.229	0.027
KP F Stat	21.73	21.73	21.73	21.73
F Stat (Enf)	47.17	47.17	47.17	47.17
F Stat (DisEnf)	51.34	51.34	51.34	51.34
Region FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	5760	5760	5760	5760

Notes: This table reports the 2SLS estimates for a panel of 192 constituencies over 30 years. The dependent variables in Columns 1 to 4 are measures of vote shares for the Labour party (Column 1), the Conservative party (Column 2), the regional parties (Column 3) and the other parties (Column 4). Enfranchised and Disenfranchised immigration is the fraction of foreign-born population from enfranchised and disenfranchised countries over the baseline constituency population, and are instrumented using the shift-share instrument described in Section 5.1 of the main text. The KP F stat is the Kleibergen-Paap F-stat for the joint significance of the two instruments in the first-stage regression. The F-stat (Enf) and F-stat (DisEnf) are the Sanderson-Windmeijer partial F-stat for the instruments' joint significance in the two separate first-stage regressions. Robust standard errors clustered at the constituency level are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 per cent level.
Data Source: Text of Speech from the UK Parliament Hansard, $1972 - 2011$ and House of Commons Library Report on General Elections $1970 - 2010$.

Table 4—Effect on Voting on Immigration Bills

| | Δ Voting on Immigration Bills | | | |
| | Amend Pro Immigration | | Amend Anti Immigration | |
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Enfranchised Immigration	-0.081**	-0.100***	0.093**	0.123***
	(0.040)	(0.037)	(0.047)	(0.042)
Disenfranchised Immigration	0.147**	0.135**	-0.163**	-0.120
	(0.059)	(0.062)	(0.073)	(0.081)
Mean DV	0.522	0.522	0.459	0.459
KP F Stat	21.74	27.28	21.47	26.94
F Stat (Enf)	47.18	56.29	47.09	56.48
F Stat (DisEnf)	51.38	57.41	50.29	56.98
Region FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls		Yes		Yes
Observations	5740	5740	5500	5500

Notes: This table reports the 2SLS estimates for a panel of 192 constituencies over 30 years. The dependent variables in the change in probability of voting on immigration bills tabled in the UK parliament. Columns 1 and 2 measure amendments in favour of immigrants or keeping the bill at status quo. Columns 3 and 4 measure amendments in against immigrants or keeping the bill at status quo. Enfranchised and Disenfranchised immigration is the fraction of foreign-born population from enfranchised and disenfranchised countries over the baseline constituency population, and are instrumented using the shift-share instrument described in Section 5.1 of the main text. The control variables in Columns 2 and 4 include: vote shares of parties in the constituency, stock of immigrants, ethnic-minority identity of MPs and observable characteristics of the immigrants. The KP F stat is the Kleibergen-Paap F-stat for the joint significance of the two instruments in the first-stage regression. The F-stat (Enf) and F-stat (DisEnf) are the Sanderson-Windmeijer partial F-stat for the instruments' joint significance in the two separate first-stage regressions. Robust standard errors clustered at the constituency level are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 per cent level.

Data Source: Voting on bills from the UK Parliament Hansard, $1972 - 2011$.

Table 5—Balance Statistics: Immigrants in the UK

Variable	(1) Mean (DisEnf)	(2) Mean (Enf)	(3) p-value	(4) q-value
Age of Respondent	41.8	47.5	0.000	0.001
Gender: Female	0.46	0.44	0.70	0.91
Live with husband/wife/partner	0.54	0.59	0.020	0.12
Years of full-time education completed	14.6	14.1	0.23	0.59
Education Respondent $\leq$ ISCED 3	0.47	0.52	0.75	0.91
Education Partner $\leq$ ISCED 3	0.46	0.48	0.61	0.91
Education Father $\leq$ ISCED 3	0.66	0.68	0.90	0.95
Education Mother $\leq$ ISCED 3	0.74	0.79	0.084	0.34
Respondent: Paid Work in last 7 days	0.60	0.55	0.29	0.59
Partner: Paid Work in last 7 days	0.37	0.35	0.31	0.59
Job satisfaction [0-10]	7.46	7.50	0.95	0.95
Life satisfaction as a whole [0-10]	7.10	7.09	0.34	0.59
Number of observations		1853		
Share of Enfranchised Respondents		53.16%		

Notes: The table shows differences between immigrants from the enfranchised (Enf) and the disenfranchised (DisEnf) group on their observable characteristics. The ISCED stands for the International Standard Classification of Education. The p-values come from a t-test of the difference between outcome variable in the two groups and the q-value is the p-value of the same test accounting for multiple hypothesis testing following the False Discovery Rate method by Benjamini and Hochberg (1995). Post-stratification and population weights are applied.
Data Source: The European Social Survey, Waves 1 to 9.

Table 6—Political Engagement of Immigrants

	I(Signed a Petition)			I(Any Action)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
1 I(Enfranchised Immigrant)	0.076***	0.044	0.108***	0.055**	0.017	0.094**
	(0.024)	(0.033)	(0.038)	(0.027)	(0.039)	(0.045)
2 I(Enfranchised Immigrant) × I(Democracy Index > Above Median)		0.125**			0.147***	
		(0.049)			(0.054)	
3 I(Democracy Index > Above Median)		0.018			0.019	
		(0.034)			(0.040)	
4 I(Enfranchised Immigrant) × I(UK Citizenship)			-0.092*			-0.097*
			(0.049)			(0.055)
5 I(UK Citizenship)			0.134***			0.123***
			(0.032)			(0.037)
Mean DV (Disenfranchised Immigrant)	0.260	0.260	0.260	0.404	0.404	0.404
Region FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Individual Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1853	1853	1853	1853	1853	1853
p-value: Coefficient 1 + 2 + 3 = Coefficient 3		0.000			0.000	
p-value: Coefficient 1 + 4 + 5 = Coefficient 5			0.627			0.934

Notes: This table presents differences in the political engagement between the enfranchised and the disenfranchised immigrants. Survey Question: "There are different ways of trying to improve things in UK or help prevent things from going wrong. During the last 12 months have you ... ?". Columns 1, 2 and 3 looks at the outcome variable signing petition. Columns 4, 5 and 6 use an indicator variable if the respondent marked any of the options: taken part in a lawful public demonstration; worn or displayed a campaign badge/sticker; worked in a political party, organisation or association; contacted a politician, government or local government official; boycotted certain products; signed a petition. Columns 1 and 4 show the level differences between the two types of immigrants. Columns 2 and 5 presents heterogeneity analysis by the democracy index of the country of origin of the immigrant. The democracy index is computed as a sum of political rights score and civil rights score available annually for each country from the Freedom House. Column 3 and 6 presents heterogeneity analysis by the respondent having UK citizenship. The individual controls include education, life satisfaction and employment status. Post-stratification and population weights are applied. Robust standard errors are included in the parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level.
Data Source: The European Social Survey, Waves 1 to 9.

Table 7—Effect across Types of Parliament Speeches

	Δ Speech Words per day (1)	Δ Share of Parliament Days			
		All Speeches (2)	Immigrant Speeches (3)	Petitions + Direct Questions + Private Member Bills (4)	Other References (5)
Enfranchised Immigration	-85.648	-0.013	0.013**	0.002***	0.011**
	(84.767)	(0.018)	(0.006)	(0.001)	(0.005)
Disenfranchised Immigration	190.426*	0.004	-0.015**	-0.002***	-0.013**
	(114.899)	(0.018)	(0.006)	(0.001)	(0.006)
Mean DV (in levels)	2207.292	0.527	0.078	0.007	0.071
KP F Stat	22.44	21.73	21.73	21.73	21.73
F Stat (Enf)	43.27	47.17	47.17	47.17	47.17
F Stat (DisEnf)	60.82	51.34	51.34	51.34	51.34
Region FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	5091	5760	5760	5760	5760

Notes: This table presents the 2SLS estimates of the enfranchised and the disenfranchised immigration on types of the parliament speeches. Column 1 measures changes in the total speech words per parliament day about immigrants. Column 2 takes changes in the share of parliament days when an MP speaks in the parliament on any topic. The dependent variable in Column 3 is change in the share of parliament days when an MP speaks about immigrants in the parliament. Columns 4 and 5 split up Column 3 into the parliament speeches about petitions, direct questions to ministers and private member bills (Column 4) and all other remaining references (Column 5). Enfranchised and Disenfranchised immigration is the fraction of foreign-born population from enfranchised and disenfranchised countries over the baseline constituency population, and are instrumented using the shift-share instrument described in Section 5.1 of the main text. The KP F stat is the Kleibergen-Paap F-stat for the joint significance of the two instruments in the first-stage regression. The F-stat (Enf) and F-stat (DisEnf) are the Sanderson-Windmeijer partial F-stat for the instruments' joint significance in the two separate first-stage regressions. Robust standard errors clustered at the constituency level are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 per cent level.
Data Source: Text of Speech from the UK Parliament Hansard, $1972 - 2011$.

Online Appendix

A   Appendix Figures

Figure A1—Parliament debates over time

Notes: The figure plots the outcome variable "Discussions", i.e. the share of parliament days related to debates on EU, immigrants, LGBTQ, NHS and Tax.
Data Source: Text of Speech from the UK Parliament Hansard, $1972 - 2011$.

Figure A2—Political Attitudes across Immigrant groups

Notes: The figure plots the coefficient and 95% confidence interval on the indicator variable for an immigrant from the enfranchised group. The y-axis shows standardised outcome variables in the regression. Post-stratification and population weights are applied. Data Source: The European Social Survey, Waves 1 to 9.

Figure A3—Immigrant Citizenship Take-up across groups

Share of Immigrants without UK Citizenship

Notes: The figure shows the share of foreign-born population who do not have UK citizenship between 2000 and 2019. The black line shows all respondents (enfranchised + disenfranchised). The blue line is for the foreign-born from the enfranchised countries and the orange line is for the disenfranchised foreign-born.
Data Source: Annual Population Survey, 2000 − 2019.

Figure A4—Immigrant Speeches across Word Groups

Notes: The figure shows the distribution of speeches for immigrants across the word groups over the years.
Data Source: Text of Speech from the UK Parliament Hansard, 1972 − 2011.

B   Appendix Tables

Table A1—Enfranchised Countries by Region

Africa	Asia	Caribbean and Americas	Europe	Pacific
Africa	Bangladesh	Antigua and Barbuda	Cyprus	Australia
Botswana	Brunei Darussalam	Bahamas, The	Malta	Fiji
Cameroon	India	Barbados	Irish Republic	Kiribati
Gambia, The	Malaysia	Belize		Nauru
Ghana	Maldives	Canada		New Zealand
Kenya	Pakistan	Dominica		Papua New Guinea
Kingdom of Eswatini	Singapore	Grenada		Samoa
Lesotho	Sri Lanka	Guyana		Solomon Islands
Malawi		Jamaica		Tonga
Mauritius		Saint Lucia		Tuvalu
Mozambique		St Kitts and Nevis		Vanuatu
Namibia		St Vincent and		
Nigeria		The Grenadines		
Rwanda		Trinidad and Tobago		
Seychelles				
Sierra Leone				
South Africa				
Uganda				
United Republic				
of Tanzania				
Zambia				

Notes: The table provides the countries which have a right-to-vote in the UK in my analysis period. The voting rights are conditional on the membership to the Commonwealth of Nations; the membership has changed slightly over time, the details are provided in Section 3.
Data Source: https://www.gov.uk/register-to-vote and https://thecommonwealth.org/.

<p style="text-align: center">Table A2—Mapping of Census Groups across years</p>

Census 1981	Census 1991	Census 2001	Census 2011
Old Commonwealth (Australia, New Zealand, Canada)	Old Commonwealth	Australia + New Zealand + Canada	Antarctica and Oceania (Australasia) + Americas and the Caribbean (Other North America)
East Africa and Africa Remainder	East Africa and Africa Remainder	Nigeria + Kenya + South Africa + Sierra Leone	Nigeria + Kenya + South Africa + Ghana
India	India	India	India
Pakistan	Pakistan	Pakistan	Pakistan
Bangladesh	Bangladesh	Bangladesh	Bangladesh
Caribbean	Caribbean	Jamaica + Other Caribbean and West Indies	Jamaica + Americas and the Caribbean (Other Caribbean)
New Other Commonwealth	New Other Commonwealth + South East Asia + Cyprus	Sri Lanka + Malaysia + Singapore + Other Far East + Cyprus	Sri Lanka + Other South East Asia + Other EU Accession Countries
Irish Republic	Irish Republic	Republic of Ireland	Europe (Ireland)
Europe	Other European Community + Other Europe	Other Western Europe + Eastern Europe - Turkey - Baltic States - USSR - Eastern Europe	France + Germany + Italy + Other EU member countries by March 2001 + Portugal + Spain +Lithuania + Poland + Romania
Rest of the World	Rest of the World	Total - UK - Commonwealth - Europe	Total - UK - Commonwealth - Europe

Notes: The table provides a mapping of the country groups in the Census 1981 with the corresponding parts in the Census 1991, 2001 and 2011.

Table A3—Parliament Speech Mapping

Date: DD/MM/YYY				
Broad Topic	Sub Topic	Speaker	Speech	Unique Speech Identifier
ABC	abc	S1	blahblah1	S1_ABC_abc_date
ABC	abc	S2	blahblah2	S2_ABC_abc_date
ABC	abc	S3	blahblah3	S3_ABC_abc_date
ABC	abc	S1	blahblah4	S1_ABC_abc_date
ABC	abc	S2	blahblah5	S2_ABC_abc_date
XYZ	xyz	S1	blahblah6	S1_XYZ_xyz_date
XYZ	xyz	S4	blahblah7	S4_XYZ_xyz_date
XYZ	xyz	S1	blahblah8	S1_XYZ_xyz_date
XYZ	def	S2	blahblah9	S2_XYZ_def_date
XYZ	def	S5	blahblah10	S5_XYZ_def_date

Notes: This table takes a dummy example to illustrate how a single speech for each MP is identified using parliament deliberations. On a given day, MPs deliberate on various topics. The raw data provides information on Broad Topic and Sub Topic. Multiple speeches of a single MP under a broad topic and sub topic are collapsed into a single speech with a unique identifier.

Table A4—Examples of Hansard Parliament Data

8th June 1976 > **Standards of Literacy and Numeracy by Pupils**
Mr Skeet (Conservative) −"*...In Bedford we have a very large immigrant population. I pay tribute to the work of the local education authority, which has done a remarkable job in ensuring that the children are ready to receive education. It does so by giving them special language courses...*"
28th June 1982 > **Immigration Regulations**
Mr Ivor Stanbrook (Conservative) − "*... we all know that the immigrant community is already so large and gives us so many problems of social friction and racial tension ... that is why we do not want to increase the number of immigrants coming in. That is why we all talk in terms of a strict control over immigration...*"
21st February 1996 > **Asylum & Immigration Bill** > **Restrictions on Employment**
Mr Jacques Arnold − "*...Is my hon. Friend aware that the clause is extremely welcome in my Sikh community in Gravesend? For far too many years, my law-abiding Sikh constituents who work in the construction trade and in market gardening have been fed up with their wage rates being undercut by illegal immigrants...*"
15th July 1996 > **Asylum & Immigration Bill**
Mr Peter Lilley − "*The procedures for claiming asylum were set up to help the small number of people who escape tyrannous regimes, but the rules have been exploited by more and more economic migrants using them to circumvent immigration controls ... The easy availability of social security benefits has been exploited by an ever-rising number of asylum seekers—more than 90 per cent of whom turn out not to be genuine.*"
7th December 2000 > **Health and Social Security**
Ms Harriet Harman − "*...the immigrants from the different African countries who come to Peckham believe in work. For them, it is a matter of principle − morality, almost − that they work in the community that they have joined .... The stereotype is that immigrants are scroungers, leeching off the welfare state, yet the truth is that much of our welfare state in south London would simply not function without the new African immigrants.*"
16th July 2001 > **Punjabi Community**
Ms Angela Eagle (Labour) − "*...The Government welcome the positive contributions made by the Hindu, Muslim and Sikh members of the Punjabi community in Britain, and we all share the vision of a society free from prejudice in which differences between religions and ethnic communities are not only respected and valued, but celebrated and promoted...*"
1st November 2010 > **Home Department** > **Immigration System**
Mr Mark Spencer (Conservative) − "*The Minister will be aware that companies such as Rolls-Royce, in my constituency, require highly skilled staff from outside the EU. What can be done to ensure that those companies have access to those highly skilled staff while also ensuring that the immigrants coming in have the right skills?*"

Notes: This table provides some snippets of the UK parliament speeches. Each speech contains a date, broad topic and/or the sub topic, and name of the speaker. The party affiliation of the speaker has been added in the brackets. The words capturing the speeches for immigrants and constituency are highlighted in grey colour.

Table A5—Keywords used to extract Parliament Speeches

	Grouping of Words				
Immigrants	Visa and Nationality	Enfranchised Countries	Disenfranchised Countries	Refugees	Constituency
immigrant*	ancestry	commonwealth	EU citizen*	asylum	constituen*
foreigner*	citizen*	windrush	polish*	refugee*	my electorate*
alien*	nationalit*	bangladesh*	bulgaria*	deport*	precint*
migra*	naturalis*	pakistan*	romania*	repatriat*	my county
legal entrant	freedom of movement	india*	france*	exile*	my voter*
illegal entrant	free movement of people	nigeria*	french*	detention*	my citizenry
minorit*	language test	kenya*	german*	extradit*	my district*
gypsy	points of entry	south africa*	ital*		my ward*
traveller	UK border	jamaica*	spain*		my resident*
ethnic*	work permit	uganda*	portugal*		local authorit*
race*	single entry	malta*	holland*		where i was born
racial*	multiple entry	cyprus*	netherland*		where i live
	visa	australia*	sweden*		where i grew up
		new zealand*	finland*		
		canada*	greece*		
		ireland*	turkish*		
		irish*	turkey*		
		hindu*	america*		
		sikh*	china		
		temple*	chinese		
		priest*			

Notes: This table provides a detailed glossary of all words used to extract immigrant speeches using words commonly used in the literature to extract parliament questions about immigrants (Saalfeld, 2011; Geese et al., 2015; Slapin and Kirkland, 2020). The words are grouped under broad headers such as Immigrants, Visa & Nationality, Enfranchised countries, Disenfranchised countries and Refugees. The words used to refer to individual constituency is in the last column.

Table A6—Immigration Bills in the UK Parliament

Bill/Act	Summary	Specific Nationalities
Immigration Bill (Act 1971)	immigration control extended to all nationalities and right of abode retained for UK citizens and some Commonwealth citizens	Commonwealth countries, colonies and former colonies
Race Relations Act 1976	(a) improved definition of racial discrimination; (b) creation of the Commission for Racial Equality	N/A
British Nationality Act 1981	no automatic citizenship by birth on British soil anymore	N/A
British Nationality Act 1981	transition period for naturalisation of specific nationalities	Commonwealth countries, colonies and former colonies
Immigration (Carriers' Liability) Bill (Act 1987)	Carriers made responsible for checking documentation of traveller	N/A
Immigration Bill (Act 1988)	stricter requirements for family reunification of commonwealth citizens	Commonwealth countries, colonies and former colonies
Immigration Bill (Act 1988)	makes overstaying an offence and reintroduction of probationary year for relatives of UK citizens	N/A
Immigration Bill (Act 1988)	EU nationals need no leave to enter and remain anymore	EU Member states at that time
Asylum And Immigration Appeals Bill (Act 1993)	(a) UK asylum definition adjusted to Geneva Convention (b) reduction of benefit entitlements for asylum seekers; (c) fingerprinting of asylum applicants introduced; (d) fast track appeal procedures and time limits introduced; (e) detention of asylum seekers	N/A
Asylum And Immigration Bill (Act 1996)	(a) extension of penalties for illegal entry to those seeking leave to enter; (b) reduction of benefit entitlements for certain asylum seekers; (c) introduction of employer sanctions; (d) extended rights for searching and arresting immigration offenders	N/A

Bill/Act	Summary	Specific Nationalities
Immigration And Asylum Bill (Act 1999)	(a) new welfare support system for asylum seekers; (b) more detention powers and capacities; (c) carrier sanctions extended to private vehicles; (d) more staff abroad to curb number of forged travel IDs used; (e) immigration for marriage restricted	N/A
Nationality, Immigration And Asylum Bill (Act 2002)	(a) creation of induction, accommodation and removal centres for asylum seekers; (b) more technology and border control, especially towards France; (c) introduction of citizenship test and ceremony (implemented in 2005); (d) expulsion of rejected asylum seekers from safe countries possible; (e) detention of asylum seekers extended	N/A
Asylum And Immigration (Treatment Of Claimants, Etc) Bill (Act 2004)	(a) employer sanctions increased; (b) increased technology to trace asylum seekers; (c) sanctions for entering on invalid travel documents; (d) refugee support limited; (e) merger of appeal bodies and creation of asylum and immigration tribunal	N/A
Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008	(a) immigration officers given detention, search and seizure power; (b) compulsory biometric identity documents (implemented in 2008); (c) automatic deportation of certain foreign criminals; (d) higher residency conditions for immigrants with limited leave to remain	N/A
Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009	(a) new requirements for students to be sponsored; (b) fingerprinting of foreign criminals allowed; (c) introduction of probationary citizenship period before naturalisation; (d) access to benefits restricted during probationary citizenship	N/A

Notes: The table provides a list of all acts discussed in the UK parliament related to immigration during my time-period of study along with a short description of bills including a one line summary and target groups (including specific nationalities).

Table A7—Mapping: Parliament Period, General Elections and Census Data

Date: From	Date: To	Parliament	General Election Year	Census Year
1972-01-01	1974-02-27	45th	1970	1981
1974-02-28	1974-10-09	46th	Feb 1974	1981
1974-10-10	1979-05-02	47th	Oct 1974	1981
1979-05-03	1981-12-31	48th	1979	1981
1982-01-01	1983-06-08	48th	1979	1991
1983-06-09	1987-06-10	49th	1983	1991
1987-06-11	1991-12-31	50th	1987	1991
1992-01-01	1992-04-08	50th	1987	2001
1992-04-09	1997-04-30	51st	1992	2001
1997-05-01	2001-06-06	52nd	1997	2001
2001-06-07	2001-12-31	53rd	2001	2001
2002-01-01	2005-05-04	53rd	2001	2011
2005-05-05	2010-05-05	54th	2005	2011
2010-05-06	2011-12-31	55th	2010	2011

Notes: The table provides a mapping of the parliament dates to the general election years and the census years.

Table A8—First Stage Results

	Immigration	
	(1)	(2)
	Enfranchised	Disenfranchised
Z Enfranchised Immigration	0.819***	0.638***
	(0.125)	(0.168)
Z Disenfranchised Immigration	-0.288***	0.338***
	(0.089)	(0.119)
Sanderson-Windmeijer F statistic	47.17	51.34
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic	21.73	
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic p-value	0.0017	
Stock-Yogo (2005) critical value at 10%	7.03	
Stock-Yogo (2005) critical value at 15%	4.58	
Region FE	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes
# Clusters	192	192
Observations	5760	5760

Notes: The table provides the relationship between the fraction of immigrants and the instrument, for enfranchised and disenfranchised groups from two separate first-stage regressions.

Table A9—Robustness to missing valence scores

	Δ Discussions			Δ Valence		
	(1) OLS	(2) 2SLS	(3) 2SLS	(4) OLS	(5) 2SLS	(6) 2SLS
Enfranchised Immigration	0.004	0.013**	0.013**	0.072**	0.246***	0.198***
	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.035)	(0.069)	(0.062)
Disenfranchised Immigration	-0.002	-0.015**	-0.022***	-0.077*	-0.235**	-0.215**
	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.046)	(0.092)	(0.101)
Mean DV (in levels)	0.078	0.078	0.078			
KP F Stat		21.73	27.31		21.73	27.31
F Stat (Enf)		47.17	56.31		47.17	56.31
F Stat (DisEnf)		51.34	57.47		51.34	57.47
Region FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls			Yes			Yes
Observations	5760	5760	5760	5760	5760	5760

Notes: This table presents the robustness of Table 2 Columns 4, 5 and 6 by imputing the valence scores from the last available speech. The valence scores are missing because not all MPs speak about immigrants every year.

Table A10—Robustness to Individual Controls

	(1) Main Result	(2) Ethnic-Minority MP	(3) MP Party Ideology	(4) Party Vote Shares	(5) Immigrant Stocks	(6) Observable Characteristics
			Panel A: Δ Discussions			
Enfranchised Immigration	0.013**	0.012**	0.013**	0.012**	0.013**	0.013**
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Disenfranchised Immigration	-0.015**	-0.015**	-0.015**	-0.015**	-0.020***	-0.016**
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Mean DV (in levels)	0.078	0.078	0.078	0.078	0.078	0.078
KP F Stat	21.73	22.01	23.65	24.19	20.48	23.23
F Stat (Enf)	47.17	49.58	50.18	50.34	47.1	50.46
F Stat (DisEnf)	51.34	51.97	57.98	66.61	46.43	49.8
Observations	5760	5760	5760	5760	5760	5760
			Panel B: Δ Valence			
Enfranchised Immigration	0.233***	0.229***	0.218***	0.209***	0.237***	0.224***
	(0.077)	(0.075)	(0.072)	(0.074)	(0.077)	(0.077)
Disenfranchised Immigration	-0.230**	-0.235***	-0.229***	-0.229***	-0.252**	-0.202**
	(0.090)	(0.090)	(0.088)	(0.086)	(0.097)	(0.100)
KP F Stat	22.44	23	23.92	23	22.06	26.63
F Stat (Enf)	43.27	45.8	47.52	47.74	43.28	47.8
F Stat (DisEnf)	60.82	61.47	69.43	81.84	56.1	60.81
Observations	5091	5091	5091	5091	5091	5091
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: This table shows the robustness of the results in the Table 2 by introducing the control variables one at a time. Table 2 Column 3 is presented in Panel A and Column 6 is presented in Panel B.

Table A11—Robustness to Selection of Parliament Speeches

	(1) Main Result	(2) (1) - Words of Ethnicity, Race and Refugees	(3) (1) - Words for Future Immigrants	(4) Words of Enfranchised Countries	(5) Words of Disenfranchised Countries
		Panel A: Δ Discussions			
Enfranchised Immigration	0.013**	0.012**	0.012**	0.009**	0.003
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.002)
Disenfranchised Immigration	-0.015**	-0.013**	-0.013**	-0.011**	-0.002
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.002)
Mean DV (in levels)	0.078	0.072	0.068	0.033	0.034
KP F Stat	21.73	21.73	21.73	21.73	21.73
F Stat (Enf)	47.17	47.17	47.17	47.17	47.17
F Stat (DisEnf)	51.34	51.34	51.34	51.34	51.34
Observations	5760	5760	5760	5760	5760
		Panel B: Δ Valence			
Enfranchised Immigration	0.233***	0.236***	0.213**	0.189***	0.147*
	(0.077)	(0.083)	(0.083)	(0.072)	(0.078)
Disenfranchised Immigration	-0.230**	-0.249**	-0.210**	-0.165*	-0.144**
	(0.090)	(0.097)	(0.088)	(0.089)	(0.069)
KP F Stat	22.44	22	20.65	18.89	18.17
F Stat (Enf)	43.27	42.09	38.96	34.45	33.83
F Stat (DisEnf)	60.82	63.1	67.83	116.34	86.92
Observations	5091	5019	4955	3772	4179
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: The table shows the robustness of the main results to the selection of speeches about immigrants in the Hansard.

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Table A12—Dropping Australia, New Zealand, Canada and Ireland

	Immigrants Speeches		Immigration Bills
	Δ Discussions (1)	Δ Valence (2)	Δ Amend Anti (3)
Enfranchised Immigration	0.013** (0.006)	0.250*** (0.080)	0.089* (0.048)
Disenfranchised Immigration	-0.016** (0.007)	-0.246*** (0.091)	-0.164** (0.074)
Mean DV	0.078		0.459
KP F Stat	19.08	19.83	18.69
F Stat (Enf)	41.31	38.51	40.74
F Stat (DisEnf)	45.3	52.39	44.23
Region FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	5760	5091	5500

Notes: This table shows the robustness of the main results to the exclusion of immigrants from Australia, New Zealand, Canada and Ireland from the enfranchised immigration.

Table A13—Effect on Turnout and Party Affiliation of MP

| | Δ Share Native Population | Δ Turnout | Δ MP from Party | | | |
| | | | Labour | Conservative | LibDem + Plaid Cymru | Populist + Green + Independent |
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Enfranchised Immigration	-0.008	-0.009**	0.005	0.022	-0.028	0.002
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.023)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.004)
Disenfranchised Immigration	0.008	0.011**	0.023	-0.045**	0.025	-0.003
	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.024)	(0.022)	(0.026)	(0.005)
Mean DV (in levels)	0.987	0.699	0.466	0.461	0.070	0.002
KP F Stat	21.73	21.73	21.73	21.73	21.73	21.73
F Stat (Enf)	47.17	47.17	47.17	47.17	47.17	47.17
F Stat (DisEnf)	51.34	51.34	51.34	51.34	51.34	51.34
Region FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	5760	5760	5760	5760	5760	5760

Notes: This table presents the 2SLS estimates of the enfranchised and the disenfranchised immigration on the changes in the share of native population (Column 1), overall turnout (Column 2) and measures of the member of parliament of the constituencies coming from the Labour party (Column 3), the Conservative party (Column 4), regional parties (Column 5) and other parties (Column 6). As constituencies have been aggregated to their parent units by a weighted average of the electorate size, the party affiliation in Columns 3 to 6 are not a dummy variable.

Table A14—Effect on Descriptive Representation

	Δ Descriptive Representation		
	(1) Both	(2) Enfranchised	(3) Disenfranchised
Enfranchised Immigration	0.051***	0.045***	0.006
	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.006)
Disenfranchised Immigration	0.015	0.024	-0.009
	(0.021)	(0.016)	(0.013)
Mean DV (in levels)	0.030	0.018	0.011
KP F Stat	21.74	21.74	21.74
F Stat (Enf)	48.29	48.29	48.29
F Stat (DisEnf)	51.98	51.98	51.98
Region FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	5376	5376	5376

Notes: This table presents the 2SLS estimates of the enfranchised and the disenfranchised immigration on the descriptive representation of ethnic-minority MPs in the parliament (Columns 1 to 3). Column 1 is split up between ethnic-minority MPs from the enfranchised group of countries (Column 2) and the disenfranchised group of countries (Column 3).

Table A15—Heterogeneity by Ethnic-Minority MP

	Immigrants Speeches				Immigration Bills	
	Δ Discussions		Δ Valence		Δ Amend Anti	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Enfranchised Immigration	0.013**	0.015***	0.233***	0.257***	0.093**	0.078
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.077)	(0.076)	(0.047)	(0.047)
Disenfranchised Immigration	-0.015**	-0.014**	-0.230**	-0.225**	-0.163**	-0.171**
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.090)	(0.090)	(0.073)	(0.073)
Enfranchised Immigration ×		-0.019**		-0.172		0.060
Ethnic-Minority MP		(0.007)		(0.164)		(0.068)
Ethnic-Minority MP		0.019**		0.164		0.102
		(0.009)		(0.206)		(0.128)
Mean DV	0.078	0.078			0.459	0.459
KP F Stat	21.73	14.47	22.44	14.9	21.47	14.34
F Stat (Enf)	47.17	43.49	43.27	42.01	47.09	43.58
F Stat (DisEnf)	51.34	53.83	60.82	69.12	50.29	52.82
F Stat (... × Ethnic-Minority MP)		390.61		322.01		392.28
Region FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	5760	5760	5091	5091	5500	5500

Notes: This table shows heterogeneity of Enfranchised Immigration by presence of ethnic-minority MP in that constituency. As constituencies have been aggregated to their parent units by a weighted average of the electorate size, the ethnic-minority MP is not a dummy variable.

Table A16—Attitude of Immigrants towards Immigration

| | EU Unification should go further | Allow more immigrants in the UK from | | |
		Poor Countries outside Europe	Same Race Ethnicity as the majority	Different Race Ethnicity than the majority
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
1 I(Enfranchised Immigrant)	0.289***	0.421***	0.364***	0.406***
	(0.091)	(0.069)	(0.066)	(0.071)
2 I(Enfranchised Immigrant) × I(UK Citizenship)	-0.074	-0.119	-0.171**	-0.121
	(0.102)	(0.080)	(0.076)	(0.080)
3 I(Disenfranchised Immigrant)	0.637***	0.384***	0.395***	0.387***
	(0.072)	(0.053)	(0.056)	(0.058)
4 I(Disenfranchised Immigrant) × I(UK Citizenship)	-0.347***	-0.106	-0.185**	-0.127*
	(0.099)	(0.076)	(0.079)	(0.077)
Region FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Individual Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
p-value: Coefficient 1 = 3	0.002	0.723	0.809	0.700
p-value: Coefficient 1 + 2 = 3 + 4	0.378	0.656	0.708	0.830
Observations	12193	17034	17034	17034

Notes: The table presents the attitude of immigrants in the UK towards future immigration using the full dataset to compare enfranchised and disenfranchised immigrants with the native responses. The number of observations in Column 1 is smaller because this question was not asked in the initial rounds of the European Social Survey.

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Table A17—Heterogeneity by Win Margin

	Immigrants Speeches				Immigration Bills	
	Δ Discussions		Δ Valence		Δ Amend Anti	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Enfranchised Immigration	0.013**	0.003	0.233***	0.092	0.093**	-0.007
	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.077)	(0.098)	(0.047)	(0.051)
Disenfranchised Immigration	-0.015**	-0.012*	-0.230**	-0.159**	-0.163**	-0.115**
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.090)	(0.070)	(0.073)	(0.057)
Enfranchised Immigration × Win Margin		0.038		0.439		0.345*
		(0.027)		(0.307)		(0.179)
Win Margin		0.034**		1.432***		0.714***
		(0.017)		(0.269)		(0.109)
Mean DV	0.078	0.078			0.459	0.459
KP F Stat	21.73	15.75	22.44	14.81	21.47	15.64
F Stat (Enf)	47.17	98.28	43.27	95.18	47.09	96.76
F Stat (DisEnf)	51.34	105.27	60.82	139.72	50.29	106.27
F Stat (... × Win Margin)		61.84		56.82		60.11
Region FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	5760	5760	5091	5091	5500	5500

Notes: This table shows heterogeneity of Enfranchised Immigration by the win margin in the constituency.

Table A18—Differences across constituencies by Labour vote share

	Immigrants Speeches				Immigration Bills	
	Δ Discussions		Δ Valence		Δ Amend Anti	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Enfranchised Immigration	0.013**	-0.016	0.233***	-0.283*	0.093**	-0.385***
	(0.006)	(0.013)	(0.077)	(0.170)	(0.047)	(0.106)
Disenfranchised Immigration	-0.015**	-0.013**	-0.230**	-0.202***	-0.163**	-0.126**
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.090)	(0.069)	(0.073)	(0.063)
Enfranchised Immigration ×		0.054**		0.923***		0.977***
Vote Share Labour		(0.026)		(0.324)		(0.234)
Vote Share Labour		0.012		0.686***		-0.679***
		(0.015)		(0.224)		(0.140)
Mean DV	0.078	0.078			0.459	0.459
KP F Stat	21.73	25.01	22.44	24.84	21.47	25.31
F Stat (Enf)	47.17	115.79	43.27	106.81	47.09	113.49
F Stat (DisEnf)	51.34	91.47	60.82	93.98	50.29	91.40
F Stat (... × Vote Share Labour)		86.97		77.66		84.69
Region FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	5760	5760	5091	5091	5500	5500

Notes: This table shows heterogeneity of Enfranchised Immigration by vote share for labour party.

Table A19—Differences across constituencies by Conservative vote share

	Immigrants Speeches				Immigration Bills	
	Δ Discussions		Δ Valence		Δ Amend Anti	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Enfranchised Immigration	0.013**	0.025**	0.233***	0.464***	0.093**	0.585***
	(0.006)	(0.012)	(0.077)	(0.150)	(0.047)	(0.124)
Disenfranchised Immigration	-0.015**	-0.014**	-0.230**	-0.228***	-0.163**	-0.147**
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.090)	(0.080)	(0.073)	(0.062)
Enfranchised Immigration × Vote Share Conservative		-0.051		-0.970**		-1.891***
		(0.034)		(0.403)		(0.326)
Vote Share Conservative		-0.003		-0.560*		0.507**
		(0.021)		(0.328)		(0.241)
Mean DV	0.078	0.078			0.459	0.459
KP F Stat	21.73	11.75	22.44	8.13	21.47	10.95
F Stat (Enf)	47.17	41.34	43.27	33.91	47.09	40.43
F Stat (DisEnf)	51.34	102.49	60.82	124.09	50.29	101.91
F Stat (... × Vote Share Conservative)		65.53		58.21		66.09
Region FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	5760	5760	5091	5091	5500	5500

Notes: This table shows heterogeneity of Enfranchised Immigration by vote share for conservative party.

Table A20—Political Engagement of Immigrants (Individual Options)

	I(Public Protest)	I(Campaign Badge)	I(Worked in Organization)	I(Contacted Politician)	I(Boycotted Products)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
I(Enfranchised Immigrant)	0.000	0.014	0.018	0.021	0.004
	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.018)	(0.020)
Mean DV	0.050	0.072	0.081	0.138	0.175
Region FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Individual Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1850	1852	1853	1852	1848

Notes: This table presents differences in the political engagement between the enfranchised and disenfranchised group of immigrants for the individual options clubbed together in one index (Table 6, Columns 4).

Table A21—Survey Evidence on Voting across Immigrants and Natives

	I(Vote)	I(Vote Party)			
		Labour	Conservative	Populist + Green + Independent	LibDem + Plaid Cymru
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
1 I(Enfranchised Immigrant)	-0.229***	0.264***	-0.223***	-0.013	-0.027
	(0.041)	(0.049)	(0.034)	(0.015)	(0.038)
2 I(Enfranchised Immigrant) × I(UK Citizenship)	0.253***	-0.003	0.051	-0.008	-0.040
	(0.045)	(0.053)	(0.039)	(0.017)	(0.041)
3 I(Disenfranchised Immigrant)					
4 I(Disenfranchised Immigrant) × I(UK Citizenship)	-0.143***	0.115***	-0.055	-0.009	-0.050**
	(0.031)	(0.039)	(0.036)	(0.014)	(0.025)
Mean DV (UK Natives)	0.746	0.365	0.355	0.105	0.174
Region FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Individual Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	16460	11352	11352	11352	11352
p-value: Coefficient 1 + 2 = 4	0.000	0.001	0.003	0.440	0.552

Notes: This table presents the survey evidence on respondents voting in the last general election comparing the enfranchised and disenfranchised immigrants with the natives. Among the respondents who voted, there is additional information on which party did the respondents voted: labour party (Column 2), conservative party (Column 3), regional parties (Column 4) and the other parties (Column 5).

Table A22—Heterogeneity by Democracy Index of Immigration

|	Immigrants Speeches				Immigration Bills	
	Δ Discussions		Δ Valence		Δ Amend Anti	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Enfranchised Immigration	0.013**	0.007	0.233***	0.147*	0.093**	0.093*
	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.077)	(0.078)	(0.047)	(0.047)
Disenfranchised Immigration	-0.015**	-0.016**	-0.230**	-0.245**	-0.163**	-0.174**
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.090)	(0.097)	(0.073)	(0.076)
Enfranchised Immigration ×		0.012**		0.159**		0.039
I(Democracy Index > Median)		(0.005)		(0.066)		(0.042)
I(Democracy Index > Median)		-0.002		-0.054		0.079**
		(0.004)		(0.061)		(0.039)
Mean DV	0.078	0.078			0.459	0.459
KP F Stat	21.73	10.27	22.44	8.99	21.47	10.24
F Stat (Enf)	47.17	54.87	43.27	61.66	47.09	55.1
F Stat (DisEnf)	51.34	46.49	60.82	55.6	50.29	48.03
F Stat (... × Democracy Index)		49.49		48.06		49.48
Region FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	5760	5760	5091	5091	5500	5500

Notes: This table shows heterogeneity of Enfranchised Immigration by the democracy index of the immigrants. The democracy index is computed as a sum of political rights score and civil rights score available annually for each country from Freedom House. The democracy index for the constituency is computed as a weighted average of the size of immigrants from each country group in the constituency.

C Model

In this section, I present a model to theorize the incumbent's decision to help the enfranchised immigrants in their constituency. The model takes inspiration from the political agency models of Besley (2006), and in particular, Besley and Burgess (2002) and has been developed within the specific context of my study (UK Parliament, single-member plurality voting, and immigrant's enfranchisement). The aim is to understand underlying conditions in which the incumbent assists the minority group and the role played by electoral competition and party ideology.

C.1 Setup

Consider a continuum of people of size one and a two-period scenario. There are two types of people− natives and immigrants. The immigrants are a minority group, their share among the population is γ (assuming $\gamma < 1/2$), and a β fraction of immigrants are enfranchised. In this two-period scenario, I do not consider disenfranchised immigrants applying for host country citizenship and thus acquiring voting rights. An extension of the model with multiple periods will allow for this and has not been considered here.

At the start of period 1, the voters have voted for an incumbent to the office. All types of people use socio-political actions to express their preferences to the politicians. I define the socio-political actions broadly as people's engagement with the state by signing petitions, contacting politicians, participating in protests, boycotting products, etc. Some examples of immigrants' preferences are increasing welfare spending on education, healthcare, unemployment insurance, descriptive representation etc. The natives may or may not have similar preferences to immigrants. Let $\phi \in [0,1]$ be a measure of preference mis-alignment between im-

migrants and natives; where $\phi = 0$ measures full alignment and $\phi = 1$ measures complete mis-alignment. For example, the immigrants may demand restricting future immigration and if the natives have similar preferences then $\phi = 1$.

C.2 Trade-offs

In my context, the first-past-the-post voting system implies that the incumbent always helps the natives (majority) with their demands. But a decision has to be made to help the minority immigrant voters or not. A fraction (α) of the native population dislike immigrants and consider them an economical and cultural threat. Let α be a convex function in γ, i.e. the electoral costs are only marginal when the enfranchised immigrant population is low and becomes very high beyond a threshold.

The incumbent has to decide to put effort ($e \in [0, E]$), measured in units of (dis)utility to help the enfranchised immigrants. Let $p(e)$ be the fraction of eligible voters who are informed about the incumbents effort, where $p(0) = 0$, $p_e(e) > 0$, and $p_{ee}(e) < 0$. Consequently, the likelihood that the voters learn about incumbents effort increases in the effort. I assume the information on effort [p(e)] is similar for both immigrants and natives as the incumbent makes public speeches in the parliament about immigrants. At the end of period 1, there is an election in which the incumbent faces a randomly selected challenger. Before the election, all voters know about the effort level of the incumbent.

C.3 Voting Environment

All enfranchised immigrants vote for the incumbent if they learn about the incumbent's effort; otherwise, they vote for the challenger. The vote share received by the incumbent from the enfranchised immigrants are $\gamma \times \beta \times p(e)$. Disenfranchised immigrants do not participate in the election. Let v be the fraction of natives who vote on ideological grounds independent of immigration. It is uniformly distributed on the interval $[a, 2b - a]$, where $1 > b > a \geq 2b - 1$. The parameter b is the expected level of support for the incumbent, and a measures the size of noise in voting $-$ the expected (ideological) votes for the incumbent increases with b.

The natives who dislike immigrants vote against the incumbent, given the effort

level. The native's votes lost in the process of helping the enfranchised immigrants are $(1 - \gamma) \times \alpha \times \phi \times p(e)$. Suppose there is perfect alignment in preferences between immigrants and natives. In that case, there are no electoral costs of helping immigrants, and the incumbent only gains in helping the immigrants.

C.4 Decision on Effort

The incumbent wins the election if

$$(\gamma\beta - \alpha(1 - \gamma)\phi)p(e) + (1 - \gamma)v > \frac{1 - \gamma + \gamma\beta}{2}$$

For a given b, the probability that the incumbent puts effort e can be computed as

$$P(e; b, \gamma, \beta, \alpha) = \tag{4}$$

$$
\begin{cases}
1 & \text{if } (\gamma\beta - \alpha(1 - \gamma)\phi)p(e) > \frac{1-\gamma+\gamma\beta}{2} - (1 - \gamma)a \\[2ex]
\dfrac{(2b - a - \frac{(1-\gamma+\gamma\beta)/2 - (\gamma\beta - \alpha(1-\gamma)\phi)p(e)}{1-\gamma})}{2(b - a)} & \begin{aligned} &\text{if } (\gamma\beta - \alpha(1 - \gamma)\phi)p(e) \in \\ &[\tfrac{1-\gamma+\gamma\beta}{2} - (1 - \gamma)(2b - a), \tfrac{1-\gamma+\gamma\beta}{2} - (1 - \gamma)a] \end{aligned} \\[2ex]
0 & \text{if } (\gamma\beta - \alpha(1 - \gamma)\phi)p(e) < \frac{1-\gamma+\gamma\beta}{2} - (1 - \gamma)(2b - a)
\end{cases}
$$

The politicians care about re-election; let Ω be the utility from holding office. An incumbent chooses the effort level to solve

$$\max_{e} P(e; b, \gamma, \beta, \alpha)\Omega - e \tag{5}$$

The equation (4) suggests the incumbent will win for sure if a is large enough, and the incumbent will lose for sure if b is sufficiently small relative to a. Therefore, the noise in voting is a pre-condition for there being an interior solution for the effort level. The first-order condition for the optimal effort level, e^* (assuming an interior solution), is

$$\frac{(\gamma\beta - \alpha(1 - \gamma)\phi)p^{'}(e^*)\Omega}{2(b - a)(1 - \gamma)} = 1 \tag{6}$$

Proposition: The effort from an incumbent is higher if there:

  (a) ... is a higher fraction of enfranchisement among immigrants (high β).

  (b) ... is a lower dislike for immigrants among natives (low α).

  (c) ... is a higher complementarity in preferences (low ϕ).

Proof: Substituting equation (4) into (5) and deriving the first-order condition yields equation (6). The derivation of the comparative statistics follow from the definition of the function $(p')^{-1}(.)$, i.e. $p_e(e) > 0$, and $p_{ee}(e) < 0$.   QED

C.5   Discussion

This simple political agency model gives us micro-foundations for politicians' behaviour toward enfranchised immigrants. A simple trade-off suggests that if the benefits are higher than the costs, the incumbents should address immigrants concerns. When immigration is not the main election issue and immigrants are a tiny fraction of the electorate, the benefits can easily overcome the costs. Thus, there is unlikely to be a step function in the incumbents' response. The positive electoral benefits from even a tiny fraction of enfranchised immigrants help secure current and future votes; the electoral costs will be lower for a small fraction of immigrants.

Next, I discuss how an increase in share of immigrants would affect the response of the incumbent and what role is played by party ideology and electoral competition. If the increase in the population of immigrants is such that the share of enfranchised immigrants decreased (low β), then the effort of the incumbent would go down over time. The model predictions are only valid when $\beta \neq 0$, i.e. there should be some enfranchised immigrants for the incumbent to choose non-zero effort.

With a constant flow of immigrants, the γ and $\gamma\beta$ increases. This increases the electoral benefits, and since α is a convex function in γ, the electoral costs also increases. An incumbent would want to keep up with the existing vote base of both natives and enfranchised immigrants. Therefore, they can either focus on issues that are common to both immigrants and natives (reduce ϕ) or find ways to reduce the loss of native votes when they assist immigrants (lower α). One example of such

a policy is restricting future immigration. While the immigrants may be favourable or unfavourable for this policy, it helps the incumbent reduce the electoral costs from natives hostility towards existing immigrants. The preference mis-alignment plays a key role here. The incumbent uses it as a lever to maintain the electoral support due to changes in the immigrant size, share of enfranchisement and native hostility. Hypothesis 1: Incumbents may favour existing migrants and at the same time be restrictive of future immigration.

If in the constituency the natives political ideology is supportive of immigration, i.e. there is low α. The incumbent will be even more likely to help the enfranchised immigrants in this case. The disenfranchised immigrants do not affect the position of the incumbent, thus, over time they should reduce their socio-political activities. Hypothesis 2: Incumbents from some political parties favourable to immigration may face lower electoral costs while helping enfranchised immigrants and should exert more efforts. Further, in a setting where winning the constituency election depends on a small vote share, immigrant voters could be pivotal, then a higher fraction of enfranchised immigrants should lead to higher effort. But at the same time, immigration is a politically sensitive issue, high electoral competition could lead to higher noise in the voting of natives (high a); thus, the model predictions for the optimal effort level becomes unclear in presence of electoral competition.

D   Data Appendix: Other Surveys

While the European Social Survey provides a representative sample of immigrants in the UK, I provide additional evidence on balance on observable characteristics using the UK Household Level Panel Survey ($2009 - 2019$) and British Household Panel Survey ($1991 - 2008$). I primarily use the European Social Survey because the foreign-born respondents in the these two surveys for about a third of the sample are grouped into "other country" leading to higher measurement errors. Table D1 summarises the data. Again, I use the respondent's country of birth to classify them between the two immigrant groups and focus only on respondents not born in the UK. The survey sample is larger but imprecise; in particular, there is a measurement error in the classification of immigrants across the two groups. Some questions are not consistently asked across survey waves. In particular, the respondent's country of birth for 33.8% of the sample was coded as another country, which I classify as disenfranchised. I used the information on ethnicity within the respondents who answered "other country" of birth to reduce the classification error; still, there is some imprecision.

Nevertheless, I find enfranchised immigrants to be four years older than disenfranchised immigrants, almost equal in gender proportion and more likely to be married. Both immigrant groups are balanced on the highest educational qualification, the number of hours worked, probability of employment, possessing a driving licence and job satisfaction. The enfranchised immigrants, on average, arrived three years before the disenfranchised immigrants and are more likely to have difficulty speaking English.

Table D1—Summary Statistics: UKHLS + BHPS Sample

Variable	(1) Mean (DisEnf)	(2) Mean (Enf)	(3) Standardized difference	(4) Observations
Gender: Female	0.56	0.51	0.096	14,165
Age of respondent	34.02	37.82	0.291	14,144
Marital Status: Married	0.41	0.57	0.291	14,165
Highest Education: Degree or University	0.44	0.44	0.009	8,844
Paid work last week	0.54	0.53	0.032	14,084
No. of hours worked per week	33.86	32.81	0.090	6,570
Job satisfaction	5.18	5.15	0.020	5,449
Respondent has driving licence	0.46	0.48	0.030	13,062
Prefer to move house	0.43	0.40	0.051	12,573
Difficulty speaking english	0.16	0.24	0.199	5,220
Difficulty reading english	0.23	0.28	0.087	5,222
Year arrival to the UK	1999	1996	0.360	14,165

Notes: The table shows the differences between the immigrants from the enfranchised (Enf) and the disenfranchised (DisEnf) group on their observable characteristics. The share of enfranchised immigrants in the overall sample is 52.31%. Column (3) reports the standardized differences between the two groups. The number of observations varies across variables because not all questions were asked in survey years. The non-response rate is only marginal ($< 0.1\%$).
Data Source: UK Household Level Panel Survey ($2009 - 2019$) and British Household Panel Survey ($1991 - 2008$).

E   Robustness Checks

In this section, I present several robustness checks to test the strength of the results presented in the above paragraphs.

E.1   Alternative Estimation Strategy

In Table E1, I re-do the main results by regressing the primary outcome variables in levels including constituency fixed effects (Columns 1 and 3) rather than in 10-year differences. In Columns 2 and 4, I analyze the main outcome variables in a levels specification that is a transformation of the main estimation equation with constituency fixed effects and regional time-trends. Next, since the explanatory variable changes at each Census while the outcome variable varies each year, in Columns 5 and 6, I show the robustness of the main estimation equation for just three time periods (3 Census years or analysis in decades).

Finally, in Columns 7 and 8, I show the robustness of results using predicted population shares rather than using the 1981 population shares. Further, to analyze the effect of the share of enfranchised immigration, I use an alternative specification that looks at changes in main outcome variables on immigration and the share of enfranchised immigration (Table E2). A constituency with 50% enfranchised immigrants and 50% disenfranchised immigrants or when the share of enfranchised immigration is 0.5 still shows null results.

E.2   Alternative Instruments

I show the robustness of the instrumental variable strategy by constructing an alternative version of the instruments (Table E3). Columns 1 and 2 use predicted immigrants using the traditional Bartik instrument without the leave-out strategy. In columns 3 and 4, I predict the share of immigrants using a leave-out version of the instrument with a larger geographical region to alleviate any concerns that pull factors are correlated across the constituency units. As my identification relies on exogenous shocks, I update the migrant networks as new information becomes available in each Census (Columns 5 and 6), i.e. I increase the number of country groups in the enfranchised and disenfranchised immigration and use new networks to predict immigration. This robustness alleviates any concerns that a

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smaller number of country groups might be problematic and that 1980s immigrant networks might not be a strong predictor of the immigrant's settlement in the later periods.

E.3 Pre-period Characteristics

To address the concerns that 1981 immigrant's settlements and other constituency-specific characteristics are correlated and might have had a time-varying effect on economic and political conditions: (a) I show that there is no correlation between pre-period changes in the outcome of interest and the change in immigration predicted by the instrument (Table E4); (b) I augment the baseline specification with the 1981 share of employment by different industries such as Agriculture, Manufacturing, Construction, Transport etc. interacted year dummies. The results in Table E5 Column 1 and 2 suggests these controls do not have any effect on my results.

I test if specific immigrant groups that settled in particular constituencies impacted the economic and political conditions in the future periods, i.e. pre-shares of immigrants were not independent of cross-constituency pull factors systematically related to 1981 settler's country of origin (Goldsmith-Pinkham et al., 2020). I find inclusion of the 1981 population shares from each country group as a control variable does not affect my point estimates (Table E5, Column 3 and 4). Following Borusyak et al. (2020), the Table E6 show that the transformed IV regression at the estimated at the level of shocks has a numerical equivalence to the existing shift-share instrumental variable regression.

Table E1—Alternative Estimation: in levels, by decades and with predicted population

	in levels				by decades		with predicted population	
	Discussions		Valence		Δ Discussions	Δ Valence	Δ Discussions	Δ Valence
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Enfranchised Immigration	0.013*	0.013*	0.398***	0.241**	0.013**	0.321***	0.012**	0.229***
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.129)	(0.094)	(0.006)	(0.121)	(0.006)	(0.075)
Disenfranchised Immigration	-0.019**	-0.022*	-0.455***	-0.351**	-0.015**	-0.266	-0.014**	-0.222**
	(0.008)	(0.013)	(0.145)	(0.168)	(0.006)	(0.187)	(0.006)	(0.090)
Mean DV (in levels)	0.078	0.078			0.078		0.078	
KP F Stat	22.3	9.38	24.11	10.86	21.39	12.1	20.91	21.74
F Stat (Enf)	52.22	27.25	53.78	34.63	46.43	38.97	46.04	42.62
F Stat (DisEnf)	54.48	19.52	64.44	22	50.53	25.67	51.31	61.8
Constituency FE	Yes		Yes	Yes				
Region Time trends	Yes		Yes	Yes				
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	5760	5760	5328	5328	576	384	5760	5091

Notes: This table shows the robustness of the estimation strategy by regressing the outcome variables in levels rather than in 10-year differences (Columns 1 to 4). Columns 5 and 6 show the robustness of the main estimation equation for just three time periods (3 census years or analysis in decades). Column 7 and 8 show robustness using predicted population shares rather than 1981 baseline population shares.

Table E2—Estimation by Share Enfranchised

	Δ Discussions		Δ Valence	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Immigration	-0.009	-0.056**	-0.146**	-0.802***
	(0.007)	(0.023)	(0.068)	(0.235)
Immigration × Share Enfranchised		0.104**		1.504***
		(0.043)		(0.435)
Share Enfranchised		-0.012		0.295
		(0.017)		(0.314)
Mean DV (in levels)	0.078	0.078		
KP F Stat	37.95	15.65	33.43	14.91
F Stat (Imm)		32.01		31.18
F Stat (Imm × Share Enfranchised)		33.5		31.71
Region FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	5760	5760	5091	5091

Notes: This table presents the robustness of the estimation strategy by regressing the immigration interacted with the share of enfranchised immigration.

Table E3—Estimation by Alternative Versions of Instrument

	Traditional		Leave Out County		Base Update	
	(1) Δ Discussions	(2) Δ Valence	(3) Δ Discussions	(4) Δ Valence	(5) Δ Discussions	(6) Δ Valence
Enfranchised Immigration	0.011*	0.213***	0.014**	0.220***	0.010	0.170***
	(0.006)	(0.072)	(0.006)	(0.070)	(0.006)	(0.065)
Disenfranchised Immigration	-0.015**	-0.209**	-0.016**	-0.259***	-0.008	-0.170**
	(0.006)	(0.086)	(0.007)	(0.094)	(0.005)	(0.068)
Mean DV (in levels)	0.078		0.078		0.078	
KP F Stat	29.22	30.03	15.8	16.37	26.28	24.16
F Stat (Enf)	54.91	50.01	55.14	56.66	56.2	53.35
F Stat (DisEnf)	66.86	76.64	38.25	46.18	119.2	137.4
Region FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	5760	5091	5760	5091	5760	5091

Notes: This table shows robustness of the instrumental variable strategy by constructing an alternative version of the instruments. Columns 1 and 2 use predicted immigrants using the traditional Bartik instrument without the leave-out strategy. In columns 3 and 4, I predict the share of immigrants using a leave-out version of the instrument with a county (a larger geographical region). Columns 5 and 6 update the migrant networks as new information becomes available in each census.

Table E4—Pre-Period Outcomes on Post-Period Immigration

	(1) Δ Discussions$_{t-10}$	(2) Δ Valence$_{t-10}$
Enfranchised Immigration$_{t+10}$	-0.004	0.072
	(0.004)	(0.066)
Disenfranchised Immigration$_{t+10}$	-0.009	-0.218***
	(0.007)	(0.080)
Mean DV (in levels)	0.073	
KP F Stat	12.4	15.95
F Stat (Enf)	60.8	60.8
F Stat (DisEnf)	68.65	68.65
Region FE	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes
Observations	3840	3395

Notes: This table shows how pre-period changes in the outcomes are linked to subsequent changes in immigration predicted by the instrument.

Table E5—Robustness to 1981 Economic Characteristics, Population Shares and Political Conditions

	(1) Δ Discussions	(2) Δ Valence	(3) Δ Discussions	(4) Δ Valence	(5) Δ Discussions	(6) Δ Valence
Enfranchised Immigration	0.012**	0.231***	0.020**	0.380***	0.013**	0.202***
	(0.006)	(0.076)	(0.008)	(0.101)	(0.006)	(0.074)
Disenfranchised Immigration	-0.015**	-0.236***	-0.023***	-0.375***	-0.015**	-0.215***
	(0.006)	(0.090)	(0.008)	(0.111)	(0.006)	(0.082)
Mean DV	0.078		0.078		0.078	
KP F Stat	21.49	22.01	21.65	25.54	24.5	23.67
F Stat (Enf)	45.68	41.64	55.96	62.25	52.69	49.36
F Stat (DisEnf)	51.11	60.44	40.38	45.51	62.11	73.28
Region FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	Economic Characteristics		Population Shares		Political Conditions	
Observations	5760	5091	5760	5091	5760	5091

Notes: This table shows the robustness of the main results to the inclusion of the 1981 economic characteristics measured as share of economically active population (Columns 1 and 2), 1981 population shares from each country group in the constituency (Columns 3 and 4), and 1981 vote shares for Labour party, Conservative party and the regional parties at the constituency (Columns 5 and 6).

Table E6—SSIV Regression: Shock Level Transformation

	(1) Discussions	(2) Valence
Immigration	0.008***	0.147*
	(0.001)	(0.070)
Mean DV	0.141	
KP F Stat	17.84	17.84
Country Group FE	Yes	Yes
Observations	230	230

Notes: This table show that the transformed IV regression at the estimated at the level of shocks as suggested by Borusyak et al. (2020).